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While cybercrime research has become well-established within criminology, there is 
very little criminological research which treats the infrastructures and platforms of 
the Internet as subjects of criminological enquiry. These are increasingly taking on 
responsibility for the governance of large populations of users, and the engineers 
and developers of these platforms are increasingly having to navigate problems of 
crime, harm, and policing. This thesis explores, through qualitative empirical 
research, an Internet infrastructure which has particularly faced these issues: the Tor 
Project, an anonymity network which gives millions of users around the world 
extremely strong protections against online surveillance and censorship. This has 
been an important tool for whistleblowers, journalists, and activists, however it has 
also become associated with a range of criminal uses, especially the rise of 
‘cryptomarkets’, marketplaces for illegal services and goods accessible through the 
Tor network which are very difficult for law enforcement to shut down. I explore how 
the Tor community attempt to navigate these issues and how they make sense of 
the role Tor plays in society, drawing on interviews with members of the Tor 
community, including designers and developers, the people who maintain Tor’s 
infrastructure, and others in the Tor community, as well as extensive archival 
research in Tor’s online mailing list archives. 
I use frameworks from Science and Technology Studies, in particular, social worlds 
theory, to explore the values of the Tor community, how they attempt to materialise 
them through infrastructure, and the challenges they face in practice. The Tor 
community, rather than sharing a strong set of shared values, is in fact a dense 
thicket of contradictory values and meanings. Using social worlds theory, I distil this 
into three internally-coherent social worlds, each of which makes sense of the work 
Tor does differently, rooted in differing practices, sensibilities and understandings of 
the political salience of privacy technology. These are: the engineer social world, 
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which views privacy as a structure, understanding privacy technologies as reshaping 
the topologies of power in information systems; the activist social world, which views 
privacy as a struggle and privacy technologies as part of a political movement; and 
finally, the infrastructuralist social world, which views privacy as a service and privacy 
technologies as the neutral facilitators of their users’ action.  
I explore the relationships between these three social worlds, how they have come 
into contact and conflict with one another, and how they have changed over the 
years. These each shape Tor’s material form, its attempts to cultivate resilience 
against disruption by powerful actors, and how it navigates its implications in crime, 
harm, and power in different ways, each of which I explore in detail. Although Tor 
represents an attempt to act in the domain of infrastructural power, it has found 
that doing politics through design and engineering relies on a lot of hidden work and 
complex negotiation in practice, spilling out into the domains of politics, 
administration, and governance and becoming caught up in the very technologies of 
control which it tries to subvert. I end the thesis with a discussion, drawing from my 
empirical research, of Tor’s place in the wider landscape of geopolitics and online 
power and how it makes sense of this. I argue that the challenges Tor faces are 
reflective of deeper tensions between freedom and control at the heart of liberal 
societies and how they are governed. 
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In this research, I studied how groups come together to build Internet infrastructure, 
and how they deal with the problems with crime, harm, and power, which arise. 
Most criminological research on the Internet to date has left the infrastructures on 
which the Internet relies in the background, however I bring these to the fore in 
order to better make sense of the role they play in crime and power in contemporary 
societies. I studied a particularly important example of this, the Tor network, using 
interviews with members of the Tor community and archival research. Tor is a 
network of computer servers operated by volunteers around the world, which users 
can access through a free-to-download piece of software called the Tor Browser. 
When using the Tor Browser, users’ Internet signals are encrypted and bounced 
around the Tor network before they reach their destination. This makes it very hard 
for external observers to see what is going on and allows users to browse the 
Internet or host web services with very strong privacy and security protections. 
These protections prevent even law enforcement or state security services from 
seeing what they are doing online.  
In this thesis, I use an approach developed to look at scientific and engineering 
projects called social worlds theory. This allows the researcher to map out the 
different kinds of work involved in complex technical projects, and how the people 
involved make sense of the project in different ways, producing a set of ‘social 
worlds’ which characterise the project. Each of these ‘social worlds’ is a coherent, 
self-consistent way of understanding the values of the technology and its purposes 
and is linked to a particular type of work involved in making the technology function. 
Contrary to what might be expected, Tor is not characterised by a strong shared set 
of values, goals, and perspectives. Rather, is a home for three distinct social worlds, 
each of which understands what Tor is doing rather differently. The ‘engineer’ social 
world, linked to the software developers and encryption experts who work on Tor, 
 8 
views Tor as reshaping the landscape of power online by making changes to the 
structures of the Internet and the way it works. Conversely, the ‘activist’ social world, 
associated with the practices of lobbying, outreach, and policy work, sees Tor as a 
social movement and explicitly political. Finally, the ‘infrastructuralist’ social world, 
connected to the work of running the Tor network itself, sees Tor as a neutral service 
which is divorced from politics or explicit values.  
I explore in depth how these three social worlds fit together and manage this conflict 
and consensus, and how this is changing over time as they begin to shape and 
influence one another. These three worlds are able to work together despite these 
conflicts due to key individuals who can translate between these perspectives. They 
are helped in this by the ways in which the worlds overlap, as they share a common 
set of category systems for Tor’s users which allows them to leave the politics of Tor 
ambiguous. When cultural changes cause this arrangement to break down, the 
worlds shift and change as well. 
In addition to exploring and mapping these different ways of making sense of Tor, I 
study how the values of the people who make Tor influence the way the technology 
works. I use Tor’s open archives, including mailing lists which document the early 
design work of Tor, to study how the developers try to realise their values in the way 
that Tor’s infrastructure is designed. I show that ideas of what Tor was and how it 
should work developed iteratively throughout the processes involved in developing 
Tor’s design. The engineer world’s understanding of Tor as restructuring online 
power arose from this design process. 
However, design and development work is not enough to make Tor’s visions of a 
private Internet a reality on its own. Tor relies on an infrastructure of relays to work, 
and so depends on a great deal of maintenance and administration work as well. This 
work has its own values and perspectives: those of the infrastructuralist social world. 
I explore this work in depth, and how it is related to Tor’s design. In particular, I 
discuss how Tor tries to defend itself against attack by nation state secret services as 
an example of how design is not always enough on its own. 
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Finally, I take these maps of Tor’s values, the kinds of work involved in making it 
possible, and the perspectives of its community, and use them to understand how 
Tor becomes involved in issues of crime and harm. Although Tor’s community intend 
it to be used for socially beneficial use cases and to fight online surveillance, some 
people use its privacy protections to commit crime. This causes problems, both for 
its public image, and for the people who run its infrastructure, who can sometimes 
come to the attention of the police. Each of Tor’s three social worlds adopts a 
different strategy for coping with these problems. The activist world seeks to 
strongly assert Tor’s values in public. The infrastructuralist world, by contrast, tries to 
withdraw Tor from these discussions about values and politics, relying instead on 
clever mechanisms and legal loopholes to allow the network to run smoothly. Finally, 
the engineer world looks to get Tor incorporated into other technologies as a 
security standard, allowing it to become so ubiquitous that it becomes simply a part 
of how the Internet works.  
I argue that criminology could usefully use the social worlds framework to better 
understand the role played by Internet infrastructure in issues of crime and power, 
as this allows researchers to develop a very deep understanding of infrastructures as 
sites where many different perspectives and visions of future worlds can be worked 
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chapter 1  
introduction: visions of 
privacy, power, and 
control 
 
Introduction and background 
This PhD arose from a deep interest in the technologies, infrastructures, and 
platforms which make up the Internet and the role they play in society. For most of 
my life, the Internet has been a subject of controversy. Being born in 1989 and with 
my family getting our first Internet-connected computer in around 1995, I am part of 
the generation who has ‘grown up’ along with the Internet as a central part of social, 
economic, and political life. I have been fascinated by hackers and hacking since I 
was a small child, getting my first computer (a ZX-81 Spectrum) at a young age and 
spending much of my free time growing up teaching myself to program.  
When coming to university, my original undergraduate degree and first Master’s 
degree were in Chemistry. Although the realities of a career in lab-based research 
did not appeal, I developed a keen interest in how technological and scientific 
projects work. Throughout this period, however, I had been becoming increasingly 
involved in antifascist, LGBTQ+, and feminist activism. This had exposed me to a 
range of different perspectives and ways of making sense of the world, and I began 
to develop an interest in social theory, first through reading Queer theory to make 
sense of my own experiences and the social issues I was trying to campaign on, and 
then as part of a broader interest in understanding social life. 
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Following my Chemistry degree, I made the switch to a criminology Master’s in order 
to further go down this path. I particularly enjoyed a course I took on cybercrime 
research, however, digging into the literature, I became frustrated at the approach 
which much criminological research at the time took to theorising or accounting for 
technology in making sense of cybercrime. These studies tended to allow the 
technologies and infrastructures of the Internet to slip into the background, either 
relegating them to the status of ‘social spaces’ or ‘situations’ in which human action 
occurs, casting them as possessing technical properties which deterministically 
shape human behaviour and societies, or falling back on descriptions of the Internet 
as a kind of hyperspace which ‘reduced time and space to zero’ without any 
engagement with their mundane (but important) technical realities and real material 
qualities. 
I was interested in the potential for Science and Technology Studies (STS) to engage 
with technologies as sites of social action in their own right. In particular, a formative 
influence on this research was a paper by Sheila Brown (2006), which argued for the 
incorporation of sensibilities and approaches from Actor-Network Theory (ANT) into 
criminological research, particularly its breaking-down of prescriptive boundaries 
between object and subject, human and technical, meaning and the material. In my 
Master’s project, and in the early work of my PhD, I wanted to engage this more 
programmatically, working out how ANT might further deepen criminological 
understanding of technology. However, as I progressed, I found myself drifting away 
from ANT, eventually finding a home elsewhere within STS. In particular, a paper by 
Thomas Pinch (2010) which called for research on the Internet infrastructure 
grounded in symbolic interactionism, and my reading of Donna Haraway’s 
scholarship (1991) led me to the social worlds framework and the scholarship of 
Susan Leigh Star (1999), which form the core of this thesis. 
Social worlds theory, and Star’s related infrastructure studies work, draws on 
symbolic interactionist frameworks to cast technologies and infrastructures as sites 
of social action, permeable to a range of different meanings and visions of the world 
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(Star, 1999; Clarke and Star, 2008). This framework focuses on the role of 
communication and interpretation, and the different kinds of work and mediations 
between meaning and materiality through which these infrastructures ‘produce’ or  
‘perform’ social facts like privacy. It involves deep, qualitative research, mapping the 
different ‘worlds’ of discourse, practices, and sensibilities which form around 
infrastructures and scientific projects through interviews and archival research. In 
trying to draw this into criminology, I aimed to use this approach in this thesis to 
explore how technologies and infrastructures become implicated in power, 
governance, values, and visions of alternative futures. 
Towards the middle of my first year of the PhD programme I decided to focus on a 
particular case study, having wanted to carry out empirical research rather than 
write a purely desk-based thesis. I quickly settled on Tor, a free-to-access online 
anonymity network which has become a particularly controversial site where 
debates about crime and control online are being worked through. This was partly 
due to my own interests in online privacy, which had been galvanised by the 
Snowden leaks in 2013 (Lyon, 2014). I judged that Tor would provide an ideal case 
study for the application of social worlds theory within criminology, occupying as it 
does such a contested space between the exercise of governmental power over the 
Internet and the attempts of people to resist this. It has also been relatively under-
researched within sociological and criminological scholarship, which focuses almost 
exclusively on Tor’s users, rather than the people who support and develop it. I was 
interested particularly in Tor as a site of social action: a form of resistance to 
authoritarian power and an attempt to realise a different vision of the Internet 
through infrastructure. I argue that although Tor is undoubtedly of deep importance 
to global society and the future of the Internet, the ideas, discourses, and types of 
work involved in its attempt to reshape this future are relatively taken-for-granted. 
As part of the underpinnings of public and private life for its millions of users, it is of 
deep democratic importance for us to understand what decisions are being made 
about how infrastructures like Tor work, how those decisions are made, and their 
broader situation in relationships of power and online governance.  
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Tor: envisioning a free Internet 
At the heart of this thesis is social worlds study of the Tor network. The Tor network 
is an infrastructure of servers, operated by volunteers around the world, which are 
accessed by users through a Web browser called the Tor Browser. The Tor Browser 
can be downloaded for free by anyone who is able to access the website of the Tor 
Project, the organisation which develops and maintains Tor. Tor provides its users 
extremely strong anonymity and security protections, preventing even nation states 
from surveilling or censoring their web traffic. It does this by wrapping the 
administrative information which this traffic uses to traverse the Internet in three 
layers of encryption before bouncing this around its network of ‘relays’ distributed 
around the world, preventing surveillance by even very powerful adversaries 
(Dingledine, Mathhewson, and Syverson, 2004). 
In doing so, Tor realises a vision of an Internet very different to the one to which we 
have become accustomed. This is an Internet more similar to that envisioned in the 
1990s, where anonymity from the powerful is possible, chaotic and creative 
communities proliferate, illegal markets which defy regulation, whistleblowers, and 
resistance movements operate under the radar of law enforcement, all, of course, 
with (slightly) slower connection speeds. When using Tor, one sees the Internet from 
a more global perspective, as adverts no longer know where you’re from, services 
can’t tailor content on the basis of your location, and the ‘filter bubbles’ created by 
services such as Google lose their grip on us, as Tor breaks the mechanisms they use 
to track and surveil our intimate lives and thoughts across the Internet. Although Tor 
began as a project of the US military’s Naval Research Laboratory, it is now in the 
hands of civil society and is at the forefront of resistance and reaction to the 
practices of mass surveillance revealed in the Snowden leaks, the rise of surveillance 
capitalism in the hands of the Internet giants, and more generally to technocratic, 
authoritarian modes of governing contemporary societies through engineering, 
automated surveillance, and ‘smart governance’. 
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Tor has largely come to the attention of criminological research in the guise of the 
‘Dark Web’. As a powerful antisurveillance technology, which also allows the creation 
of web services which are extremely difficult to locate and take down, Tor has 
become associated with a range of illegal use cases, particularly ‘cryptomarkets’, 
online anonymous marketplaces for illegal goods which are accessed through Tor. 
This illegal conduct on Tor (and increasingly, the Internet more broadly) is often 
referred to in media accounts as the ‘Dark Web’ or ‘Dark Net’, and has become 
somewhat of a media sensation, with TV shows, films, and even music videos all 
painting Tor as a digital demimonde: a dangerous place outside the control of law 
enforcement. This creates substantial issues for the Tor community, whose work is 
animated by values of liberation, privacy, and democracy. I contend in this thesis that 
framing Tor as a ‘criminogenic’ tool (as much of the criminological literature has) 
misses out far more interesting potential facets of Tor for criminological research. 
Tor poses extremely important questions about governance, harm, crime, and power 
online. Through understanding Tor as an infrastructure and exploring it as a site of 
social action, I argue that a social worlds approach has the capacity to unearth 
important aspects of justice and power at play.  
I particularly draw on the work of three other scholars in contextualising this thesis: 
Stefania Milan’s concept of “stealing the fire” (Milan, 2016), Francesca Musiani’s 
(2012) explorations of how engineers “do politics” through architecture , and 
Gabriella Coleman’s (2017) “weapons of the geek”. Coleman and Brunton ’s (2014) 
call to get “closer to the metal”, and Musiani’s to engage in research on Internet 
infrastructure that “isn’t afraid of its subject” (Musiani, 2012) are also important in 
animating this thesis. Coleman, Musiani, and Milan each engage in deep, 
appreciative study of technology and infrastructure (and the people embedded in 
them) and their links to social change. They each approach this work from different 
perspectives, interested in a distinct facet of technological work and its attendant 
practices, sensibilities, and framings of technology as a site of social action. For 
example, Coleman (2017) foregrounds the creative, subversive sensibilities and 
practices of hackers, and tracks their rise to prominence as key political actors in 
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contemporary societies, playing with technologies, laws, and systems to repurpose 
them to their own ends. Musiani (2012), conversely, studies the mass-scale 
infrastructure of the Internet itself and how its engineers shape society in important 
ways through decisions made about its architecture. Finally, Milan (2016) focuses on 
technology and infrastructure in more explicit social movements, and how the 
practices and values of these activist-technologists attempt to perform and realise 
particular political values and visions of society. 
Each of these framings reveals a great deal about Internet infrastructure and the role 
it plays in contemporary societies, and I draw from them throughout the thesis. 
However, instead of adopting one of these perspectives from the outset, I aim to 
map Tor as a site at which multiple different kinds of social action are attempted. I 
do this through appreciative, qualitative research, including interviewing members of 
the Tor community and deep archival study of the Tor Project’s open access online 
archives. In doing this, I wanted to move beyond the majority of the criminological 
research on Tor, which focuses on the illegal behaviours of some of its users, to the 
largely hidden perspectives of the people behind the infrastructure. In finding out 
what they wanted to achieve with Tor and how they went about realising these 
visions, I have tried to characterise Tor as a home for multiple overlapping social 
worlds and kinds of social action. 
In doing this, I have structured this research around a set of four main research 
questions, which I outline here: 
1. In what different ways do the people who contribute to Tor make sense of it 
as a site of social action, and what different visions of privacy do these 
understandings evoke? In other words, what are the key social worlds of the 
Tor community, how do they relate to one another, and how do they come 
into conflict, conversation, and collaboration? 
2. How do these social worlds shape the material form and design of Tor; how 
are these values realised as properties of the Tor network? 
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3. When this design is materialised as infrastructure, what other kinds of work 
are needed so that this infrastructure can create Tor’s visions of privacy in 
the world, especially given the considerable opposition it faces?  
4. What problems with crime, power and harm arise when Tor begins to realise 
its visions? How does the Tor community make sense of these issues, and 
through what strategies does it navigate them? 
These questions evolved across the course of my PhD research, and I describe how I 
arrived at them in more detail in Chapter 5. 
 
Thesis structure 
In Chapter 2, I outline the context of this research and how it fits into the broader 
criminological literature on the Internet. I discuss what I see as the main gaps in 
criminological research which I set out to explore in this thesis, in particular how it 
frames and accounts for technology and infrastructure. I discuss some of the ways in 
which criminology has begun to move towards ‘situational’ approaches to making 
sense of the Internet, in particular Routine Activities Theory and, to a lesser extent, 
Actor-Network Theory, and draw out what I see as the limitations of these 
approaches. I then make the case for a different branch of STS research, social 
worlds theory, to shed light on what some of these frameworks may be missing. I set 
out Foucault’s concept of governmentality in order to sketch the broader theoretical 
context of this research and describe some of the specific issues which apply to Tor 
and the current state of criminological research on the so-called ‘Dark Web’. 
In Chapter 3, I set out the historical context of Tor, mapping out a history of the 
Internet and the discourses and ideas which have shaped it. I trace the Internet’s 
roots in military research through to its opening up to commercial and personal use, 
outlining how it has been shaped by military, neoliberal and countercultural ideas 
among others. After discussing the rise of different strains of ‘hacker’ politics and 
 26 
how they have fed into the development of the Internet, I turn to the conflicts in the 
1990s over encryption technologies, and bring Onion Routing, Tor’s precursor, into 
this history. I then discuss Tor’s early development and growth, and the rise of 
technologies of online control documented in the Snowden leaks. Finally, I end this 
chapter with a discussion of the current issues facing the Internet and where Tor fits 
into them.  
Chapter 4 outlines the theoretical underpinnings of this thesis, setting out the social 
worlds framework and how I make use of it. I begin with a discussion of research on 
privacy, positioning this thesis as an exploration of how Tor realises particular visions 
of privacy in practice through infrastructure. I then set out some of the foundational 
literature in the symbolic interactionist school, which forms the basis of the social 
worlds approach. Following this, I discuss the social worlds framework in depth and 
the key approaches and sensitising concepts on which I draw in this thesis. 
Having set out the context of my research, the key research problems, and the 
theoretical underpinnings of this thesis, I set out my methodological approach in 
Chapter 5, giving an account of my fieldwork and analysis, and discussing the ethical 
issues which I considered throughout the research. I also set out my four core 
research questions and discuss how they fit into the social worlds approach. 
I then devote four chapters to the results of my empirical research, one addressing 
each of my four main research questions. In Chapter 6, the first of my ‘results’ 
chapters, I begin by exploring in more depth the Tor’s project’s core values and the 
vision of the world it is trying to realise. Rather than a single core value system, Tor’s 
values are heterogeneous, with its community drawing on a range of different 
understandings of the status of Tor, and privacy technology more generally, as a 
social actor. I distil these into three ideal type social worlds and explore how they 
collaborate, conflict, and shape one another. 
Having mapped in depth the social worlds of the Tor community, I then, in Chapter 7, 
map the processes through which they attempted to enact these in practice. In 
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particular, I explore the ways in which Tor’s engineers attempted to do politics 
through architecture by creating an infrastructure which not only embodied their 
values but aimed to make them a reality for Internet users around the world. This 
turned out in practice not to be a simple act of translation, and the developers’ 
motivations and understandings of Tor were shaped as much by these design and 
development processes as the infrastructure itself was. I then discuss how the 
engineer world and its design practices have changed since the early days of Tor. 
Having set out Tor’s values and vision of the world and how it attempts to realise this 
through infrastructure, I then spend the two chapters which follow, Chapters 8 and 
9, exploring what happens when this infrastructure actually meets the world it is 
attempting to transform. 
In Chapter 8, I discuss how the ideas embedded in Tor’s design are materialised in 
the world in practice and the hidden work which helps make them a reality. As an 
oppositional infrastructure aimed at disrupting the control which powerful actors 
wield over the Internet, and a system which carries extremely sensitive traffic, Tor is 
an opportune target for nation states, organised crime groups, and security 
companies whose resources far exceeds the few million dollars a year on which it 
can draw. In this chapter, I explore how Tor attempts to defend against these threats 
against both its community and its technologies. Through this, I illustrate how the 
design ideas embedded in Tor in fact rely on hidden work to be realised, which 
carries with it its own perspectives and values. 
In my final ‘results’ chapter, Chapter 9, I explore what happens when Tor’s attempts 
to wield infrastructural power meet problems with crime and harm, becoming 
caught up in the technologies of control which they are trying to disrupt. I map the 
challenges which Tor faces in practice, and how it becomes tangled up in 
administrative and criminal justice systems in a variety of ways. I follow this with an 
account of how the different social worlds of Tor understand its implication in harm 
and illegal activities, and the strategies which they use to assert their own claims to 
Tor’s social meaning and vision of the Internet. Unlike most infrastructures and 
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platforms, Tor cannot govern crime and abuse through design, through self-policing 
and moderation, or through working with criminal justice organisations, as its design 
removes the ‘control points’ on which these rely. I discuss in depth in this chapter 
how it attempts to deal with and make sense of these problems. 
In Chapter 10, I pull the different threads of my results chapters together into a 
discussion of Tor as a site of social action, drawing out the key themes which link my 
research questions together. I begin by discussing the role of design in Tor, and how 
this mediates between constructions of crime, privacy, and control, the material 
features of Tor, and its attempt to ‘do politics through architecture’. Next, I discuss 
the ways in which these visions are produced in practice, the other perspectives 
which this brings in, and how this links to Tor’s relationship with crime and harm. I 
then discuss how these social worlds and visions are changing, in part in reaction to 
the issues which Tor faces, especially its shift towards a more ‘governmental’ 
sensibility. In the next section, I draw these together into a discussion of how Tor fits 
into broader questions of power and governance. Finally, I make the case for an 
‘infrastructural criminology’ which engages in appreciative, qualitative exploration of 
the infrastructures and platforms on which our societies depend. 
I conclude the thesis, in Chapter 11, with some reflections on the contributions of 
the research and its limitations, outlining potential avenues for future work. 
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chapter 2  




In this chapter, I set out the gap in scholarship which I explore in this thesis. I discuss 
the key literature which informs this thesis and set out the core questions which it 
aims to answer. This is not an in-depth exploration of my theoretical approach, 
which I leave to Chapter 4, rather it is an attempt to position this research within the 
broader fields of criminological, digital society, and Science and Technology Studies 
scholarship, and within the research literature on Tor. 
I begin this chapter by setting out the current state of cybercrime scholarship and 
the broader criminological research which touches on the Internet, arguing that 
while there has been a great deal of excellent qualitative research on cybercrime, 
this has tended to neglect the social life of the technologies, platforms, and 
infrastructures of the Internet. These have been allowed to fade into the 
background, and with them key issues of power, crime, and control in contemporary 
societies. I set out some of the ways in which criminological scholarship has 
attempted to account for this, in particular using Latour’s Actor-Network Theory, and 
some of the limitations of this approach. I then present a possible route forward, 
drawing on Susan Leigh Star’s (1989) developments of the social worlds framework, 
which has proven fruitful in disentangling the complex, heterogeneous meanings and 
discourses which become enmeshed in technological infrastructures.  
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I then situate these in broader frameworks for understanding the links between 
discourse, power and control, discussing the work of Michel Foucault and focusing 
on his concept of governmentality and how it has shaped criminological scholarship, 
in particular its tracing of the links between discourse, materiality, and power. I then 
discuss the relevance of this framework to the Internet, and the groups which are 
attempting to resist this through building their own infrastructures. I argue (drawing 
on separate work by Milan, Coleman, Musiani, and Star) that these groups are 
particularly worthy of study in exploring power in the Internet age, situated as they 
are between state attempts at online control and the people on whom they act, and 
engaging in deliberate attempts at oppositional action in the domain of material 
power. I then discuss the focus of this thesis, the Tor Project, setting out some 
background and the existing research which has studied Tor. I end this chapter with a 
brief summary of the gaps in criminological literature which I explore in this thesis. 
Cybercrime, criminology, and technology 
The spread of the Internet throughout human social, economic, and political life has 
posed vital questions for criminologists about the relationship between technology, 
infrastructure, crime, and power. Since before the turn of the current millennium, a 
growing body of criminological research has attempted to make sense of the 
apparently-novel types of crime which occur in contemporary Internet-embedded 
societies (Wall, 2007; Yar and Steinmetz, 2019). Much cybercriminal theoretical work 
has been concerned with whether the rise of cybercrime constitutes a ‘novel’ form 
of crime, or simply technologically-mediated versions of well-established 
phenomena. This ‘old wine in new bottles’ debate (Wall 1999, Grabosky 2001) is still 
fairly contentious within cybercrime research (Wall 1999; Yar 2005; Wall 2007). 
Cyber-criminology, or criminological research on cybercrime, has developed into a 
substantial sub-discipline over the past twenty years (Holt 2013; 2014). This has 
progressed from initial descriptive and framing work to a wider subfield of research, 
which, like criminology itself, is multi-disciplinary and brings in many types of 
expertise from other fields, including security researchers, statisticians, engineers 
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and anthropologists (and many more). This has involved substantial theoretical work, 
both through the development of novel theory and attempts to apply established 
criminological frameworks, such as differential association (Hutchings and Clayton, 
2016; Bohman and Freng, 2017), feminist criminology (Hutchings and Chua, 2016; 
Lazarus, 2019), and radical criminology (Steinmetz, 2016) to cybercrime. In more 
recent years, this subfield has begun to break its boundaries, with a range of other 
areas of criminological study attempting to reckon with the Internet and how it 
affects their own subjects of enquiry. In scholarship on electronic monitoring (Nellis, 
Beyens, and Kaminsky, 2013), probation (Mair, 2013), border criminology 
(Milivojevic 2019a, 2019b), prisons (Jewkes, 2008) and policing (Wall & Williams, 
2013; Dodge, Spencer, and Ricciardelli 2019), to give only a small selection, Internet 
technologies are playing increasingly important roles. 
However, this thesis is not about ‘cybercrime’, about which a substantial literature 
clearly exists. Rather, I am interested in what the particular standpoint of criminology 
might be able to reveal about the technologies of the Internet themselves, and how 
they shape crime, power, and control. These ‘deeper’ elements of the Internet 
include the platforms designed and curated by companies such as Google, Facebook, 
and Twitter which mediate much of our online interaction, and the yet deeper world 
of protocols, Internet Service Providers, Internet exchanges, and the material 
infrastructure of cables, switches, and software. They incorporate important 
decisions about human action which shape our societies in ways which are still 
poorly-understood (Lessig, 1999a, 1999b; Lievrouw and Livingstone, 2002; 
Mackenzie, 2005; Healy, 2015; Musiani, 2015; Milan and ten Oever, 2017). Contrary 
to framings which describe the Internet as ‘cyberspace’, ‘reducing time and space to 
zero’ (Benedickt, 1991; Introna, 1997) or a transcendental ‘digital dimension’, the 
Internet does not work by magic, nor is it divorced from the material. In fact, it is 
composed of a myriad of different material technologies, infrastructures and 
platforms built atop and alongside one another, which all have their own properties 
and histories (Musiani, Cogburn, DeNardis and Levinson, 2016). This means that an 
understanding of the salience of the Internet for social life has to take into account 
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this complex landscape of infrastructures which are not all pulling in the same 
direction or working towards the same ends, in fact underpinned by often 
contradictory or opposed values and visions of the world. These infrastructures can 
both embed profound mechanisms of social control and constitute powerful 
attempts at resistance.  Exploring these dynamics, however, requires a move beyond 
the existing frameworks through which criminology makes sense of technology.  
There has been relatively little criminological scholarship on the infrastructures of 
the Internet, despite the fact that criminology is well-suited to exploring questions of 
power, governance and control which are deeply salient here. This work has largely 
been left to fields outwith criminology. Surveillance studies, for example, has shown 
pathbreaking critical research into the ways in which the Internet is transforming (or 
being transformed by) mechanisms of surveillance (see for example, Lyon, 2002; 
Graham & Wood, 2003; Lyon, 2007; Finn, 2011; Ball et al., 2012; Dubrofsky & 
Magnet, 2015). Science and Technology Studies has made substantial contributions 
to developing frameworks for accounting for technology and the values which 
underpin it (see for example Friedman, 1997; Joerges, 1999; Winner, 1999; Musiani, 
2015). A broader range of ‘digital society’ scholarship, new media studies and critical 
algorithm studies have all engaged in powerful explorations of how social media and 
the Internet’s other platforms and infrastructures are shaping, and being shaped, by 
human action, how they are being used by social movements, and their salience to 
power and social harm (see for example Lessig 1999; DeNardis, 2009; Napoli, 2015; 
Milan 2013, 2016; O’Neill, 2016; Just and Latzer, 2017; Goedhart et al. 2019; Aradau, 
Blanke & Greenway, 2019). Finally, (though this list is clearly non-exhaustive), 
anthropological and ethnographic studies of technology have developed a range of 
insights into the cultures and practices of technical work, resistance, and political 
action in the Internet age (see for example Escobar et al. 1994, Haywood, 2012; 
Coleman 2014; Brunton & Coleman, 2014; Pink, Ardevol and Lanzeni, 2016; Gehl, 
2016). I argue, however, that criminological scholarship has its own contribution, as-
yet largely unrealised, to make alongside these efforts. Criminology’s particular focus 
on state-sanctioning of behaviour, governance, power, and control equip it with 
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useful frameworks and sensitivities for exploring some of the less well-understood 
aspects of the problems with crime and governance in which these infrastructures 
and platforms are becoming implicated. 
While criminological research has substantial successes in exploring the communities 
(Yip, Webber, and Shadbolt, 2013; Lusthaus, 2013; Holt, Brewer, and Goldsmith, 
2019), motivations (Brewster, 2015; Yar and Steinmetz, 2019) and economics (Afroz 
et al. 2013; Anderson et al. 2013) of online crime, there has been little progress in 
developing frameworks for understanding the role technology plays in in 
criminological accounts of the Internet and cybercrime (Stratton, 2017). Much of the 
scholarship which does attempt to account for the technologies of the Internet 
approaches cybercrime through Routine Activities Theory (RAT). RAT was developed 
initially to explain the changes in criminal offending which occurred following the 
Second World War, arguing that changes in crime were largely driven by the 
opportunities created by patterns of routine behaviour: situational factors such as 
the absence of guardians in the suburbs while people were at work and the rise of 
high value, portable consumer goods (Cohen and Felson, 1979). This is a ‘situational’ 
account of crime, focused on changes in material circumstances and how they 
shaped broader ecologies of criminal opportunity, and hence created ‘criminogenic’ 
situations. A wide range of scholarship on cybercrime uses RAT to explain changes in 
crime which have arisen as a result of the rise of the internet, drawing on it to 
understand how this has affected traditional avenues of guardianship and the 
coming together of offenders and victims in different ways to provide new types of 
criminal opportunity (Yar 2005; Leukfeldt 2016). This has led to useful studies of 
online victimisation (Holt, 2008; Hutchings, 2009), offending (Williams 2015; 
Leukfeld, 2016), and other aspects of online crime. 
This line of reasoning naturally leads towards attempting to understand the material 
qualities which make particular technologies ‘criminogenic’, and how they transform 
physical situations in ways which promote crime and victimisation. RAT research 
frames internet infrastructures as ‘bringing together’ victims and offenders in novel 
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situations whose criminogenic properties are determined by the qualities of these 
technologies (Yar. 2005; Holt and Bossler, 2008; Yar and Leukfeldt, 2016). For 
example, it frames the connective properties of the Internet as a ‘force multiplier’, 
bringing would-be offenders into contact with very large number of potential victims 
through services such as email. This has proven particularly useful as an explanatory 
framework because its core concepts of guardianship, opportunity, ease of access, 
and risk-benefit calculus are well-suited to translation into classic experimental 
designs (Holt 2008) and produce outputs with direct relevance for policymakers 
(Clarke, 1995; Weisburd, 1997).  
The ‘situational’ nature of this framework, as it does with more traditional forms of 
offending, often generates solutions to cybercrime problems which involve fixing 
these criminogenic situations through technological target hardening and Situational 
Crime Prevention approaches (Yar 2005) which alter how the built environments of 
social spaces are designed (whether that be the layout of park benches, locking 
doors, installing firewalls, or automatically deleting abusive Twitter messages and 
email spam) (Clarke 1983, 2005). Shifting this responsibility to the largely privately-
owned companies who own these platforms does, however, ultimately also involve 
devolving key democratic debates about crime control, social justice, and 
governance to the private sphere, with little role for participation on the part of the 
user other than through the exercise of consumer choice (Garland 2001, Hayward 
2007). Equally, it treats technology as a deterministic force, eliding cultural or social-
structural factors, black-boxing motivations on the part of the offender, and ignoring 
the important role played by the cultural life and value systems of these technologies 
in shaping their design, development, and how they are used. These kinds of 
questions are at the heart of Science and Technology Studies scholarship, and as 
such this would appear to be a natural body of work from which criminologists could 
draw ways of better framing technology.  
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Criminology and Actor-Networks: tracing socio-technical 
agencies with ANT and RAT 
Some criminological research has begun to develop this situational approach further 
using theoretical frameworks from Science and Technology Studies such as Actor-
Network Theory (ANT) to make sense of the role which technologies play in 
cybercrime (Latour, 2005; Brown, 2006). ANT argues for deep explorations of the 
material and social properties of technology, and how ‘non-human actors’ exert an 
agency of their own alongside human action (see for example, Murdoch, 1998; 
Latour, 2005; Law, 2009; Mol, 2010). ANT seeks to trace the networks of human and 
technological components of ‘sociotechnical’ systems and the different types of 
agency they exert (Latour 2005). In this framework, various human and non-human 
’actants’ come together and enrol one another in Actor-Networks, arrangements of 
technological and human components whose topology reflects the power struggles 
and perspectives involved in their creation (Latour 2005). When one actor aims to 
achieve something in this network, their action becomes ‘mediated’ by the various 
human and non-human intermediaries through which it travels. So, an ANT approach 
to cybercrime could trace the complex agencies embedded in the tools which people 
use in committing cybercrime, and how different human and non-human elements 
come together in criminal, harmful, or deviant online situations (Luppicini, 2014; van 
der Wagen and Pieters, 2015). This proposes research which is alive to an expanded 
ontology that dissolves pre-made binaries between technological and human actors 
(or ‘actants’) and which does not assume at the outset which agencies (be they 
human or non-human) are key to a given situation (Brown, 2005).  
Within criminology, ANT is gaining increasing purchase as a theoretical framework 
and set of methodological directives (to ‘follow the actors’) with which to deepen 
framings of technology within cybercrime studies. A pathbreaking paper by Brown 
(2005) inspires much of this work, which called for a broader incorporation of some 
elements of ANT into criminological research on high-tech societies. ANT has been 
used to study the sociotechnical factors involved in the curation of botnets 
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(networks of infected computers) (van der Wagen, 2015), to explore relationships 
between hackers and their tools (Van der Wagen, 2018), to better understand data 
breaches (Statchel and DeLaHaye, 2015), and music piracy (Hinduja, 2012). Outside 
cybercrime research, it has also seen wider use by criminologists to frame subjects as 
diverse as charities in the criminal justice system (Tomczak, 2016) and prisons 
(Anderson, 2017). Theoretical work has attempted to apply this within cybersecurity 
and cybercrime studies as a more programmatic framework (Balzacq and Cavelty, 
2016; van der Wagen, 2019) or as a looser set of sensitising concepts (Brown, 2006, 
Luppicini, 2014; Bossler, 2016). 
While incorporating these insights from Actor-Network Theory would be a welcome 
step forward for criminological understanding of the internet, I argue that the 
programmatic application of ANT, often described as a process of ‘tracing’ networks 
of non-human and human agencies, shares the limitations of situational models of 
crime and technology such as RAT. In fact, De Paoli (2018) directly makes this 
connection between ANT and RAT in their discussion of security engineers as 
“engineer criminologists”. This assumes that the values, meanings, and agencies of 
technological situations are the products of the arrangement of the network of 
causally-connected human and non-human agents which constitute them (Latour, 
2005). This retains Routine Activities Theory’s concern with the material qualities of 
technologies and the built environment, and how they frame, shape, and constrain 
human action in different ways (and exert agencies of their own). It also, however, 
elides the role of communication, interpretation, interaction, and culture, treating all 
of the links between these ‘actants’ as equal. From a criminological perspective, this 
also accepts ‘crime’ as a given, reproducing administrative and hegemonic 
constructions of crime and power; a criticism often levelled at ANT (Whittle and 
Spicer, 2008) and more administrative criminological scholarship (Hillyard, 2004). 
Other theoretical work by cyber-criminologists similarly maintains this focus on the 
ways in which technologies transform situations, afford users new abilities, or 
generate new connections between people, often taking for granted the processes 
by which these properties are actually designed and implemented, how they are 
 37 
negotiated by users, law enforcement and the general public in practice, and the 
contested attempts of a range of different social groups to imbue them with 
meaning. In order to understand and critique power in these infrastructures, a 
mapping rather than tracing approach is needed, one which is more open to 
multiplicities of meaning, communication, and interpretation (Haraway 1994). 
 
Meaning and the material 
There is now a wealth of theoretical writing (Hayward, 2012; Surette, 2015) and 
qualitative, appreciative empirical studies which go beyond purely situational 
frameworks to include the role of culture, interpretation, and identity in making 
sense of cybercrime (see for example, Melvin and Ayotunde, 2011; Dremiluga, 2014; 
Marcum et al., 2014; Hutchings and Chua, 2016). There is also a great deal of 
research outside the field of criminology which is alive to these aspects of online 
crime, from studies of how cryptomarkets shape users’ understanding of anonymity 
(Bancroft, 2017) to anthropological studies of hacktivist groups on IRC networks 
(Coleman, 2013). This research engages with the lives, understandings, perspectives 
and cultures of the people who become caught up in the technological networks of 
the Internet, full of deep mapping and rich description of how their cultural lives, 
interactions, and values are lived with these technologies. While these studies have 
contributed some of the most impactful and transformative developments in 
understandings of crime, deviance, and social harm in the Internet age, they tend to 
centre on particular groups, subcultures, social movements, or online ‘spaces’. In 
contrast, I focus on the discursive life of internet technologies and infrastructures 
themselves in order to better understand the struggles over meanings and values 
which underpin and surround them, and hence how they become tangled up in 
crime, deviance, and power (Pinch 2010). As Pinch suggests (which I discuss in more 
detail in Chapter 4), this requires turning this qualitative, appreciative approach 
towards the hidden people behind these infrastructures and platforms, bringing to 
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the foreground the different kinds of relationships they have with technology. As 
Milivojevic (2019) has shown for internet-connected mobile phones and migration, 
using the theoretical scholarship of Milan (2013), a more critical focus on 
technologies themselves has the capacity to powerfully extend criminological 
accounts of technologies to understand the ways in which they act in power 
relations.  
Brown (2006), rather than mandating a programmatic application of ANT, suggests 
that elements of Latour’s scholarship could be employed as sensitising approaches, 
in particular the dissolution of simple binaries between humans and technologies 
(the pursuit of the ‘technosocial’), and an attentivity to the ways that agencies can 
be exerted by nonhumans. Brown further argues for a ‘cyborg’ approach to social 
theory in the model of Donna Haraway’s work. Although many of the criminological 
papers which advocate an ANT approach draw links with Haraway’s cyborg theory 
(Brown, 2006; Van der Wagen, 2015; Van der Wagen, 2019), in fact, these are not 
necessarily harmonious perspectives, and Haraway has often been critical of Latour’s 
frameworks. Haraway critiques Latour’s conception of technology as the product of 
‘trials of strength’ (Latour, 1987; Haraway, 1997), where technosocial agencies are 
portrayed as agonistic and competitive, legible in tracings of networks of actants. 
Haraway’s scholarship within Science and Technology studies orients the study of 
technologies instead as the mapping of complex, often communal and multifarious 
worlds of discourse and power which take up contested and contingent 
arrangements with materiality (Haraway, 1994; Haraway, 1997).  
This allows for (and, in fact, mandates) technosocial arrangements which support 
multiplicities of meaning and a range of co-inhabiting worlds and discourses, each 
with their own complex shaping relationships with the material (Haraway, 1994). 
While a range of “post-ANT” scholarship attempts to address this multiplicity 
through concepts like “fire objects” (Law, 2002), where material signifiers can be 
mutable and multiple in meaning (Law 2005; Mol 2010), I argue that a greater focus 
on communication, interpretation, and discourse is needed for the type of research I 
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have engaged in in this thesis. Although I do not make particularly deep use of 
Haraway’s frameworks in this thesis, her ‘material semantics’, which forges ways to 
map these difficult relationships between materiality and meaning, was an important 
beginning for the approach I adopt, especially the call to study the “world-building 
alliances of humans and non-humans” (Haraway, 1997, p51). Her scholarship was 
also foundational to the methodological approaches developed by Clarke (2007) on 
which I draw. I discuss in substantially more depth the theoretical approach which 
drives my empirical work in Chapter 4, however, I outline its contours briefly here.  
Pinch’s (2010) call for qualitative empirical research focused on the designers, 
developers, and maintainers of the infrastructure and platforms of the Internet 
argues that this project should move beyond an ANT approach, embracing the 
frameworks of symbolic interactionist social theory to map the multiplicity of 
meanings with which people imbue these technologies, and the complex 
relationships these meanings have with the material forms which the technologies 
take. I do this through social worlds theory, an approach from Science and 
Technology Studies which frames technologies as arenas around which complex, 
overlapping worlds of discourse can form (Star, 1989; Clarke and Star, 2008). These 
discursive worlds are implicated in complex relationships with materiality through 
the ways in which they structure practices, and the ways these practices shape (and 
are shaped by) these infrastructures (Star, Bowker, and Newman, 1998; Star, 1999). 
This has been used fruitfully to study many technological and knowledge-making 
projects, including museums (Star & Griesemer, 1989), art (Schlossmann, 2017), 
education (Bayat, Naiker & Combrinck, 2015), and online knowledge communities 
(through the related ‘communities of practice’ framework) (Lave, 1991; Angouri, 
2016). It also underpins Star’s ‘infrastructure studies’ scholarship, which exhorts us 
to study the “hidden work” and “frozen discourses” within the infrastructures which 
support our societies (Star, 1999), and how the assumptions and default settings 
baked into them can fail to reflect the lives of marginal groups and individuals, 
contributing further to their marginalisation (Star, 1990). Methodologically, this 
allows a deep study of technology without becoming lost in technical detail, 
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excavating meanings and how they become embedded through interviews and 
archival research. This is a deeply productive approach, framing as it does 
technological projects as places where multiple visions of the world can be 
embedded, negotiated, and go on to shape social life, and Star’s theoretical 
frameworks and methodological approaches are at the heart of this thesis.  
This approach provides a ‘hook’ for criminology’s own standpoints as a discipline, 
presenting a range of theoretical tools and methodological approaches with which to 
frame the Internet’s platforms and infrastructures in ways which fit well into 
criminological understandings of power, crime, and control. In order to understand 
the broader consequences of these visions of the world at the micro-level, we also 
need to understand the relationships these discourses have to higher levels of power 
in a wider social and historical context. Accordingly, I situate this research, as 
Hacking (2004) describes, “between Goffman and Foucault”, attendant both to the 
actual practices, processes and mechanisms through which control is enacted and 
crime problems are established, but also to the broader history and context of these 
discourses, where they come from, and why particular voices and visions of the 
world gain influence (Lippert, 2010). I discuss Goffman’s scholarship and how it 
relates to the thesis in more depth in Chapter 4, where I set out the core theoretical 
framework which drives my empirical research. To situate this research in its broader 
context, I discuss in the following section the Foucauldian frameworks which I use to 
frame the wider mechanisms of control by which the Internet’s infrastructures are 
governed, and the discourses and visions of the world which underpin these. I use 
Foucault’s governmentality scholarship, whose framing of power as mediated by 




Governmentality, power and discourse 
Internet technologies are increasingly implicated as sites of power in our societies, 
and the precise kinds of power wielded by their designers and the governments who 
attempt to control these infrastructures are at the heart of many of the core debates 
around data, privacy and power with which contemporary societies are wrestling 
(Kahler, 2011). Some of the most vital questions for criminological understandings of 
the Internet relate not only to the novel forms of online harm and crime which have 
emerged in the Internet age, but changes in the way that nation states and other 
powerful forces understand and carry out the business of governing their societies.  
In the previous section, I made the case for qualitative, appreciative research into 
the understandings, values, and visions of the developers of Internet technologies 
and platforms, how they are realised as material infrastructure, and the problems of 
power, governance, and control which they then have to navigate. In situating this 
research in the broader field of criminology and histories of governance and control, 
I draw on the body of scholarship which is broadly defined as governmentality 
studies (Lippert and Stenson, 2010). This work, which draws on social theory 
developed by Michel Foucault (Foucault, 1991, 2007, 2008, 2010; Garland, 1997; 
Lemke, 2015), has been particularly influential in describing the changing ways that 
power and control have been shaped by the late modern turn (Garland 2001; Lippert 
and Stenson, 2010). Foucault’s governmentality work is a good basis for framing the 
technologies, platforms, and infrastructures of the Internet, as it approaches power 
as the materialisation of visions of the world, exploring how these visions provide the 
basis for people’s attempts to imagine themselves as subjects (Darier, 1998; 
Badouard, Mabi, and Sire, 2016). This is particularly well-suited to contextualising the 
empirical work in which this thesis is engaged, providing as it does a way of making 
sense of infrastructures and platforms as sites where different visions of the world 
are realised and contested, the relationship this bears to power and the people who 
become tangled-up within them. In this section, I set out the fundamental elements 
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of governmentality theory, then in the following section articulate it as it has been 
applied to the Internet. 
Foucault’s concept of governmentality draws from his understanding of power as 
linked to changing ways of thinking about and understanding society and the 
business of government; what Foucault describes as the “conduct of conduct”. 
Foucault argues that one cannot understand the ways in which modern societies 
exert power and control, their technologies of power, without understanding the 
rationalities of government which underpin them (Foucault, 1991; Garland, 1997). 
Rationalities of government are the changing discursive formations, or ways of 
thinking, through which different states at different historical moments frame and 
approach the work of government and crime control. These discourses are 
ideotypical, and the point of Foucault’s work is less to identify these understandings 
as a total depiction of any particular individual, organisation, or state in a given 
historical moment, but as useful ways of conducting a genealogical account of the 
history of forms of government and control (Garland, 1997; Foucault, 2007, 2010). 
This leads to an epochal view of the history of ideas, rather than one necessarily 
reflective of messy historical reality, something for which Foucault is oft-criticised by 
historians (Weeks, 1982). Foucault argues that modern societies are characterised by 
the development of new forms of power which he describes as the formation of 
governmentality: rather than the domination of society from above, power operates 
throughout society, clustered around governing bodies, requiring new types of 
knowledge about populations (through censuses and social-scientific research) for its 
operation, and expressing itself through the social shaping of populations and how 
they experience the world and understand themselves (Mehta & Darier, 1998; Rose, 
O’Malley & Valverde. 2006; Foucault, 2010). 
Foucault argues that these ways of making sense of how to govern societies become 
materialised in technologies of control, as the documents, practices, policies, 
infrastructures, institutions, laws and architectures with which governmental actors 
engage in the business of government. These technologies of control reflect the 
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rationalities which underpin them both in their material design and the ways in 
which they operate in and shape the world. They also operate as important conduits 
of power, both as direct mechanisms of control over people and their behaviour, and 
the more subtle ways in which they shape how people in their societies think and 
understand themselves (Foucault, 2007).  
Foucault’s understanding of this kind of power changed across the course of his 
writing (Garland, 1997). In early work such as Discipline and Punish¸ power operates 
almost deterministically on individuals, with the logics embedded in institutions, 
architecture, practices, and other materialisations of control rendering them 
coercively as passive objects, or “docile bodies” (Foucault, 2012). His later writing, 
however, acknowledges this as a process of subjectification, with people actively 
constructing themselves as subjects in ways which are shaped and structured by the 
materialised discourses embedded in institutions, architectures, and other 
technologies of control (Garland, 1997; Foucault, 2010). These technologies of 
control therefore also become technologies of the self, ‘held out’ to individuals as 
resources with which to construct themselves, and it is through this subjectification 
that the state exerts its sovereignty and lays claim to individuals, shaping in its own 
image the kinds of people which they are able to be (Garland, 1997; Foucault, 1991, 
2007, 2010). Foucault offers the rise of ‘biopolitics’ as an example of one form which 
these technologies of control can take in modern societies, through which the 
collection of information, through censuses and social scientific research, about 
subject populations forms one of these mechanisms of subjectification, calling out 
individuals to fit themselves into the category systems and frames of representation 
which these collection mechanisms employ (Foucault, 2008).  
This has been taken up by criminologists as a way of problematising the idea that the 
institutions and ways of governing (such as prisons, or the police) by which our 
societies are characterised are somehow inevitable, rather asking us to map their 
histories to find out why they take the forms they do, what visions of the world 
underpin them, and how things might have been (or might be) different (Garland, 
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1997; Williams and Lippert, 2006). I use these ideas in the thesis to frame the 
operation of power as the result of contested attempts to materialise different 
visions of the world, as constituted in worlds of discourse. Although, as Brown (2006) 
notes, technologies are often left somewhat inert in these accounts, I argue that this 
is not by necessity, and that a governmentality approach has much to add to study of 
the technologies and infrastructures of the Internet. In this thesis, I use this to 
connect Star’s (1999) developments of the social worlds framework, which tackle 
how meaning is negotiated within technical projects and becomes imbued in 
material technologies, to their broader context of governmental power as realised in 
the Internet infrastructure. 
 
Technologies of online control and infrastructural resistance 
Applying a governmentality perspective to the Internet, one can begin to draw 
relationships between these ways of thinking and the mechanisms through which 
the governance and control of online space are arranged (Mehta & Darier, 1998; 
Badouard, Mabi & Sire, 2016). The Internet is both governed by technologies of 
control (such as the police, Internet Service Providers, regulatory bodies), and a 
technology of control in its own right (as a set of infrastructures that operate as 
conduits of control, which embody the rationalities of their designers). The original 
egalitarian promises of these technologies bringing the world together have been 
contradicted by the physical infrastructures of the Internet largely replicating, and 
even deepening, existing inequalities and power relationships (Mehta & Darier, 
1998; Hand & Sandywell, 2002). I discuss the history of the rationalities of the 
Internet and the technologies of control within them in further detail in Chapter 3. 
This paints a rather bleak view of the Internet and its infrastructures; however, these 
platforms are also the focus of powerful visions of hope. While Foucault focuses on 
the rationalities of states and other powerful actors’ in their attempts to discipline 
and govern (although understanding the power of their discourses as dislocated and 
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dissipated through society), they are not the only ones whose visions of the world 
are asserted through these kinds of power, and other groups are able to contest 
power in this domain (Musiani 2013; Milan 2019; Zalnierute & Milan, 2019). A range 
of counter-movements have attempted to resist these increasingly authoritarian 
trends in internet governance and renew its status as a platform for liberation and 
social transformation (Marechal 2015; Milan 2013, 2016). The privacy properties of 
these infrastructures are hence a key battleground in which the futures imagined by 
technological innovation and political struggles are contested (Dencik, 2016). This 
takes place within conventional institutions, such as parliamentary democracy, 
constitutional challenges in the courts, and traditional activism (Bennet 2008); 
however important parts of these conflicts take place outside this sphere. These 
movements have given rise to a number of technological organisations which engage 
in internet politics by developing new tools and infrastructures which better reflect 
their values (Dencik 2016; Milan 2013, 2016). This is possible on the scale we now 
observe due to a fundamental quality of Internet architecture: it permits new, 
alternative infrastructures to be built to extend its capabilities in different ways with 
relative ease, changing its technical properties and creating new imagined spaces 
(Van Schweick, 2012). As governments have sought to reimagine the internet as a 
space of control through building surveillance infrastructures on its foundation, so 
too have citizens and organisations begun to build their own infrastructures 
alongside it which have different constructions of privacy at their heart (Milan 2013, 
2016). These constitute oppositional engagements deliberately situated in the 
terrain of power imagined by Foucault; clashes between material infrastructures 
which stand as proxies for conflicts between distinct, opposed visions of the future 
of our societies. 
These oppositional attempts to assert alternative visions of the world to those 
embodied in our current Internet are the subject of a growing and vital body of 
digital society scholarship, of which I here highlight three perspectives which have 
been particularly useful in situating the research in this thesis. Coleman (2017) 
frames these attempts through the rise of ‘hackers’ as a class of practitioners who 
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are now increasingly engaged in political struggles, distinct from other kinds of 
technological workers in their “impulse for craftiness” (Coleman, 2017, p92), and 
their drive to subvert and repurpose static and established systems. This subversion 
is accompanied by a range of attempts by these hacker groups, aligned with a wide 
range of different political sensibilities, to build their own platforms, expressive of 
particular ideological agendas. Aggressive state assertions of control of the Internet 
and attempts to claim sovereignty over and regulate its technologies bring these 
subaltern technologists into direct conflict with established power, drawing them 
into political domains which they might otherwise have avoided (Coleman, 2017). As 
they become drawn into these political arenas, the ‘hacker’ sensibility extends 
further than merely experimentation with technical systems, especially as they begin 
to build platforms and infrastructures which need to sit within established legal and 
administrative contexts. As a result, Coleman argues that these groups become 
adept at ‘hacking’ the law as well, finding loopholes and clever edge cases to allow 
them to do their political work. The political character of this ‘hackery’ social action 
often demonstrates a certain ideological pragmatism, as these groups often enrol 
odd bedfellows who might not be expected to work with one another in the service 
of overlapping goals. Coleman’s research documents the rise of this new class of 
political actor, arguing that these “weapons of the geek” are reflective of a particular 
shared set of cultural practices, sensibilities, and strategies. 
Outwith these oppositional ‘hacker’ communities, Musiani, Cogburn and DeNardis’ 
work (2016) draws on a range of Science and Technology Studies scholarship, but 
particularly the infrastructure studies work of Susan Leigh Star (1989, 1999), to 
describe how the structural, or ‘architectural’ forms of Internet infrastructures 
constitute an important domain of politics in their own right in which a variety of 
groups can engage. This documents the broader attempts by communities of 
software developers and engineers to ‘do politics’ through architecture and a “turn 
to infrastructure” in Internet governance (Musiani, Cogburn & DeNardis, 2016). The 
‘architectural’ or ‘infrastructural’ domain therefore becomes a key domain of power, 
not only subject to governance, but itself a form of governance. Musiani draws on 
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Star’s scholarship to pull out the hidden work behind the design of this infrastructure 
and to critique its connection to power relations (Musiani, 2013). Musiani’s studies 
excavate the ways in which politics and design are worked out in the creation of 
decentralised Internet infrastructures, which she argues frame relationships 
between users and providers, power and control points, in different ways to more 
centralised designs. She uses this to extend the idea of infrastructure as a site of 
social action, unearthing the spaces where engineers and developers attempt to 
realise alternatives to the dominant visions of the future through building 
infrastructures which reflect their own imagined future worlds (Musiani 2013).  
Finally, Milan’s (2016, 2019) research on the intersections between technologies, 
infrastructure, and activism provides another catalyst for this thesis, and frames this 
more explicitly through the lens of social movements. Milan (2016) argues that the 
Internet has led to a multiplying of the pre-existing traditions of community-run 
infrastructure, manifesting as ‘tech activism’. Milan (2016, 2019) describes this as 
“stealing the fire”, the challenging of power interests by activist groups in the terrain 
of infrastructure, asserting a radical democratisation of the ‘plumbing’ (Milan, 2016) 
of everyday life and reclaiming the power which these technologies exert over 
populations. This action occurs in four domains: the “creation of alternative 
infrastructures”, “the appropriation of existing enclosed spaces”, “hacking and 
tinkering”, and “bypassing legislation through technical fixes” (Milan, 2016). Milan 
argues for exploring the complex relationships between practices and values at work 
in these types of social action, and how they “merge in the moment of technology 
design” (Milan, 2016). 
Each of these foregrounds a different facet of Internet technologies as a site of social 
action, bringing out a distinct package of sensibilities, rationalities and practices. 
Rather than adopt any one of these, I make use of a social worlds approach (which I 
describe in more detail in Chapter 4) to try to make sense of how infrastructures like 
Tor can become places where multiple different kinds of social action come together 
in conversation and conflict. These infrastructures are increasingly where important 
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battles over power, policing, and control are being fought. I argue that focusing on 
these conflicts and how they play out through deep qualitative empirical research 
has the capacity to deepen criminological understanding of the Internet in important 
ways.  In this thesis, I study how these platforms and infrastructures actually engage 
in this domain in practice through the study of a single ‘rebel infrastructure’, or 
attempt to “steal the fire” (Milan 2019) which touches particularly on issues of 
salience to criminologists: the Tor network, which attempts to directly frustrate and 
subvert the technologies of mass surveillance and censorship through which the 
internet is governed. 
 
The Tor network – critical infrastructure 
This brings me to the central subject of this thesis: the Tor network. Tor is an 
anonymity network built on top of the Internet’s backbone, a rebel infrastructure 
originally developed by the US Navy but long since moved outside the domain of 
military research to the NGO sector, where it has become the technological jewel in 
the crown of the Internet freedom movement. It is maintained and developed by the 
Tor Project organisation and is supported by a vibrant community of volunteers who 
help develop and scrutinise the code, run the servers which make up its 
infrastructure, and promote its use around the world. It is a profoundly successful 
intervention in the topologies of online power and an attempt to realise a subaltern 
vision of the future of the Internet. The Tor network is generally accessed by its users 
through a free web browser (the Tor Browser) and allows them to browse the 
Internet and host websites while effectively undermining the ability of the 
government to surveil their actions. This has an important secondary quality: by and 
large, websites which are blocked by Internet Service Providers are freely accessible 
over Tor, making it extremely difficult for governments to censor online content. The 
Tor network can be used both for browsing and for hosting, allowing users to set up 
websites called Onion Services, which are extremely difficult to take down and can 
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only be accessed through the Tor network (Moore and Rid, 2016). I discuss the 
technical design through which Tor achieves this in greater depth in Chapter 3 and 
explore its development in Chapter 7. In brief, the administrative information which 
the users’ internet signals employ to navigate the Internet are encrypted, then these 
signals are bounced around the Tor network, a volunteer-run infrastructure of 
servers around the world, which creates a ‘crowd’ of users which it is very difficult 
for even nation states to unpick. 
Criminological research on Tor has almost entirely focused on its capacity for crime. 
In particular, this has taken the form of the ‘Darknet’ or ‘Dark Web’ – a colloquial 
term for the relatively small number of Onion Services which have been set up by 
those looking to facilitate illegal or harmful action (Moore & Rid, 2016). The Tor 
network is unquestionably implicated (in the same way that the Internet itself is) in a 
degree of harmful traffic which flows through its servers. Some online communities 
involved in illegal activities make use of these services to set up forums where they 
can discuss these activities, interact, and form communities (Bancroft, 2017; Fonhof 
et al., 2018; Kamphausen and Werse, 2019). Particular academic interest has been 
directed towards ‘cryptomarkets’, online marketplaces hosted on Onion Services 
which facilitate trade in a variety of illegal goods, such as drugs or stolen credit cards 
(Martin, 2014). There is a substantial body of research on these cryptomarkets, from 
their effect on broader drug markets (Aldridge & Decary-Hetu, 2016; Gilbert & 
Dasrupta, 2016; Demant & Munksgaard, 2017) mechanisms through which they 
cultivate trust and reputation (Tzanetakis et al. 2016; Morselli & Decary-Hetu, 2017; 
Lorenzo-Dus, Cristofaro, 2018), their effects on harm (Barrat et al., 2016a; Barrat et 
al. 2016b), their resilience to police intervention and disruption (Decary-Hetu & 
Giommoni, 2017; Ladegaard, 2017; Ladegaard, 2019), and the internal dynamics and 
cultures of their communities (Maddox, Barratt & Allen, 2016; Bancroft, 2017; 
Tzanetakis, 2018). 
It is important to note that these services facilitate a range of legal use cases. The 
largest Onion Service belongs not to a criminal group, but to Facebook, whose Onion 
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Service allows users nations in which Facebook is blocked to access its services 
(Muffet, 2014). Several major, well-respected newspapers run Onion versions of 
their websites or services, including the New York Times (Sandvik, 2017) and the 
Guardian (2019). Onion Services are used by whistleblowing organisations such as 
SecureDrop to provide a secure means of releasing information and protecting 
whistleblowers’ identity (SecureDrop, 2019). Even organisations such as the CIA 
operate Onion Services of their own (CIA, 2019). The Tor network provides an 
important service for researchers, activists, and investigators, as it allows people to 
access websites without revealing their identify. This enables those attempting to 
research online crime to scrape websites without being blocked, allows the officials 
at the Internet Watch Foundation to investigate online child sexual abuse on the 
regular Internet securely, and provides law enforcement with a range of tools for 
investigating crime, especially by powerful corporations and organised groups 
(Laidlaw, 2012). It is equally important to note that the vast majority of online harm 
occurs on the regular Internet; in fact, the barriers to entry posed by Tor use mean 
that many online criminal economies operate on the regular Internet, without the 
use of Tor, in order to attract the largest possible amount of commerce (Hutchings, 
2016; Pastrana, Hutchings, Caines et al. 2018). Tor use also facilitates a range of 
other security benefits, protecting its users from a range of common security threats, 
and frustrating attempts by web services to track them across the Internet using 
cookies and other fingerprinting techniques. 
There is a small body of sociological and legal (Minarik and Osula, 2015) research on 
Tor outside criminology which does not frame it solely in terms of crime and harm. 
Gehl, for example, has discussed in depth the attempts of the Tor community (and 
other anonymity technologies) to cultivate legitimacy of different kinds, analysing 
online archives and other materials (Gehl 2018a. 2018b). He has also engaged in 
more theoretical work which discusses the ramifications of Tor for private and public 
space online (Gehl and McKelvey, 2019). Bancroft (2017) has engaged with the links 
between values and the material, focusing on user perspectives and studying the 
interactions between the material anonymity properties of cryptomarkets and the 
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discourses through which their users construct anonymity. Marechal has more 
directly engaged with the Tor community itself, studying it as a social movement and 
tracing its political economy and attempts at professionalisation (Marechal, 2018). 
What is missing, however, is a systematic sociological account of the Tor community, 
its values and visions of the world, and how these are linked to Tor as an 
infrastructure; its design properties, the challenges it faces, and how it actually 
engages in questions of power. 
Conclusion 
In many ways the most interesting unanswered questions about the Internet for 
criminologists have little to do with cybercrime as conventionally conceived. I 
therefore argue that a ‘criminology of the Internet’, in partnership with but distinct 
from cybercrime scholarship, would be a fruitful next step for criminological 
research. Tor clearly poses a set of extremely interesting questions for criminologists 
beyond the particular communities, harms or illegal activities which it facilitates. In 
undermining the fundamental technologies of control through which states govern 
the Internet, Tor presents not only a challenge to governmental power, but also an 
attempt to realise a distinct vision of the future Internet., Foucault’s concept of 
governmentality provides a useful framework for understanding the context of these 
struggles, as it shows the technologies of control which characterise our societies 
(such as mass online surveillance and censorship) to be far from inevitable, rooted 
instead in the ways of making sense of the business of government which have 
provided the backdrop to the history of the Internet. As Garland (1997) contends, 
however, the most productive criminological research in this area does not take 
these rationalities and technologies as total, rather it uses them as ideal types which 
are realised and conceived in partial, contested ways, in heterogeneous partnerships 
and oppositions with other forces and factors. Tracing the complex reality of how 
these are worked out in practice requires a deep investigation of how these visions 
of the world are actually materialised and the challenges they face: as Musiani 
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(2012) argues, “doing a sociology of networks that is not afraid of its subject of 
study”. 
Criminology as a discipline has been a locus of enormously productive work exploring 
the ways in which the materiality of technologies of power interact with the 
discourses which shape them and the world at large. In its studies of laws, 
architecture, institutions, practices, and policies it has greatly extended academic 
understanding of power and the complexities of how our societies are governed. As 
yet, criminological research has been surprisingly slow in engaging the 
infrastructures and platforms of the Internet in this way. It is in the nature of these 
technologies that they ‘black box’ their values behind complex computer code which 
obfuscates this connection between meaning and the material. However, social 
worlds theory presents a possible way forward for this research as a project of 
qualitative, appreciative exploration of the people embedded in these technologies, 
and how they understand these questions. In this thesis, I engage in deep empirical 
research on Tor’s attempt to “steal the fire” (Milan, 2016), how the people of Tor 
make sense of their values, the different ways in which they attempt to realise them 
in material infrastructure, the problems they face in practice when they come into 
contact with the technologies of power which they are trying to undermine, and how 
they navigate these challenges. 
In the following chapter, I situate this work in context, engaging in a genealogical 
history of Tor to fit it into the broader history of the Internet, online governance, and 
social control. I argue that the position Tor occupies in the world and the way it 
works was by no means inevitable, and is deeply contingent on its history, the 
interaction between the ideas underpinning its creation and those embedded in the 
Internet, and how particular groups attempted to meet the challenges which arose 
throughout its lifetime. In Chapter 3, I sketch this history of the ideas which shaped 
these technologies, the developing mechanisms and rationalities of online control, of 
Tor’s design and how it has evolved alongside the Internet, and of the challenges 
which Tor and its community have faced. 
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chapter 3 
a genealogy of Tor (and 




Having set out the gap in academic scholarship which this research aims to address, 
in this chapter I step back to explore Tor’s history and the history of the Internet. I 
write this as a genealogical history, mapping the changing ideas, contexts and 
challenges which have shaped what Tor and the Internet have become today. In 
doing this, I draw out a series of core issues which this thesis explores through 
empirical research.  
Tor as it stands occupies an extremely contested position. Public knowledge about 
Tor is scant, with most people only knowing it as the Dark Net or Dark Web, a ’Wild 
West’ where crime is conducted with impunity from law enforcement (Bartlett, 
2015). Where Tor is portrayed in the media or academic research, it is usually this 
use for criminal harm which is the focus, with a token gesture towards its origins as a 
military technology and use by whistleblowers and journalists (Chen et al. 2008; 
Jardine, 2015; Bartlett, 2015; Weimann 2016). This presents a rather confusing 
picture from the outside: that a technology exists which undermines the police and 
intelligence services’ attempts to surveil the Internet, which is widely used for crime, 
government-defying journalism and whistleblowing, but is not criminalised in all but 
a handful of nations despite its clear challenge to power; one which was invented by 
the US military, but now appears to undermine the ability of the US to surveil its 
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population (Jardine, 2015; Minarik and Osula, 2016; Moore and Rid, 2016; Gehl and 
McKelvey, 2016). Situating Tor within the history of the Internet and the different 
ways people have attempted to control online infrastructure does a great deal to 
explain these apparent contradictions but makes Tor no less fascinating a subject of 
criminological research. In fact, as I argue in this chapter, there are much more 
interesting aspects of Tor (and by extension, the Internet) for criminologists than 
only its involvement in crime. 
In this chapter, I set out the historical context for this thesis, aiming to break up the 
idea that Tor’s current design and social situation are natural or inevitable, and trace 
why it occupies this contested position. In laying out this history, I draw on archival 
research, my interviews with members of the Tor community, and a review of 
relevant literature. I begin this chapter by setting out a brief history of the Internet 
and the different ideas which were influential in shaping it up until the turn of the 
millennium. Then, I discuss the struggles over encryption and control which have 
been fought since the early 1990s, often termed the ‘Cryptowars’, and the genesis of 
the Onion Routing technologies which preceded Tor. The following section discusses 
the early years of Tor’s development and the problems it faced. I then discuss the 
Snowden leaks, which revealed the extent of the growth in US surveillance and the 
securitisation of the Internet in the wake of 9/11, and their salience to Tor’s work 
and the Tor organisation (Lyon, 2015). Finally, I return to the present day and the 
issues which Tor (and the Internet more generally) face, including the backlash 
against mass surveillance and the rise of surveillance capitalism (Zuboff, 2015). At 
each turn, I attempt to link the evolving material infrastructure of the Internet and 
the different approaches which people, states, and corporations have taken to 




The Internet and its discourses 
Internet prehistory – military, sovereignty, and the scientific elite 
The history of computing and the Internet is not one of ‘neutral’, ‘inevitable’ 
technical progress, rather it is bound up deeply with ideas, cultures, and social 
context (Castells, 2004). Throughout this history, the Internet and the mechanisms 
through which it is governed have been shaped by a confluence of several 
intersecting rationalities; different ways of thinking about society and technology, 
and distinct visions of the Internet and its future. There have been many different 
attempts to separate these out, such as Castells “four cultures” of the Internet 
(Castells, 2004), or the multi-stakeholder mappings in the Internet governance 
literature (Pickard, 2007; Chenou, 2014). Instead of sticking programmatically to one 
of these systems, I try to draw them together into something which usefully frames 
different ethics of control, freedom and openness, the discourses underpinning the 
Internet and their consequences for how it is organised. In this section, I characterise 
some of the main ideas which underpin the Internet and their salience to the shape 
it has taken. 
The Internet’s roots are well-documented and can be traced back to the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (ARPA), a US government agency founded in 1957 to carry 
out scientific and technological research projects for the Defence Department 
(Rosenzweig, 1998). ARPA and their contractors began the development of the 
ARPANET computer networking project in 1967, an attempt, using an idea developed 
by the RAND Corporation, to solve the problem of nationwide computer 
communications in a hypothetical nuclear war scenario when centralised exchanges 
might be destroyed. This Cold War context led to the development of a ‘distributed’ 
network, which routed packets of information along different paths through the 
network – the ‘packet switching’ design – and assembled them at the destination, 
without the need for a centralised authority (Sterling, 1993; Rosenzweig, 1998). 
These initial aims also extended to the scientific community (which, in any case, was 
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viewed as crucial to maintaining US military supremacy), allowing the sharing of 
computing resources between researchers distributed around the nation as well as 
the implementation of systems for more direct military use (Rosenzweig, 1998).   
The Internet’s foundational visions have their roots in the ideas, motivations, and 
perspectives of the US military and a research and technological elite based in US 
universities and research labs (Leiner et al., 2009; Curran, 2012; Cohen-Almagor, 
2013). Although the Internet is built around a decentralised model, this way of 
thinking is not particularly committed to ‘decentralisation’ or ‘centralisation’ as 
values in their own right, rather it was (and is) more concerned with the pragmatics 
of developing the interests of the US nation state, both domestically and in the 
sphere of geopolitical power. As such the scientists were engaged in designing 
systems to solve particular research problems which were determined by their 
funders in the military; rather than attempting to achieve a particular kind of system 
for its own sake, they were attempting to develop an infrastructure for the Internet 
which could both be resilient, and have a topology which would allow the US to 
establish itself at crucial control points (Edwards, 1996; Curran, 2012). In the case of 
the packet switching design, this gave rise to the apparent contradiction of the 
centralised, hierarchical US military finding its needs best met by a fundamentally 
decentralised system. While this was happening, though, a counter-discourse had 
been developing among the communities of technical experts, researchers, and 
academics involved in designing the technologies, and in the hobbyist communities 
which had been increasingly gaining access to these networks (Rosenzweig, 1998; 
Curran, 2012). 
 
Hackers and cyber-libertarianism 
Despite their close engagement with the US military (Rosenzweig, 1998), the 
technologists and researchers who developed the early technologies of the Internet 
incubated a radical countercurrent to these more establishment sensibilities. Rooted 
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in 60s and 70s counterculture (though perhaps more “libertarian rather than 
liberational” (Rosenzweig, 1998)), a radical body of thought and practice arose which 
equally shaped the foundations of the Internet and how it has evolved over the 
years. This set of ideas, emerging variously from computer science departments 
(especially the much-documented Tech Model Railroad Club and Artificial 
Intelligence Lab at MIT) and the countercultural movement in 1960s and 1970s San 
Francisco, established a vision of technology in which the structural forms, design 
principles, and technical practices of information systems were themselves the 
embodiment of a particular politics: the ‘hacker ethic’ (Levy, 1984; Jesiek, 2003; 
Nissenbaum, 2004; Coleman, 2012). The developers at work in these labs mobilised 
the 60s and 70s countercultural values of anti-authoritarianism and liberation which 
were growing out of the anti-Vietnam and civil rights protest movements, 
envisioning that the technologies which they were building might be able to reflect 
these ideas. Underpinned by a techno-libertarian ethos of personal liberty and 
freedom of information, they prized decentralised systems as powerful political 
statements in their own right, alongside practices of creative experimentation and 
repurposing of existing systems in subversive ways (Levy, 1984).  
As the hacker subculture spilled out from research departments to the growing 
hobbyist computing movement and the underground forums of the Internet’s 
‘demimonde’ it developed a far wider cultural relevance of its own. Its romantic, 
techno-utopian visions flowered in science fiction depictions of hackers, from 
Gibson’s (1984) Neuromancer, to Trouble and Her Friends (Scott, 1994), to The 
Matrix and more recent fiction such as Rosewater (Thompson, 2016), and hackers 
are now staple characters in contemporary action films (Yar, 2012; Wall, 2012; 
Taylor, 2012). There is now a substantial scholarship on hacker subcultures, initially 
portrayed as male, introverted, and based around a narrow set of values (Levy, 
1984), which now reflects an diverse range of communities with very different goals 
and perspectives (see for example, Coleman, 2004, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014; 
Steinmetz, 2016; Milan and van der Velden, 2016).  Coleman and Golub (2008) argue 
that there is no individual ‘hacker ethic’, but that it encompasses a range of ‘moral 
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genres’ stemming from the diverse array of people, practices and politics within a 
range of hacking communities around the world. They identify three distinct 
rationalities within this: crypto-freedom, free software, and the hacker underground 
(Coleman and Golub, 2008). Although all steeped in essentially liberal values and 
hacker practices of creative engineering, each of these ‘variants of liberalism’ (Hall, 
1986; Coleman and Golub, 2008) emphasises a different facet, reflecting the 
tensions and discontinuities within liberal thought. I adopt this threefold framing 
here, as it is particularly useful (as will become apparent) for contextualising how the 
history of the Tor Project fits into the history of the Internet. 
The first of these, crypto-freedom, is particularly important for this history, as these 
ideas go on to form a core part of Tor’s development and its reason for existence. 
The crypto-freedom sensibility stems from the computer scientists and 
cryptographers who were developing the encryption technologies which grew up 
alongside the Internet. For many involved in this work, it took on a distinctly political 
character: these encryption technologies could have a powerful impact beyond their 
use by the military in underwriting a liberal conception of privacy and autonomy of 
the individual, protecting the Internet as a space for freedom and information, 
commerce and community (Coleman and Golub, 2008). While they shared a utopian 
view of the Internet with other hacker sensibilities, they believed that this would 
need to be guaranteed by robust technical mechanisms for ensuring privacy, lest it 
become a dystopian tool of repressive control and surveillance. This developed 
beyond the research community into the cypherpunk movement (a formative 
influence on Tor, whom we will revisit in the next section), an association of 
cryptographers, hackers, and privacy enthusiasts centred around the infamous 
‘cypherpunks’ mailing list1 (Hughes, 1993; Bartlett, 2016). The particular trust and 
security requirements of these systems, which counter-indicated reliance on a 
centralised authority, tended to mandate decentralised networks, and this is 
 
1 An archived copy of the Cypherpunks mailing list can be downloaded at: http://mailing-
list-archive.cryptoanarchy.wiki 
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reflected in the values of the cypherpunks, who share with the other hacker ethics a 
love of decentralisation as a value of its own (Jordan and Taylor, 1998). 
The second of these ‘hacker ethics’ finds its home in the Free and Open Source 
Software movement (Stallman, 2002). Some of the hackers who had played a role in 
the Internet’s early years of development had begun to set up foundations and 
communities dedicated to developing software in a new way, which embodied their 
techno-utopian values and hopes for the Internet as a vehicle for social 
transformation. In reaction against ‘closed’ and ‘proprietary’ models of software 
development, in which source code is obfuscated to prevent unauthorised copying 
or changing, they envisioned a future Internet in which code was the foundation of a 
radical democratisation of the material underpinnings of social life (Coleman and 
Golub, 2008; Coleman, 2009, 2012; Soederberg, 2015). By opening up source code 
to public scrutiny, they argued that as the Internet became more central to everyday 
life, so too would it empower people to question and shape the ways in which the 
programs they depended on worked. This was underpinned by an ethic of radical 
participation, arguing that not only should the source code be open, but the people 
who use it and others interested outside the academy should be able to take part in 
development (Berry, 2008; Powell, 2012). Prioritising the free and open sharing of 
ideas and the right to experiment with technology free from regulation, this is a 
separate facet of an essentially libertarian view of the world, emphasising the 
freedom to act rather than freedom from surveillance. There is a substantial 
scholarship on the Open Source movement which has drawn out the conflicts and 
tensions within this movement, and the cultures, beliefs, sensibilities and practices 
which have formed within these communities (see for example, Coleman 2004, 
2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014; Elliot and Scatchi, 2005; Powell, 2012 ). 
As the 1980s progressed and hobbyists and computer enthusiasts were increasingly 
getting access to networked computing, a burgeoning hacker underground was 
growing (Sterling, 2002; Skibell, 2002; Taylor, 2012). Over the 1980s a range of other 
computer networks, often set up by user communities,, were proliferating outside of 
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the ARPANET. Two of the most famous of these were Usenet, a community platform 
which had been developed by Unix users which operated as a series of boards which 
they could post on about a variety of topics (Turner et al., 2005; Tepper, 2013), and 
Bulletin Board Systems (BBSes), a set of home-made bulletin boards hosted on user 
computers which could be connected to over telephone lines2 Myers, 1987). These 
networks developed “from below”, rather than imposed from above, and developed 
a set of vibrant cultures of their own (Rosenschweig, 1998, p. 1544). In these 
hobbyist communities, a distinct hacker subculture began to arise, similarly 
concerned with technological experimentation, creativity, and anti-authoritarianism, 
but interested in disruption and subversion of power rather than the creation of 
cryptographic tools or participation in an open software organisation (Coleman and 
Golub, 2008). Steeped in these techno-libertarian ideas, and worked out online and 
through in-person meet-ups (which still exist today), this grew into the ‘hacker 
underground’, a range of Internet communities engaged in sometimes criminalised 
attempts to hack, repurpose, tinker with, and exploit computer systems, either out 
of curiosity, to establish a reputation, for personal gain, or for political purposes 
(Bachmann, 2012). A substantial cultural life has grown up around these 
communities (Taylor, 2012). When criminologists study ‘hackers’, it is generally the 
hacker underground to which they refer. 
Coleman’s research on open source hacker communities identifies in them a deep 
distaste for overt politics, or “political agnosticism” (Coleman, 2004), but her later 
scholarship shows that many of those engaged in hacker practices are increasingly (if 
often reluctantly) entering the terrain of political action, wielding technological and 
infrastructural power in the form of what Coleman terms “weapons of the geek” 
(Coleman, 2017). The three distinct moral genres of hacking which Coleman and 
Golub (2008) identify have played crucial roles in the development of the Internet. 
Cypherpunks have created encryption and anonymity technologies which are now 
fundamental to global finance and communication, as well as to more contested 
 
2 An excellent collection of archived BBSes can be found at https://www.textfiles.com 
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privacy technologies such as Tor and Bitcoin (Dingledine, 2004; Nakamoto, 2008). 
Free software can be found as a component in almost all technical systems and 
provides the backbone for huge swathes of the Internet. Tor itself is developed open 
source and draws on many of the beliefs of the open source ethos (Kelty, 2008). 
Equally, the hacker underground has been a powerful force, allying with social and 
activist movements like Anonymous, becoming involved in more serious crime, and 
provoking (and resisting) a backlash of control from governments (Sterling, 2002; 
Coleman, 2014, 2017). Still others have spilled out of the academy, free software 
communities, and the underground into the corporate world, where the ethic of 
Internet-mediated disruption has upturned whole industries and allowed them to 
create entirely-new power structures of their own (Guttentag, 2015; Jones, 2017; 
Levina and Hassinoff, 2017; Zuboff, 2019). These more corporate visions of the 
Internet resonate with the dominant political rationality in the US of the 1990s: 
neoliberal capitalism. 
 
The neoliberal Internet 
The 1990s saw the growth of the Internet away from its roots as a military and 
scientific network culminate in the ‘commercialisation’ of the Internet and its 
opening up to businesses, everyday users, and global commerce (Weis, 2010). While 
the Internet pre-1990s had been largely managed by a “technical/scientific” elite, 
businesses and corporations now began to cultivate an increasing interest in 
developing it as a space of capitalist exploitation (Chenou, 2014). As the Internet 
grew, the development and popularisation of email, bulletin boards3 and other such 
applications marked the beginnings and growth of a burgeoning consumer market 
for Internet-connected technologies, which led to the handing over of custodianship 
from the military to the National Science Foundation. This dream of an Internet open 
 
3 for an excellent introduction to these bulletin boards, visit the website www.textfiles.com 
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to everyday users and commerce was realised in the creation of the World Wide 
Web in 1991, which allowed users to explore these networks through ‘websites’ 
where text and multimedia content could be hosted, which were linked through 
‘hypertext’ links which created a semantic connection between different sites 
(Berners-Lee and Fischetti, 2001) The release of the Mosaic web browser in 1993 
and early search engines began the expansion of the Internet to an even wider 
audience, and in the 1990s, Internet use grew rapidly (Kim, 2011). 
Arguably some of the most important ideas which have shaped the contemporary 
Internet are those of neoliberal thought, which underpinned much of this vision of a 
commercialised Internet which could form the basis of new global free markets in 
ideas, commerce, and communication (Mansell, 2011; Pickard, 2007; Chenou, 2014; 
Curran, 2012). The neoliberal vision of the world envisions the increasing dissolution 
of national and international barriers to free trade, free movement, and 
communication, with a vision of modernity synonymous with the spread of capitalist 
democracy and market freedom around the world (Alfredo Filho and Johnston, 2005; 
Wacquant, 2012). It views the market as the ‘true’ arbiter of democracy, bringing 
democratic force to every element of the provision of every public good, as publics 
“vote with their money”. It claims that market provision has the effect of maximising 
efficiency and quality through open competition, and hence argues for a minimalist 
conception of the state. This model of freedom is based on individual choice and is 
deeply suspicious of technocratic attempts to govern from the centre (Harvey, 
2007). 
In practice, this involves the delegation of traditionally public services (including 
order maintenance and policing functions) to the private sector and free market 
competition. The counter-current to these lassiez faire postures of the state within 
neoliberal governmentality is that it traditionally entails the presence of some 
extremely strong forms of state control in order to enforce and protect these free 
markets (Harvey, 2007; Wacquant, 2009). Control becomes, therefore, a force 
enacted at a distance, with states “steering, not rowing” (Crawford, 2006). This 
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vision of the world has been roundly critiqued by a vast scholarship of political and 
social scientific thought (and by social movements and civil society groups) for its 
naivete towards (or calculated disregard for) the effects which such systems have on 
the poorest in society (Wacquant, 2009), how they concentrate wealth and power, 
its implication in neo-colonial geopolitics (Mohanty, 2013) and the entrepreneurial, 
consumerist, individualised vision of the subject and the citizen which they create 
(Giddens, 1991, Bauman, 2000; Rose, O’Malley, and Valverde, 2006; Harvey, 2007;  
Beck, 2009; Gane, 2012, 2014). 
The Internet and the World Wide Web grew up in the shadow of these ideas, and the 
governance regimes and shape of the Internet which grew up over the 1990s are 
reflective of this (Von Bernstoff, 2003; Chenou, 2014). This can be seen in much of 
the neoliberal discourse which surrounded the Internet in this period, which framed 
it not only as enabling free markets but, through a kind of technological 
determinism, embodying open and decentralised structures which inherently 
promoted democratic and free market capitalist forms of society. 
Liberty will be spread by cell phone and cable modem… We know how much the 
Internet has changed America, and we are already an open society. Imagine how 
much it could change China…. Now there’s no question China has been trying to 
crack down on the Internet… Good luck. That’s sort of like trying to nail jello to the 
wall. 
Bill Clinton, speaking in 2000, quoted in John Lanchester (2019) 
Many of the foundational policy papers and documents which led to the formation 
of core Internet governance organisations like ICANN are explicitly neoliberal in 
sensibility, imagining the Internet as facilitating the proliferation of free markets and 
competition (Pickard, 2007; Chenou, 2014). This extends both to the purpose of the 
Internet, but also to the way it is administered, largely delivered by private 
companies competing in a free market. However, the ways in which the Internet and 
online power have developed since Clinton’s speech in 2000 show up the tensions 
within neoliberal visions of society and how easily these free and decentralised 
structures can be repurposed for control and repression. 
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Waging the Cryptowars – the Internet as a crisis of control 
The commercialised, global Internet soon began to pose problems for the very 
nation states which had championed it. In order to realise these visions of an 
Internet which might underpin business, commerce, and communication in global 
free markets, robust mechanisms for securing this traffic from eavesdroppers were 
vital (Thomas and Wyatt, 1999). The cryptographic technologies invented by the 
Cypherpunks and academic researchers took on a new importance outside their 
traditional military applications. For much of the 80s and 90s, cryptographic 
protocols remained classified by the US as munitions for export purposes, a 
hangover from the period following WWII, when such technologies were nearly 
exclusively in the hands of the military and the US was loath to allow other nations to 
take advantage of them (De Nardis, 2007). With the invention of the World Wide 
Web in 1989, its release to the public in 1991, and the release of the Mosaic web 
browser in 1993, Internet use began to spread beyond businesses, the military, 
academics and hobbyists, and a burgeoning consumer market emerged (Berners-
Lee, Fischetti, 2001). Encryption technologies, suddenly vital for business and citizen 
use of the Internet, posed a number of issues for law enforcement and the military 
as they fell into the hands of the public (Monsees, 2019). 
In particular, law enforcement, intelligence and government agencies in the US 
viewed this as a direct threat to the ability of the criminal justice system to maintain 
order, protect national security, and investigate crime. The creation of social spaces 
and forms of communication which could not be surveilled posed what appeared to 
many policymakers as an unacceptable hurdle to the gathering of intelligence (De 
Nardis, 2007). This resulted in a range of attempts at policymaking in order to permit 
the use of encryption for security and the protection of consumer and business 
privacy, but also to allow the law enforcement agencies and intelligence services 
access to communications and data in extremis. This marked the beginning of the 
Cryptowars, a protracted series of attempts by governments (especially in the US) to 
compromise and weaken encryption, which still continues to this day (Swire and 
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Ahmad, 2012). These proposals ranged from physical compromise of machines 
through technologies like the Clipper chip (which would allow authorities access to 
encryption keys), to limiting the strength of encryption allowed for sale to 
consumers, to the ‘backdooring’ of encryption technologies (by which secret 
weaknesses would be built in that could be exploited (Saco, 1999; De Nardis, 2007).  
These inevitably came up against material and moral constraints. Firstly, it is widely 
considered by cryptographers to be impossible to weaken encryption systems and 
plant backdoors in ways which could not also be taken advantage of by organised 
crime, hackers, rival corporations, and other malicious actors (Rivest, 1998; Swire 
and Ahmad, 2012). Secondly, the removal of privacy protections from mass 
populations of citizens conflicts with widely-held sensibilities and conceptions of 
legally-protected human rights within liberal democracies (Raab, 1997; Nissenbaum, 
1998; Hoboken, 2016). Thirdly, the argument that encryption technologies are an 
existential threat to law enforcement’s capabilities is undermined somewhat by the 
fact that such protections in practice do little to frustrate tried-and-tested forms of 
investigation, such as human intelligence gathering and targeted surveillance, and 
more novel approaches such as the compromise of machines with malware. What 
encryption technologies mostly threaten is novel modes of surveillance-at-scale 
(Guerses, Kundnani and van Hoboken, 2016).  
As these efforts ramped up over the 1990s, they galvanised substantial resistance 
both from within the technical and academic community and from civil society 
groups. In particular, it led to a call-to-action from the Cypherpunks, who attempted 
to resist across a variety of domains. In addition to policy engagement, lobbying, and 
legal action, they continued to develop and popularise the use of encryption 
technologies (Levy, 1996; Bartlett, 2016). They also used more creative methods of 
resistance, including eye-catching stunts, such as undermining the export regulations 
on strong cryptography by having the code of encryption programs printed on T-
shirts, which would hence allow them to fall under constitutional protections for 
speech and expression (Burgers and Robinson, 2018). Despite some abortive 
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attempts at controlling encryption, these battles have generally favoured the 
Cypherpunks, not least because their interests overlapped with those of businesses, 
and with the dominant neoliberal ethos of lassiez faire state control and globalised 
free markets. As a result, the Internet as it exists today is supported by strong 
encryption technologies, which secure browsing, commerce and communication by 
default for most applications and users. Nevertheless, state attempts to push back 
on this have been frequent, flaring up particularly in recent years. As I discuss 
towards the end of this chapter, liberal democracies have increasingly put pressure 
on the Internet giants which have taken over responsibility for much of online space 
to backdoor their platforms and compromise their encryption protections to allow 
access to law enforcement (Lyon, 2015; McLaughlin, 2016). It is at this point, in the 
mid-1990s, that Tor’s involvement in this history begins in earnest, with the Onion 
Routing project. 
 
Onion Routing and Tor 
Onion Routing – anonymity loves company 
In this section, I discuss Tor’s place in this history of the Internet, building on the 
previous discussion of the Internet’s formative years and discourses to discuss how 
Tor came to exist, and its early life. I first discuss the Onion Routing project, Tor’s 
early precursor, and then the foundation of Tor, how it has grown, and some of the 
challenges it has faced.4 
While the Cryptowars were heating up over the 1990s, the US military and 
intelligence services were engaged in solving a separate problem: anonymity. Much 
 
4 Much of the history of Tor and Onion Routing in this section is informed by interviews 
with members of the Tor Project and the historical information and mailing lists archived at 
www.onion-router.net and www.torproject.org  
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as with the development of the Internet’s traffic routing model itself, a decentralised 
model for identity and traceability has notable security and resilience benefits for 
military uses. The centralisation of the Internet around ISPs and the inherent 
traceability of communications poses the same problems for the military as it does 
for human rights activists and privacy-conscious citizens, granting the government of 
a nation state a substantial capacity to observe the Internet within its own borders 
Demont-Heinrich, 2002). This design works well for the US state’s domestic interests, 
as it allows the government to establish itself at key control points and surveil user 
traffic, however the spread of the Internet around the world has also given non-US 
states this power over their domestic communication networks (Thomas and Wyatt, 
1999). This means that US intelligence and military personnel abroad who want to 
make contact with their handlers in the US or communicate with base have a 
problem if they do so using the Internet.  
While encryption technologies protect the content of messages, the metadata, the 
administrative information which these messages use to route themselves to their 
destination, can in fact be extremely revealing (Edman and Yenner, 2009; Lyon, 
2015). For example, if a CIA spy is in a foreign nation and sends a message over the 
Internet back to the CIA’s home servers, ISPs in this nation can observe this and 
deduce who they are. Protecting this routing information from surveillance is 
extremely difficult, as the signals need to be able to travel through the Internet to 
their destination and so at least some of this information needs to be exposed. Even 
if the US government were to run their own network of servers which could hide 
their users’ traffic, this would not solve this problem. In practice, this would simply 
mean that the authorities would observe someone connecting to the CIA’s secret 
anonymisation network, and hence become even more suspicious (Dingledine and 
Matthewson, 2006). 
As a result, an anonymity system cannot only be used by the US military, or even by 
people in the US, rather, it has to be open to as wide a range of users as possible so 
that the fact that someone is using the system doesn’t reveal anything about their 
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identity. Thus, rather than an encryption system, which could conceivably remain a 
military-only technology, an anonymity system requires a diverse base of users 
(Dingledine and Matthewson, 2006). This philosophy, of a system open to the 
general public, in which small numbers of high-risk users could hide in cover traffic 
from more everyday users, underpins what became the Onion Routing paradigm, the 
predecessor to Tor. Work on the Onion Routing design began in earnest in 1995, led 
by Paul Syverson, David Goldschlag, and Michael Reed at the US Naval Research 
Laboratory. This early work led to the publication of a design paper for Onion 
Routing called Hiding Routing Information at the First Information Hiding Workshop 
in 1996 (Goldschlag, Reed, and Syverson, 1996)). Onion Routing has undergone 
many changes and refinements over the years, however the basic principle involves 
wrapping the routing information which packets of internet traffic use to navigate 
the Internet in layers of encryption: the layers from which Onion Routing gets its 
name. This is then sent into a network of Onion Routers: servers, or “relays” located 
around the world which bounce the traffic around between themselves, each 
decrypting a layer of encryption to reveal the address of the next server in the 
network, until the final server reveals the destination of the traffic and makes a 
connection to the target web service (Dingledine, Matthewson, and Syverson, 2004).  
This serves to separate the information used to route signals from the identity of the 
user. Each relay involved in carrying the signal only has access to the previous and 
following steps in this chain: the first relay knows the identity of the person entering 
the network, but not where they are going, middle relays only know the identity of 
other relays within the network, and the exit relay knows the final destination, but 
not the user who made the request. This means that no single part of the 
infrastructure has both the identity of the sender and the identity of the receiver 
(Goldschlag, Reed, and Syverson, 1996). If these servers can be set up in countries 
around the world, this means that an adversary would have to have a ‘global’ view of 
all Internet traffic in order to deanonymize the users. Equally, this means that this 
network infrastructure could not be run by the US Navy, as only people who trust the 
US Navy would use it. For a CIA agent to use Tor without suspicion in non-US nations, 
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for example, there need to be plenty of citizens in these nations using Tor for 
everyday Internet browsing.  
This ethic of widespread adoption, making the Internet a more private space for its 
users, meant that the US military had mutually overlapping interests with a range of 
groups to whom it might traditionally be considered to be opposed, particularly the 
countercultural ‘cypherpunks’, a loose association of academics, security 
researchers, technologists, and privacy activists. Having met several members of the 
cypherpunk community at the Symposium on Security and Privacy in Oakland, 
California in 1997, the NRL developers discussed the possibility of collaboration, to 
establish what kind of system the military could create which would actually be used 
by the privacy-conscious general public. This culminated in the Onion Dinner, a 
meeting during the Symposium on Security and Privacy (including a range of onion-
themed food) in which the potential goals and futures of Onion Routing were 
discussed in depth5. Several of the cypherpunks would play a long-term role in the 
efforts to create Tor, and while the development remained largely with the NRL 
scientists in the 1990s, they played a vital role in reviewing and shaping the direction 
these efforts took. The birth of Onion Routing therefore represents a confluence 
between two distinct but overlapping, visions of the Internet: the interests of the 
military, and those of the cypherpunks.  
The ways in which these two groups see the Internet are not in fact that different. 
Both the cryptographers working as US military researchers and those of the 
Cypherpunks had a deep technical understanding of computer systems, and were 
attempting to make changes to the structures of these systems in order to 
undermine the ability of nation states to exert centralised control over the Internet 
infrastructure. In one case this was to support the geopolitical and military aims of 
the US abroad, and in the other to promote privacy and resist authoritarian control 
 
5 A discussion of the Onion Dinner can be found in the or-dev archives at 
https://www.onion-router.net/Archives/onions-1997.txt  
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(in the 90s, these were still considered by many to be compatible ideologies). At the 
same time as one part of the US government was trying to clamp down on 
encryption, another was developing a technology which would give strong 
anonymity protections to large parts of the world. This highlights a central tension 
within contemporary liberal societies between freedom and control, one which 
would only become more evident as Onion Routing continued to grow. 
 
The birth and early life of Tor 
Moving past the 1990s to the early years of the new millennium, the Internet was 
entering a new era. The bursting of the Dot Com bubble (Goodnight and Green, 
2010), global recession, and the September 11th attacks signalled the end of the 
techno-optimism of the 1990s, and the utopian visions of the Internet began to give 
way to a rather bleaker picture of surveillance and control (Scordato and Monopoli, 
2002; Ball and Webster, 2003; Lyon, 2005; Yar, 2012; Zureik and Salter, 2013). At the 
same time, development work on the next generation of Onion Routing was 
beginning. In 2002, the developers of Onion Routing at the Naval Research 
Laboratory, in collaboration with Roger Dingledine (a developer from the Free Haven 
project), Nick Mathewson, and a handful of other developers, set about designing 
and developing an implementation of Onion Routing intended for much wider use 
than the test networks which had been attempted throughout the late 1990s, with 
scrutiny and assistance from some of the remaining cypherpunks, such as Lucky 
Green. The main contributors on the development mailing list in these early days 
were Nick Matthewson, Roger Dingledine, Andrei Serjantov, Paul Syverson, Matej 
Pfajfar, and Rachel Greenstadt. This built on an initial codebase produced by Matej 
Pfajfar at the University of Cambridge as part of an undergraduate dissertation 
project.  
The early design work of Tor is recorded in substantial detail in archived mailing list 
discussions which are freely-available on the Tor Project website. Although Onion 
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Routing was by this point fairly well-established within the research community as a 
paradigm for anonymity systems, no truly wide-use system had yet been developed. 
In building something which went beyond a prototype, the Tor developers needed to 
make a number of decisions about the practical implementation of Onion Routing in 
a real infrastructure. I discuss these decisions in detail in Chapter 7. This took place 
over a series of mailing list discussions from 2002 onwards (and the development of 
Tor is still ongoing on the same list). This development is documented extensively on 
open, freely-accessible public mailing lists, with Tor remaining an open source 
project to this day and embodying many of the practices of the Open Source 
movement, which I discuss in more depth in Chapter 8. After the launch of the Tor 
network and the publication of its codebase in 2003, the organisation continued to 
grow, beginning to receive funding from the Electronic Frontier Foundation in 20046, 
and founding the Tor Project in 2006 to manage development and support. The 
potential for Tor to be a tool for liberation, helping activists and journalists in 
authoritarian nations, and whistleblowers in liberal democracies, was becoming even 
more evident over this period, and this became a key focus of Tor’s development 
and public goals. While there was a focus on Tor’s potential as a human rights 
technology from these early days, this more politically engaged sensibility was within 
the context of a fairly ‘broad church’ community which welcomed contributions from 
those with a range of views and political standpoints. 
Once Tor was released to the world, the community needed to expand beyond the 
developers and researchers working on the software on which Tor depended. To 
make its vision a reality, Tor needed infrastructure, which meant that it also needed 
people to maintain and administer it. Due to their desire to attract as large and 
diverse a community of network operators as possible, and their understanding that 
many potential users would not trust a service run by a US organisation, the Tor 
developers decided to have the network entirely run by volunteers, with the Tor 
Project minimising their involvement in running the network as far as possible. 
 
6 https://www.eff.org/press/archives/2004/12/21-0  
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Equally, unlike other anonymity networks, there was no formal sign-up procedure for 
relay operators, who (while scrutinised by Tor for suspicious activity) are able to add 
relays to the network without providing proof of identity. The initial Tor network 
pulled relay operators from the existing Mixmaster and Mixminion projects, and 
although at the start the developers knew most of the operators, as the network 
grew other people began to contribute.  
Throughout this period, Tor was steadily growing in popularity, with the relay 
network reaching around 160 nodes by mid-2005, and tens of thousands of daily 
users. Despite this, Tor was initially fairly difficult to use, relying on making a number 
of different tools work together. This was both a problem in terms of its initial 
design, which relied on as wide and large a community of users as possible for its 
privacy properties, and also from the perspective of those who wished to see its 
protections extended to as wide a community as possible, rather than just becoming 
a high-tech security tool for experts.. This led to the creation of the Tor Browser (led 
by Steven Murdoch), released in 2008, which integrated these components into a 
single easy-to-use program which could be downloaded from the Tor Project 
website. Another development in Tor’s design which would prove pivotal in the years 
to come was the development of Onion Services. Originally developed as somewhat 
of a hobby project by Roger Dingledine, Onion Services allow the hosting of services 
on the Internet which are extremely difficult to locate or shut down. They do this by 
forming a connection through the Tor network in much the same way that Tor users 
do. This creates a rendezvous point within the Tor network to which users can form 
connections, protecting both the identities of the users and the providers from one 
another. These Onion Services have a range of potential uses (both licit and illicit), 
which I describe in Chapter 2. 
It did not take long for Tor to come into conflict with the world around it. First came 
a wave of DMCA complaints and other abuse notifications directed at the relay 
operators, as the automated systems which manage the Internet picked up the 
illegal activities of some Tor users and traced it back to the Tor network. Tor then 
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began to come into conflict with other networks and services, as a subsection of its 
users began to use its anonymity protections for vandalism and abuse. For services 
such as Wikipedia, this meant blocking edits and comments from users connecting 
through the Tor network; a potentially deeply worrying problem for Tor, which 
depended on the ‘network effect’ which came with being able to connect to as many 
other services as possible. Onion Services were also becoming a serious public 
relations issue for Tor. A community of libertarian techno-utopianists who believed 
in total freedom from state regulation of commerce had used this technology to set 
up cryptomarkets where drugs could be bought with what appeared to be total 
impunity from law enforcement. These saw widespread media attention, especially 
the infamous Silk Road market, and were one of the key developments in the rise of 
Tor’s construction as a crime problem in the public eye (Munksgaard and Demant, 
2016). The romantic figure of the Silk Road’s administrator, the Dread Pirate Roberts, 
made for compelling headlines across the world, with substantial publicity following 
his arrest. While law enforcement have generally been able to shut down these 
cryptomarkets, the ease of creating these Onion Services and potential for 
substantial profit have led to cryptomarket trade quickly displacing to new markets 
as old ones have shut down, and the media and Tor has as a result become  
associated with crime, often referred to in reporting and academic research simply 
as ‘The Dark Web’.  
As its popularity has increased, Tor has also become a go-to tool for security 
researchers and police officers investigating online crime. It is important to 
emphasise here that the vast majority of crime online occurs on the “Clearnet” (the 
regular Internet) rather than on Tor Onion Services, and as a result the protections 
which it offers are particularly useful for law enforcement attempting to gather 
intelligence on illegal conduct on Clearnet websites who wish to hide the fact that 
they are connecting from police servers (Watson, 2012; Minarik and Osula, 2016). 
Equally, the protections which Tor provides are extremely strong, but do nothing to 
protect users from other law enforcement techniques such as human intelligence 
gathering, manipulation, targeted surveillance, and actions against pinch points in 
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physical infrastructures such as the postal network. Despite this, Tor has also 
achieved a somewhat totemic status among the ‘hacker underground’, both for the 
security protections it provides and for its implicit anti-authoritarianism, and Tor has 
become a cultural force in its own right, featuring in rap songs (Pitchfork, 2019)7, 
films (including Michael Mann’s Blackhat and more low-budget fare, such as Susco’s 
Unfriended: Dark Web), and television programmes (including the Netflix show Dark 
Net). It has also seen substantial use by whistleblowers, journalists, and human rights 
activists, and has become a core part of many organisations’ ‘security toolkit’8 
(Jardine, 2018). 
Finally, in addition to the anti-surveillance protections it provides for those browsing 
the Internet or hosting their own Onion Services, Tor has an additional property: it 
has become a powerful tool for circumventing censorship. A side-effect of the way 
which Tor works is that, by routing user traffic around the world, it also evades 
attempts by nation states to block access to web services: as long as a user can enter 
the Tor network, they can largely access whatever services they desire. This works 
both at the national scale, allowing access to websites blocked by ISPs under orders 
from governments, and at the local level (Chaabane et al., 2014; Fifield et al., 2015). 
As a result of this property, Tor is blocked by a small number of governments who 
maintain a regime of strict control over Internet access, most notably China, which 
blocks Tor access entirely (Afroz and Fifield, 2007; Winter and Lindskog, 2012). As 
the Tor network’s relays are publicly visible, blocking access to Tor is fairly easy, 
however Tor has developed a range of mechanisms for circumventing this blocking, 
such as a semi-secret list of ‘bridge’ relays which allow people access to the Tor 
network where direct connections to the public relays are blocked, and tools such as 
pluggable transports, which disguise Tor signals as other kinds of traffic (Murdoch 
and Kadianiskis, 2012). 
 
7Teejayx6’s track Dark Web can be accessed at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ubs9b-
ssuuM&feature=emb_title  
8 For example, Tactical Tech’s ‘Security in a Box’: https://securityinabox.org/en/  
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Instead of understanding Tor as a technology balanced between prosocial and 
harmful use cases, I frame Tor instead as an infrastructure which acts as a home for a 
range of diverse visions of potential futures: at the same moment embodying a 
vision of libertarian, regulation-free marketplaces for drugs, helping US to subvert 
centralised control over the Internet in hostile nation states for the benefit of its 
military and espionage, creating a space for human rights defenders, journalists, and 
activists around the world to communicate and organise, realising a vision of the 
Internet where everyday users can browse and participate in democratic society free 
from censorship or surveillance, and undermining the visions of law enforcement of 
an Internet in which crime and harm can be governed at scale through surveillance 
and censorship. These visions have not been static, and as the mechanisms through 
which nation states and powerful actors have sought to control the Internet have 
evolved over the past two decades, so has Tor’s place in the Internet and in broader 
society. 
 
The rise of control 
The Snowden leaks and mass surveillance of the Internet 
In the years since the 9/11 attacks, the US state had been undergoing a profound 
reorganisation of its approach to security, control, and geopolitical power online 
(Brodeur, 2007; Schuilenberg, 2017). The full extent of this was revealed by one of 
the most significant events for the Internet of the 21st Century so far. In 2013, 
Edward Snowden, a contractor working for the NSA, leaked a substantial number of 
Top Secret internal documents relating to US communications surveillance to the 
Guardian and the Washington Post (Lyon, 2014). In doing so, Edward Snowden, who 
would soon become the face of a new online privacy movement, revealed three key 
facts about US surveillance practices. Firstly, the US government and other Five Eyes 
nations had developed arrangements with telephone and Internet communications 
providers and platforms to share vast quantities of personal data with them, and set 
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up other collection mechanisms, such as the Tempora programme, which involved 
the tapping of the undersea Internet cables between the US and the UK by GCHQ. 
Secondly, this underpinned the collection of huge amounts of information about the 
telephone calls, browsing habits, and communications of large swathes of the 
world’s population, which were being processed and fed to systems through which 
intelligence officers could browse with very little in the way of safeguards. Thirdly, 
this surveillance relied on deep data-sharing relationships between the Five Eyes 
nations and extended both to surveillance of politicians and everyday citizens in 
nations outside the Five Eyes (including their allies), and to the citizens of these 
nations themselves (Lyon, 2015; Greenwald, 2014).  
What Snowden revealed was the enormous, hidden scope of a general process of 
securitisation which had been ongoing since the turn of the millennium, through 
which liberal democracies, in particular the US and the Five Eyes nations had been 
engaging in a range of ways to reassert their sovereignty and retain control over the 
Internet (Deibert, 2008; Schuilenberg, 2017), pulling it into the surveillant 
assemblage (Ericson and Haggerty, 2000), the heterogeneous set of sites and control 
points where the state records the flows of data generated by people’s everyday 
lives (Lyon, 2015). In particular, the collection and processing of enormous amounts 
of communications metadata (the administrative information, such as time of 
delivery, identities of conversational participants, and location, attached to 
communications) in the US and around the world was revealed to have become a 
key part of the US national security strategy. This was exactly the problem identified 
by the developers of Onion Routing in the 1990s: this administrative information is 
often even more revealing than the content of communications (Schneier, 2014; 
Lyon, 2014, 2015). Especially when pored over by algorithmic systems, the timings of 
who was talking to whom and when could reveal characteristic patterns of behaviour 
which were a powerful form of intelligence of their own.  
This had implications for policing as well as for national security. The well-
documented jurisdictional issues which police face in maintaining order and 
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investigating crime online (Jewkes and Yar, 2012; Wall and Williams, 2013) are 
compounded by the fact that the Internet is largely delivered and administered by 
private and non-profit organisations (Wall, 1998; Hoar and Hope, 2002). This 
devolution of responsibility away from state-run services accords with the free-
market supremacy of neoliberal ideology but presents states with problems for 
maintaining online order, as these organisations have control over the vast amounts 
of administrative information which law enforcement and security services feel they 
need to establish a view of what is actually happening on the internet at any given 
time, to develop intelligence leads, and pursue investigations. While throughout the 
1990s this took the form of targeted subpoenas by police for these platforms’ 
customer records, since the World Trade Centre attacks in the US this had 
increasingly been the domain of what criminological research terms high policing 
(Brodeur, 2007). High policing, as opposed to low policing, which involves more 
traditional police work, is characterised by a focus on gathering and processing large 
amounts of intelligence, the conflation of separate legislative, executive and judicial 
powers, the framing of their role through security, rather than crime, and the use of 
informants (Brodeur 2007). 
After the end of the cold war and increasingly since 9/11, the distinction between 
high and low policing has been increasingly blurred (Brodeur, 2007). In tandem with 
the collection mechanisms and intelligence gathering which Snowden documented, 
policing had been attempting to adapt to the Internet, a domain to which traditional 
police practices were ill-suited (Wall and Williams, 2013; Holt, Burruss, and Bossler, 
2015; Jewkes and Yar, 2012). Law enforcement adapted to this by establishing 
centralised bodies, either within, or with links to, high policing bodies such as the 
UK’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and National Crime Agency 
(NCA), or the US’s National Security Agency (NSA) and Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) (Wall and Williams, 2013; Levi and Leighton Williams, 2013; 
McGuire, 2016). With intelligence services becoming more involved in policing 
transnational serious and organised crime, and local policing increasingly devolving 
more specialist functions to centralised units such as the NCA, this means that the 
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tools of espionage, automated mass-scale data gathering and processing, were (and 
are) increasingly being used for policing functions (Brayne, 2017; Ferguson, 2019).  
This places the private companies running platforms and infrastructure at a key 
control point in the operation of power in the Internet age (DeNardis, 2009). Where 
states have devolved the provision of public infrastructure to private internet 
companies, a countervailing trend throughout the War on Terror has been their 
reassertion of authority and mechanisms of control through the establishment of 
intelligence-gathering relationships between state security services and private 
infrastructural companies (Lyon, 2015; Schuilenberg, 2017). In practice, the co-
option of infrastructure, service, and platform providers has taken two key forms: 
first, the security services attempted to compromise the technologies, either 
through directly compelling companies to backdoor their tech, or indirectly through 
wiretapping and state hacking (Lyon, 2015). Secondly, they attempted to develop 
sympathetic relationships with the organisations, through establishing liaisons, 
serving formal subpoenas or data requests, and getting people within them with 
whom they can negotiate (Greenwald, 2013). Both of these involve the collection of 
bulk data on users of the internet, and targeted data about particular high-value 
individuals, as well as the capacity for “target discovery” (Schafer, 2016). Through 
developing wide-reaching novel surveillance capabilities, the Five Eyes nations had 
developed automated, scalable mechanisms for administering the business of 
intelligence gathering and crime control under the auspices of ‘national security’ 
(Greenwald, 2013; Lyon, 2014, 2015). 
The revelation of these capabilities had deep consequences for Tor as a technology 
and an organisation. Most importantly, it brought issues of online surveillance to the 
forefront of public debate for months, allowing Tor to reposition itself as at the 
forefront of a massive civil society campaign against mass surveillance. From being 
vulnerable to criticism that it was being used for illegal and harmful activities, Tor 
suddenly had a powerful articulation of the moral justification for its existence which 
was on the front page of most major newspapers in the world (Greenwald, 2013). 
 79 
The backlash to the practices revealed in the Snowden documents brought with it a 
growing critique of online surveillance, and especially the role played by private 
platforms and infrastructure providers, which has only continued to grow (Lichka, 
2015, Dencik and Cable, 2017). Tor itself received not-inconsiderable free advertising 
in these documents, featuring prominently in the Snowden leaks, where it is 
described in a NSA Top Secret briefing as “the king of low-latency anonymity – there 
are no contenders to the throne” (Guardian, 2013). These documents also revealed a 
wide-ranging research programme within the security services of the Five Eyes 
nations focused on attempting to find ways to undermine the Tor network. This has 
also changed Tor significantly as an organisation, leading to a wave of people, 
especially those with a background in policy work, lobbying, and activism joining the 
community. Finally, it provided the largest trove of material intelligence to date on 
the actual practices of security services against which Tor was trying to develop 
technologies to defend. 
 
Surveillance capitalism and the new platonic guardians  
Bringing this history to the present day, we arrive at an Internet in a deeply 
contested moment, when many of these issues of power and control are coming to a 
head. The way in which people use the Internet has changed dramatically since the 
1990s (Agger, 2011; Vincent and Haddon, 2017). From something which could be 
considered a discrete space of its own by its users, the Internet has exploded into a 
network which is embedded in every aspect of contemporary high-tech societies and 
is now largely accessed through ever-present mobile phones rather than static 
computers (Hine, 2015). In tandem with this proliferation has been a profound 
centralisation, with the ‘Web 1.0’ of static websites, individual homepages, and a 
glorious mess of small services and sites having given way to an Internet which for 
most people is hosted or mediated through a small number of enormously powerful 
companies (Boyd and Ellisson, 2008; Barassi and Trere, 2012; Moore, 2016; Moore 
and Tambini, 2018; van Dijk, Nieborg, and Poell, 2019) . The neoliberal free markets 
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of the Internet have condensed into monopolies around the Internet giants of 
search, for which Google now has a near-monopoly, social media, dominated by 
Facebook, Instagram and Twitter, commerce, through Amazon and Paypal, and a 
range of other ‘disruptive’ services such as Deliveroo, AirBnB, and Uber. Many of 
these companies drew heavily on the hacker ethic’s ‘disruptive’ sensibilities, seeking 
to break up existing power structures in, for example, journalism or the music 
industry, or invent pioneering, creative new platforms for human interaction, 
community, and financial gain (Marwick, 2017).  
The rise of social media in particular has been behind many of these transformations 
in the way the Internet fits into public life. ‘Content’ - the stories, videos, music, and 
other information which people consume online - is now increasingly not created by 
platforms and websites themselves, which instead act as a hosting service for user-
generated content of different kinds (Ritzer and Jurgensen, 2010; Ritzer, Dean, and 
Jurgensen, 2012; Ritzer, 2015) . As a result, and supporting their disruptive 
innovation by allowing them to undercut traditional providers, many of these 
services are provided extremely cheaply, or for free. This means that they need to 
make money in other ways. Shoshanna Zuboff’s (2016, 2019) work documents at 
length the rise of a business model which she argues is a novel form of capitalist 
exploitation, coining the term surveillance capitalism. This involves these platforms 
using the enormous amounts of personal data about behaviours, interactions, and 
demographics which their infrastructures handle in conjunction with ‘algorithmic’ 
methods of processing to create very detailed individual profiles of their users. This 
includes both data which users directly host on these platforms, and a range of 
‘tracking’ mechanisms through which the platforms download tracking software 
(‘cookies’) onto users’ computers and follow them around the web. These profiles 
then provide the raw material for a market for extremely finely targeted advertising 
– this advertising revenue is what sustains the current platform economy (Zuboff, 
2016, 2019). 
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The collection of this personal data and the creation of these intimate profiles of 
opinion and behaviour create a substantial capacity for abuse. While criticism from 
academia and civil society had been growing, this was brought to a head by the 
Cambridge Analytica scandal, in which a company had engaged in massive data 
farming without consent through an application, facilitated by Facebook’s systems, 
which allowed them to target political advertising illegally (Cadwalladr and Graham-
Harrisson, 2018; Isaak and Hanna, 2018; Laterza, 2018). This added fuel to the fire of 
a wider critique of the increasing surveillance-based governance of society. There is a 
substantial and growing literature within digital society scholarship and ‘critical 
algorithm studies’ which draws attention to the problems with these models of 
governance, which involve collecting enormous amounts of information and using 
machine learning techniques to, variously, ‘predict’ crime, tailor insurance prices, 
direct healthcare, and change behaviour in ways which have a veneer of ‘neutral’ 
scientism, but in fact often exacerbate existing inequalities (see for example, 
Gillespie and Seaver, 2016; O’Neill, 2016; Brannon, 2017; Wachter-Boettcher, 2017; 
Williams, Brooks, and Shmargard, 2018; Eubanks, 2018; Noble, 2018). 
All of this represents an increasing critique of the rise of the engineers who design 
and develop these platforms as arbiters of power. The disruptive ethos (as typified in 
Facebook’s old motto, ‘move fast and break things’) has increasingly transformed as 
these people and their platforms have gained real power: they have become 
administrators and governors, increasingly taking responsibility for the huge 
(sometimes billions of people strong) communities on their platforms (Kohl, 2013). 
Having spent many years attempting to avoid responsibility for policing their 
communities, they are increasingly finding themselves forced into this role (Trottier 
and Fuchs, 2014, Chapter 1; Wagner, 2013). While they are often described in media 
profiles as ‘philosopher-kings’ (see for example, Adams, 2018), this largely reflects 
the self-valorisation of a very small number in the Bay Area tech elite, and in fact a 
more fitting term might be ‘platonic guardians’, reflecting the existence of a wider 
class of software engineers, data scientists, and infrastructure and platform 
developers who are increasingly taking on an important governmental role in 
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society. Loader (2005) uses the term ‘platonic guardians’ to describe the rise and fall 
of a particular elite group of experts in shaping criminal justice and the governance 
of crime across the second half of the 20th Century. Much like these platonic 
guardians, the engineers designing and implementing these platforms and their 
‘algorithmic’ management technologies represent a group that presents itself as a 
neutral, expert elite on whom the state draws; one possessed with a particular claim 
to a particular kind of knowledge, and who view themselves as steering and shaping 
society. 
Across recent years, as these transformations have been ongoing, Tor has also 
changed considerably as an organisation. Tor increasingly sets itself against not only 
government surveillance, but also the efforts of private sector organisations such as 
Facebook to surveil their users. This is evident both in the published materials which 
set out Tor’s aims as an organisation and also in their development work; substantial 
work has gone into adapting the Tor Browser to defend against surveillance and 
tracking by these private platforms. Tor has also taken steps in recent years to 
professionalise as an organisation (which I describe in more detail in Chapter 6), 
instituting a range of changes to working practices, reporting, and management 
culture within the Tor Project. In remaking itself from a fairly loosely-organised free 
software project to a modern NGO, Tor has placed a far greater emphasis on 
branding, usability, and messaging, and has begun attempts to move further away 
from US government funding (which still makes up a large percentage of their 
income) and towards a more diversified, crowdfunding-based model. 
 
Conclusion 
The picture which this history paints is a deeply contested one, in which the 
infrastructure of the Internet has been a focal point within liberal democracies for 
the working through of the essential contradictions and tensions within liberal 
thought: between control and freedom, centralisation and decentralisation, 
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openness and closedness, market and monopoly. Issues of privacy, control, and 
freedom and how they are realised in infrastructure are at the heart of the Internet 
and its salience to social, political, and economic life. As I argue at the beginning of 
this chapter, Tor itself poses much more interesting questions for criminologists than 
the crime and harm in which it is implicated. It embodies in a particularly pure form 
many of the less well-understood criminological issues for the Internet, such as the 
role played by infrastructure and platform providers, how they fit into relationships 
of governance and power in contemporary societies, how they cope with the 
increasing responsibility they have for policing their platforms, and for the crime and 
harm in which they become implicated. In this thesis, I explore how Tor actually fits 
into these questions of power, crime, and harm. 
The formative discourses of the Internet represent a meeting of several different 
groups and perspectives. Given the pivotal role played by the US in this history, it is 
unsurprising that many of these are reflective of versions of liberal thought 
(including the related schools of libertarian and neoliberal ideology). The dominant 
voices shaping the Internet as it stood in the 1990s gave rise to a marketized Internet 
which embodied utopian visions of the spread of liberal capitalist democracy around 
the world. Tor itself arose from a collaboration between the cypherpunk movement, 
whose anti-authoritarian focus on privacy mandated strong protections for Internet 
traffic, and US military researchers, who sought to create a tool for the protection of 
US personnel abroad and the undermining of authoritarian nations’ control over 
their citizens’ communication. As Tor grew and became the go-to online privacy 
technology, the US state’s vision of the world was also changing, emphasising the 
primacy of control, the increasing securitisation of society, and the development of 
wide-ranging practices of surveillance, as revealed in the Snowden documents. These 
practices relied on the centrality of Internet Service Providers and the increasingly-
powerful platforms such as Google and Facebook, and their developing model of 
surveillance capitalism, which provided a wealth of information on citizens which 
could be exploited both for advertising revenue and for the cultivation of intelligence 
by law enforcement and security services. Tor has positioned itself at the vanguard 
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of resistance to these developments in control, and increasingly articulates itself as 
an attempt to imagine (and realise) an alternative future for the Internet through 
infrastructure. 
The priorities, discourses, and motivations of US law enforcement, military, and 
intelligence services – in short, the concerns of US sovereign power – have played a 
disproportionate role in shaping the history of the Internet. While the system designs 
which meet these concerns have often taken a shape which aligns with that of 
groups like the cypherpunks, prioritising decentralisation of control and distributed 
trust, this does not stem from any particular enthusiasm for these kinds of systems. 
Rather, the interests of US sovereign power are in reshaping power relationships and 
designing systems which allow them to establish themselves at key control points, to 
undermine the control of rival actors, and to ensure the resilience of their own 
infrastructures. However, as Donna Haraway’s (1991, 1997) scholarship advises us, 
infrastructures and technologies are rarely the product of a single vision, nor are the 
possibilities they hold for the future anchored solely in the aims of a single group. 
Tor (and the Internet more broadly) is a repository not only for these visions of a 
reasserted US liberal world order at a time when it appears to be faltering, but also 
of a range of other potential visions, such as the radical, crypto-utopian cypherpunks, 
the hacker underground, the US military, and Internet freedom activists. 
This history has drawn on both the discourses which have shaped the Internet and 
the types of structures which the Internet has taken as it has evolved. Tor can be 
understood as an attempt (both by govt and civil society) to act on this structural 
level: to decentralise power and to disrupt established mechanisms of control. 
However, the discourses and material structures I describe in this chapter are 
represented at a fairly high and abstract level: neoliberalism, surveillance capitalism 
and crypto-freedom; centralised or decentralised. The empirical work of this thesis 
takes this discourse in the Foucauldian sense, as a contextual macro-level framing 
device, but it then attempts to study Tor and how people make sense of it at a much 
deeper level, that of Giddens’ discourse at the micro scale, engaged in real practices, 
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beliefs, and ideas. In Chapter 2, I describe this as attempts at “doing politics” through 
architecture (Musiani, 2013), “weapons of the geek” (Coleman, 2017), or “stealing 
the fire” (Milan, 2013), and in my results chapters I explore how these attempts 
actually work in practice: the specific ways in which the Tor community makes sense 
of Tor as a technology, how they understand the kind of action in which they are 
engaged, the ways in which this shapes the material form which Tor takes, and how 
they navigate the problems which arise. 
In mapping how Tor aims to realise a vision (or visions) of the world through building 
infrastructure, I draw on deep empirical research in the Tor community, including 
both interviews and extensive archival research. To make sense of this, I use 
frameworks from Science and Technology Studies, in particular the work of Susan 
Leigh Star and Social Worlds Theory. In the following Chapter, I set out my 
theoretical framework in depth: the conceptual tools through which I explore 










Technologies and infrastructures have a rich social life, but one which is not always 
easy for researchers to access (Star, 1999). In this chapter, I set out the theoretical 
framework through which I explore Tor, and which guides my empirical research and 
analysis. While there has been a substantial body of research, which I sketched in the 
previous chapter, into the changing ways in which Internet governance and crime 
have evolved, there has been very little criminological research which engages in 
depth with the platforms and infrastructures of the Internet. Through a Foucauldian 
lens, the material forms and practices through which power and governance are 
exerted on the Internet can be understood as reflections of the discourses and 
understandings of the business of government which underpin them (Foucault 
1991). As Garland (1997) argues, this depiction of power is at its most useful when 
considered as a set of ideal types, used to frame analysis at a lower level which 
shows the partial, contested ways in which these discourses are materialised and 
worked out in practice.  
While I have mapped out the key discourses which have played a role in shaping the 
broader history of the Internet and of Tor, this thesis dives well below this contextual 
level, investigating the actual ways in which a particular part of the Internet 
infrastructure, the Tor network, is made sense of by the community which develops, 
supports, and maintains it, and what the consequences of these understandings are. 
As I argue in Chapter 2, criminology in the late modern era is well-used to pulling 
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apart complex policy documents and organisational charts; working practices and 
political processes; architecture and institutions to map the rationalities which 
connect them to power. However, the analytical and methodological frameworks it 
uses to do this are not particularly well-adapted to perform this work for Internet 
communication platforms and infrastructures, as they embed meaning in the 
material in different ways and rely on forms of technical work where this meaning 
can be rather difficult to discern (Star, 1999). 
In conducting a sociology of Tor through empirical research, I explore how its 
attempt to “steal the fire” is actually worked out in practice (Milan, 2016). This 
entails breaking this idea of making a vision of the world a reality through building 
infrastructure into a range of questions to be answered about Tor and the Tor 
community. What are the actual values of Tor, below these abstract ideas of crypto-
freedom, liberalism, and anti-authoritarianism? How do these values change and in 
what different ways are they put into practice and made sense of when they are put 
to work in a technical project: the creation of a real infrastructure? How are they 
materialised in the design and development of this infrastructure as qualities, 
practices, and structures of its software and hardware, and of the people who 
support them? Further questions are generated once Tor’s initial design is complete 
and it is released into the world. To what extent, and through what mechanisms, if at 
all, does the infrastructure make these values and visions a reality, and what kinds of 
work are required to support this in practice? What factors enable this to happen, 
and what shapes the outcome? Finally, what happens when Tor, which situates itself 
as a direct challenge to existing technologies of control, comes up against the 
systems which it is trying to subvert and undermine? How do the Tor community 
understand the crime and harm in which Tor becomes implicated, and how do they 
navigate these questions of governance? What other problems arise, and how do 
the people involved make sense of them? Encompassing these is a broader question: 
how can we make sense of Tor as a site of social action? 
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In exploring these questions, I draw theoretical frameworks from Science and 
Technology Studies. In particular, I use social worlds theory, a symbolic interactionist 
approach to the study of science and engineering communities (Star and Griesemer, 
1989). In Chapter 10, I draw on the findings of my empirical work on Tor to reflect on 
the potential of the social worlds framework as a productive companion to 
criminological research, expanding and deepening its framing of Internet 
infrastructures, however here I set out the core elements which I use in this thesis. In 
this chapter, I first discuss the literature on privacy, situating my theoretical framing 
of privacy technology within existing scholarship. In the following section, I set out 
the Social Worlds framework, which provides a “theory and methods package” 
(Clarke and Star, 2008) through which to separate out the multiple, overlapping, and 
contradictory ways of sense-making which accrete around infrastructures and 
scientific projects. Finally, I draw on Star’s (2003) concept of ‘convergence’ to frame 
how these worlds of discourse go on to shape the material form and design of Tor 
itself, and the concept of ‘performativity’ to frame the ways in which Tor might 
realise its visions of privacy in the world (Law and Singleton, 2000). 
 
Material privacy – Internet infrastructure and stealing the fire 
As I describe in Chapter 3, the Internet has long been a site of political struggle, and 
issues of privacy and power have been at the forefront of debates about the politics 
of the Internet. There is a substantial research literature on online privacy, including 
scholarship on governance and policy (Bennett & Raab, 2017), people’s perceptions 
and experiences of privacy (Viseu, Clement & Aspinall, 2004; Lyon, 2017), and 
privacy’s place in social and political life (Nissenbaum, 2009; Rider, 2018). Although 
privacy and anonymity are related concepts (and often used interchangeably), I refer 
to privacy in this thesis using Vedder’s (2011) broad definition, as socially 
constructed category systems pertaining to the control of information about 
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individuals, with spatial, relational, decisional and informational dimensions, and 
deep links to social order, power, and culture (Steijin and Vedder 2015).  
The research literature on privacy recognises that it is not monolithic, in fact 
composed of a range of related concepts and values (Solove, 2008) and understood 
very differently in different contexts and cultures (Nissenbaum 2009; Steijn and 
Vedder, 2015). Privacy is a core value through which liberal democracies construct 
their systems of government (though by no means exclusive to them) and underpins 
many of the conceptions of rights and public goods therein (Wright and Raab, 2014; 
Raab, Jones and Szekely 2015). The right to a private life, to have control over the 
intimate information circulated about oneself, and to establish spaces distinct from 
the ‘public’ sphere underpin the ability to formulate selfhood and identity as 
conceived in liberal democracies and to engage in democratic participation free from 
coercion (Wright and Raab, 2014). While privacy is certainly not confined to liberal 
democracies, it is crucial to their conception of the state, and a core way through 
which they differentiate themselves from more authoritarian modes of governance.  
This distinction is particularly important for Tor, whose public communications 
explicitly frame it as both protecting privacy within liberal democracies and providing 
it to those in authoritarian nations. Privacy as a value is by no means absolute, even 
within liberal and democratic nations, and is often balanced against other concerns, 
such as security and order maintenance (Solove, 2011). For example, the security 
services and law enforcement are routinely permitted to violate individual privacy in 
carrying out their duties (Lyon and Zureik, 1996). I distinguish privacy from 
anonymity, which (as befits privacy technologies like Tor) is the material affordance 
which allows an individual to control the knowability of their own identity in a given 
situation (Danezis and Guerses 2010). For the purposes of this thesis, privacy is a 
predominantly social concept, linked to a range of cultural factors, while anonymity 
is a narrower material property concerned with the actual distribution of information 
about people. 
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Conceptions of privacy, as will be apparent from the history I describe in Chapter 3, 
have changed substantially alongside the rise of Internet technologies (Lyon, 2007). 
Lyon argues that the form which the Internet has taken over the past ten years, 
providing communications platforms which allow and encourage their users to 
display private information in spaces which are accessible to billions of people 
around the world has created a ‘surveillance culture’ (Lyon, 2017), where people 
actively take part in their own surveillance, and surveil one another as an everyday 
part of social life. This poses deep problems for the balance of social power; these 
social transformations are being driven by private companies for financial 
exploitation and are having potentially harmful effects on vulnerable individuals and 
social groups, and broader human societies. Lyon argues that they constitute a 
power grab away from democratic institutions, and are opening societies up to 
greater control from prospective employers, insurers, law enforcement and security 
services (Lyon, 2007, 2014, 2017).  
As the mechanisms through which states and corporations govern the Internet 
expand to involve increasingly intimate surveillance of everyday life, the platforms 
and infrastructures of the Internet have become key sites of resistance, and these 
struggles are often framed around conceptions of privacy (Lyon 2015; Raab, Jones, & 
Szekely 2015). There is a well-documented history of privacy as a subject of social 
action, tied up as it is with ideas about state overreach, law enforcement, and 
democratic participation (Raab, 1997, Nissenbaum, 2009). This has historically 
occurred through traditional mechanisms, including protest, lobbying, policy 
engagement, the democratic political process, and legal challenges in the courts 
(Saunders, 1991; Garrow, 2015; Leizerov, 2000; Heisenberg, 2005). In this research, 
however, I explore an attempt to realise a particular vision of privacy through 
building infrastructure. The Internet freedom movement, a loose arrangement of 
NGOs, lobbying organisations, and activist groups, engage both in these more 
traditional routes of resistance, and through supporting the creation of privacy and 
anonymity technologies (Postill, 2014; Milan, 2016). Although Tor’s roots may be in 
military communications, as far back as the mid-90s this cypherpunk conception of 
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privacy as crucial to realising the utopian visions of the Internet (and averting its 
potentially dystopian futures) has been at the core of Onion Routing, and Tor.  
Social constructions of privacy are composed of multiple different elements which 
are understood and put into practice very differently in different contexts and 
cultures (Nissenbaum 2009, 2011; Steijn and Vedder, 2015). For example, Lewis’ 
work on Queer Privacy highlights the radically different types and constructions of 
privacy valued in the everyday lives of queer people (Lewis 2017), and other 
researchers have outlined the different ways in which privacy is understood, 
attached meaning to, and achieved within different religious traditions (Cannataci 
2009) and in older and younger groups (Steijn and Vedder, 2015). The Internet 
freedom movement frames its understanding of privacy in yet another way, as a 
reaction to developing technologies of control online. There has, however, been little 
research into the mechanisms by which these understandings are translated into 
technical properties through design processes. In addition to technical and 
engineering research on privacy technologies, a small but growing body of research 
applies sociological approaches to understanding the relationships between social 
constructions of privacy and privacy as a feature of technological systems. This 
research posits that privacy properties of technologies are material realisations of 
their designers’ understandings of privacy (Musiani 2010). The social constructions of 
privacy and anonymity held by their developers are therefore important in shaping 
the actions and understandings of their users (Bancroft 2017; Pfitzmann and Hansen 
2005). 
Some researchers have begun to explore the different ways in which developers 
conceptualise privacy in technological systems (Baer et al., 2009; Danezis and 
Guerses 2010; Musiani 2012). Danezis and Guerses (2010), for example, document a 
range of different understandings of privacy in technical systems which have 
developed since the turn of the millennium (Danezis and Guerses, 2010). This work 
has also been a fruitful avenue for critique. For example, Guerses, Kundnani and Van 
Hoboken argue that the conceptions of privacy by contemporary anonymity 
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technologies are often guilty of reproducing colonial logics which counterpose 
democratic nations to ‘alien’ practices of mass surveillance (Guerses, Kundnani and 
Van Hoboken, 2016) imported from so-callled ‘Eastern’ societies. They further argue 
that many of the mechanisms for providing anonymity which anonymity 
technologies employ are largely designed to protect groups who face less societal 
oppression, opposing themselves to mass surveillance in ways which implicitly or 
explicitly attempt to justify “targeted” surveillance which disproportionately affects 
people of colour (Guerses, Kundnani, and Van Hoboken, 2016). 
As I found when beginning my interviews, Tor is not characterised by a single shared 
set of values, practices, and understandings, or even shared constructions of privacy 
and its relationship with technology. In separating these distinct perspectives out 
and mapping the terrain of discourses and values which cluster around Tor, I employ 
a framework from STS: social worlds theory (Clarke and Star, 2008). This framework 
takes broader approaches and theory from symbolic interactionist scholarship and 
develops them within STS to explore complex relationships between sense-making, 
values, and the material world of science and engineering. Rather than study Tor as a 
social movement, I study it as a site where multiple different kinds of social action 
are attempted, of which an activist approach is only one potential frame. In Chapter 
10, I discuss in more detail (drawing on my empirical research) the potential 
contributions which this framework could make for criminological scholarship on 
technology, the Internet, and cybercrime, however here I set out an overview of its 
foundations and key ideas. 
 
Social Worlds 
The foundations of Social Worlds theory: symbolic interactionism 
I now turn to the theoretical framework which underlies the research in this thesis, 
and through which I explore Tor and the Tor community: social worlds theory. This 
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framework stems from the sociology of the Chicago School, whose ecological 
approach at the level of city regions went on to incorporate studies of micro-scale 
interpersonal interactions and how they contributed to group-level meaning-making 
(Deegan, 2013; Mathews, 1977; Park and Burgess, 1921; Plummer, 2000; Clarke and 
Star, 2008). The symbolic interactionist sociology which developed out of this 
academic community and their body of work is at the heart of social worlds theory. 
The focus of the symbolic interactionist school of social theory is on humans as 
interpretive beings who assign meaning to the actions of others and themselves 
(Blumer 1954, 1962). This situates the sociological level of analysis at the micro-level 
of interaction and interpretation, building these up into larger structures with wider 
social ramifications. Rather than studying social, cultural, structural, or biological 
‘forces’ that act on individuals and groups, this studies the self-making and meaning-
making behaviour of human beings themselves (Blumer, 1986; Plummer, 2000). 
These wider social contexts and structural features are treated as the conditions 
within which this meaning-making and action occurs rather than determining 
individual action in their own right. The work of George Herbert Mead (see for 
example Mead, 1934), and later Herbert Blumer (for example, Blumer, 1954, 1962, 
1986), is foundational for this school of social theory. Stemming from ‘social 
psychology’, this focuses on the interiority of human beings, and the ways in which 
they not only interact with others, but also interact with themselves, attempting to 
make sense of the things which they do and build up a set of understandings of their 
own internal lives (Plummer, 2000; Albas et al., 2003). Mead posits that this is at the 
core of how humans engage in social life, experiencing the world through processes 
of ‘self-indication’ as events are interpreted, assigned meaning, and acted upon 
(Mead 1934; Blumer, 1962).  
This is effectively a theory of subjectivity; the world with which people interact is 
experienced through these frames of interpretation, rather than a direct experience 
of any objective properties of the objects in the world themselves. This is the 
‘symbolic’ dimension of symbolic interaction, that humans engage in the world not 
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through solely through reactions to the material, but through a dense symbolic 
realm of meaning-making (Plummer, 2000; Mead, 1934; Blumer, 1962). The world as 
interpreted is therefore built up of an aggregation of these symbolic interpretations, 
which form the basis for and give meaning to individual action. As a result, social life 
is not fixed, rather it is constantly emerging and evolving, always being actively 
created and constructed by the people who make up societies (Albas et al., 2003). 
Where this picture extends to groups, these interpretive frames which are built up 
individually are able to align with one another through group interaction (Mead, 
1934; Becker and McCall, 2009). People share and learn the meaning-making 
frameworks of one another through these processes of interaction and 
interpretation, and within groups these align over time into a shared set of meanings 
and concerns. In fact, while the conception of the self is foundational to symbolic 
interaction, this body of scholarship does not consider individuals in isolation. 
Instead, what is studied is interactions and collective behaviours, and how these 
interactions and interpretations shape themselves and one another to produce 
collective action (Becker, 1986). 
Although many of the foundational studies which are often taken to be 
representative of social interactionist research focus on extreme micro-perspectives, 
such as the minutiae of gesture, expression, and speech in interpersonal 
interactions, the classic critique of interactionism as myopic and unconnected to 
broader relations of power is overstated (Plummer, 2000; Dennis and Martin, 2005). 
For example, Becker’s work on labelling theory connects this up to the much wider 
social processes of crime and deviance, which explores the role of others’ 
interpretations of us, in particular where these are stigmatising, in reinforcing group 
membership and the process of meaning-making, creating “outsiders” (Becker, 1963, 
2018). This explicitly tackles how patterns of interaction and meaning-making at the 
level of interpersonal interaction become perpetuated, building up through self-
reinforcing loops (for example, where labelling of a group as deviant shapes that 
group’s behaviours and understandings, producing a situation which reinforces the 
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initial deviant label in the minds of the labellers) to have effects at much higher 
social levels. This scholarship tends to reject the ‘micro-macro’ distinction entirely 
for an exploration of the particular processes at work in a given situation, none of 
which are ex ante given primacy over another (Haynor, 1989; Fine, 1993; Plummer, 
2000; Dennis and Martin, 2005). 
This concern with connecting up interactions and interpretations to broader social 
structures can also be found in Erving Goffman’s work, which takes these concerns 
with self-presentation and the production of social meaning and situates them 
within institutions, occupations, and power relationships between and within groups 
(Williams, 1986; Goffman, 1961, 1963, 1967, 1974, 1978, 1983, 1986). Although 
Goffman did not strictly identify his work within the interactionist tradition (Blumer, 
1986; Williams, 1986), his approach to empirical study and social theory resonates 
strongly with the interactionist concerns with interpretation, meaning-making, and 
communication, and is often considered as a core part of the interactionist canon. 
Goffman’s scholarship is chiefly concerned with the management and production of 
human social life, particularly the role of face-to-face interactions and how they 
allow people to inhabit particular roles in social settings (Goffman, 1963, 1967, 
1978). This frames interactions and social situations as performances and rituals in 
which individuals take on particular roles, engaging in active management of the 
ways in which they and their actions are perceived.  
Goffman’s research frames this through the interaction order: the conditions, rituals, 
staging and performances which constitute social life (Goffman, 1983). This engages 
not only with the performances themselves, but the conditions and structures which 
make them possible, the 'frontstage’ and ‘backstage’ areas of social life, the 
preparations and framing devices required, and the ways in which ‘audiences’ for 
these ritual performances are defined (Goffman, 1961, 1967, 1978, 1983; Pinch, 
2010). It is through the commonly-established rituals of interaction which 
characterise particular societies and groups that broader social relations, values, and 
social stratification are reproduced (and it is also through these which they might be 
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changed). For example, in an interaction between a doctor and a patient, both 
‘perform’ their assigned roles, thus reproducing the power dynamic between them 
(Goffman, 1961). 
This depicts society as composed of a plethora of overlapping and interacting social 
worlds, the higher level structures of discourse and meaning which form around 
professions, subcultures, organisations, and other groups and focal points of social 
action. Strauss packaged this up into a broader theory of social worlds, 
conceptualising these as “shared perspectives that form the basis for collective 
action” (Clarke and Star, 2008; Strauss, 1978). Becker was another early contributor 
to this body of scholarship which takes the social world as a primary unit of analysis 
(above the micro-studies of affect and gesture), most notably in Art Worlds, which 
maps the different perspectives, forms of labour, necessary conditions, and frames 
of meaning making which feed into the production of a work of art (Becker, 2008).  
As these interactionist perspectives began to gain more traction within Science and 
Technology Studies in the 1980s, they provided a powerful alternative approach to 
the tracings of Actor-Network Theory (which I describe briefly in Chapter 2) (Clarke, 
1997; Latour, 2005). Turning this concern with interpretation, communication, and 
meaning to the business of science and engineering has allowed a range of studies 
and theoretical conceptualisations which engage directly with the material world and 
how people attempt to attach meaning to it in different ways and through distinct 
practices. Although this theory draws from Strauss’ foundational work, the particular 
instantiation of the social worlds approach which I deploy in this thesis is that 
developed by Star, Bowker and Clarke within Science and Technology Studies 
(Bowker and Star, 2000; Clarke and Star, 2008). Within STS, this has been an 
extremely productive framework, providing an approach for separating out the 
heterogeneous terrain of intersecting perspectives, practices, and discourses which 
scientific, technical, and engineering work enrols due to the wide range of different 
kinds of work and actors on which it depends (Star and Griesemer, 1989). 
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The social worlds approach 
Scientific research and engineering work are often characterised as processes 
through which groups arrive at consensus about the material ‘truth’ of a shared 
subject of enquiry (Star and Griesemer, 1989). However, as Star and Griesemer 
argue in their foundational (1989) study of Berkeley’s Museum of Vertebrate 
Zoology, the stories of scientific endeavours are in fact often characterised by the 
maintenance of substantial dissent and diversity of understanding between groups 
which nevertheless manage to “co-operate without consensus”. Clarke and Star 
(2008) lay out a framework for exploring these dissonant perspectives within Science 
and Technology Studies through the concept of social worlds: “universes of 
discourse” (Mead, 1938; Strauss, 1978; Clarke and Star 2008) which accrete around a 
common focus, splitting, converging, interacting, and conflicting over time. This 
frames particular infrastructures, technologies, artefacts or knowledge-making 
projects as arenas around which multiple ways of understanding can gather and 
“interweave” (Clarke and Star, 2008 p113).  
The precise ‘discourse’ at issue in Social Worlds theory draws from a Meadsian 
understanding of discourse as bound up in “collective, material action” (Mead, 1934, 
1964; Clarke and Star, 2010, p116), rather than focused around the conventional 
groups which often form the units of organisation and analysis for other social 
scientific approaches to the study of discourse. As a result, social worlds research 
does not pre-define such groups as elements of analysis, instead mapping the messy, 
overlapping ways in which worlds of discourse draw their boundaries across arenas, 
often ignoring the neatly-defined social groups which may be most obviously 
apparent, such as “organisations, institutions, and even social movements” (Clarke 
and Star, 2010, p116). The symbolic interactionist concern with the role of the micro-
level processes of interpretation and interaction, and how they aggregate into 
higher-level structures, is at the core of this approach. Although some social worlds 
scholarship focuses on individuals (Shibutani, 1955), the majority, and the 
scholarship on which I draw in this thesis, does not, instead focusing on the social 
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worlds themselves as subjects of enquiry. For this research, this means that a single 
characterisation of Tor’s ‘values’, or of Tor as a site of social action, is not sought 
from the outset, rather what is attempted is a mapping of the complexity of 
discourse and action, of meaning and materiality, which actually characterises the 
organisation. 
Methodologically, this leads to an approach heavily drawn from grounded theory, an 
inductive approach to fieldwork and analysis. This generally generates data through 
deep qualitative empirical research, including interviews and ethnographic study, 
which are then coded inductively, building up a set of very low-level codes which are 
then grouped into higher levels of meaning. This involves a “tack[ing] back and forth” 
(Clarke, 2005, p59) between this painstaking building-up of semantic structures and 
higher-level interrogation of meaning, which converges on a framework for making 
sense of the empirical data. This is as distinct from a more deductive approach, 
which begins with a coding framework, usually drawn from pre-existing theory, and 
fits the data into it, drawing analytical purchase from investigating the structures the 
data takes within these predefined categories (Bonnell,1980). Clarke has developed 
this further into situational analysis, which I discuss in more detail in Chapter 5, 
along with a more thorough accounting of my methodological approach (Clarke, 
2003).  
In order to guide the process of inductive analysis, social worlds research uses 
sensitizing concepts (Blumer 1954; Clarke 1997; Clarke and Star, 2008) which 
indicate potentially interesting avenues of investigation, commonly-found features, 
and sensibilities with which to approach data generation and analysis. Rather than a 
programmatic toolkit, in which all elements must be present, these can be taken up 
and used as best suits the research and put back down or ignored when they cease 
to be relevant. As a knowledge-making process in itself, social worlds theory is hence 
formulated as a community of academic research practice which shares these 
methods and ideas: as a conceptual reservoir on which to draw rather than a 
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prescriptive set of frameworks which need to follow a standard form in every case 
(Clarke and Star, 2008). 
 
Sensitising concepts 
I now turn to describe in detail the sensitising concepts which I have found 
particularly helpful in shaping this research. The first of these is the concept of ‘social 
worlds’ itself.  Social worlds are “universes of discourse” (Strauss, 1978, p121) which 
intersect around a shared focus (which Strauss terms an arena), populated by 
individuals and groups whose working practices engage them in different ways with 
this central site of concern, and who develop distinct ways of making sense of the 
activities in which they are engaged and the focus and purpose of their work. These 
package up practices, discourses, ways of understanding, and sensibilities into a 
coherent form which constitutes a distinct perspective on a mutual topic of concern 
(Strauss, 1978; Star and Griesemer, 1989; Clarke and Star, 2008). For example, an 
operating theatre may be the site at which many different social worlds intersect, 
with the worlds of the surgeon, the neonatologist, and the obstetrician (and by 
extension, the nurse, the cleaning staff, the researcher, the architect, the computer 
programmer, and the anaesthetist) all contributing to the production of a situation in 
which surgery can occur in different ways (Casper, 1998). Each of these have their 
own understandings of the situation, their own place in it, and their own 
contribution to make.  
Social worlds tend to be associated strongly with a primary activity or set of practices 
and a distinctive ideological position on the work in which they are engaged (Clarke 
1997). This allows the technologies, infrastructures, or endeavours at the focus of an 
arena of discourse to represent a multiplicity of meanings, as multiple social worlds 
cluster around them. These social worlds are linked to the material elements of 
these technologies, infrastructures, and artefacts through points of passage, 
particular sites through which they can shape and influence the material, and hence 
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stabilise their own perspectives and steer the collective action towards their own 
goals and visions (Latour, 2005; Clarke and Star, 2008). Taking the example of the 
operating theatre, a computer programmer may influence the way in which the 
digital systems of the theatre are designed, the nurse may, through established 
practices and policies, shape important elements of patient pre-care and 
preparation, and so on. In this way, they materialise elements of their social world’s 
discourses and frameworks of meaning in the situation, which represents a 
multiplicity of overlapping worlds which shape the material in different ways.  
Crucially, this does not lock the social worlds of discourse which form rigidly to 
distinct groups of actors, rather it allows individuals to inhabit multiple worlds of 
discourse (Unruh 1979). Although particular social worlds may stem from and be tied 
to particular practices or groups, they have a life of their own above this and can 
overlap, conflict, influence one another, and be drawn on by a range of different 
(and often surprising) groups and individuals. Worlds may change over time, 
incorporating one another, subdividing internally, or changing entirely (Clarke and 
Star, 2008). The participation of individuals themselves in these worlds is fluid, and 
groups and individuals are able to draw on dissonant or conflicting ways of 
understanding their arena in different situations, becoming themselves sites where 
social worlds come together and interact. A substantial amount of boundary work is 
therefore involved in maintaining and negotiating the distinctions between social 
worlds (Star, 2010). In addition to these core participants are implicated actors, 
which are those which those directly involved conjure or draw on in doing work, but 
whose own voices are not present in these discussions (either because they are 
present but silenced, or because they are simply not involved directly). For example, 
in design processes with little user consultation, the users of a technology might be 
considered implicated actors, speculated about and used to argue for particular 
solutions or designs, but not active participants in the arena in their own right 
(Clarke and Star, 2008). These also extend to nonhumans which are gestured at in 
discussions and discourse but whose actual material forms are not closely 
interrogated through empirical inspection or brought in actively. 
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The boundaries between worlds are particularly productive subjects of enquiry (Star 
and Neumann, 1988). Actor-Network Theory frames this boundary work between 
different groups through interessement, a process through which one group 
becomes enlisted in the aims of another and the concerns of that group are 
translated into the language of the dominant group through points of passage and 
reframed to suit their goals (Star and Griesemer, 1989; Latour, 2005). In social 
worlds scholarship, however, translation work is not unidirectional and agonistic, 
rather it occurs simultaneously between multiple interacting social worlds. As such, 
the formations of the different actors retain their essential character despite this 
translation, and the work of the researcher becomes mapping the ecologies of these 
different perspectives and the ways in which they interact and engage in this mutual 
work of translation, without assuming that any of the worlds have a better claim to 
truth than the others (Star and Griesemer, 1989).  
Social Worlds theory explores this translation work through the concept of boundary 
objects (Star and Neumann, 1988; Star, 2010; Star and Griesemer, 1989). These are 
concepts, artefacts, or technologies which tie social worlds together, allowing 
“cooperation without consensus” (Star 1989; Barret 2010; Star, 2010). These 
constitute “practices, structure, and language [which] emerge for doing things 
together” (Star 2010 p602; Becker, 1986). Where the perspectives of contrasting 
worlds need to work together, it is boundary objects which permit the necessary 
translation work to occur. They do this by having some fixed elements which are 
shared between worlds, allowing a common language for collaborative working and 
translation. In addition to these fixed elements, they have some elements which are 
left more amorphous and are permitted to differ in different worlds, allowing them 
to take different, or even totally conflicting shapes in order to facilitate specific kinds 
of work. (Star, 2010). These properties allow them to “inhabit several intersecting 
social worlds… and satisfy the informational requirements of each of them” (Star and 
Griesemer, 1989), and be used in those settings where worlds overlap while being 
repurposeable as more specific formations within the worlds themselves (Star 1988; 
2010). Where these become established together within infrastructures, they can 
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extend to greater levels of scale, becoming classification systems which allow 
multiple large groups to carry out different kinds of work (Bowker and Star, 1999). 
Boundary objects can be physical artefacts or infrastructures that constitute sets of 
work arrangements such as a library, which is characterised by a classification and 
organisation system which supports multiple different kinds of work (Star, 2010), or 
more conceptual constructions; ideas which permit groups to cultivate shared 
elements of understanding that bind them together despite their differences. 
Susan Leigh Star’s development of the social worlds framework is the guiding light 
for this thesis, which takes inspiration from Star’s studies of information systems and 
their designers (see for example, Star and Ruhleder, 1996; Star 1999). Infrastructures 
are core parts of social worlds, and are embedded with their key values, logics and 
constructions – they are “frozen discourses that form avenues between social worlds 
and into arenas and larger structures” (Clarke 2008). Star and Ruhleder (1996) lay 
out a theorisation of infrastructure which has a number of key characteristics. 
Infrastructure becomes visible on breakdown, and relies on a substantial degree of 
‘invisible work’ in order to function in a way which is transparent to its users: the 
“sinking into the background” (Star and Ruhleder, 1996) which is often ascribed to 
infrastructure is only ever partial and contingent on maintenance work and material 
conditions (Star and Ruhleder, 1996; Star 2010). This maintenance work is also a 
productive subject of sociological enquiry (Star, 1999; Graham and Thrift, 2007). It is 
built on an installed base, constructed atop and relying on existing infrastructures 
and shaped by the assumptions and historical legacies which they embody. It also 
allows further systems to be built on top of it and alongside it, becoming part of a 
system of standardisation which can fit into other systems, infrastructures, and 
technologies. This also creates a level of inertia, as the size of such systems mean 
that top-down change is extremely difficult, and so transformations are local, partial, 
and slow. It is linked to conventions of practice which both structure its material 
forms and need to be learned by new people who want to engage with it. Finally, it 
supports a wide range of different use cases, and is permeable to multiple different 
meanings (Star and Ruhleder 1996; Star 2010). This conceptualisation of 
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infrastructure is particularly conceived within the context of the rise of large-scale, 
distributed and decentralised infrastructures and the problems they pose for 
attempts at standardisation, arguing that “one person’s standard is in fact another’s 
chaos. There are no genuine universals in the design of large-scale information 
technology” (Star and Ruhdeler, 1996). 
In using a social worlds approach to study Tor, I treat it both as an infrastructure, but 
also as the focus of a range of different people, kinds of work, perspectives, and 
attempts at sense-making. This allows us to explore the plethora of hidden work 
which underpins the conditions which make Tor possible, allowing it to be more than 
a proof-of-concept, rather, a successful, widely-used infrastructure. In Musiani’s 
terms, this constitutes a study of Tor which is “not afraid of its subject” (Musiani, 
2012, p5) happy to dive into the worlds of technical development and administrative 
practices where necessary to understand Tor’s values and its place in the world. A 
social worlds approach achieves this through interviews, archival work, and 
ethnographic study, allowing the Tor community itself (as experts in their own 
worlds) to give voice to their own diverse understandings of the important 
controversies at play, and the connections between values, practices and technical 
forms (Clarke and Star, 2008). In combination with studies of the practices and forms 
of work in which they actually engage, and the sensitising concepts I have described 
herein, this forms the “theory-methods package” (Clarke and Star, 2008) which I use 
to investigate the social life of Tor, giving due weight to the material without getting 
lost in the minutiae of technical detail. 
 
Making the link from meaning to the material 
Embedding values in technology 
In studying these group attempts at the production of knowledge and the 
development of technologies; the question of materiality is an important one. 
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Moving from a framework for separating out the complex landscape of types of 
work, practices, perspectives, and discourses which surround Tor, in this section I 
discuss the frameworks which Science and Technology Studies offers to make sense 
of how these values and perspectives are actually materialised in practice: how they 
become crystallised as infrastructure (Star, 1999), embedded in the material, or 
‘inscribed’ in technologies (Latour, 2005). I then discuss how these technologies and 
infrastructures might go on to reproduce these values and categories in society. 
For my study of Tor, the most obvious ‘material’ features to study were the software 
and hardware of Tor itself: the code and protocols which create privacy for its users, 
and the infrastructure of relays which allows this to work at scale. These involve very 
different kinds of work, however the most ‘high-profile’ and visible of these is 
undoubtedly the development work through which Tor’s initial developers created 
an initial design for Tor. Although there were many other important processes 
through which Tor grew into its current form, this early design work is undoubtedly 
an important point at which the kind of privacy which Tor envisions and creates in 
the world was fixed. In this thesis, I describe this through a set of processes and 
mechanisms which include ‘design’, ‘development’ and ‘implementation’. Where I 
refer to ‘design’, I mean the processes by which the structure and function of the 
infrastructure are reasoned about and formalised, largely at the beginning, when the 
initial work of technological creation and engineering is ongoing, but also at other 
points when it is revisited. ‘Development’ constitutes the entire process of creation, 
including design, but also testing, implementation, consultation and other 
subprocesses which continue throughout the whole lifetime of the infrastructure. 
‘Implementation’ refers to the ways in which the formal design of the infrastructure 
is materialised, and the modifications, revisions and compromises which this entails 
(Williams, Stewart, and Slack, 2005). In practice, development is multifaceted and 
iterative, with designs and implementations being refined, tested and 
reconceptualised in different ways throughout the process (Guedanna and Ayadi, 
2013). I do not use a linear conception of the development process in this paper, 
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rather I am interested in the negotiations between different kinds of work which 
take place across the course of an infrastructure’s creation and beyond. 
Science and Technology Studies approaches to understanding how values become 
embedded in technologies often draw on the concept of ‘inscription’ from Actor-
Network Theory: the “translation of one’s interest into material form” (Callon, 1991, 
p143). The designers of an artefact, or those involved in its creation, have a 
particular view of the people who will use it and the kinds of action which they 
intend it to permit, which both reflects their own values, social structures, and 
understandings of the world, and is stabilised in the material forms of the technology 
(Akrich, 1992; Latour, 2005). Where a broader range of humans and non-humans 
actors (or ‘actants’, in ANT) are involved in the creation of a technological artefact, 
each of them struggles to enrol the others into their vision of the project and install 
themselves at key control points in the network: points of passage (Latour, 2005). 
Where multiple visions conflict, particular groups can assert themselves through a 
process of interessement which involves particular actors attempting to recruit those 
with different visions, reframing their concerns in terms of their own and hence 
establishing their position as gatekeepers at points of passage and exerting their 
control over the project (Monteiro and Hanseth, 1996). The properties of the 
resulting technology are the result of this struggle, and ANT frames this as a process 
of ‘funnelling’, through which the concerns of a wide range of actors are shaped 
down and translated through the perspective of a key gatekeeper (Latour 2005; Star 
and Griesemer, 1989). This has been extensively used to study the creation of 
technical artefacts, uncovering hidden actors and agencies at play in social life 
(Venturini, 2010, Van der Wagen, 2015).  
Where social worlds theory conceptualises how value systems shape the material 
properties of infrastructure, it does so through a more multifarious conception of 
translation work. Rather than an agonistic perspective, where a dominant group of 
actors (or ‘actants’) enrols others in its vision, in the social worlds framework, 
multiple intersecting social worlds all attempt to engage in this translation work and 
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establish their vision of the project, engaging at a multitude of different passage 
points (Clarke and Star, 2008). Therefore, rather than an Actor-Network approach, 
which funnels perspectives down through gatekeepers, social worlds theory takes a 
broader approach, framing at the level of the organisation and mapping how 
multiple worlds shape and collaborate with one another across a range of passage 
points (Star and Griesemer, 1989). 
While this is a useful conceptual framework for mapping which elements of the 
material form of an infrastructure are shaped by which actors, I am also interested in 
the ‘backwards’ flow from the material to the discursive: how the material 
constraints, design processes and technologies shape the social worlds of Tor as they 
themselves are shaped by them. For this, I draw on the idea of convergence, a 
process by which infrastructures and the human actors who come into contact with 
them ‘converge’ as their social worlds mutually shape one another (Star, Bowker, 
and Newman, 1998). Star argues that one of infrastructure’s core features is 
transparency, the quality which infrastructure possesses for certain users at certain 
times, where it becomes to a greater or lesser extent visible to the user, its material 
resistance to user action fading into the background to permit more seamless 
mediation of intent (Star and Ruhdeler, 1996; Star, Bowker, and Newman 1998; Star, 
1999). This transparency is the result of a convergence between the social world of a 
particular actor and the category systems embedded in the infrastructure itself (Star, 
1990, 1999). Star uses this specifically to study information artefacts, or technologies 
and infrastructures which codify particular category systems for the purpose of 
knowledge work and information sharing. These form a key undergirding for social 
worlds, stabilising and formalising their knowledge forms and category systems, and 
hence facilitating knowledge work (Star, Bowker and Newman, 1998).  
Tor is a different kind of infrastructure, however I have found this useful for 
understanding the processes at play within the design work of the Tor developers. 
Although Tor is used to share information, it does not primarily act as a system of 
categorisation for that information but as a more general-purpose conduit for 
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communication, the contents of which it leaves largely untouched. It does, however, 
embed a set of category systems within it, in particular, a taxonomy of the users of 
Tor and the people who are trying to attack it.  I use convergence in this thesis, 
therefore, as a way of understanding the development process itself. Using archival 
records of the development process, I track the steady, iterative emergence of the 
social world of Tor’s developers alongside the materialised category systems 
embedded in its infrastructure, framing these as ‘converging’ together as they tack 
back and forth between different kinds of work. 
Existing conceptualisations of convergence often focus on systems already-in-place 
and already-existing social worlds; how the rationalities of different groups interact 
with those embedded in technical systems, including library systems (Star, 2003) and 
information systems for biological research (Star and Ruhdeler, 1996). In contrast, in 
this thesis I develop this approach to explore how these processes work when an 
infrastructure is created for the first time. When the developers of Tor first began to 
design it, the foundational social worlds of Tor were not yet fully-formed – they 
needed to pull this together from a variety of pre-existing and newly developed ideas 
and understandings. My approach frames the values of the developers through the 
category systems they use to understand privacy, and maps how they refine these 
categories through the design process, finally stabilising this social world in Tor’s 
infrastructure as a set of materialised values. This is particularly useful for a study of 
Tor, as it also allows us to focus not only on design, but also on the more hidden 
forms of work, such as maintenance and administration, on which Tor relies. This 
extends the idea of what makes Tor ‘work’ beyond the mere completion of a 
functioning prototype, to consider the conditions and types of work which allow Tor 
to be robust, resilient, successful, widely-used, and usable; in short, to make its 
vision of privacy a reality in the world. 
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How technology shapes the world 
Finally, I turn to the consequences of these materialised discourses, setting out 
frameworks for exploring how technologies and infrastructures such as Tor might 
shape the world and realise the visions of privacy which characterise its social worlds 
and become embedded in its material forms. To do this, I use the concept of 
‘performativity’, a core concept in STS research and theorisation (see for example, 
Orlikowski, 2005; Callon, 2009; Mackenzie, 2005, 2006; Law and Singleton, 2000; 
Licoppe, 2010; Musiani, 2015). The extensive and vital scholarship of Judith Butler 
(for example, Butler, 2002, 2006, 2011, 2013) argues that the social categories which 
make up human societies are not static, positivist, or inevitable, but need to be 
continuously and actively produced, or performed. These performances – of gender, 
race, social class, sexuality – are not a given, sometimes succeeding, sometimes 
failing, often only partially realised. While Butler focuses on the discursive domain of 
performance, in Science and Technology Studies, the idea of ‘performativity’ has 
been used in a wide body of scholarship which bridges the material and semantic to 
map, or trace, the material and discursive conditions and elements which produce, 
or allow the production of, particular social categories and realities (Callon, 2009; 
Licoppe, 2010). This framework therefore constitutes a theory of technosocial 
action, through which technologies can be considered as ‘performing’ the values and 
assumptions of their designers, shaping and producing social life in a variety of ways. 
In performing the motivations and worldviews of their designers, they can grant or 
stabilise access to power, capacities and resources for different people and groups 
(Harre, 2002), and can act as a direct representation or stand-in for particular 
discourses: a symbol, or set of symbols in themselves, or a frame within which 
symbols can be communicated. Thus, the “embedded discourses” which we 
discussed in the previous sub-section themselves go on to be reproduced in social 
life by the infrastructures and technologies in which they are embedded (Akrich, 
1992). 
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Performances are ways of making up reality in a certain way, and this is equally the 
case for the “material performances” (Law and Singleton, 2000) of technologies and 
infrastructures. The discourses which form across the creation of an artefact and 
become embedded in its material form package up a range of different ideas and 
scripts, performing the relationships between the actors involved in their creation 
and their understandings of the world. (Akrich, 1992, Musiani, 2012, 2015). 
Performativity has been used as a conceptual framework for understanding how the 
Internet and its technologies become sites where particular views of the world and 
ideas are realised. For example, De Nardis’s research studies the “embedded politics 
of technical architecture” and the ways in which control points designed into the 
Internet infrastructure act as important sites of power (Musiani, 2015; DeNardis, 
2009, 2014). While there is a small but growing body of studies of the category 
systems at play in Internet technologies, the politics and values of their designers, 
and their consequences, particularly for social media platforms (Howard and Parks, 
2012; Youmans and York, 2012), I engage in this study at a lower level, as Tor sits not 
at the ‘platform’ level, but just above the material infrastructures and protocols of 
the Internet itself.  
The work of Goffman forms a useful bridging-point between the interactionist 
approach of social worlds theory and these concerns with ‘performativity’ and the 
ways in which technology shapes society (which are more usually tackled within STS 
through Actor-Network-aligned frameworks) (Goffman, 1983; Clarke, 2005). Pinch 
(2010), in a paper which provides an extremely useful guide for these elements of 
this thesis, argues that the “hidden technologies” within Goffmann’s sociology play 
an important role in structuring the interaction order, forming the material setting 
which distinguishes ‘audience’ from ‘actor’, ‘frontstage’ from ‘backstage’ and the 
more subtle conditions in which social performances and ritual interaction takes 
place. These both set the conditions in which performances are able to occur and 
constitute performances (or parts of performances) in their own right. He further 
extends this to argue that understanding social action, especially in contemporary 
societies where a vast array of Internet services, platforms and technologies are 
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involved in its mediation, requires a deeper engagement with interactionist 
approaches to technologies and infrastructures, and deep empirical work studying 
the designers of platforms and infrastructures on which the Internet relies (Pinch 
2010). 
This framing allows us to make the final connection to social worlds. Rather than 
assuming the primacy of the designers, a social worlds approach aims to square the 
contributions of all the different worlds involved in the creation of infrastructure, 
and the maintenance and administration which provides the conditions for it to 
perform these visions of the world. This extends these worlds into the performance 
itself,  to explore what happens when Tor meets the world and begins to perform 
these values and shape the interaction order of its users, to make sense of the 
problems which arise, how these performances are frustrated and subverted, and 
how Tor’s different worlds attempt to navigate this. This presents an active form of 
technological performance, supported and shaped by a range of human and 
technical elements – not only the creative embedding of the values of the designers, 
but the other forms of hidden work, such as maintenance, public relations, 
administration, or resilience practices, which nevertheless play an important role in 
shaping and supporting Tor’s performance of its particular vision of privacy. 
Star’s research on information systems and other kinds of infrastructures connects 
social worlds and the category systems which they embed in material forms explicitly 
to power and marginality (Star, 1990).  The people who use and interact with 
infrastructures once they are deployed are often considered by developers only in 
the abstract at the design stage, and the ways in which they attempt to bring them 
into ongoing development or categorise them through research are themselves 
systems of classification, and hence, power (Foucault, 1991, 2007; Star, 1990). This 
means that the category systems through which the developers imagine user groups 
are important sites where social reality is produced, and an important form of power 
wielded by the developers to realise their vision of the world. Those who don’t fit 
perfectly can find themselves shaping their own lives and selves to better conform, 
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and those who don’t fit at all can find themselves cast out entirely and created as 
outsiders (Star, 1990, 1999). 
The view of Tor which I set out in this thesis is not a total one. In deciding to focus on 
the Tor community itself, rather than the myriad different groups who use Tor, I 
develop only a partial perspective, which is unable to say much about how these 
visions of the world are performed in reality when they come into contact with 
users. What I can do, however, is talk about the different kinds of work and 
conditions which go into making these performances possible and successful; the 
things which help Tor to realise its vision of privacy in practice. I am also able to 
explore the problems with crime, power, administration, the criminal justice system, 
and active attempts to undermine Tor which these performances face in practice 
and how they are negotiated. In doing so, I set out an in-depth sociological study of 
Tor which breaks down its attempt to ‘steal the fire’ and wield infrastructural power 
into its component parts, mapping in detail the different people, stagings, and kinds 
of work (both frontstage and behind-the-scenes) which are involved; the successes, 
failures, and problems which it encounters; and the new forms of work, ideas, and 
ways of making-sense which arise as a result. 
 
Conclusion 
This research constitutes a social worlds study of the Tor Project which aims to open 
up the black box of Tor and explore how it fits into these wider domains of power 
and ideas of privacy and the Internet. Although the empirical work in which I engage 
is concerned with the detailed practices and understandings of the people in the Tor 
community, this work does aim to connect back up to bigger questions of power. 
Conceptualising Tor as an attempt to ‘steal the fire’ on this broader stage, I use a 
social worlds approach to break this apart into its constitutive components. I am 
concerned with what these attempts at social action through technology actually 
depend upon in practice: what kinds of work (both hidden and overt), conditions, 
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ideas, values and visions are implicated, the problems which arise and how Tor 
navigates them.  
Through a social worlds approach, this can be conceived as a process of mapping the 
social worlds of Tor, the practices and perspectives associated with them, and the 
boundary objects through which they negotiate conflict and collaboration. This 
engages with the different ways in which the worlds of the Tor community imbue Tor 
with meaning and the kinds of work with through which they encounter, support, 
and produce Tor as a collective endeavour. I then explore the materialisation of 
these worlds in the infrastructure of Tor itself through processes of convergence, not 
assuming that this is unidirectional, but allowing the material properties and 
constraints of Tor and the practices of design and development to recursively shape 
the values and understandings of Tor’s designers even as this development work 
proceeds. I then use Star’s frameworks for researching infrastructure and hidden 
work to explore the additional forms of work, maintenance, and resilience practices 
which are required beyond the simple picture of ‘designing in values’ in order to 
make the infrastructure perform these values in practice and at scale. I use Tor’s 
social worlds as a way of understanding these different kinds of work, the 
rationalities which underpin them, and how they also constitute sites at which the 
‘values’ of Tor’s infrastructure are embedded and reinforced. Finally, I draw these 
different strands together into more explicitly criminological terrain. I use the 
framework of social worlds which I have characterised within Tor to explore the 
issues of illegal and harmful activities by its users and friction with governance and 
criminal justice regimes which Tor faces in practice, and how each of these social 
worlds make sense of and navigate them.  
Taken in its entirety, this constitutes an in-depth sociological study of the Tor 
community and its attempts at social action, yielding insights into how wider 
concerns of power and values at play in Internet privacy are actually worked out in 
practice. In the following chapter, I set out how I went about exploring these 
questions through empirical research. I outline the methodological approach and 
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fieldwork through which I generated the data for this thesis, the ethical practices, 
considerations, and issues which I took into account in the planning stages and 
throughout the research, and my approach to analysis.  
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chapter 5  
exploring the values of 
an infrastructure: 
methodology, ethics, 
fieldwork and analysis 
 
Introduction 
My interest in the Tor Project as a site of study stems from my broader interest in 
the Internet, online privacy, and their links to politics and power. As I was in the final 
stages of my MSc in Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Edinburgh 
in 2013 and sounding out potential PhD topics, the Snowden leaks broke, revealing 
that liberal democratic nations were engaged in mass surveillance at home and 
abroad (Lyon, 2014, 2015; Wood and Wright, 2015). Already sensitised to issues of 
governmental power from my activist work, I developed a keen interest in what this 
might mean for conceptions of how societies are governed, how power is enacted, 
and the consequences for justice and liberation movements in contemporary 
societies. Over the next few years, throughout the process of applying for the PhD, 
carrying out fieldwork, and writing up my thesis, surveillance and data privacy have 
become only more contentious issues, with significant public controversies around 
surveillance by social media companies (Zuboff, 2015; Smith, Henne and von Voigt, 
2012; Carlson, 2018), the use of surveillance-driven advertising for election 
interference (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017; Guardian, 2019), and worrying shifts 
towards the management of public services and policing by algorithmic processing of 
mass-collected personal information (Ferguson, 2016; Casady 2011; Zwitter, 2014). I 
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share with the Tor Project a deep anxiety about the potential visions of the future 
which are implicit in these trends: of societies governed through unaccountable 
surveillance and control managed by private companies and spy agencies outside 
robust democratic institutions (Tor Project, 2019). 
My intention in this research was to take frameworks and approaches from social 
worlds theory and bring them into criminological study of the Internet. However, 
rather than simply doing theoretical work, I was keen to do this alongside a 
programme of qualitative research through which I could explore the benefits and 
challenges of these approaches in practice. I initially intended to do a comparative 
study including multiple technologies and projects, however, in conversation with my 
supervisors, I decided that an in-depth qualitative study on a single infrastructure 
would develop a richer picture than a comparative study might. I aimed to choose a 
subject for this study which particularly showcased the links between values and 
technology, and, having previously had an interest in the work of the Tor Project, 
with whose mission I was sympathetic, this seemed to be an apposite choice. Tor 
occupies a deeply contested space at the meeting point between state control of the 
Internet and attempts at resistance. It also poses particular questions around the 
governance of online crime and the appropriate limits of state power, constituting a 
potentially productive case study for bringing social worlds theory into criminological 
study of the Internet.  
In the first year of my PhD, I discussed at length with my supervisors which potential 
sites for collecting data about Tor might be available and how best to capture these 
sources. The openness of the Tor community meant that, unlike with for-profit 
infrastructure providers such as Google, Facebook, or ISPs, the Tor Project would not 
have commercial sensitivities preventing them from speaking to me (although they 
have other considerations which made this difficult, which I discuss below). This, 
along with the fact that Tor was beginning to engage more in public conversations 
about its values through blog posts and news interviews, meant that conducting 
interviews with members of the Tor community was potentially feasible, if requiring 
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careful handling. In addition to this, the public nature of much of the Tor Project’s 
work meant that there were numerous potential sites for ethnographic observation, 
including IRC channel meetings, developer meetings, and conferences. Finally, the 
existence of Tor’s expansive public archives of mailing lists, design documents, 
feature proposals, and code changes meant that even if all the other avenues fell 
through, there would still be sufficient material for a PhD thesis. My own technical 
background was important here: having worked with computers throughout my life, 
including  as a statistical programmer, I was able to read and understand technical 
material, had a good understanding of how to talk fluently about technical issues 
with engineers, and was attuned to what might be interesting problems and 
controversies. This meant that I was able and willing to engage with the technical 
fundamentals of Tor to the extent needed to explore how they might be linked to 
questions of sociological interest.  
The Tor Project presents both unique challenges and opportunities for sociological 
research. From the researcher’s perspective, it exists in tension between two 
countervailing forces: its policy of radical openness means that its developers, code, 
discussions and public life are uniquely accessible, while its position as a resistance 
technology (which comes into conflict with law enforcement and state security 
services) means that many in its community are deeply reluctant to engage with 
researchers, and the human cost of mistakes is potentially very high (Gehl, 2018b). 
Even aside from the difficulties of negotiating access, Tor’s openness, which it adopts 
both as an expression of its core values and as a protective mechanism (as I discuss 
at length in Chapter 8), presents the sociological researcher with difficult decisions as 
to how much of this archival material and open discussion spaces such as chat 
channels are really ‘fair game’ (Gehl 2018a; Gehl, 2018b; Kozinetz 2010). 
Researching technological projects is a challenge in its own right and pulling this 
wealth of technical detail into something sociologically meaningful, ethically 
defensible, and engaging to read has its own difficulties (Star, 1999). 
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At the core of my research was a desire to study Tor as a site of social action: as an 
attempt to ‘do politics’ through infrastructure (Musiani, 2015). I wanted to break this 
infrastructural politics down into its component parts, studying in depth the values 
which shaped each part, the ways in which the material design of Tor was created, 
the additional forms of hidden work and other conditions which allowed it to 
succeed, and the problems which its ‘performance’ of its vision of the world faces in 
practice. In doing this, I undertook both semi-structured qualitative interviews and 
archival research. Given the explicitly political nature of their work, I had expected 
the Tor community to have a set of strong, shared values and understandings of Tor. 
In fact, the earliest finding of my research was that its community was characterised 
by a diverse range of conflicting motivations and perspectives. The social worlds 
framework proved to be an ideal approach for distilling this into three main social 
worlds which could then be used to answer other questions about Tor and make 
sense of some of the contradictions which characterise it as a site of social action 
(Clarke and Star, 2008). 
In this chapter I focus on the practicalities of the fieldwork and analysis, describing 
how this theoretical framework fits into these more practical concerns and why I 
made the methodological decisions I did. I begin this chapter by discussing the 
design strategies and research questions of the study, drawing out the links between 
my theoretical framework and my fieldwork approach. I then discuss how I 
developed my approach to interviews and the archival data sources of which I made 
use. Next, I describe my fieldwork journey, from initial approaches through to 
building trust, to the corpus of interview data I managed to generate. I then set out 
the ethical principles and considerations which structured the design of this 
research. In the next section, I then set out my analytical practices, from the initial 
coding and mapping to the organisation of my data into a set of findings. Finally, I 
reflect on some of the potential methodological limitations of my research. 
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Research questions and strategies 
Research questions 
As I describe in the previous chapter, the social worlds framework is based in 
symbolic interactionism, and the inductive, grounded methodological approaches 
which stem from this means that research questions evolve across the course of the 
research project. I began with a broad set of research questions and areas of interest 
and refined these as particular themes and findings arose from my fieldwork. The 
initial questions with which I began were as follows: 
1. What are the main social structures, kinds of work, and technological 
infrastructures which make Tor function? 
2. What motivates the people in the Tor community, and how do they 
understand what Tor is trying to do? What is their vision of privacy? Do 
they share a single coherent perspective and set of values, or is the 
community characterised by multiple different perspectives? 
3. How do their views on crime, privacy and surveillance affect their work 
and shape the technology itself? How are decisions about Tor software 
development made and negotiated? How do contributors manage or 
mitigate the potential harms which could arise from use of their software, 
and how do they deal with friction from the criminal justice system and 
law enforcement?  
As my interviews with the Tor community progressed, it became apparent that there 
was no single set of ‘Tor values’ or a single vision of privacy, rather the Tor 
community was a home for multiple distinct perspectives which appeared to be 
associated with particular kinds of work. This suggested that mapping these as social 
worlds might be a productive way to make sense of the Tor community. Equally, 
from my archival research, I found that the values and ways of understanding Tor 
which I was finding in the Tor community could be linked to specific design features 
and practices documented in the development mailing lists. Additionally, my 
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mappings of different kinds of work, through interviews and from my study of the 
mailing list archives, found that a huge amount of work was going on beyond the 
design and development of Tor’s technologies in order to maintain Tor’s resilience 
against attack and allow it to reliably realise its visions of privacy for its users in 
practice. This led me from an investigation of Tor as a technology in the abstract to 
an attempt to understand it as an infrastructure, supported by many different kinds 
of work. Finally, it was apparent that conceptions of crime, power, and harm were 
implicated in important (and often unexpected) ways in Tor’s design and the various 
other kinds of work involved in the community, forming key parts of the emerging 
social worlds which I was beginning to find. 
This led me to develop these initial questions into a series of four core research 
questions, each of which is the subject of one of my results chapters (Chapters 6 to 
9). 
1. What are the key social worlds of the Tor community, how do they relate to 
one another, and how do they come into conflict, conversation, and 
collaboration? 
2. How do these social worlds shape the material form and design of Tor; how 
are these values realised as properties of the Tor network? 
3. When this design is materialised as infrastructure, what other kinds of work 
are needed so that this infrastructure can create Tor’s visions of privacy for 
its millions of users, especially given the considerable opposition it faces?  
4. What problems with crime, power and harm arise when Tor begins to realise 
its visions? How do the social worlds of the Tor community make sense of 
these issues, and through what strategies do they navigate them? 
Although this may appear to be a linear, causally-driven set of questions, in other 
words that there are a pre-existing set of values which become materialised in 
infrastructure, then go on to exist in the world in practice, then run into practical 
problems with crime and criminal justice, in fact this is merely a useful framework for 
setting them out as different domains of enquiry. One of the core findings of my 
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research was that for Tor (as is the case for other Open Source projects – see 
Guedenna, 2015) these do not follow a linear pathway; the processes of creating 
infrastructure are iterative, messy, and looping, with values changing over time, 
design needing to be revisited and changed (and in fact not being the only relevant 
technical practice), and problems with crime (for example) arising as a consideration 
at every stage of the project. This has been well-established in the research literature 
as a feature of these multifaceted infrastructural and computing projects (Guedenna 
2015; Pollock and Williams 2008, 2010; Williams, Stewart and Slack, 2005). As such, 
the way in which these are presented in the thesis as four discrete domains in a 
linear order should not be taken to assume a causal direction. An exploration of the 
relationships between these (as befits my findings) can be found in Chapter 10, and 
in the maps in Appendix E and F. 
 
Qualitative research with technological projects 
The social worlds approach is not solely a theoretical framework, but is a “theory-
methods package” (Clarke and Star 2008) with strong methodological implications. 
Social worlds research draws on practices of mapping and coding, using deep 
qualitative enquiry methods, interviews with as wide a range of members of a 
community as possible, and archival research to map out material relations, 
practices, meanings, and discourses. As discussed in the previous chapter, social 
worlds theory involves a grounded theory approach to research design (Clarke, 
2007). Grounded theory requires that analysis begins at the very beginning of data 
collection, continuing throughout the research and iteratively working up categories 
from micro-coded data, tacking between different levels of abstraction, and between 
data and theory (Clarke, 2007; Strauss and Corbin, 1994). As interesting questions 
arise from the initial mappings and throughout the research, these drive iterative 
development of approach strategies and interview formulation. The social worlds 
approach enables the researcher to avoid the problem of “collaps[ing]” (Brunton and 
Coleman, 2014, p94) arenas where multiple perspectives overlap over a single site of 
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collective action into a unitary perspective, instead attempting to reflect this 
multiplicity of meaning. 
This entails study not only of people, but also of things. In studying the material 
world of technology itself, the practices with which people interact with it, and the 
values which are embedded in it, I drew methodological insight from social worlds 
scholarship, particularly the contributions of Susan Leigh Star, and her related 
infrastructure studies research which draws out the specific application of social 
worlds approaches to infrastructures (Star, 1999, 1989). Star describes this as “a call 
to study boring things” (Star, 1999, p 377). Trying to research infrastructure is not 
always easy: technical documents, code, and design discussions are very alienating 
(and often unintelligible) to the non-expert, and it is often hard to discern narrative 
structure or the human underpinnings and values which are expressed as code, 
protocols, and design jargon (Star, 1999). Despite this, it important not just to 
consider these technologies as backdrop for action, but as sites of social action 
themselves. Star (1999) argues that this should involve a combination of “historical 
and literary analysis… interviews and observations” (Star, 1999, p384), using 
interview investigation about practices of design and maintenance, particular 
controversies and design decisions as a mechanism for gaining purchase on these 
more technical data sources such as archives of code repositories. This approach has 
been put to productive use in studies of computer and information systems (Star; 
Star; ref, and outside explicitly Social Worlds studies, Brunton and Coleman, 2014). 
Having discussed potential approaches with my supervisors, I began with an initial 
pilot study of three interviews. This was intended to scope out interesting potential 
avenues of investigation for the main project and to help my supervisors and me 
assess whether the Tor community were likely to be amenable enough to constitute 
a viable subject of research. Having used this to generate initial data and themes, I 
sought to approach in my main fieldwork as wide a range of people from within the 
Tor community as possible, not simply concentrating on the more famous or 
influential people within the Tor community as I was equally interested in the hidden 
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perspectives and more invisible work of Tor. In combination with this, I conducted 
substantial archival research in the Tor Project’s online archives of design documents 
and mailing lists. Moving back and forth between these two main approaches, I was 
able to develop a ‘deep’ sociotechnical study of Tor, which I describe in depth in the 
remainder of this chapter. 
 
Instrument development and data sources 
Before the fieldwork began, I identified a range of potential data sources, and began 
the processes of study design which would continue throughout the project. The 
choices I made in these early stages, much like those made by the Tor developers in 
their early design work, shaped the data and findings which I and my participants 
generated across the course of the research (Ritchie et al., 2013).  In this section, I 
outline my main instruments of data collection and the decisions I made at the 
preparatory stages in designing my approach.  First, I discuss my interview design, in 
particular, choices of questions, topics and ordering, and the different kinds of 
interview I conducted (through a range of different mediating platforms, and face to 
face) and the benefits and drawbacks of these different approaches. Finally, I set out 
the archival data made available by the Tor Project and how I approached its study. 
 
Interview design and practices 
Working in consultation with my supervisors, I decided to carry out semi-structured 
interviews with members of the Tor community, split into four key thematic parts. 
Semi-structured interviews are a well-established form of qualitative enquiry, 
especially in grounded theory approaches, where research questions are non-
prescriptive and exploratory (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995; Kvale, 2008; Kvale and 
Brinkman, 2009). This allows a more fruitful exploration of the values and 
understandings of the interviewee, and can often reveal new and unforeseen 
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avenues of investigation. I gave design of the interviews careful consideration, and 
drew from the initial findings of the pilot study in drawing up interview schedules 
and plans. Although I had a list of potential questions within each section, I was very 
happy to let the interviewee lead, and aimed to establish a more loosely-structured 
discussion rather than a prescriptive set of questions. Having a loose thematic 
structure was useful for providing a sense of progress to the interview and allowing 
the sections to flow into one another naturally, and having a bank of prepared 
potential questions was useful for where the interview faltered or began to meander 
into less relevant topics. As Ritchie (2013) advises in Qualitative Interviewing, 
question order is often important, and I explicitly structured these sections to 
facilitate rapport and openness, beginning with very general, reflective questions 
which would set the tone of the interview and ease the participant in. These broader 
questions about values, subjective interpretations and motivations set the tone for 
the rest of the interview, encouraging deeper and more reflective answers to the 
more practice-oriented discussions. This could then move onto more specific 
questions about practices and problems, before finishing again with a more 
reflective exploration of the politics of Tor and privacy technology. 
The interviews were broken up into four sections. The first of these was a general 
discussion of motivations and values intended to ease respondents in and develop 
rapport. This began with a broad question about how they had become involved with 
the Tor project, which led to follow-up questions and further probing around 
interesting lines of enquiry. I then asked them questions about the dynamics in the 
Tor community, the values of Tor, and their personal motivations for their work. 
The second section sought to dig into more technical detail about specific working 
practices. This moved from an initial broad question about the work they did for Tor 
to a request for the interviewee to walk me through a specific example in fine detail, 
outlining their rationales for the different choices they made along the way. This 
proceeded very differently for people with different roles in the Tor community – for 
relay operators, this could be about general practices of relay operation, while the 
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developers tended to outline what they thought were important design decisions 
and how they had made them in practice, or other forms of development work. 
Some of these were deeply specific explorations of particular features of Tor, while 
others were more ‘day in the life’ discussions of an average day contributing to the 
Tor Project. 
The third section touched on more contentious issues, and as such was located later 
in the interview so that a degree of mutual trust might be established. This involved 
questions about criminal or harmful uses of Tor, and opinions of and experiences 
with law enforcement. These questions naturally raised suspicion that I was 
attempting to paint Tor in a negative light or frame it as associated with crime and 
harm (as I discuss in the ethics section and fieldwork section of this chapter), and as 
such I made sure that I had established a level of trust with the interviewee by this 
point before bringing it up. 
The interviews concluded with more broad questions about privacy politics. Ending 
on a more expansive note, I invited the interviewees to speak more broadly about 
current trends in online privacy and the future of the Tor Project. This allowed the 
interview to end on a positive, reflective note and to clear the air after more 
technical or difficult questions (Ritchie et al., 2013. 
Carrying out interviews with members of the Tor community posed some challenges, 
as the community is dispersed across much of the world. As a result, many of the 
interviews were carried out using ICT-mediated channels, such as Skype and Jitsi 
video calls, IRC chat, email interviews, and Signal voice calls, with the particular 
format decided by the interviewee to maximise their comfort with the setting, and 
enable them to have control over any privacy or security protections which they 
desired. A number of the interviews were carried out face-to-face, often at 
international conferences where many people from the Tor community were 
present. Carrying out interviews via these different media presented particular 
challenges and contributed to the individual character of each interview. Developing 
rapport, judging emotion and affect, and keeping a natural flow to conversation was 
 126 
challenging over online video and voice chat. The text-based interviews took place 
over a longer time, but with more potential for short breaks, note writing and 
referring back to previous discussions and other media. This proved useful, especially 
in the case of interviews where the interviewee took the opportunity to paste links, 
email text and other media into the body of the conversation.  
These conversations were, however, less natural than voice chats or face-to-face 
interviews, with more considered replies and some difficultly in ascertaining when 
the respondent had finished providing a response due to the lack of a typing 
indicator on some chat clients. The data provided from the text and email interviews 
was less rich in some ways than that collected through the voice and video calls or 
the face-to-face interviews, where interesting tangents could arise through natural 
conversation. As with the voice calls, the lack of visual feedback proved slightly 
awkward, however this effect largely disappeared as the conversation progressed 
and the respondents became more relaxed and began to build trust. Despite these 
potential barriers with voice-only interviews, they are well-established as suitable 
methods for qualitative research (Sturges, 2004; Stephens, 2007). The advantages 
and disadvantages of these different forms of interviewing are already well-
documented in the qualitative research literature (Kozinets 2010; Morgan 2004).  
Of all the considerations feeding into the interviews, one of the most important 
turned out to be an appreciation for the cultural mores of computer scientists 
(Laudel and Glaeser, 2007, Flammia, 1993). This was a set of sensibilities which I 
needed to cultivate across the course of the fieldwork. Of particular importance 
proved to be a dislike for ‘small talk’, and for being asked questions about technical 
matters of fact which could be found online. While I had initially been using these to 
get the interviewee talking and lead into more probing questions. I stopped using 
these entirely, as they inevitably either destroyed the rapport we had built up or 
triggered a long, technical answer which replicated available information. This is a 
well-covered phenomenon in qualitative research with experts, not limited to 
computer science, and maintaining the balance between ‘demonstrated 
 127 
competence’ versus ‘playing dumb’ is something which needs to be negotiated and 
learned throughout the research for each particular community (Littig, 2009; 
Teicher, 2015; Bogner, Littig, and Mentz, 2009). The respondents were sometimes 
reluctant to venture personal opinions in case they might be taken as representative 
of the Tor Project as a whole, and I soon included in my preamble a specific direction 
that I was interested in exactly these subjective ideas and the heterogeneous 
landscape of values in the Tor community, and that I would represent them as such 
rather than as a ‘Tor party line’. Again, this is well-documented in interview-based 
research within organisations (Garsten and Nyqvist, 2013). 
 
Tor’s archives 
Archival research is a key part of many social worlds studies (see for example, Star 
and Griesemer, 1989; Star and Ruhleder, 1996; Bowker and Star, 2000), as it 
provides a physical record of design decisions, practices, and documentation of the 
composition of material artefacts. Where records exist of discussions about design, 
such as meeting minutes, mailing lists, or design documents, these can provide 
substantial insight into not only why particular decisions were made, but the broader 
practices, contextual factors, and discourses which shaped them (Guedenna 2015; 
Pollock and Williams 2008, 2010; Williams, Stewart and Slack, 2005). Approached 
with care, these can provide a record of the development of the interpretive 
frameworks, category systems, and master narratives which went into the creation 
of a particular technology, and hence the discursive constructions and 
interpretations of the world which the technology embodies (Star, 1999). Where 
controversies and arguments are documented, these too provide important 
evidence of the different perspectives which shaped a particular project and how 
they interacted (Pollock and Williams 2008). Tor follows a policy of ‘radical 
openness’, openly providing a wealth of sensitive information about itself freely 
online. This includes the source code of most of its technologies along with detailed 
design notes, online trackers and wikis which record the work of the team in real 
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time, the content of internal mailing lists, IRC channels, and team meeting notes, 
extensive financial information and considerably more (Gehl, 2018b).  
The archives of data which Tor makes available online constitute an enormous and 
rich site of research for sociologists. Gehl (2018b) has previously identified these 
archives as an untapped resource for sociological study and has made productive use 
of them in his comparative study of various ‘darknet’ technical communities and 
their attempts to cultivate legitimacy (Gehl 2018a). The discussions and material 
circulated on the mailing lists were the main source of archival data which I used in 
this PhD. Tor has several mailing lists which it uses for communication and work. 
These lists constitute sets of email conversations, sorted into particular topics by 
‘threads’, and involve substantial discussions about many of Tor’s key design 
decisions. The first of these, and the most important for this research, is the Tor-dev 
mailing list. This mailing list has been in operation from 2002 to the present day and 
is an extremely full record of the design and development of the Tor browser, right 
back to its initial creation. Although it does not capture telephone calls, in-person 
meetings, and work done individually, this was the main medium through which 
collaborative development work on Tor was managed between its developers. I also 
made use of its predecessor, the or-dev mailing list, which was set up in the 1990s 
for work on the Onion Routing project, and the Tor-talk and Tor-relays mailing lists, 
which constitute a general discussion list and a list for relay operators to discuss 
practices respectively. These can be freely downloaded from the Tor Project 
website9.  
I coded up a set of Python programs to help me work through this, establish 
timelines, and do text search more efficiently than NVivo would allow. These scripts 
turned the mailing list into a dataset, separating out the administrative information, 
such as dates, names of senders and titles of threads, from the content of the emails. 
 
9 A full archive of Tor’s public mailing lists can be accessed at: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-
bin/mailman/listinfo 
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This enabled me to browse and search emails more effectively, pull out particular 
threads and conversations with keywords of interest, and fit them into a timeline, 
helping me to establish when particular topics and decisions appeared and recurred. 
It also assisted with high-level coding of these emails, allowing me to tag up 
particular emails by topics of discussion. My analytical method for this material, 
which draws on a social worlds/situational analysis approach, is described later in 
this chapter. I did not use the logs of Tor’s public IRC meetings as I felt that this 
would be intrusive, as after discussion with members of the Tor Project, it became 
clear that these were intended as spaces for community outreach, and might involve 
Tor users revealing personal information when asking for help, or the more paranoid 
being put off engaging in these spaces entirely. However, I did engage in study of 
some of the other working sites of the Tor Project – namely, their “issue tracker” 
site10, which documented ongoing implementation and development work in 
progress, and their various wikis11, blog posts12, FAQs13 and design documents14. 
These were more justifiable sources of data, as they are made available for the 
express purpose of public scrutiny of Tor’s development. 
 
Fieldwork and data generation 
Early steps 
In this section, I describe the progression of my fieldwork, recruitment, and data 
generation across the course of the project. This research began with a pilot study 
whose purpose was to assess the feasibility of the wider project, in particular, the 
 






likely access which I would be able to negotiate with members of the Tor community. 
Pilot studies are a well-established approach to beginning sociological fieldwork (van 
Teijlingen and Hundley, 2002; Sampson, 2004), allowing for the cultivation of 
gatekeeper relationships, refinement of research questions, and identification of key 
areas of interest for the main project (Kim, 2011). I made an application to the 
University of Edinburgh Law School’s ethics committee for this pilot study, which was 
approved. When I began this research, I drew largely from public information about 
the Tor Project, such as blogs, media statements and other writing, in developing my 
initial research questions and interview schedules. For example, the Tor website15 
contains substantial information about Tor’s history and values, and the Onion 
Routing website contains a detailed history of Tor’s precursor projects16. This 
generated a series of initial themes to inform my pilot study and an initial sketch of 
the different actors, groups, kinds of work, and technologies involved in Tor. I 
identified the relay operators, the volunteers who run the servers which make up 
Tor’s network infrastructure, as a potentially useful starting point for a pilot study, as 
they constituted fairly hidden voices in the Tor community and hence might be more 
interested in having their perspectives heard. Equally, I judged that the relay 
operators might be more amenable to my scoping out of initial themes, and 
beginning with them would allow me to approach the core Tor Project staff with 
more developed ideas and understandings of Tor. 
In beginning this pilot study, I made approaches by posting on the Tor mailing lists 
and on websites such as Stack Exchange17 (a widely-used technology and 
programming forum) asking whether relay operators might be interested in taking 
part. This led to three interviews with relay operators and one with a volunteer 
contributor to Tor’s codebase. My initial findings generated a series of potential 






relationships, values and practices within the relay operator community. In 
particular, I was struck by the fact that the Tor relay operators appeared to draw on 
a range of different, and often conflicting, views of Tor as a site of social action, and 
some were emphatic in their denial of Tor as possessing any politics of its own. 
Instead, they viewed running a relay as either a hobby or a form of public service, 
rather than a form of activism. Conversely, some also switched within the interview 
to framing Tor and privacy technology as deeply political, bound up with human 
rights discourses. In addition, the role of openness and decentralisation as key 
values, but also as practices of resistance and resilience, was an important early 
theme. It became evident from the way which they talked about the developers and 
others in the Tor Project that meanings and discourses were deeply contested within 
the Tor community, rather than set around strong shared perspectives, ideas and 
motivations. This initial ease of finding willing participants and interesting early 
themes indicated that a deeper study of the Tor Project might indeed be successful. 
Following the pilot study, I developed a proposal for the main fieldwork. I applied for 
and received ethical clearance from the University of Edinburgh Law School for an in-
depth qualitative study of the Tor Project, including semi-structured interviews, 
observation, and archival research. This involved anticipating any potential ethical 
issues which might be raised by the research, including risks to myself, participants, 
or the Tor community. In my First Year PhD Review Panel, I discussed potential 
ethical issues in depth with academics with relevant expertise from Edinburgh 
University’s Law school and Science and Technology Studies group, then submitted a 
written discussion of these issues to the ethics board in my department, which was 
subsequently approved. I give a more detailed discussion of ethical issues in a later 
section of this chapter, however at this early stage my main concerns involved 
protecting the anonymity of interviewees in such a small community, ensuring the 
security of my data, attempting to mitigate potential harms to myself from malicious 
actors who might want to disrupt my research, and identifying questions which could 
cause harm to Tor or people within its community. 
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Developing trust 
I began my approaches to further members of the Tor Community (based largely 
around the personnel list on the Core Tor People section of the Tor website18), and 
this took place across the course of two years, sent in batches of three once every 
few weeks so as not to alarm or overwhelm the organisation. My initial forays into 
getting interviews with developers, however, were less fruitful, and I faced 
substantial suspicion at the outset from members of the Tor community who 
thought that I might intend to paint Tor in a bad light, or even be an undercover law 
enforcement agent. Equally, even those who believed that I was sympathetic to Tor’s 
mission and sincere in my desire to represent their views fairly felt that there was a 
chance that I might not be able to anticipate all the potential ways in which the 
research might be used against them. 
This was understandable: at the time I was conducting this research, the Dutch 
secret service had been revealed to be attempting to cultivate informants to gather 
information on the Tor Project’s developers (Techdirt, 2017), and other core 
members of the Tor development team had reported being approached by law 
enforcement (CNN, 2016). The widespread characterisation of Tor as criminal or 
deviant in media reporting and academic study also posed some issues for the 
research, as respondents were very wary that I might not be sympathetic to Tor’s 
beliefs and goals. This is a common (if not ubiquitous) problem within sociological or 
anthropological research and learning to develop this trust with a community or 
organisation is an important part of research practice for most qualitative 
researchers (Hine, 2008). 
This suspicion was compounded due to my disciplinary affiliation: in a spirit of 
transparency, I was open from the outset in all my approaches that my research was 




criminologist. This engendered a substantial degree of suspicion and guardedness 
from my interviewees at first, most of whom thought that criminology was 
synonymous with ‘crime science’ and assumed that I was either working for law 
enforcement or interested in painting Tor as a tool for crime (which is very much the 
opposite of the forms of appreciative enquiry in which social worlds research 
engages). While there are many ways in which one could divide up the discipline of 
criminology, scholarship commonly distinguishes between ‘administrative’ 
criminology, which is aligned with the interests of the state and law enforcement 
(see for example, Rock, 1994; Farrington, 1985; Cohn and Farrington, 1998; 
Sherman, 2009), ‘critical criminology’, which takes a Marxist approach and uses 
criminology as a vehicle for critiquing state power (see for example, Box, 2002; 
Walton and Young, 1998; Young, 1988; Reimand and Leighton, 2015; Vold, 1951), 
and the ‘sociology of deviance’ approach, which engages in qualitative, appreciative 
research to understand how criminal and deviant social categories and ideas about 
crime and justice are constructed and produced by groups and institutions (see for 
example Becker, 1963; Hall et al. 2013; Taylor, Walton and Young, 2013; Garland, 
2001, 2012; Feely and Simon, 1992, Bosworth, 2017). In fact, my approach and 
sensibilities could not be further from administrative criminology, and I was often 
tempted to reframe myself as a sociologist rather than a criminologist in my 
approaches. Despite this, I felt that it was important to be honest about my 
disciplinary affiliations; I would after all still aim to publish in criminology journals, 
and any research on Tor might well be of interest to law enforcement, even if not 
initially conducted in that spirit. I decided that being open about my intentions was 
the best way to allow my interviewees to approach the interviews with a good 
understanding of how their words might be used, not just by me, but by others as 
well. A number of the interviewees themselves brought up these issues, arguing that 
although my own motives might be well-meaning, I ought to think carefully about 
how my findings might be used by others with less sympathy for Tor. 
Equally, I was keen to adopt an approach to interview practice which would facilitate 
the building of trust, both with the individual participants and with the Tor 
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community more generally. The rise of critiques within feminist sociologies and 
postmodern scholarship of more traditional approaches to interviewing has led to a 
radical reinterpretation of traditional ideas about objectivity and the role of the 
interviewer (Clarke; Sprague 1993). While traditional interview practice often 
requires the interviewer to attempt to minimise the presence of their own reactions, 
values, and opinions as far as possible, for fear of ‘leading’ responses (Ritchie et al., 
2013), this newer feminist school considers this kind of confected objectivity to be 
false (DeVault, 1990; Haraway, 1997). Instead, this sort of research embraces the 
subjectivity of the process, and the researcher as an active part of data generation 
(Holstein and Gubrium, 1995). This both enables a more reflective and critical 
approach to qualitative enquiry, but rather than hiding behind an assumed 
objectivity, opens the inherent subjectivity of all interactions and attempts to create 
knowledge up to critique and inspection, leading to better research which is more 
cognizant of power relations (Kvale, 1996; Haraway, 1997).  
Although I did not adopt some of the more radical departures from traditional 
interviewing which some of these methodological critiques have developed, they did 
shape my research practice as a softer set of sensitising concepts. I felt it counter-
productive to attempt to hide my own political opinions about Tor and privacy 
(which I discuss in the introduction to this chapter), and although I let the 
interviewee’s perspective be the dominant voice, I would indicate agreement, say 
where I thought responses were interesting or potentially contradictory, and make it 
clear from the outset that I was engaging with this in a spirit of appreciative enquiry 
(Leibling, 2015), and that I sympathised with and supported Tor’s work.  I felt that 
this was important as it gave the participants a better understanding of the 
sensibilities I was going to take into analysis and reporting, and also proved a key 
part of developing trust within the broader Tor community.  
While my sympathies towards privacy activism and Tor doubtless facilitated my 
interviews (and the more I spoke to and interviewed people, the easier it became to 
get further interviews), this also had the potential to pose difficulties as well. In 
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particular, my support for Tor had to be balanced with my desire to develop careful 
and reasoned discussions and analysis of issues such as the crime and harm 
committed using Tor, which might, if not handled carefully, lead participants to feel 
that I had misrepresented myself, or, on the other extreme, to a hagiographic study 
of Tor which simply represented the ‘party line’ of the Tor Project. I believe that I 
have managed to navigate this well, and although the picture which this thesis paints 
of Tor is generally an appreciative one, I have not shied away from discussing critical 
perspectives on Tor in my interviews and analysis. In public presentations of my 
work, such as on my blog, or in talks, I have made my own political beliefs clear, but 
also stressed that I am aiming to investigate Tor rigorously through sociological 
research. 
 
Moving forward: fieldwork details and data collection 
After little initial luck in getting interviews, I noticed on the public Tor Project 
calendar19 that several members of the Tor community would be attending an 
international conference in Europe. I made members of the Tor Project aware that I 
would be attending, and managed to set up meetings with three developers which 
led to in-person interviews. Having now spent time with some of the Tor community, 
both through the interviews and in more social settings, I found that my approaches 
via email on my return had substantially more success. I had made contacts with 
other members of the Tor community at the conference and was able to both 
interview them remotely and begin the process of snowballing to further interviews. 
I was aware that some discussion of my research was ongoing in the Tor community 
and asked my interviewees to point interested potential participants in my direction. 
Cultivation of this trust was still a slow process. At the beginning, most of my 




with the older and more senior developers coming later. This was a deliberate 
research strategy, arrived at in consultation with my supervisors. From a social 
worlds perspective, this is ideal, as it gave room for these more hidden and 
contested perspectives to breathe and to structure the initial analysis, rather than 
being dominated by the more established views of the well-known and influential 
developers who had been with the community for a long time (Star, 1999). 
My interviews continued over the next year as I made further approaches via email. I 
sought to get as wide a spread of viewpoints and as good a gender balance as 
possible, and to represent viewpoints outside a merely US perspective.  In total, 
across the course of my fieldwork, I approached 62 members of the Tor community, 
largely via email (although some were approached in person at conferences). Of 
these, 32 people responded. Of these, 4 gave outright refusals, and two dropped out 
after an initial expression of interest. These approaches were not always without 
friction. My approaches to developers were made through publicly available email 
addresses listed on the Tor Project’s “Core People” webpage20, while relay operators 
were generally approached at conferences, on the Tor Project’s mailing lists, or on 
StackExchange.  
The final corpus of data spanned 26 in-depth interviews, listed in Appendix A. My 
sample of interviewees was broadly reflective of the diversity of the Tor community, 
based on the information available on the Tor Project people page21. This included 
nine developers (from fairly new members of the Tor team to some who had been 
involved since its early days), three other core contributors to the Tor Project who 
were not developers, eight relay operators, three developers of Onion Services, and 
three other members of the broader Tor community. Based on the information 
available, nineteen of my participants identified as men and seven did not. Despite 
active attempts at establishing a more gender-representative sample, this is 
 
20 https://www.torproject.org/ 
21 Tor Project People Page: www.torproject.org/about/people/ 
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unfortunately skewed towards men. An advantage of online methods, given the 
geographically dispersed nature of contributors to the Tor Project, was that 
interviews could be conducted with respondents in a variety of different countries. 
My participants were based in a range of countries, including Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Russia, Spain, the UK, and the USA. This is fairly 
representative of the core Tor community, though unfortunately misses members of 
the Tor community in the global South.  
These interviews ranged from one hour to two and a half hours, and I transcribed 
them as soon as possible after the interview, securely deleting the audio thereafter. I 
also observed a meeting of the team involved in improving the usability of Tor and its 
website (having approached them via email). This meeting was carried out over 
group video and text chat, and conducted around the midpoint of my fieldwork. We 
discussed this again afterwards, and I was very kindly and sensitively asked not to 
attend again, as the usability work was something in which they particularly wanted 
to involve the less well-represented members of the Tor user community, and they 
didn’t want to put off more reluctant members of this community from taking part. I 
agreed with this entirely, deciding to avoid any further approaches for observation of 
Tor Project meetings and instead focus on interviews. 
As I progressed with data collection and analysis, the ‘values’ of the Tor community 
began to surface more clearly in my interview materials. I began to find that not only 
was the Tor community deeply heterogeneous, with a range of different values, 
positions, and understandings, the individuals with whom I spoke themselves made 
statements which appeared to articulate multiple contradictory understandings of 
Tor. This inconsistency indicated that many of the members of the Tor community 
were members of multiple distinct social worlds. As analysis and collection 
progressed, and these worlds, themes, and issues began to appear more strongly in 
the data, I began to bring in the archival materials as a complementary data source. 
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Bringing in the material and ending fieldwork 
Once I had begun to develop a sense for the main social worlds of Tor and their 
contours, and some of the key practices, forms of work, controversies and material 
design elements at issue in Tor, I began the archival portion of my research alongside 
continuing interviews. I discuss my approach to this in more depth in the analysis 
section of this chapter, however here it suffices to say that this involved an initial 
stage of immersion, when I read the first five years of the Tor-dev mailing list and 
much of the Tor-talk mailing list in full, then engaged in more targeted analysis and 
coding, tacking back and forth between interviews and archival work. This enabled 
me to get a view into the material working of Tor and real traces of the working 
practices of developers and others, providing a useful comparator to their own 
descriptions of these processes and indicating how they might have changed over 
time. 
I finished the main body of my interview-based fieldwork by attending a second 
major European hacker conference with deep ties to Tor. By this point, I was 
beginning to reach saturation (Guest, Bunce, and Johnson, 2015), with new interview 
material serving to reinforce existing themes and points rather than leading to new 
lines of enquiry. Although I did not engage in this conference as formal ethnographic 
research, it did provide a useful glimpse into the “lifeworld” (Coleman 2010) of Tor 
and the broader European hacker community, allowing me the opportunity to speak 
to further members of the Tor project and discuss some of my findings.  
At this conference, I gave a talk at a self-organised session about my research, 
presenting the findings to a small group of academics and some members of the Tor 
community. I did this to sound out the ideas I had been working with in my analysis, 
to provide an opportunity to get feedback from academics and from the Tor 
community on the emerging themes, and in the interests of accountability, to allow 
community members and participants an opportunity to raise any concerns they had 
about the research. At this point, I had more or less established a level of cautious 
trust with the Tor Project, illustrated by an exchange I had on the Tor Project’s 
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mailing lists during the conference. I posted on the Tor-talk mailing list to let 
members of the community know that I would be presenting at the conference, and 
that if they wanted to talk to me about the research then this would be a good 
opportunity. This resulted in an accusation on the list from someone (not in the core 
community) who insinuated that I was a police informant and should not be trusted: 
so it is easy to recover all secret users of ! 
good try, officer Ben.  
I respect your perseverance, great work 
Tor-talk mailing list, 2018 
At this stage, a senior member of the development staff came to my defence on the 
list: 
Hello angry person who fears science, 
This is not a productive or helpful response here. It certainly doesn't help other 
people think that this list is a productive or helpful space. The research world has 
been critical for Tor, both in understanding attacks and in helping to design a 
stronger system: https://blog.torproject.org/tor-heart-pets-and-privacy-research-
community and while these social science approaches to studying Tor as a 
community are not quite the same, they still don't deserve that response. Please 
keep it not just civil but also productive 
Tor-talk mailing list, 2018 
Following this conference, I completed a few final interviews over the next few 
months and then finished my data collection. Although I had been conducting 
analysis throughout this process, at this point, I turned my focus entirely to analysis 
of my data. Before I discuss this, however, I first outline some of the ethical 




Ethics in Internet research 
Ethical considerations are vital to any programme of sociological study and are 
widely recognised as at the foundation of good research practice (see for example 
established institutional codes of practice from the British Society of Criminology, 
2016; British Sociological Association, 2017; Economic and Social Research Council, 
2019; University of Edinburgh, 2019). Equally, ethical considerations should not be 
considered only at the beginning of the research, as a hurdle to be cleared during 
research design, but taken into account actively throughout all the processes of 
design, approaches, data generation, analysis, and writing up (Murphy and Dingwall, 
2001). Additionally, they should not only relate to the immediate practical concerns 
of harm to participants or researchers, but also to the broader consequences of the 
research; how the findings will be used, and their implications for the community 
under study and for wider society (Sparks, 2002). Hence, critical reflection on harm 
and power should be embedded at the heart of every stage as an intrinsic part of 
research praxis. In this section, I set out some of the core issues which I considered 
throughout the research, and how I attempted to mitigate them, in particular around 
use of archival materials, anonymity, and potential avenues for harm to participants, 
myself, and the broader interests of Tor. 
Informed consent forms the basis for most sociological interviewing and is widely 
regarded as best practice for this kind of research (Miller and Boulton, 2007). This 
means that the terms of the interview are made clear beforehand to the 
participants, properly explained in a way which effectively communicates their 
meaning, and are agreed by the interviewee, who has a free choice whether or not 
to take part. Rather than over-informing the participant with a great deal of 
irrelevant or technical information, this instead requires balancing the information 
given to ensure that the meaning and purpose of the study and what will happen to 
the data provided are communicated in a way which the participant can best 
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understand (Kvale, 1996). This includes the purpose for which the data are being 
collected, how they will be used and stored, for how long they will be retained, the 
participants’ rights to withdraw, how issues of harm will be dealt with, and how the 
data will be processed. This is a particular issue for a community such as Tor, which is 
both extremely well-informed about data harms and has good reason to be cautious. 
It is common practice to record this through the use of signatures on a consent form 
which states these terms in full and records assent by both parties. While I 
negotiated full informed consent for all my interview participants, sent them copies 
of these consent forms prior to interview, and restated the main points at the 
beginning of the interview, several of my participants indicated that they would 
prefer to give consent verbally, rather than recording a copy of their signature. I 
respected these wishes, and as a result consent was recorded verbally for some 
interviews. 
The Internet poses particular ethical issues of its own for researchers, especially 
around the use of archived online material, such as in forums or mailing lists (Eynon, 
2009). The ethical frameworks developed for traditional offline qualitative research 
do not always capture all the potential dimensions of harm and consent associated 
with these new data sources (Eynon, 2009; Ess and Jones, 2004). The qualities of 
Internet platforms, conceived of as ‘social spaces’, often lead to information and 
communications which may have been considered private at the time, being made 
publicly available. Much online research uses a ‘human subjects’ (Basset and 
O’Riordan, 2002) approach, which prioritises the rights of research subjects over the 
interests of sociological research, and as a result a degree of caution is necessary 
when considering whether online archival material is a suitable source of data. In 
many ways, this is understandable – particularly given the increasing harms to which 
individuals are being exposed through the misuse of personal data, and the 
increasing volume of this which is now being gathered and archived by social media 
companies without their informed consent (Zuboff, 2015; Custers, van der Hof, and 
Schermer, 2014). While the potential harms associated with use of online data are 
serious (Kozinets, 2010), Basset and O’Riordan argue that over-caution in the use of 
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online data itself constitutes an ethical issue, potentially leading to the silencing of 
the perspectives and interests of already-vulnerable communities. These online data 
sources have also proven important vehicles for the foregrounding of hidden or 
marginalised voices and perspectives, such as those in LGBT communities (Basset 
and O’Riordan, 2002). 
An overly-restrictive approach to online research fails to account for the 
differentiations in private and public communications which occur therein, conflating 
online texts (which are often authored explicitly as public statements for wide 
consumption) with authors. As such, an approach which takes concerns of privacy 
and harm into account and reflects on the actual contexts in which particular online 
data sources were authored should not necessarily result in a restrictive ethic which 
puts all such sources out of bounds (Basset and O’Riordan, 2002; Ess and Jones, 
2004; Lomborg, 2012). Through careful consideration of how results are analysed 
and presented, and the particular contexts of different sites and archives, ethical 
research on online archives can be conducted. Equally, it is now well-established 
within sociological and criminological research that informed consent for use of 
mailing lists and forum data is not always best ethical practice (given the burden of 
collecting this from people who may have left these communities decades ago), and 
that this can be waived as long as the data could reasonably considered to be public 
and care is taken to report findings about groups and communities rather than 
specific individuals (Martin and Christin, 2016; British Society of Criminology 2016).  
Tor especially exemplifies this problem, as its radically-open approach puts a huge 
amount of archival information, including emails and meeting minutes, freely 
accessible online (Gehl, 2018b). I took the view that some of this material would be 
within bounds for ethical research, and some would not. The mailing lists, code, and 
issue tracker discussions I judged to be suitable, as these were either professional 
documentations of the work of Tor explicitly intended for public consumption, or 
places where communication with the community was engaged in with the 
knowledge that it would be recorded and made public. On the other hand, I judged 
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that observing meetings and using IRC logs would be out of scope, as this might 
make people in Tor’s privacy-conscious community feel less able to contribute to 
these discussions. Equally, there is an ethics case to be made that these more 
intimate spaces of community interaction should be approached with care (Kozinets, 
2010; Pink, 2016), and I judged that the benefit to the project of this source of data 
would not justify the potential invasion of these semi-private spaces. By building 
legitimacy within the Tor community, and discussing these other potential sources 
with my interviewees, I was able to get a better understanding of which voices I 
might find foregrounded in different places, the potential power dynamics and 
sources of harm associated with different sites, and develop a strong case for making 
use of the data sources which I did. The mailing lists were a particularly suitable 
balance between foregrounding hidden perspectives, as they are generally open to 
contributions and often hosted contentious discussions, and minimising harm, as 
they are well established as a public record of Tor’s community debates. I thank the 
Tor Project staff who discussed these issues with me for their help.  
Taking this into account, I made senior members of the Tor Project aware that I 
would be conducting research into their public mailing list archives, ensured that 
they were happy for me to do so, and have taken care not to include identifying 
information in any quotes which I use. I also asked their advice around any potential 
issues of harm which might be caused by my reporting of mailing list discussions at 
the outset of my archival research on the mailing lists. Rather than an potentially-
intrusive practice of “lurking” (Eysenbach, 2001; King, 1996) in the Tor community, I 
was very clear in communicating on mailing lists what I would be doing and the aims 
of my research, and largely restrict the analysis herein to older discussions which are 
less likely to pertain to ‘live’ issues in the Tor community. Equally, as the mailing lists 
which I study herein were well-established as public to their participants, I believe 
that the participants in these discussions did so with the knowledge that their 
comments might come under scrutiny, especially as these mailing lists were explicitly 
set up to provide a public record of decisions about Tor’s design and allow public 
conversations within the community. Finally, I engage in this analysis not with the 
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intention of finding ‘scoops’ about Tor, but to bring to light the wide array of hidden 
work which underpins it, and to give a voice to some of these more hidden 
perspectives. 
Other researchers have developed this further, bringing ethnographic practices and 
methodologies into study of the Internet (see for example, Markham 1998, Coleman, 
2014; Kozinets 2010, Pink, 2016). While the “distance” (Eynon, 2009) which 
separates the people who authored online materials and the researcher is doubtless 
greater than for offline research (though not always, as in the case of offline archival 
research), Kozinets (2010) argues that participatory research, in which the 
researcher immerses themselves into the community which they are studying, is one 
way of reducing this and hence mitigating some of the potential harms associated 
with studying online communities. This both makes the community aware of the 
research and its aims at the outset, and allows the researcher to develop a deeper 
understanding of the expectations of their participants and the potential avenues 
through which harm might occur. Through meticulous public documentation of the 
research process (Kozinets argues for the creation of a research website to facilitate 
this), the research participants have ample opportunity to comment, to ask 
questions, or to raise concerns (Kozinets 2010). 
I was wary of adopting a fully ‘ethnographic’ approach in this research, and ended up 
maintaining substantially more distance from the Tor community. The first reasons 
for this are practical: my buy-in from the Tor Project was limited at first, and while 
they were happy for me to interview and approach community members who 
wanted to participate, there was little prospect of them officially endorsing the 
project or allowing me to conduct more embedded research, especially as this might 
put off other members of the community from participating in their discussions. The 
second set of reasons are reflective of the power dynamic between me as a 
researcher and the Tor Project. In qualitative research it is vital to cultivate a 
reflexive understanding of whom the researchers and participants are and the 
relationships between them (Clarke and Friese, 2007, p368). While other routes to 
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immersion would have been possible – for example, I could have started running a 
relay myself or contributed to community discussions in other ways – I was very 
reluctant to attempt to become part of the community in this way. While this would 
undoubtedly give me insights into the practices and values of this group, it would 
also complicate my position as a researcher, placing the Tor Project developers in 
the awkward situation of being obliged to engage with me as a member of the 
community. As I wanted participation to be on a strictly voluntary basis, I felt 
maintaining more distance and focusing on interviews and archival research was 
appropriate. I did, however, take up some aspects of Kozinets’ (2010) “honest and 
open” approach, creating a project blog where I documented my research aims and 
some of my fieldwork progress. 
 
Anonymity for experts 
While anonymisation of participant responses is common practice in the social 
sciences (Thomson, Bzdel, Golden-Biddle, 2005), it was of particular importance to 
the Tor community and required especially careful handling. Anonymisation of 
interview data is widely used to protect interviewees from harm, for example, if their 
participation might bring them to the attention of powerful actors, and to allow 
them to speak more freely and reveal information which they otherwise would not 
(Smythe and Murray, 2000). It also reduces the pressure on them to give a ‘party 
line’, which they might feel were their statements to be publicly attributable and 
hence scrutinised by their community. This goes beyond merely not reporting the 
name of the interviewee associated with a quote (especially in small communities), 
and quotes need to be selected with care to not reveal identifying information while 
preserving the richness of the data (Saunders, 2015). I decided that, unlike for many 
studies, where the name of the organisation is not revealed in order to protect the 
anonymity of respondents, this was not feasible given the importance of Tor’s 
particular history and the relatively unique nature of the organisation.  
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In many studies, the power balance lies substantially in favour of the researcher, who 
will have a better position from which to understand anonymisation techniques, 
disclosure risks and other such factors than the people whom they are interviewing 
(Brinkmann and Kvale, 2008). In the Tor community, however, understandings of 
anonymity, consent, and information disclosure are highly specific, advanced, and 
atypical. The Tor community contains many people who are deeply concerned about 
privacy issues, especially where they concern data collected, stored, and processed 
about individuals. Additionally, the community contains several individuals who are 
world-leading experts on privacy technology, anonymity, and data ethics, who have 
spent whole careers working on data privacy issues and advancing academic and 
technical understanding of anonymity. As a result, conducting sociological research 
on Tor required managing different understandings of anonymisation to that which 
might be expected of most other groups. 
In the spirit of providing as strong anonymity guarantees as possible, and in the 
knowledge that they would be particularly well-placed to critique my practices, I 
designed an anonymisation strategy which I believe balances making the best 
possible use of these data while also protecting my interviewees. All quotes are 
presented anonymously, and I have as far as possible taken precautions to ensure 
that the identities of the people whom I interviewed remain secret. I do this despite 
the fact that several of my interviewees said that they were happy for me to 
attribute their quotes to them. This is because Tor is a fairly small community, and, in 
the spirit of more technical definitions of anonymity (Syverson, 2009), I wanted to 
retain the largest possible pool of potential sources of any given quote. Every 
individual named would therefore, through deductive reasoning, reduce the 
anonymity of those who did not wish their responses to be attributed. Where 
participants had particularly recognisable ways of speaking or discussed information 
which would likely make their identity clear to someone with a knowledge of the Tor 
community, I took care to remove or disguise these traces from the published 
outputs, while retaining the sense of the statement (where quotes have been 
paraphrased, this is indicated). 
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Despite this, it is extremely difficult to fully deanonymize the outputs of sociological 
research in small communities (Thomson, Bzdel, Golden-Biddle, 2005; Wiles et al., 
2008, p417). In a community of Tor’s size, with such high levels of specialisation, 
there are often only a handful of people who could conceivably make informed 
comments about particular aspects of Tor’s work. As a result, I took steps to mitigate 
any potential harms resulting from inadvertent deanonymisation. I largely avoided 
speaking about potentially sensitive topics and have been careful to avoid using 
quotes where there was a risk of harm or embarrassment to the respondent if they 
were identified. A good deal of this mitigation took place through the interview itself, 
and I made sure to discuss with participants beforehand my aims and let them know 
that I wasn’t interested in talking about sensitive topics or information that would be 
problematic if released into the public domain. 
 
Safety, power, and harm 
Empirical research is not without risks, and even an apparently innocuous study can 
result in unforeseen harms to the individuals or communities being researched, or to 
the researcher (Hajistavropoulos and Smythe, 2001; Bloor, Fincham and Sampson, 
2010). In this sub-section, I briefly lay out some of the main potential sources of risk 
which I identified throughout the research and the steps I took to mitigate them.  
Given the nature of Tor’s work, which brings it into contact by design with groups 
attempting to work against powerful actors, its adversaries include extremely well-
resourced actors, including the military and secret services of nation states, and 
organised crime groups. As an attractive target for a range of powerful organisations, 
Tor is subject to particular safety concerns which other similar organisations might 
not be. The ethics review at my First Year PhD Review Panel for progression into the 
main fieldwork identified a number of potential concerns with safety which needed 
to be addressed. The presence of these unlikely but extremely serious situations 
entailed protecting myself, the Tor Project, and the people who work with them 
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from adverse consequences from the research. The first concern was data security. 
Although I was not intending to ask any sensitive questions of my participants, I was 
still aware that aggregating the information I was gathering, especially if tied to 
individuals, would pose a potential risk if any of my devices were breached. As a 
result, interview data and transcripts were kept securely in a single copy stored on 
an encrypted partition of a USB disk which I kept on my person or in a locked desk 
drawer. I travelled to the US at one point during my research, and made sure to 
leave this USB disk in the UK in case of seizure by US Border control. I chose to 
minimise any further records of the interviews, other than a project management file 
stored in the encrypted partition of the USB disk, and removed saved passwords to 
email accounts from my devices before crossing the border each way. I also planned 
for potential scenarios involving law enforcement, such as a request for my raw data. 
In this case, I would attempt to legally fight disclosure of this as far as possible, but 
would inevitably be faced with the prospect of handing this information over. This is 
not without precedent: for example, researchers at Boston College were forced by 
law enforcement to hand over their interview recordings and details of participants 
for a highly sensitive study they had carried out on ex-IRA members (McDonald, 
2016). As a result, I sought to minimise the collection of any identifying or sensitive 
information, and made this clear in my interviews.  
The archival research itself poses important questions of harm (Tesar, 2015). 
Although the Tor archives are open source, and I had discussed this research with 
the Tor leadership, some of the people featured in these archives could potentially 
object to me dredging up their email conversations from twenty years ago. Although 
they were sent in the knowledge that it is a public board, the context of statements 
can shift a lot in twenty years. In the nineties, far fewer people had access to the 
internet, and the likelihood of someone hunting through tens of thousands of emails 
in an obscure archive was very low. By bringing these emails to a broader audience, I 
am exposing them to a kind of scrutiny which the people who sent them might not 
have envisioned, as they likely thought about this as scrutiny of the security 
properties of their decisions rather than sociological analysis of their values and 
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practices. I deal with this by not identifying any of the interlocutors by name, and by 
trying to be sensitive in how they are presented, talking about groups and ideas 
rather than particular individuals. 
In addition to more general concerns, I had to contend with a particular issue which 
posed difficult questions as to best ethical practice. My fieldwork began in the 
immediate aftermath of a serious crisis in the Tor community. A prominent 
developer on the Tor Project, Jacob Appelbaum, was accused in 2016 by several 
members of the Tor community of sexual assault, bullying, and abuse22 (Loll, 2016). 
This led to a major upheaval within the Tor Project: for most of its life, Tor had been 
known for being lassiez-faire with regards to organisational structure and practices, 
and it appeared to many that the time had come for serious change. Appelbaum was 
expelled from Tor and a new Board of Directors were appointed. This led to a 
programme of professionalisation within Tor, including aims to transition to more 
formal and healthier working arrangements, proper human resources support, and a 
range of changes intended to prevent any developer taking too-prominent a role in 
Tor’s public life23 (Marechal, 2018).  
My initial feeling was to exclude this scandal as a topic of analysis and avoid asking 
questions about it. This was both in order to avoid causing additional harm by 
potentially asking participants to re-live traumatic events or disrupt the community’s 
attempts to recover from this crisis, and because I felt that this would generate 
suspicion among the community that I was a bad faith actor with either a prurient 
interest in this topic, or a desire to stir up trouble in a community still in the process 
of recovery. Additionally, this was not the direct focus of my research topic. 
However, in practice, this topic was impossible to avoid: nearly all of my interviewees 
actively brought this up themselves and some spoke about it at length. It became 





either the events themselves or the profound organisational changes for which they 
provided a catalyst. This in fact ended up being an important factor in the research – 
a signal event which communicated a shift in the underlying values and social 
organisation of Tor (which I discuss in more depth in Chapter 6). As a result, I do 
discuss these accusations and the organisational change which resulted from them in 
depth in Chapter 6, and attempt to do so sensitively and with my focus on how they 
reflect changes in the social worlds of Tor. While this all clearly also pertains to 
important issues of gender, the feminist movement, power relations, and abuse 
within technical communities as well, I have not engaged in these questions in this 
thesis, as I feel they deserve a fuller exploration in their own right than I am able to 
provide here (for a more in-depth exploration of this, see Nathalie Marechal’s PhD 
thesis, Marechal, 2018). 
Moving on to broader questions of harm, I needed to account for not only the risk of 
harm to the people whom I interviewed, but the broader implications of my research 
for the Tor community, the Tor Project, and the privacy technology community more 
generally. I was particularly concerned in designing and carrying out the research 
with either presenting information which would be damaging to Tor, or revealing 
information about the resilience practices, community structure, or key individuals in 
Tor which might be of use to law enforcement and state security agencies who might 
wish to undermine the Tor Project. I made sure that I gave careful consideration to 
what I presented in my research outputs, including presentations, reports, and this 
thesis, and did not include anything which I thought might primarily be of use to 
state security actors attempting to destabilise the project.  
All research has a normative dimension, and the choice to give voice to a particular 
set of people is in itself an intervention in politics. Brunton and Coleman (2014) 
argue that the very act of conducting this kind of materially-grounded research on 
technical communities whose practices bring them to the interest of law 
enforcement itself has an ethical dimension. By bringing material reality into 
contention with the often speculative and “hyperbolic” depictions of groups like 
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Anonymous or the Tor Project, one can provide a counterpoint to these narratives 
and shape public discussions to be more grounded in the actual capacities which 
these groups and technologies have (Brunton and Coleman, 2014). As a result, I 
believe that I have conducted this research in a way which not only minimises any 
potential harm to the Tor community, but also one which potentially might have 
positive social effects, bringing these somewhat hidden perspectives and voices to 
light and potentially providing some insights for the Tor community as well. Despite 
this, I cannot, of course, be certain how this research will be used or interpreted by 
others, or how it might shape public conversations about Tor. 
 
Analysis 
Analysis in the social worlds framework 
Social worlds theory, as with other interactionist frameworks, favours an inductive 
approach to analysis. This involves a coding strategy which works from “the bottom 
up” (Straus and Corbin, 1997), coding the individual meanings of statements at the 
micro-level, and clustering these into higher level categories and concepts which 
arise from the data themselves. This is distinct from a deductive approach, which 
begins with pre-defined semantic categories into which the data are fit after 
collection. Clarke develops this into a more formalised methodological approach 
through situational analysis (see Clarke 2003, 2011), which draws on Haraway’s 
(1997) theoretical work and methodological critique within Science and Technology 
Studies research. As with social worlds theory, this is not a programmatic framework, 
rather a set of approaches, maps, tools, and sensibilities with which to approach and 
guide a programme of social worlds research. This focuses on processes of mapping, 
bringing in social worlds, but also other levels of consideration - mapping materiality 
and actors, or particular rhetorical positions on a topic. Situational analysis brings 
together the focus of social worlds on discourse as bound to social action with more 
Foucauldian concerns of discourse in the abstract, in complementary ways which 
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build up an inductive picture of the worlds of discourse, practice, and sensibility 
which accrete around sites where social life is produced (Fairclough 1992). 
Clarke (2003, 2005, 2007) suggests combining interview coding and archival research 
with the generation of three kinds of maps which assist in the development of 
higher-order coding structures and the generation of findings. The first of these are 
situational maps, which set out the different actors, technologies, organisations and 
groups and the relationships between them. The second are social worlds maps, 
which show the different social worlds which accrete around the arena of concern, 
and how they relate and overlap. Finally, Clarke suggests positional maps, which map 
"issues, positions on issues, absences of positions where they might be expected... 
and differences in discursive positions central to the situation under study..." (Clarke, 
2005, p126). By separating these discourses from particular people, groups or 
professions and analysing them first in their own right, this reflects the fact that 
people can and do hold multiple contradictory positions and are often not "bound" 
irrevocably to a particular group. Equally, discourse can and does overlap between 
social worlds, and this mapping of discursive terrain can provide a useful way to get 
past a sole focus on individual worlds and find the points of overlap and conflict 
between them. Using these rough maps (which can be found in Appendix B through 
F) together with more traditional grounded coding strategies allows for useful 
mechanisms and practices for stepping between different levels of abstraction and 
understanding how they interrelate. 
 
Coding and mapping 
In conjunction with these maps, I used more familiar approaches to coding the 
interview data itself. Using NVivo qualitative research software, I inductively coded 
the transcripts of the 26 interviews. This involved working through the text of each 
interview and coding meaning at the level of sentences (or small groups of 
sentences). From the first interview, and increasingly as I gathered more data, I 
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clustered these together into higher-level concepts. These were then further 
clustered together, until a final higher-level structure was arrived at. This broadly, at 
the top level, grouped the interview data into information about practices, 
community structure, privacy values, and crime.  
NVivo’s coding system is designed around a hierarchical, tree-based model, where 
lower level codes are sorted into branches, leading to a many-to-few approach in 
which one works backwards from empirical complexity into simpler higher-order 
structures. This process of condensation, however, serves to generate a model of 
coding which seems ill-suited to social worlds analysis, which looks at connections 
and multiplicity. Therefore, while NVivo was very useful for the inductive coding and 
aggregation of discourses, facts, and themes in my data, I needed to supplement it 
with other approaches. This is where Clarke’s maps become a vital resource, allowing 
the generation of horizontal links and representation of the relationality of these 
codes and discourses. Mapping these horizontal topologies within levels of 
abstraction across different coding ‘branches’, I found a set of three broader 
perspectives which formed a pattern across the different groups of codes. These 
constituted three discrete, self-consistent frameworks of understanding within the 
Tor community. Although these were by no means exclusive to particular groups, 
they did appear to be linked to the logics of particular types of working practice: the 
engineering work of the developers, the campaigning work of the activists, and the 
maintenance and administrative work of the relay operators. Having mapped 
discourses, I could then therefore group these perspectives into particular social 
worlds. 
At this point I engaged, as Clarke (2011) suggests, in an intense focus in the discourse 
of these worlds. As these broad maps of social worlds, practices, discourses, people, 
and relationships were developing, I drew on the library of sensitising concepts which 
I describe in detail in Chapter 4. In particular, the idea of boundary objects proved 
useful in mapping how the different worlds overlapped, and how they related to the 
technological design of Tor itself (as I discuss in Chapter 6). Once this had been 
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mapped out (the results of which I present in Chapter 6), I could use these social 
worlds as a framework for exploring other questions, asking, for example, “which 
world or worlds is this discourse attached to?”, or “what does this world think about 
this issue?”. This often led to spotting things I had missed and helped with siting 
ideas and practices in their broader context within the Tor community.  
I then took these social worlds and mapped them onto the practices, work, 
technologies, hardware, software, and groups of Tor. At this point, the archives 
became a vital record of material practices and places where the connection 
between values and the material could be elucidated. I approached this archive of 
material by drawing key sensitising themes and lines of enquiry from my interviews. I 
began by immersing myself in the data, reading from start to finish the first five years 
of Tor’s Tor-dev development mailing list, large parts of its later years, and large 
sections of Tor’s more informal Tor-talk mailing list, writing notes on content and 
marking up what seemed like important discussions or places where Tor’s values 
were being articulated or struggled over. I reduced this material to a handful of key 
design discussions, from which I chose a single core controversy on which to focus in 
depth, namely Tor’s choice not to include padding traffic on the network which 
would have further strengthened user anonymity, and instead prioritise usability and 
speed (I explain this in greater detail in Chapter 7). This was selected based not only 
on my own reading, but through the interviews, as it was often brought up as a 
particularly foundational and contentious aspect of Tor’s design. 
While I first intended to look at the different actors involved in these discussions and 
how they tried to get their particular vision of the project inscribed into the design, 
in fact I found a remarkable degree of consensus. Development in Tor appeared to 
be a more mutual process of working through and refining different ideas and 
values, rather than an agonistic struggle between different interests. This kind of 
iterative, cyclical, tacking-back and forth has been well-established within studies of 
Open Source communities and infrastructure development, in stark contrast to more 
traditional, linear models of development (Guedenna 2015; Pollock and Williams 
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2008, 2010; Williams, Stewart and Slack, 2005). I therefore decided to focus on the 
evolution of these discourses and category systems into a coherent social world 
across the discussion, rather than the actors themselves. A range of “tricks of the 
trade” (Star, 1999, p384) are offered by Star as strategies for directing this kind of 
research. In addition to Latour’s (2005; 2007) approach of bringing out controversies 
as sites where values are brought to the surface, Star (1999) suggests a range of 
other approaches for pulling out sociologically interesting findings from the vast 
archives associated with engineering and infrastructural projects. Two of these in 
particular proved useful. The first of these was the identification of ‘master 
narratives', frameworks of imagined users, purposes, and contexts with which the 
technology is designed to interact, and the creation of ‘others’ who are left out of 
these frameworks. This involves mapping out systems of categorisation and 
representation: the way in which people doing technical work seek to represent the 
world, and how this becomes inscribed into the logics of the system. This allows the 
researcher to discover the values implicit in the system through, for example, critical 
examination of taxonomies of user types or use cases, and hence to find out what 
kind of world the system envisions, and who might be left out. The second of these 
‘tricks’ is the search for kinds of hidden work – the work which goes on behind the 
scenes that fades into the background, but which is nonetheless vital to 
infrastructure (Star, 1999). Exploring these, their links to social worlds, and their 
change over time, was particularly productive, surfacing many of the key findings 
from the archival research. Finally, in some cases, values, ideas, and discourses came 
right to the surface, in discussions of contentious issues, or explicit debates around 
the broader politics of Tor and its design. 
Throughout this process, I moved between my existing interview data, the mailing 
list discussions, other secondary forms of archival data (such as bug and issue 
trackers), and the ongoing business of interviewing, as I brought in new questions 
and topics as they rose to prominence in the archival study. This approach bears 
some similarity to the kinds of mappings drawn in Brunton and Coleman’s research 
(2014), which pull apart the technical underpinnings of their subjects of enquiry and 
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relate them to distinct frames of sense-making: the “multiple, sometimes 
contradictory, and sometimes coexistent experiences that obtain on the network 
infrastructure” which “thrive together, like commensal bacteria in which the by-
products of one happen to create a suitable environment for the population of 
another” (Brunton and Coleman, p82). I believe that through this exploration of 
these rich data sources, and with the help and generosity of my research 
participants, the research in this thesis represents an initial, but hopefully rich and 
representative, study of some key aspects of Tor. 
Conclusions and methodological reflections 
This chapter has set out the key methodological decisions I made throughout my 
research design, fieldwork and analysis, drawing on the theoretical and 
methodological literature from which I drew inspiration and guidance. I have set out 
my main four research questions and my broad strategic approach to answering 
them, and how I designed my interview schedules and approaches to archival 
research. I sketched out my fieldwork journey and the process of building trust with 
the Tor community, and reflect on some of the key ethical issues posed by the 
research, in particular around anonymity, the use of archival material, and harm. I 
have also discussed my analytical approach and the use of Clarke’s (2003) situational 
analysis and Star’s (1999) ethnography of infrastructure approaches to mapping, 
coding, and making sense of the densely packed human and technical communities 
which accrete around infrastructures. 
I have enjoyed the writing up and analytical portions of this PhD immensely, however 
the most thrilling, exhausting, moving, and rewarding part has been the fieldwork 
itself. I value enormously both my experiences of doing qualitative interviewing and 
of archival research, which were exciting and draining in different ways. In particular, 
negotiating concerns around legitimacy was an issue which caused me some anxiety 
throughout, as I was concerned that I might give a negative impression of my 
intentions and have a gatekeeper close off access to other important potential 
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participants. In retrospect, I could have mitigated this by developing a more public 
relationship with the Tor Project, engaging in discussions on social media or 
commenting on their blog posts. This might have enabled more interviews with some 
of the core developers and access to other spaces in the Tor community, such as 
developer meetings, however this may also have backfired, potentially compromising 
the objectivity of the research or putting off some of the more hidden voices in the 
community from speaking to me. 
While I have aimed to conduct this research on an open and ethical basis 
throughout, this process is nonetheless still ongoing. As I write up my results in the 
form of this thesis, and begin to present them at conferences and in journal articles, 
these ethical considerations continue to operate, and I am aware of the continuing 
potential of my research to influence the discourse which surrounds Tor, for better 
or worse. I now intent to feed my research back into the Tor community, circulating 
it amongst my participants and others in the Tor Project so that they can play a role 
in shaping the future life of the research, so that it can continue as a dialogue rather 
than merely a series of statements. 
Although I believe that I have been successful in speaking to a range of people across 
the Tor community and that this research presents a representative view of the 
topology of values, discourses, and practices within Tor, it is nonetheless only a 
partial perspective based on the people with whom I was able to speak. Building on 
my findings in future research would undoubtedly involve closer co-operation with 
the Tor Project itself, if possible. Having established myself more, and with evidence 
of research findings, of my approach, and of my sensibilities towards Tor and privacy 
technology, I would feel more comfortable asking to attend Tor’s developer 
meetings and work more closely with the Tor Project (if possible) in a more 
traditionally ethnographic approach. Additionally, the users of Tor are almost entirely 
absent in the account I give here, other than as implicated actors. Although there is a 
wealth of literature on Tor users, future study could entail broadening the picture of 
the social worlds I have identified here to see where and how they seep into the Tor 
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user communities (and their own worlds), and how they are shaped by the users 
themselves. 
I now turn to the results of the thesis, which I present in the following four chapters 
(Chapters 6 to 9). Each of these is broadly organised as a response to one of the four 
research questions I outlined at the beginning of this chapter. In the first of these, 
Chapter 6, I map out and characterise the three key social worlds in Tor: the engineer 
world, the activist world, and the infrastructuralist world. I then explore in detail how 




chapter 6  
the social worlds of Tor 
 
Introduction 
Tor is underpinned by a rich and vibrant cultural life, and exploring, mapping, and 
representing this was one of my main goals from the outset. On beginning my 
research, my initial interviews revealed a very different picture than I had expected. I 
had imagined Tor, given the deeply political nature of its work, as an organisation 
with a strong set of core values and well-aligned shared perspectives. In fact, I found 
a dense and heterogeneous aggregation of different ideas and ways of making sense 
of the core work of the community and the social meaning of Tor itself. As I describe 
in Chapters 4 and 5, I use the social worlds framework to map this social life and to 
distil this complexity into a set of three social worlds. I use these social worlds to 
explore Tor as a site of social action, collaboration, conflict, and consensus. In this 
chapter, I focus on my first research question: what are the social worlds of Tor, and 
how do they interrelate? 
Social worlds are not only ideas and discourses, but embody practices, sensibilities 
and interpretive frameworks for making sense of the world. They are deeply linked 
to the material life of technologies, but are also relational, able to interact, conflict 
and influence one another in the abstract. They are a link between the material and 
the semantic, a form of embodied discourse which is lived through practices, 
interactions, and relationships with people and technologies (Clarke and Star, 2008). 
In this chapter, I begin with a mapping of the main social worlds of Tor which I have 
identified and characterised. Although these worlds are not recognised as such 
within Tor, coming instead from my own analysis of my fieldwork interviews, I have 
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found them a useful framework for making sense of some of the main questions, 
issues, and contradictions facing the Tor Project. 
I suggest that this mapping exercise is in itself valuable, a form of ‘thick description’ 
(Geertz, 1973, 2008) of the Tor community, and the lives and values of the people 
therein, which aims to brings some of the more hidden voices and perspectives in 
this community to light. My exploration of the ways in which Tor manages to square 
these mutually contradictory value systems and deal with the conflicts between 
them suggests potential explanations for why Tor has managed to succeed in 
promoting this “collaboration without consensus” (Star, 2010, p604) where other 
organisations have failed. 
I begin this chapter with a mapping of the different people, groups, and technologies 
which make up Tor and the Tor community.  I then move on to the values of Tor with 
an exploration of the Tor’s community’s perceptions of privacy more broadly and the 
threats which they feel it faces in the contemporary era. I then argue that this shared 
focus on privacy and internet freedom actually masks a deeply heterogeneous 
community who understand these core values in very different ways. I refine this 
web of discourse and values into three ideal type social worlds which I characterise 
in turn as the engineer world, the activist world, and the infrastructuralist world. In 
the next section, I explore how Tor manages the overlaps, discontinuities, and points 
of rupture between these worlds through the idea of privacy as a ‘boundary object’, 
creating a détente which has allowed the organisation to survive. I end this chapter 
by illustrating what happens when this détente is shaken by crisis, reflective of how 
these Social Worlds have begun to shift and change in recent years. 
 
Mapping the Tor community and infrastructure 
Before I turn to the values and worlds of the Tor community, it is useful to map out 
the main human and technical components which make up Tor. This constitutes 
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Clarke’s first kind of map, a situational map, and serves to ground the discussion of 
values and meaning-making which follows in the material infrastructure, community, 
and work of Tor (Clarke, 2003). A simplified graphical representation of this map can 
be found in Appendix B. 
The Tor Project is the organisation at the heart of Tor, taking the main responsibility 
for its development and support. It is headed up by the Tor Project Board of 
Directors, a group of experts and leaders from civil society organisations and 
academia who act in a consultatory capacity and provide advice in steering the 
organisation and its connections to public life. The developers and other staff 
working for Tor are arranged into ‘teams’, each of which specialises in a particular 
part of Tor. These include the network team, which works on the programs which 
deliver the Tor network, the applications team, which develops user-facing aspects 
of Tor, such as the Tor Browser, the UX (user experience) team, which feeds insights 
from the Tor user community to the network and applications teams, the community 
team, which conducts outreach and advocacy, the metrics team, which collects and 
analyses information about the Tor network, the anti-censorship team, who aim to 
circumvent nation state attempts to block Tor around the world, the sysadmin team, 
who run the Tor Project’s own systems, the operations team, who manage human 
resources, administration, and accounting, and the fundraising team. Historically, 
only a handful of developers were actually paid by Tor, with the rest contributing on 
a volunteer basis, but since Tor’s efforts at professionalisation, the organisation 
supports an increasing number of paid staff.  Tor is funded by a combination of 
grants from the US government, civil society organisations, private companies, and 
crowdfunding. Sometimes, this funding directly pays for particular research, such as 
improving Tor’s usability or translating its programs into non-English languages. In 
addition, Tor has links to a range of other technical projects, including the people 
developing the Tails operating system or the developers of Onion Services such as 
SecureDrop, and looser links to organisations such as Mozilla, who make use of some 
of Tor’s security and anti-tracking updates to their Firefox browser. 
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In addition to the core Tor development teams, there are other projects under the 
Tor ‘umbrella’. The most interesting and notable of these is the Open Observatory of 
Network Interference (OONI) project. The OONI project conducts research on 
Internet censorship around the world through an infrastructure of collection devices 
run on a volunteer basis, similar to the Tor relay network itself. Contributors can 
download the OONI software onto their computer or phone and run tests on their 
local networks to detect different kinds of blocking and surveillance. This provides 
valuable information for journalists, for example, where governments censor the 
Internet in advance of elections, and important intelligence for the Tor Project 
developers concerning what practices of surveillance and censorship are in operation 
around the world. They also engage in a substantial amount of outreach work, 
travelling around the world to work with Internet freedom activists and better 
understand their needs. 
In addition to technical experts, Tor also plays host to a range of people with rather 
different skills. In recent years, Tor has taken on board more people from an activist 
background, and there are now a number of people within the Tor core community 
with experience in lobbying, public relations, policy, user security training, working 
with activists, journalism, fundraising, and public outreach. It has also been making 
efforts in recent years to strengthen its ties to internet freedom activist and 
campaigning organisations such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation. 
Tor is not just a computer program which people run, but an anonymity network: an 
infrastructure which people access through the Tor Browser. This is comprised of 
around six thousand ‘relays’, servers run by volunteers around the world which carry 
encrypted Tor user traffic and bounce it between them before sending it to its final 
destination. For reasons of trust and safety, the Tor Project tries to have as little as 
possible to do with running the network itself, and so a loose community of relay 
operators has sprung up over the years. In addition, the wider Tor community 
comprises a range of other contributors, including developers who make use of Tor’s 
network in their own technologies to provide anonymity and security, and 
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information security researchers and academics who scrutinise Tor’s code and 
attempt to break it in order to make it stronger. 
 
Privacy at the heart – Tor’s values 
If the Tor community can be said to be united around a common value, it is privacy. 
Privacy is at the heart of Tor’s mission and it is privacy which gives Tor its sense of 
meaning and identity. Before I map out the heterogeneities within the Tor 
community, I first set out here some of the similarities they share; in particular, their 
shared commitment to privacy as a value, and the idea that this is under threat in 
contemporary societies. 
And I think there are for sure some common principles, and things that motivate our 
work, which is, you know, we believe in the right to privacy, we believe that people 
should be able to engage in conversations in a way that is private, and that in the 
end, people should have the right to access all information. 
Participant H - Tor core developer 
The rise of ‘mass surveillance’, as revealed in the Snowden leaks, is of particular 
concern to the Tor community, and was brought up by many of my participants. In 
particular, they link the use of these techniques not only in authoritarian nations, but 
also in liberal democracies, to a dangerous trend which is threatening global society. 
These increasingly technocratic technologies of control and the use of automated 
processing of large datasets of intimate information about people were perceived as 
having potentially disastrous consequences, intensifying social control and removing 
large parts of how countries are governed from democratic scrutiny. 
For me the thing that really concerns me about… web monitoring or internet 
monitoring is that people are… like, basically all of politics is online now. Apart from 
some TV, you know? But it’s very much, you know, Twitter and everything, all the 
other web stuff. And if this is all monitored by governments, including my own 
government, it’s extremely dangerous for democracy… the web, while it was 
intended as this wonderful new, you know, invention to… essentially add a lot of 
freedom to people, unfortunately it has this sort of unanticipated, or somewhat 
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unanticipated potential for doing the opposite and we have to be really careful that 
we don’t slide into this disaster. 
Participant C - Tor core developer 
My participants also drew links between issues of surveillance and other forms of 
online power, especially Internet censorship. A side-effect of Tor’s frustration of 
attempts to surveil the traffic of its users is that it is also a powerful tool for evading 
online censorship. There is a strong ‘free speech’ ethos within the Tor community, 
and they generally saw Tor’s mission as encompassing both resistance to 
surveillance, and to censorship: 
As censorship has increased around the world and internet freedom has 
declined, we realized we needed to step up our game to outpace the censors 
preventing people from enjoying the human right to freedom of expression and 
access to information on the internet. 
Tor Project blog, 2019 
This ethic of resistance is not only concerned with government power over the 
Internet, but also with the power exercised by the private companies who manage 
the Internet’s infrastructure. The ‘surveillance capitalism’ practiced by the Internet 
giants such as Google and Facebook was a particular source of anxiety (Zuboff, 
2019). 
But I'm worried. Not about government or three letter agencies, but advertising. 
Market forces and Moore's law makes bulk surveillance both easier and more 
profitable every year. Maybe I underestimate the public's desire for privacy, but 
when offered convenience in exchange for it, I'm uncomfortable thinking where we 
might end up. 
Participant E – Tor core developer  
However, beyond this commitment to privacy, free speech and resistance to online 
power, these values are refracted through the different practices, motivations and 
perspectives of the Tor community into rather different forms, which understand the 
salience of privacy technology to power and politics rather differently. In practice, 
when I began the research, I found Tor not to be centred around a unitary set of 
shared values but to be remarkably heterogeneous, with even individuals drawing on 
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multiple, complex, and often mutually contradictory understandings of the work in 
which they were engaged. This is also well-recognised within the Tor community 
itself: 
I think one interesting thing about Tor is that because we are such a large and 
diverse community, it’s impossible to actually agree on a small set of ideals and 
values and goals for the large group. 
Participant A – Tor core developer 
Through my research, I have separated out these discourses into self-consistent 
perspectives, or social worlds. This set of three core social worlds at the heart of Tor, 
how it is understood by its community, and its position as a site of social action, 
forms the main analytical framework which underpins this thesis. 
 
Privacy worlds 
Tor is an attempt to realise particular visions of society, the internet, and privacy in 
practice through material infrastructure. As an infrastructural project, Tor draws 
together different kinds of people engaged in different types of work which are 
embodied in different kinds of relationship with technology. In the remainder of this 
chapter, I use the social worlds framework to map the complex landscape of privacy 
values in the Tor community. Privacy and security are at the heart of Tor’s work, and 
form the core values of Tor. However, within the broad concept of privacy lies a 
heterogeneous terrain of different concepts and elements. This includes the 
category systems of use cases and users for whom Tor provides privacy, the 
adversaries against which Tor attempts to provide privacy, how privacy is understood 
as a feature of technical systems, the relationship between privacy and anonymity, 
and how privacy, security and resilience interact and balance against one another. 
Additionally, a further component of how privacy is constructed concerns its 
implication in power and politics: namely, how privacy technologies become sites of 
social action, and the kinds of social action in which they are implicated. In Tor, there 
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is a deep tension between different understandings of the links between privacy, 
politics, technology, and power. 
Through empirical research, clustering strands of discourse from my interviews into 
self-consistent ways of framing Tor, I have identified three main social worlds of 
understanding which are rooted in different kinds of work. I describe the process of 
arriving at these social worlds in more depth in Chapter 5. The first of these is the 
engineer social world, which stems from the design and development work on Tor 
and understands privacy technology as rewriting structures of power in technical 
networks.  The second is the activist social world, which is linked to the campaigning, 
lobbying and advocacy work of the Tor Project, and sees privacy technology as 
engaged in political work, and part of a social movement in its own right. The final 
social world is that of the infrastructuralist, arising from the maintenance and 
administration work done by the Tor community, which is deeply agnostic about the 
political character of privacy technology, preferring a “neutralised” ethos of service 
provision.  
These constitute ways of understanding the work of Tor, ‘universes of discourse’ 
imbued with their own culture, practices and politics, which different actors draw on 
when working on the project. While these worlds appear to map neatly onto 
particular groups in the Tor community, in fact, as I discuss during this chapter, 
individuals often draw on more than one of these social worlds in making sense of 
the politics of privacy technology, especially when they are involved in multiple kinds 
of work. Thus, a particular relay operator might occasionally draw on the engineer or 
an activist perspective when talking about how Tor relates to other organisations, for 
example, but primarily identify as an infrastructuralist where these worlds directly 
come into conflict. In this section, I characterise each of these social worlds, and how 
they articulate different understandings of Tor’s relationship to power and politics. 
For each world, I set out some background about how they fit into the work of Tor 
and detail the main kinds of work in which they are engaged. I then discuss the main 
discourses which together constitute the way the social world makes sense of Tor as 
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a site of social action, then briefly outline the points off passage through which this 
world exerts its influence on the material forms of Tor. 
 
Engineers: privacy as a structure 
When Tor was first created, most of its community was composed of the people 
involved in designing and developing its software and encryption protocols. Tor’s 
technological design and the rationalities which underpin it are shaped by this 
development work and the social world to which it gives rise. Tor now has a small 
core team of full-time development staff who work on the project, supported by a 
larger Open-Source community of volunteer developers. Their work is undoubtedly 
the highest-profile work involved in the Tor community and is characterised by a 
social world which I describe as the engineer perspective. In addition to this, many 
other projects – in particular Onion Services, which use the Tor network to provide 
anonymous and uncensorable web services – contribute to the broader Tor 
ecosystem (Tor Project 2019). Their developers, and the large community of 
academics who develop privacy technologies, also contribute to the engineer 
perspective on Tor. This perspective is the foundational social world of the Tor 
community: 
Uh, I think people working on Tor then were technical people. Um, so either they 
had computing science degrees, or, or something approximating that. The, the more 
inter-disciplinary aspects came later. Um… uh, like, OK, there’s probably a few 
exceptions, so, [an early founder of Tor is] a philosopher and a mathematician, but I 
think he, he does computer science research, um, so I think people either doing 
computer science or doing computer science research at the time. 
Participant F - Tor core developer 
Tor’s engineering work bears some similarities with hacking, involving deep technical 
knowledge, creativity and expertise. However rather than subverting or repurposing 
technologies which already exist, Tor’s engineers are engaged in the creation of 
something new: a massive, stable infrastructure which needs to be reliable and 
maintainable. This entails planning and software development processes, and 
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balancing between privacy, usability, resilience and security in design (Dingledine 
2004). I describe this development work and the practices of Tor’s developers in 
considerably more depth in Chapter 7. 
Although the Tor engineers are engaged in the same debates about privacy and 
internet freedom (and often on the same side) as many hackers, their understanding 
is framed by a different set of practices, logics and goals. The engineer social world is 
shaped by a deep, systematic technical understanding of internet infrastructure, 
combined with a practical engagement with its systems through design processes. 
Through this work, the Tor engineers construct politics and power as enacted 
through the structural forms which communications systems take, mapping the 
‘choke points’ which the topology of the internet creates and how this gives power 
to the particular actors who control them. This perspective frames the politics of 
technology, privacy and anonymity in topological terms:  
But the act of [running a Tor node], just like the act of creating an internet service 
provider where there wasn’t one before, is a political act, right? It changes the 
landscape, and the relationship between people, and what people can do, and can’t 
do, you know, so it’s, I mean, yes, it is [political]… People who say that the choice to 
do this is not political are deluding themselves. 
Participant U - Tor relay operator 
Musiani (2013) argues that perspectives like these represent part of an 
‘architectural’ turn in internet governance discourse. In the engineer world, privacy 
is a quality of the structures of technosystems whose designs produce different 
types of privacy and topologies of power. What is distinctive about the engineer 
perspective is that it does not make value judgements about who has this power, 
rather it critiques the accumulation of this structural power itself: 
I see the work that I do as decentralising and distributing power. Because I think 
that’s always a good thing. *laughs* I see that as a fundamental… like, if nothing else 
is true in the world, distributing power in this world is a good thing. And, so… when 
you’re threat modelling, it’s a case of, how do we take this cluster of power here… 
and how do we remove that from the equation? 
Participant Z - Onion Service developer 
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This perspective confines explicit value discussions to the initial goals of the project, 
whose consequences are worked out through engineering practices which are 
perceived as largely value-neutral. This is not a disavowal of the politics of 
technology, rather, it is an understanding of power and politics as arising from 
structural forms in networks. Privacy is understood through topologies of 
informational power, in which making the internet more private is seen as a process 
of redistributing power, inherently helping the weak more than the strong. Thus, Tor 
is seen by the engineer perspective as changing the terrain of power online through 
a technical ‘fix’ to the structures of these networks, reframing political questions 
about the technology in ways which can be tackled through design and development 
processes. 
I think privacy does level the board a bit. So, I think privacy helps weaker people, it 
helps people who want to enact change. Powerful people do not need privacy to the 
same extent, because they have other means of defending themselves against bad 
things happening. So, I think it is also a technology that tries to help equality. 
Participant F - Tor developer 
The points of passage through which this perspective shapes Tor are its design and 
development processes, and hence the material and functional qualities of the Tor 
network. This obviously constitutes substantial power to shape what Tor is and how 
it works. Access to this power is, naturally, limited by the technical expertise required 
to understand and make informed contributions to these debates, and this can prove 
difficult even for members of the developer community. Tor relies on a range of 
different design elements, including the cutting-edge encryption protocols on which 
it is based, the design of the browser and the way traffic is routed around the 
network, and the design work which goes into shaping its user experience, among 
many others. Each of these in their own right requires substantial technical 
expertise, and as a result, the range of people whose values shape the material 
design of Tor is restricted by this high barrier to entry. 
As I describe in Chapter 8, this is mitigated somewhat by Tor’s philosophy of radical 
openness. Even the less technical members of the community are generally fairly 
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trusting of the decisions made by the Tor developers, as the Tor Project makes its 
source code and design freely available and open to scrutiny by independent 
researchers. Tor’s engineers, however, are beginning to go beyond a passive model 
of openness, in which they simply lay themselves bare to the technical and academic 
elite who have the knowledge to engage in these discussions. They are now 
beginning to take a more active role in involving their community and users, even 
those with less technical ability, in these design processes. This is often led by 
funding, with sponsors from particular regions of the world or representing 
particular user communities donating money in order to make Tor more usable for 
particular groups or use cases. Underneath all this, however, the inherently 
‘structural’ or ‘topological’ framing of social life remains at the heart of how the 
engineer social world makes sense of privacy. 
 
Infrastructuralists: privacy as a service 
Design and engineering, however, is not the only work involved in Tor. As a globally-
distributed infrastructure with millions of daily users, Tor relies on a substantial 
quantity of ‘invisible work’ (Star 1999). The infrastructuralist perspective which 
typifies this labour is drawn on by a wide array of relay operators and volunteer 
maintainers who provide this work, concerned with the maintenance and upkeep of 
the network rather than design and engineering. Rather than a practice of ‘hacking’, 
based around breaking, subversion and creativity, these technologists are involved in 
maintaining and administering an infrastructural project, which needs to be stable 
and robust. The relay operators are the largest group of these ‘invisible labourers’ 
and this section focuses on them. This perspective dates largely to the original 
release of the Tor network in 2002, though many of the sentiments, practices, and 
sensibilities draw from the administrators of the other anonymity networks which 
grew up alongside, and sometimes predated, Tor. 
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The Tor relay operators, who administer the servers or “nodes” which form the 
backbone of the Tor infrastructure, are largely volunteers. Once a node had been set 
up, very little effort or attention is required to keep it running, apart from occasional 
checks and (depending on jurisdiction) dealing with complaints from ISPs and law 
enforcement. These complaints can be mitigated through careful selection of a 
sympathetic ISP, with wikis and mailing list discussions available to document 
favoured providers and ones to avoid. There was considerable variation among my 
participants in terms of how they set up and managed their node, with one operator 
running a node from their home computer, one running a few exit nodes on their 
secondary computers and one running a bank of several Raspberry Pis, each hosting 
a Tor node. Most of the relay operators I interviewed had at least some background 
in IT, whether as a programmer, a systems administrator or a security consultant. 
When asked how well they understood how Tor worked, they took care to make the 
distinction between their knowledge of network administration (the functioning of 
the infrastructure, their own machines and connections between nodes), which was 
generally  good, and the inner workings of the Tor code, which was of less interest to 
them. This was generally seen as the job of the core project developers and open 
source contributors, even by the operators with more technical knowledge: 
I do not follow the development. I think they know what they are doing and I am not 
a coder. 
Participant P - Tor relay operator 
Legal knowledge, in particular the legal situation in the host’s country with respect to 
running a Tor node, was felt to be of more use to a relay operator, especially to 
those starting out.  
Get in touch with the laws of your country. Read, read, read. Understand, 
understand, understand. And… try to have the Tor network growing… Depends on 
your intention – if you, if you don’t have any technical background and you just want 
to help the Tor network, it’s very important to know the laws of your country.  
Participant Q - Tor relay operator 
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While they enjoyed running relays or contributing code, they often reaffirmed the 
importance and the seriousness of the work they did, describing it as a ‘service’. As 
setting up a node was fairly straightforward, one of my participants was keen to 
make the distinction between their approach and that of more hobbyist 
contributors: 
I think for someone who’s doing it in the spare time or hobby, it is more like “ohh, 
this is spooky, this sounds nerdy, let’s give it a try!” and for me as a technician, it’s 
like, OK, I have the possibility to provide services to people which have restricted 
internet. I think for, uh, the free-time IT nerds it’s some play stuff and if you’re kind 
of a professional, it’s like, bringing out a service. That’s my opinion. 
Participant Q - Tor relay operator 
Despite sharing practices through wikis, mailing lists and IRC discussions, the relay 
operator community has been rather atomised for much of Tor’s history, and 
appears more as a collective of individuals rather than a coherent group. Whatever 
‘community’ of relay operators exists is a fairly loose-knit network composed of 
individuals with their own motivations, political opinions and levels of technical 
engagement. None of the respondents felt that there was a strong Tor node 
operator community. The majority of node operators viewed their work as a hobby, 
a mix of charitable work, public service and a leisure time pursuit such as gardening, 
a practice of cultivation and contribution.  
Despite the lack of a tight-knit relay operator community, many of my participants 
did feel that the volunteer operators running the Tor relay network had a shared 
perspective which extended past the operation of the Tor network and to a more 
general set of beliefs about security, privacy and resistance to state surveillance. The 
infrastructuralist social world is characterised by rather different discourses from 
that of the engineers, and the practices of relay operation give rise to a distinct 
framing of Tor as a site of social action. Part of Tor’s strength is that anyone with the 
capacity to set up a server can contribute, no matter their motivations. This allows 
for collective action without the need for shared political allegiances, and a large, 
broad-church community of contributors.  
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I think [Tor works] probably because it’s easy to work together. We don’t actually 
have to work together! The Tor Project has made it so simple to start a relay and just 
run it, and not actually interact with anyone... they’ve made it so easy to, to act like 
a big community when actually, we’re not really, I think we might be a bunch of 
individuals…We don’t have to co-operate with each other, apart from running the 
same software. 
Participant R – Relay operator 
The social world which arises from this is deeply agnostic to Tor’s relationship to 
power, and anxious to ‘neutralise’ the politics of their work as much as possible. 
Coleman describes a similar sensibility in the Free and Open Source Software 
community, which she terms “political agnosticism” (Coleman, 2004). Coleman 
describes this as an expression of the interaction between the liberal values and 
technical practices of ‘hacker’ culture: “what grows out of this particular life world of 
intense, lifelong programming and networked sociality is an overt aesthetic dislike 
for politics and a culturally embodied experience of freedom that conceptually shuns 
politics.”(Coleman, 2004, p512). 
Within this agnostic view of Tor’s politics lies a common commitment to deeply 
political values: the vision of a privacy-focused internet where the flow of 
information, capital and communication proceeds without surveillance or 
censorship. The infrastructuralist world expresses these ‘hacker ethic’ values through 
forms of practice more rooted in infrastructural labour than hacking, framed around 
an ethic of service provision rather than creative breaking. This frames Tor’s 
relationship to power and politics through a ‘neutralised’ variant of technoliberalism. 
I think most of us believe that we want to provide the tools so others can exercise 
their powers and their influences. People that understand society better, maybe. 
And we are just the infrastructure providers. Right? I think that’s a notion that a lot 
of hackers have, is that ultimately they don’t want the political influence, they just 
want to provide the infrastructure. For democratisation. 
Participant L – Tor core contributor 
This is distinct from the engineer perspective. Where the engineers see Tor as a 
political attempt to redraw the maps of informational power online, 
infrastructuralists are more agnostic about Tor’s relationship to power, 
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understanding privacy as a service they provide to users, who engage in political 
action themselves. Getting involved in normative conversations about how the 
network is used becomes a dangerous game, and so this perspective strongly resists 
any attempts on the part of the organisation to decry or promote particular use 
cases, legal or illegal, or to claim that Tor itself represents any specific set of values 
outside a neutral service for protecting data in transit. By constructing themselves as 
apolitical actors, they shift the moral character of the network onto the users, 
allowing them to contribute without feeling responsible for the traffic which their 
relay serves. 
The key point of passage through which the infrastructuralist perspective shapes Tor 
is the infrastructure of Tor itself: the relay network. Although the operators are not 
involved in the code, and hidden voice, they are crucial to the success of Tor, and 
together shape a lot of how the network is run. While they by and large do not 
consider themselves a community in the sense that the Tor activists and core team 
appear to, they wield considerable consensus power as the infrastructural backbone 
of the project. However, the dispersed, atomised nature of the relay operator 
community means that unless the Tor developers violate the fundamental 
guarantees of privacy and security on which the organisation is founded, in practice 
this group is too diffuse and heterogeneous to wield any real power to shape the 
direction of the organisation and its public life. Nevertheless, the Tor Project still 
need to keep them on side in order to maintain a robust and growing relay network. 
 
Activists: privacy as a struggle 
Many of Tor’s intended use cases involve explicit interventions in political struggles, 
either in the broader social movement for internet privacy or as a tool used by 
activists for secure communication. While this perspective, or elements thereof, has 
long been a part of the Tor community, it only really rose to prominence after the 
revelations made by Edward Snowden, which inspired a generation of activists to 
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nucleate around Tor, in some cases becoming deeply involved in its community. Due 
to the increasing maturity and professionalisation of the Tor Project organisation, 
there has equally been an increasing demand for HR workers, policy professionals, 
and fundraisers, who tend to come from other NGO and civil society groups and 
hence also contribute to this perspective on Tor.  
Um, as Tor grew, um, firstly, there’s just people who are needed for administrative-
type roles, so, just, running a project, um, getting in funders. Um, then there, there’s 
also the recognition that there’s interdisciplinary aspects of it, so you need someone 
who actually understands how people use the internet in order to do things better. 
Participant F - Core Tor developer 
As a result, Tor’s community includes a wide range of people who engage with civil 
society, activist movements and policymaking: these people develop an activist 
perspective. There is a substantial body of research on internet freedom activists, 
and so this section has been left brief other than a few remarks on the specific 
contours of Tor’s activist world (Marechal 2015). 
The activist social world understands Tor as part of a social movement. They see 
privacy technology as a site of activism, and contributing to Tor as an explicitly 
political act. Thus, from this perspective, privacy is often couched in the language of 
fundamental human rights or constitutional protections:  
I personally feel that, that Tor is political, because it enables individuals to have 
access to somewhat different internet, in the sense that it enables individuals to 
circumvent internet censorship. Circumventing internet censorship in itself is a 
political act of resistance. It enables individuals to, uh, circumvent, um online 
tracking, which is capitalist surveillance – that in itself is a form of resistance. It 
enables individuals to be anonymous – that is a human right, and so I feel that 
because of the nature of the software, in my personal opinion, is political.  
Participant K  – Tor core contributor 
This world can increasingly be seen in the public life of Tor, through strong value 
statements about what Tor ‘stands for’ and explicit articulations of Tor as embedded 
a specific set of values. They understand Tor as part of a long history of struggles for 
social justice and fight for Tor to move away from a ‘neutral’ understanding of 
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privacy in favour of one which recognises that ideas of privacy are inherently political 
and change for different people and in different contexts: 
The fact that many LGBTQ+ people need a private, anonymous internet to 
communicate with their peers or find important resources without being tracked 
and outed is one of the many reasons why we do what we do at the Tor Project… 
We are proud that our tools can serve the LGBTQ+ community. We hope that by 
offering a way to privately access the internet, allowing people to get online without 
fear, that we can communicate with one another to change the world. We all 
deserve to live in a world where we can express who we are without shame. 
Tor Project Blog, 2019 
These discourses, drawn from the practices and experiences of privacy activism and 
working with journalists and activists around the world, frame Tor’s work as explicitly 
political. While they are anxious that Tor not abuse its influence, they are generally 
happy for Tor to engage in political debates which touch directly on its work, for 
example, to condemn far-right users as they did following the far-right marches in 
Charlottesville which resulted in the death of one counter-protester, and some far-
right websites proposing moving to Tor. 
We’ve heard that the hate-spewing website Daily Stormer has moved to a Tor onion 
service. We are disgusted, angered and appalled by everything these racists stand 
for and do… Tor stands against racism and bigotry wherever and whenever such 
hatred rears its ugly head. It is our work to provide everyone with the best possible 
security and privacy tools so human dignity and freedom can be promoted all over 
the world. 
Tor Project Blog 2017 
Ultimately, the activist social world sees privacy technology as the focus of a 
sustained battle between authoritarian forces and surveillance capitalists on one 
hand, and privacy activists on the other. They see it as connected intrinsically to 
other such struggles and movements – whether those movements be women’s 
liberation, LGBTQ rights, or harm reduction movements for criminalised practices 
such as drug-taking or sex work. While this framework is drawn on by the policy 
workers and activists in the Tor community, many developers and relay operators 
are also involved in campaigning and advocacy, drawing on the activist perspective in 
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understanding the broader meaning of their work. The points of passage where the 
activist world wields its influence are those associated with Tor’s public image, which 
this world has a substantial capacity shape through blog posts, press releases, public 
talks, advertising and fundraising campaigns, and lobbying. These are important 
aspects of Tor, shaping as they do how it is understood in public life, and hence who 
uses it and how. 
 
Relational perspectives 
The above social worlds constitute three different instantiations of liberal 
technopolitics, refracted through three different kinds of labour. Much like the 
labour practices on which they rest, these social worlds do not exist in isolation. They 
are relational, defining themselves in key ways in opposition to one another. For 
example, the willingness of activists to link Tor to explicit political causes can clash 
with the infrastructuralist perspective, and provides a foil against which they can 
contrast their own “neutrality”. Where those who interact less with the Tor 
community draw heavily on an infrastructuralist perspective, they can even be 
sceptical that the other worlds of discourse really exist: 
I think it’s neutral… I think the people behind the Tor Project, are they free of 
values? I’m not sure if it was marketing they put on the front page… of course every 
privacy project in the Internet has to put some big strong words on their front 
page… But I think most of the people which are connected to the Tor Project, I think 
they are seeing it more… as a tool. A tool for people doing whatever they want. 
Participant Q - Tor relay operator 
While the engineers have less hostility to explicitly activist or political work, they see 
it as frustrating, an arena in which they are ill-equipped and unempowered and 
which they prefer to circumvent.  
I’m quite averse to getting involved in policy issues. And I don’t know if that’s 
something that technical people tend to share? That they look at it and they go, oh, I 
don’t really want to touch that, I don’t like making rules and things. Especially when I 
know someone’s going to go through them and mess them all up after I’ve written… 
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And then you have to have huge arguments with people and go, no, you really don’t 
understand this issue… I’d rather just implement a technical fix that prevents their 
law from being effective. 
Participant D - Tor core developer 
I’m not claiming I’m unaware of anything going on geopolitically, but I guess 
addressing that sort of thing is just outside my bailiwick… I mean, we’re certainly 
aware of how evolution of technology is going on in the broader world, but the 
specific sorts of, as you said, the Cryptowars, and other things, I don’t think they 
directly played a role, at least for me. Whether they were important motivation for 
other people… perhaps, but I don’t think it significantly changed what we were 
trying to do. Because I think that it made sense whether those things were 
happening or not. 
Participant I – Tor core developer  
These social worlds represent ‘ideal types’, a typology which aims to differentiate 
and accentuate the characteristic qualities of each of these worlds, stressing 
commonalities within particular categories without claiming exactly to correspond 
with the views of any particular person or group of people (Aronovitch 2012) While 
the perspectives of individual people in the Tor community tend to be aligned with 
one of these worlds based on their role in Tor, they often draw from others, bridging 
between different worlds. Identities and roles in Tor are hence often multiple or 
ambiguous:  
I think I avoid having an identity too much. Not in terms of anonymity, but in terms 
of a self-image of what I am. Because I feel like that’s limiting somehow. 
Participant C - Tor core developer 
While some members of the community may only be involved in engineering, policy, 
or infrastructural work, many of the core team are involved in all of these to some 
extent. Some of the engineers also carry out a variety of maintenance work, such as 
bugfixes, patching and monitoring the network, and outreach or policy work. This 
means that many of the core developers, while primarily viewing Tor through the 
engineer lens, draw on framings from the activist or infrastructural perspectives 
when talking in more abstract terms about the place of Tor in the world. Similarly, 
there are some relay operators who see the work they do as part of their political 
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activism (and many of the developers and activists also contribute to the relay 
network), or as restructuring power relations online.  
Within individual interviews, participants would often tack between different ways of 
making sense of Tor, drawing from different social worlds in different contexts. For 
example, in the following pair of responses, when discussing their broader 
motivations for being part of the community the participant describes Tor from an 
activist perspective as part of a political movement for privacy as a human right, 
then, when discussing the practices of operating a relay and the traffic which flows 
through it, describes Tor from the infrastructural perspective as a neutral tool whose 
politics stem entirely from its users.  
If you can see in Europe in United States, in Asia, in Russia, in Africa, there are a lot 
of crimes actually, against free speech, against human rights, about anonymity, you 
know United Nations has enlisted online anonymity as a basic human right more 
than a year ago… [Tor is] very important because the, yes, people have the right to 
think freely, to speak free, to speak from their hearts, not from fear of governments 
that will punish them for not being, you know, not being agreed with the official 
positions, for example. 
Participant N – Tor open source contributor 
Because the tool is something that helps you to do something. But uh, you know, 
what you will do, with this tool, is up to you. Crime happens not on the hard drive of 
the Bond movie producer, crime happens not on the Silk Road drug store, no. Crime 
happens inside people’s mind… Neither Tor or other software authors, nor people 
who are running even exit nodes, no they’re not responsible. They are not 
responsible for another people’s thoughts and actions. They are not. Tor is just a 
tool. 
Participant N – Tor open source contributor 
As Unruh (1980) describes, it is this multiplicity of membership in social worlds which 
forms the “glue” that binds them together. Part of Tor’s success has been precisely 
due to the productive tension between these three perspectives (which have grown 
and developed alongside the infrastructure at different points), and due to the fact 
that many of the core team can translate between these social worlds.  
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Collaboration, conflict and transformation 
Privacy as a boundary object 
Despite this heterogeneity, Tor has been remarkably successful at fostering 
collaboration within its diverse community. In this section, I explore how these 
worlds coexist, and how individuals are able to bridge between them. Although they 
differ in their understandings of the politics of privacy technologies, these social 
worlds share important sites of agreement. This gives these social worlds a shared 
link between the diverse kinds of work they do and the animating values and goals of 
the project.  
When asking participants about the most important use cases of Tor, they 
conceptualised these as falling within two distinct categories which took a common 
form across all three social worlds. The first of these, which I characterise here as 
everyday privacy, are everyday users of the internet. This is linked to the idea of 
privacy as a foundational democratic value, underpinning the rights of freedom of 
speech and association, and a cornerstone of free societies. 
The whole reason that Tor Browser existed is because there was a belief that privacy 
should be for everyone, it shouldn’t just be for techie people who are able to pull 
together all these obscure components. 
Participant F – Tor core developer 
This type of privacy affects the quotidian rhythms of users’ daily lives. This constructs 
privacy through the aggregated, patterned interactions of whole populations and the 
personal details which can be learned about them through studying this. Many of the 
participants linked this to protecting democratic values, the right to free speech, and 
halting what they saw as a dangerous trend towards authoritarian surveillance of 
people’s private lives. 
This is contrasted with the use of Tor to protect people in cases where detection 
might mean imprisonment, death or other serious consequences. These high-risk 
users, which include political dissidents, freedom fighters, CIA field agents, 
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journalists, and human rights activists, tended to be much rarer activities which 
incurred substantial interest from powerful actors and hence needed protection 
through rigorous security practices. This is a vision of privacy which is more directly 
oppositional, allowing those in authoritarian nations (or whistleblowers and 
journalists in Western democracies) to speak truth to power, resist control, or create 
spaces where they can organise against state-backed oppression. 
[journalists] are getting people to speak to them in a truly free way that they would 
not in almost any other context. You know, there’s no… parking garage where you 
can go to speak to, you know, Woodward and Bernstein any more, that’s over. [Tor 
Onion Services] is that parking garage. 
Participant X - Onion Service developer 
Some community members prioritise high risk use cases, while others place more 
emphasis on everyday privacy. For example, some of my participants were keen to 
emphasise Tor’s use by everyday Internet users in Western democracies, while 
others argued that their participation in the Tor network was motivated by a desire 
to protect human rights defenders in authoritarian nations, rather than privacy-
conscious citizens in more open societies. While individuals differ in which of these 
they see as important, they share the same system of classification: that Tor’s 
construction of privacy encapsulates these two distinct forms.  
I think you couldn’t have Tor when you didn’t have all of those things. Anonymity 
loves company, and you couldn’t have the Chinese dissident anonymity system, or 
the US military open intelligence gathering system, it doesn’t make sense. So, I think, 
if there’s one thing that’s the most important, it would be that all of these things can 
interact on the same system. I’m sure everyone will have their own preferences… 
I’m happier that people who are trying to promote human rights are able to have 
their job facilitated through Tor. That’s probably what I personally think, but I 
recognise that it would be useless to have just that sort of group. 
Participant F – Tor core developer 
This category system arises from the design of Tor itself. Tor’s predecessor, the 
Onion Routing project, was initially created through the coming-together of two 
distinct social worlds. As I describe in Chapter 2, this involved a chance collaboration 
between US Naval researchers and “cypherpunk” technologists wanting to shape the 
internet as a privacy-preserving social space. Somewhat to their own surprise, these 
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two groups had more aligned perspectives than they might otherwise have 
imagined: 
I'm very happy to see the NRL doing this research. I have no doubt that you guys 
have what it takes to pull this project off. I'm also happy to see that your goal is to 
resist serious traffic analysis (as opposed to hiding browsing patterns from your little 
sister). We cypherpunks have been thinking about these problems for quite some 
time, as they are central to our agenda, but too often we sit around and talk about 
them rather than actually building things. 
Cypherpunk, Or-dev mailing list 1997 
We are researchers.  That is our job description.  That is what we get paid to do.  
There are more PhD's walking around this base than some college campuses.  We 
publish constantly in academic circles, we attend conferences, we participate in the 
larger academic world.  Please do not assume that since we work for the 
government that we are uninformed, undereducated, GAK-loving idiots.  What we 
lack is the practical experience in this area – most of what we do is theory, theory, 
theory...very little applied (at least in the computer security area). Thus the 
prototype where we've already learned a great deal about where the theoretical 
models break down in the real world…  Please don't view this as an "us vs. them" 
environment...we want the same level (and possibly even higher level) of security 
that you want out of this system... help us do that. 
US Naval researcher, Or-dev mailing list 1997 
The initial development of Tor constitutes an alignment between these ‘military-
academic’ and ‘cypherpunk-engineer’ worlds. In practice, the Onion Routing design 
represents a technological solution which brings these two strange bedfellows into a 
mutually beneficial relationship. The final top-level design of Onion Routing reflects a 
coming-together of both of these worlds, as it involves large numbers of everyday 
users acting as ‘cover traffic’ for higher-security use cases, thus satisfying the 
‘everyday privacy’ requirements of the cypherpunks and the ‘high-security’ 
requirements of the US Naval research lab. In terms of the kind of social action they 
see privacy technologies as being engaged in, these two worlds also resonate: they 
both understand them, much as the ‘engineer’ social world does, as using technical 
fixes to reshape the topologies of power in information systems. For the 
cypherpunks, this removes pinch points in the infrastructure of the Internet which 
states can use to surveil their citizens, while in the case of the military, this 
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undermines non-US nations’ ability to secure their communications networks against 
use by US military personnel. 
The old Cypherpunks and the US Navy are facing the same problem and are 
therefore looking at similar solutions. You need broad public use of the system to 
provide you with cover traffic and we want to see such a system deployed to provide 
the citizens with privacy. We are allies, not enemies. 
Cypherpunk, Or-dev mailing list 1997 
The three social worlds of Tor draw their constructions of the user from the logics 
embedded in its technical design, which provide a common point of stabilisation 
between Tor’s worlds. From the engineer perspective, this frames user categories 
through the patterns they trace in technical systems and envisions privacy in terms 
of the decentralisation of structures of power and control in the internet. The world 
of the activist understands everyday privacy as a civil rights movement in its own 
right and sees high risk use cases as important for activists and journalists involved in 
social justice struggles the world over. The infrastructuralist perspective resonates 
with the content-agnostic nature of this user classification, which classifies users 
according to security criteria and the patterns of their use rather than their politics 
or allegiances. 
That is a political question, and to date, we have tried to only deal with the 
technological issues instead of the political ones.  As soon as we start dealing with 
political issues, this thing will fall apart. 
Developer, Or-dev mailing list, 1997 
In this way, privacy acts as a boundary object (Star 1989), with a shared construction 
of privacy in the end user providing a common element which allows individuals to 
bridge between otherwise irreconcilable social worlds. This has historically allowed 
Tor a productive ambiguity around the political dimension of privacy, leaving 
different parts of its community the freedom to conceptualise the links between 
privacy technologies and power differently. Until recently this détente has proven 
remarkably resilient, helping Tor has to navigate these conflicts and draw on the 
interpretive power of these different social worlds. 
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Cultural change and boundary breakdown 
Boundary objects, however, are not immutable (Star 1989). Tor’s productive 
ambiguity has proven durable for much of its life, however a series of internal crises 
and cultural changes have in recent years made this untenable. As it has had to be 
clearer about its core values and what it stands for, so too has the cultural landscape 
of the Tor community changed. In this section, I explore the nature of this challenge 
and how Tor has navigated it, how a social worlds perspective helps us to understand 
the deeper implications of this, and the resulting transformations in Tor’s social 
worlds. 
Following the Snowden revelations, the Tor community saw a massive influx of new 
members, galvanised by the social backlash against mass surveillance by the US, and 
a more activist perspective on Tor. At the same time, a shift in the broader culture of 
the tech industry was underway, bringing a more critical and politically engaged 
sensibility to prominence, and calling out a history of misogyny and abuse in these 
communities. This was accompanied by an increasingly critical trend in public 
discourses about online platforms, focused on the power and politics of the people 
behind these technologies. For Tor, this came to a head in June 2016, when several 
members of the Tor community accused Jacob Appelbaum, a member of the core 
team and one of Tor’s most prominent representatives, of engaging in a pattern of 
abusive behaviour and sexual assault (Loll, 2016).  
This resulted in Appelbaum being fired from the project, the replacement of the 
project board and the installation of Shari Steele as director. Steele led a programme 
of professionalization, remaking Tor into a modern NGO with more developed 
organisational practices and structure and a well-defined set of core values 
(Marechal - forthcoming). This has met with praise from some sections of the 
community, and considerable opposition from others, and has shaken the détente 
between the social worlds of Tor.  
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A social worlds perspective allows us to understand this crisis as not just a clash 
between groups within the Tor community, but as the rupture of a previously-stable 
equilibrium between different ways of understanding the project. From the activist 
perspective, Tor is inherently political, promoting values of liberation and 
democracy, so this change was a necessary part of Tor’s growth as a modern activist 
organisation. Equally, despite their suspicion of policy work, the engineers seem to 
have welcomed this formalisation of Tor’s values, especially against harassment. I 
contend that this is because of how this has been framed – as attempts to 
redistribute and decentralise power within the Tor Project.  
Tor has definitely become more open in the last year or so… And I still think they’re 
going through this evolution of wondering where they fit in the world.... And they’re 
getting better at addressing all these issues, they’ve done a lot of work in making 
sure that accusations of sexual assault and harassment are addressed, and, you 
know, opening up the power structures, and restructuring that. 
Participant Z – Onion Service developer 
However, for some of those adopting a purist infrastructuralist perspective, these 
changes were less welcome. Asserting Tor as embodying feminist principles and 
attempting to transform Tor into a diverse, modern organisation with explicit values 
has, for some in the community, undone the political ambiguity which enabled them 
to feel aligned with its goals.  
This changed to, Tor is now about women’s rights as well... They are probably right, 
with everything they say, so don’t get me wrong. But Tor isn’t specifically about 
empowering women and technology. I mean, they can do that, whatever. Take 
turns, do workshops, whatever. But that’s not why I’m running a Tor relay. I’m 
running a Tor relay because there are people in Turkey and they’re in jail for things 
they write, because people in Syria are getting killed if they are found reporting from 
certain areas. People in China just disappear if they are found using Tor, that’s why 
I’m running Tor relays, Tor bridges. That’s what I care about. Women’s rights - fine, 
but, just, sorry, not my department! And saying that out loud makes people upset. 
Participant W – Tor relay operator 
The assertion of political neutrality to rule feminist concerns out of scope for 
technical projects has historical precedent in hacker and OSS culture (Nafus 2012). In 
Tor’s case, the firing of Appelbaum and the resulting organisational changes led to a 
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minority within the community leaving outright. The atomised nature of the relay 
operator community meant there were no real leaders to drive an exodus, and no 
strong sense of a shared social meaning (in fact, the infrastructuralist understanding 
of Tor itself precludes this). Many who understood Tor from this perspective were 
still able to see themselves in the infrastructural labour of the organisation, however 
where some felt unable to do so was in the public life of Tor, feeling that Tor’s values 
now excluded their way of understanding it.  
And then with the Jake fallout and different conflicts… a bit of the dynamics 
changed… I mean Tor is trying to become a professional NGO. Tor Project 
Incorporated. And I think that’s a change over the previous idea of being deeply 
rooted in a lot of different communities. When you want to become a professional 
NGO, you have to make decisions…Before, you can be very flexible, and in different 
situations with different people act very differently. And it’s not necessarily that 
there were any mistakes, it’s just the growth is now changing things. And also, of 
course, changing who… stays around and what their incentives and motivations are 
for still hanging around and doing this kind of work. 
Participant L – Tor core contributor 
This is not merely the sidelining of one group in favour of another, rather it is 
representative of a fundamental transformation in how the Tor community 
understands the project on which they collaborate as the organisation has matured. 
Accordingly, the infrastructuralists’ world has also begun to change, moving from an 
“atomised” model of relay operation to a collaborative one based around in-person 
operator meet-ups and a more engaged community with a shared sense of purpose.  
And then there’s also this element of, we should all get to know each other, because 
we’re kind of in this boat together. Uh, even if we disagree on a lot of things, like, 
there’s clearly something that’s binding us together, so we should at least meet and 
talk about it. 
Participant R - Relay operator 
The engineer perspective is also transforming. Its topological understanding of 
power is increasingly turned on Tor itself, critiquing the developers’ own “power to 
structure” in designing these systems. This is indicative of a broader trend in the 
internet freedom community, as through organisations like Tor, Tactical Tech and 
Open Privacy there is a concerted effort to extend this understanding of power in 
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network structures to specific, subjective, and local contexts rather than 
universalising abstractions. Open Privacy, for example, draws on Lewis’ work in 
Queer Privacy where she critically unpacks the construction of “privacy”, exploring 
how it might mean different things to marginalised communities (Lewis 2017). 
The crisis in Tor around the firing of Appelbaum was a signal event, emblematic of 
changes which had been ongoing within the Tor community for some time. Part of 
this is due to Tor becoming more successful and maturing as an organisation, 
however it is also the result of the worlds of Tor shaping one another and changes in 
the broader context of information security work and Internet politics. Over the last 
few years, Tor has been undergoing a major shift in terms of what kind of 
organisation it is, and as a result, its social worlds have been changing too. As Star 
argues, this new détente may well require new or altered boundary objects, and 
different kinds of boundary work. 
 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have mapped the social worlds of Tor and how they relate to one 
another, managing conflict, consensus, and change. Infrastructures require a range 
of different kinds of work to function, bringing together people, cultures and 
perspectives in complex ways.  Tor is characterised by three main social worlds: the 
engineer world, rooted in Tor’s development work, which understands ‘privacy as a 
structure’; the activist world, rooted in the policy and lobbying work of Tor, which 
sees ‘privacy as a struggle’; and the infrastructuralist world of Tor’s relay operators, 
which sees ‘privacy as a service’ . It is important to emphasise that any given person 
in the Tor community likely draws on a range of discourses from these worlds in 
different situations in making sense of Tor, although some are clearly more firmly 
rooted in a particular world than others. Equally, as I describe in this chapter, these 
worlds are not static, but change and shape one another over time.  
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In navigating the boundaries between these worlds, Tor has for much of its life used 
the concept of privacy as a boundary object to unite the community around a shared 
sense of the meaning of their work. Through a common category system of the users 
in their construction of privacy, they were able to afford the place of privacy 
technology in relations politics and power a productive ambiguity. This enabled 
many of the core team to bridge and translate between these worlds and has been 
largely successful in allowing Tor to persist. As the context of Tor changed through 
the Snowden revelations, the increasing prominence of the activist perspective, and 
broader cultural changes in the information security community, the tension 
between these worlds began to come to the surface, erupting in the firing of Jacob 
Appelbaum and the professionalisation of Tor. The result of this has been the 
tentative formation of a new détente, reflecting changing understandings of politics, 
power and practices in each of these three worlds. How it navigates this will be 
deeply consequential for the kind of organisation Tor becomes and its role in 
struggles over privacy, politics and power online. 
Tor’s engineers constitute the foundation of the organisation, and although other 
worlds have grown up around Tor, theirs was the initial framing which shaped its 
development. The engineer world and the design practices to which it is connected 
are therefore of particular interest, and I focus on this in the following chapter – 
where this world came from, how it developed, and how it shaped the foundations 
of Tor’s design and its vision of the world. Tor therefore constitutes an explicit, 
conscious attempt by its engineers to ‘do politics through architecture’, rather than 
simply a military tool or software project: to realise a particular vision of society 
through technical design. In the following chapter, I explore how they actually 




growing onions: Tor, 
values and design 
 
Introduction 
Having mapped out the main social worlds of Tor and the different facets of its 
visions of a private Internet, I now explore how the discourses and ideas 
underpinning Tor’s social life shape the technology itself. Of the three social worlds I 
characterise in Chapter 6, the engineer world is the one with the closest connection 
to Tor’s design. Focusing on the design and development processes of Tor, I explore 
the relationship between the engineer social world and the material design of Tor, 
and hence how this vision of the world becomes embedded in the category systems, 
technical paradigms, and frameworks of representation which characterise Tor as a 
material artefact. Although Actor-Network Theory has been more commonly used in 
understanding how different visions of the world become embedded in material 
artefacts (Latour, 2005), I instead use the social worlds framework, which focuses on 
collaboration, multiplicity, and communication (Star and Clarke, 2008). In doing so, I 
draw both on my interviews and extensive archival research in the Tor Project’s 
mailing list and design archives, mapping values, category systems and frameworks 
of representation and how they shape Tor’s material form. 
In this section, I first sketch out the kind of privacy envisioned by Tor’s design, and 
the key values and constructions of privacy which underpin this. I then outline how 
Tor implements this design in practice, the privacy properties this confers on users, 
and the design decisions the Tor developers had to make. I highlight a particularly 
important decision: the decision not to include ‘padding traffic’ in Tor’s design to 
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protect against adversaries with a global view of the Internet. In doing so, I also map 
the development of the engineer social world through a process of convergence, in 
which Tor’s design and development practices at once create, through iterative, non-
linear processes, both a coherent social world and a material design for Tor. Finally, I 
discuss how development practices in Tor and the social world of the Tor engineers 
have changed over time, and the consequences this bears for making sense of Tor’s 
implication in power. 
 
Onion Routing: a technical design and a value system 
Tor is based on the Onion Routing design, where users’ Internet traffic is bounced 
around a network of volunteer-operated servers (known as ‘relays’) around the 
world in order to disguise its origin and destination. First, the administrative 
information which routes users’ traffic around the Internet is wrapped in three layers 
of encryption. This traffic is then sent as a series of packets to the Tor relay network. 
The traffic is first sent to a Tor entry relay, a server which decrypts the first layer of 
encryption and reveals the address of the next relay in the chain. This next ‘middle’ 
relay decrypts the next layer of encryption, revealing the ‘exit’ relay’s address. The 
exit relay then decrypts the last layer of encryption, finds the final destination of the 
traffic and sends it on. Thus, no part of the network knows both the origin and the 
destination of the traffic, and anyone observing a particular user only sees them 
connecting to Tor, not which websites they are accessing. This allows Tor users to get 
lost in a crowd of millions of other users (Syverson, 2009, Dingledine, Matthewson 
and Syverson, 2004).  
Onion Routing is not just a technical specification; it represents a particular social 
construction of privacy. The Onion Routing design was originally developed in the 
mid-1990s in collaboration between US Naval researchers seeking to develop a 
secure communications system and a group of technologists from the cypherpunks 
subculture, who view strong privacy protections as central to realising the liberatory 
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potential of the Internet. The naval researchers wanted to develop a system which 
would protect high-risk military traffic, requiring as many everyday users as possible 
to act as ‘cover traffic’, while the cypherpunks wanted to provide strong privacy 
protections for everyday users. The Onion Routing design brings the values of these 
groups into a mutually beneficial relationship. By protecting the everyday online lives 
of the general public, Onion Routing constructs privacy as a human right and a public 
good for all, not just those with strong technical skills. 
Tor’s values are anchored in a technological vision of privacy underpinned by the 
properties of the Internet. This frames privacy as the product of engineering 
decisions in information systems, the administrative traces left in communication 
networks and the geographies of informational control in global IT infrastructures. It 
is deeply oppositional in character, with its goal being the greatest practical 
anonymity at the technical level, leaving the social negotiations of sharing personal 
information up to the user. As such, it aims to neutralise any architectural features of 
the Internet which compromise users’ privacy. Onion Routing frames users as 
topological types. This means that its developers design around particular patterns of 
use and the information structures they leave in the network, rather than designing 
for particular user groups. I explore the importance of this framing and how it 
developed in detail in subsequent sections of this chapter. This allows people with 
fundamentally opposing views to use the system while only sharing a concern for 
privacy (Dingledine 2006). Thus, people using Tor to access far-right websites, those 
using it to access LGBT advocacy charities, and law enforcement using it to collect 
intelligence all contribute to one another’s protection. 
Well, you know, the technology’s cool, and it’s nice to make something that’s 
actually going to be useful and help people, but one of the really nice things about it 
is that you… you build something which by its very nature takes people who think 
they ought not to trust each other and work together at all, and forces them to 
collaborate in order to get the results that you want. And I just like the idea that you 
are forcing people who thought that they should never work with these other 
people to do so. 
Participant I – Tor core developer 
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This creates a collective of individuals who act together without a single shared 
worldview or centralised control, strongly shaped by a techno-libertarian, US-
grounded view of privacy based around individual choice, agency and freedom. It is 
both deeply individualist, framing users as singular owners of their data, and 
paradoxically communitarian, with privacy reliant on the protection of a ‘crowd’ of 
these atomised users who underwrite one another’s protection as a swarm of 
connected individuals. Fundamentally, it constructs privacy through the idea of 
topologies of informational power, mediated by the structures and design of the 
Internet. 
 
Implementing Onion Routing - Tor’s construction of privacy 
The privacy which Tor provides is the product of the design decisions made by its 
developers. In implementing Tor’s design in practice, its developers could not make 
it impervious to all possible adversaries and usable for all use cases. These practical 
considerations make the development of an anonymity system different to more 
theoretical cryptographic research: 
The problem with anonymity is that we can build such threat models, stronger than 
any adversary, but then we don’t know how to build a system that actually works, 
or, at least, is usable in that case. So, the threat models in cryptography are quite 
different from the threat models in anonymity, not just in what they are, but also in 
how they’re developed. So, we would like to be in the situation where we can come 
up with a threat model that covers everyone, but I think, in anonymity, there’s a 
trade-off between threat models, and then other design requirements. So, if we 
started off with a strong threat model, then that will naturally lead to design choices 
that will bring us to high-latency, and then we get something that drops usability. So, 
I think, what probably more happens is that there is some estimate of what 
attackers can do, the design consequences are worked out, and then there’s 
iteration. In order to work out what is actually useful to people, that feeds into that 
process, you’re right, it’s hard. 
Participant F – core Tor developer 
Tor’s privacy properties are shaped by three key design decisions. First, its network is 
structurally decentralised: the core team which design Tor have minimal control over 
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its volunteer-run infrastructure, and it has no centralised mechanism for censoring 
user traffic. This is vital for a tool designed to subvert censorship and surveillance, 
but makes it harder to mitigate any harms arising from its use by malicious actors. 
Secondly, it is low latency:  fast enough to use for everyday Internet browsing 
(Dingledine 2006). This widens its potential for social good, and for harm. Finally, it 
sacrifices some protections against a class of very powerful attacks in the interest of 
maximising usability and speed. These ‘timing attacks’ are theoretically available to 
powerful enemies who are able to collect and process vast amounts of the world’s 
Internet traffic: by doing this, they can time the signals travelling around the Tor 
network and trace them back to their origins. This means that extremely powerful 
enemies, such as the signals intelligence services of the Five Eyes nations, may be 
able to deanonymize some users of Tor (Dingledine 2006).  
Tor did not begin the design process with these properties; they are a particular 
practical implementation of the Onion Routing framework developed over a period 
of months through careful experimentation and discussion. Although they began 
with the Onion Routing design, implementing this necessitated making difficult 
decisions about which users and use cases Tor should support, and against which 
adversaries they should attempt to protect these users. The remainder of this 
section maps the background to these decisions, and the different categories of 
adversary and user around which they attempted to design. 
When Tor was being built, the developers had very little knowledge about state 
surveillance capabilities, and, given the fast-changing nature of surveillance in the 
wake of the 9/11 attacks, they needed to build a system which was capable not only 
of subverting current practices, but those which might arise in the future. Today, the 
information security community knows far more about the practices of nation state 
security services, often thanks to the dedicated efforts of researchers, leakers and 
whistleblowers: 
That’s one of the very challenging aspects to a project like this, same with Tor, is 
that… you know, to quote a questionable strategist, there are ‘known knowns’, you 
know, *laughs* we can read news articles, uh, we can look at the Vault 7 release and 
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get an idea of what’s currently in practice. We can talk to former whistleblowers and 
get their feedback, people that have been on the inside and understand how these 
systems work. 
Participant X - Onion Service developer 
By contrast, the developers began their initial design work on Tor with very little 
information about adversary capabilities. As such, Tor’s category system of 
adversaries is not based around specific real-world actors, such as the Chinese or 
Russian governments. Adversaries are instead conceptualised as a set of abstract 
categories based on how much of the network they can observe, and the power they 
can exert in different places. These categories include the global passive adversary 
(an adversary which can passively monitor traffic between all users and servers), the 
global active adversary (an adversary which can actively interfere with or otherwise 
modulate traffic between all users and servers), and the roving adversary (an 
adversary which has a subset of nodes which it controls which changes over time). 
Global adversaries are particularly problematic for Tor. These adversaries, with a 
view of the whole Internet, are able to observe the timings of the ’cells’ of 
information sent around the Tor network, then use these to trace traffic around the 
network and deanonymize users through ‘timing attacks’. In the original Onion 
Routing design discussions, this attack is thwarted by using ‘padding traffic’ to 
complicate this traffic analysis (Dingledine 2006). However, these defences often 
slow down the system, and hence reduce Tor’s usability and suitability for everyday 
Internet browsing. 
The Onion Routing framework distinguishes between two kinds of users. This stems 
from Onion Routing’s technical design, which relies on attracting a large set of 
everyday users to provide ‘cover traffic’ for high risk users for whom 
deanonymisation has more severe consequences. In the original design discussions 
for Tor, the developers often draw on examples to illustrate different kinds of users: 
“Somebody is watching cnn.com, say some guy in China.” 
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“A road warrior who is logging into his home enclave with OR on the OR firewall. 
Nobody is likely to be watching his connection to the network because they don't 
expect him there.” 
“Someone is gather[ing] intelligence on some web site owned by the adversary.” 
“Alice has a hotmail account 'foo at hotmail.com', which she logs into periodically via 
the onion routing network.” 
“A group of CIA agents are deployed around the world, and check back with the 
cia.gov site periodically.” 
“Amnesty International allows anonymous story submission. Reporters risk their 
lives going to rural Asian countries, and surface every so often to submit a story, to 
pass back lists of contacts, etc.” 
“Dedicated political dissidents in the United States check an online bulletin board for 
a list of upcoming peaceful protests and recent news. When actually participating in 
the protests, they use masks to maintain anonymity while exercising their rights.” 
“Anne logs in every day and checks these 4 news sites; it would make Anne unhappy 
to not be able to use our system for that” 
Selected quotes from developers, tor-dev mailing list, 2002 
Whether the user is a CIA agent, an Iranian journalist or a privacy-conscious member 
of the public, these use case categories constitute either everyday privacy, with 
sensitive information inferred through observing the patterns of everyday life, or 
high-risk, where detection relates to the observation of a small number of 
particularly recognisable traces. In order to protect the security of the high-risk 
users, Tor needs to be usable and fast enough to attract a large number of everyday 
users: usability is not just desirable, but in fact one of its core security properties 
(Dingledine, Matthewson, and Syverson, 2004). The diversity of users and the 
innocuous nature of much of the traffic means that use of the system itself is not 
incriminating. Thus, Tor takes the tension between developing a high security 
anonymity tool and a mass-use privacy infrastructure and makes these apparently-
contrasting aims mutually supportive. 
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Exploring the development process in Tor 
Balancing between protecting against global, nation-state surveillance and 
maintaining the greatest usability possible is crucial to Tor’s design. In working out 
how to implement their privacy values in practice, the developers needed to make a 
number of decisions about Tor’s technical features. This section explores the initial 
design of Tor through one of these decisions: whether to include padding traffic in 
the Tor protocol to protect against a global adversary. First, I lay out the context of 
this design discussion and the various ideas the Tor developers drew on. Then, I map 
the processes by which the Tor developers came to a decision by refining and 
evaluating these ideas. Finally, I explore the consequences for Tor’s privacy values 
and privacy properties. 
 
Decomposing privacy values and reconstructing privacy properties 
In 2002, the developers of Tor came together on a mailing list to begin work on a 
practical anonymity system, following previous attempts to develop test networks as 
proof-of-concept for Onion Routing. These developers included academics, military 
security researchers and others, drawn from the initial Onion Routing project and 
other early anonymity systems. They began with a high-level assumption that some 
form of padding ought to be included to defend against the global passive adversary. 
In tension with this were the other core values underpinning the Onion Routing 
paradigm, as its technical design explicitly links privacy to usability and speed. This 
made the padding decision anything but certain in these early stages. The developers 
needed to work out the tension between the core values driving the project through 
exploring the practical consequences of different potential designs.   
The way these decisions were made looked rather different to the traditional picture 
of ‘inscription’, in which different groups of actors compete to inscribe their own 
more-or-less coherent sets of values and understandings into an artefact. Rather, in 
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Tor’s case, there was remarkable consensus around goals, and Tor’s vision of privacy 
(as practically realised in particular design decisions) was fairly amorphous, only 
stabilising across the course of a substantial amount of work. Tor’s vision of privacy 
was as much shaped by these design processes as the nascent ‘value system’ with 
which the developers began. 
When you were saying, did you do this, or did you do that… I was going to say, yes! 
Because I do think that it evolved over time. I know, sometimes, security research 
goes where somebody has a very well thought-out, theoretically analysable, 
mathematical argument for something, and then they try to design a system that 
meets that. But for us I think the idea of what security we wanted, and how to 
reason about it, and the system design, all kind of grew up together. And I think that 
actually makes sense, because if you’re doing something that’s really new you don’t 
know what makes sense, and you could start with the abstract model, but you have 
not so much reason to think that that model is the right one. I mean, we went back 
and forth, and people do analyses, and then argue about the nature of the 
properties that are useful. And I mean, sometimes we were aware of things on an 
abstract level, but the data changed things.  
Participant I – Core Tor developer 
In practice, this constituted a long period of experimentation with different potential 
padding regimes. The developers engaged in this in the absence of any real 
knowledge about how users were going to use their system, or about the capabilities 
of the extremely powerful adversaries against which they were designing. As a result, 
they were forced to reason about the properties of their system by breaking down 
and refining the abstract user and adversary categories with which they began. 
Through working out their practical consequences for the system’s privacy 
properties, they were able to implement those that fit, and discard those which 
didn’t. 
To do this, the developers needed to be able to reason about threats and risk in a 
way which brought social, technical and mathematical factors into conversation with 
one another. While the developers began with mathematical and technical 
representations of the anonymity provided by the system, they quickly found that 
they needed to represent social factors in these discussions as well. They needed to 
develop a common language which could translate between these three domains. 
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This involved transforming social factors, such as properties of users and adversaries, 
into technical representations by mapping them as topological patterns of 
information, power and risk in the system.  
Informally I think [the roving adversary] reflects the capability of an attacker to root 
several machines very quickly but can't hold on to them for very long (sysadmin 
having a late night and figures out something is going on or some other form of 
[intrusion detection system] etc). 
Developer, tor-dev mailing list, 2002 
But, what is reasonable in [the roving adversary] is the partial compromise of the 
network. An adversary has a budget, and short of a systemic vulnerability, he must 
compromise individual network elements or set up his own. 
Developer, tor-dev mailing list, 2002 
This allowed the developers to assess the practical consequences of different 
implementations of padding traffic for usability, resilience, security and a range of 
other system factors. In the following quote, the developers translate social factors 
in this way to reason about how long it would take to deanonymize different kinds of 
user: 
* If there are more users, it may take longer. 
* If Alice's behavior isn't very odd (that is, if she behaves similarly to other users), it 
may take longer. 
* If other users are online more often, or Alice is online more often, or Bob is online 
more often, it may take longer. 
* If Alice sends requests to a bunch of people besides Bob, it may take longer (or it 
may not improve anything at all -- wouldn't it be neat to be able to show that.) 
* If Alice refrains from talking to Bob as often, then it may take longer. 
Developer, tor-dev mailing list, 2002 
In these discussions, users and adversaries were abstracted into categories based on 
the informational traces their activities map in the network. Crucially, this frames 
social factors through the formalisation of patterns of human behaviour (Musiani 
2013). The everyday human interactions which Tor protects are intrinsically 
patterned; people want to speak to the same people repeatedly, have long-term, 
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linkable relationships and regularly visit the same websites. This can be modelled and 
reasoned about; how unique particular ‘patterns’ and the activities which 
correspond to them are, and how expensive or attractive they will be for an attacker 
to compromise.  
Once these representations were formalised, the developers could engage in ‘attack 
brainstorming’, iteratively attempting to work out the consequences of different 
kinds of attack, adversary, or use case. 
It’s like, someone presents a solution to this problem. And then usually what 
happens is that a bunch of people think through this and then come up with attacks 
to it. Um, and it’s like, hey, what if someone did this, what if someone did this, what 
if someone did this? And you kind of iterate on it until you come to a point where all 
of the attacks you can think of in this space fail against your solution. I mean, unless 
someone comes up with something that’s completely different, or comes up with an 
attack that completely subverts that, that is your working model of how things are 
going to be. 
Participant Z - Onion Service developer 
In doing this, the developers built a topology of risk, mapping each threat and its 
defence as part of the internal logic of the system. They interrogated each of their 
core adversary and user categories in this way, mapping different potential 
geographies of information and control, and the consequences this bore for Tor’s 
users in each case. 
This reframes social issues in ways which can be solved by engineering practices and 
reasoned about in the language of technical systems. In turn, the ‘values’ of the 
developers became translated into material features of the system as the outcomes 
of particular design choices; choices which constrain or open up the ways in which 
Tor works, the uses to which it can be put, and the protection which it offers users. 
Those user and adversary categories or system properties which didn’t fit were 
discarded, and those which did were stabilised in the high-level design of Tor. As 
they worked through these different scenarios, refining their abstract user and 
adversary categories, they came up against two irreconcilable material constraints.  
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Firstly, the everyday types of online activity which they were trying to protect are 
inherently patterned. The administrative traces left by these activities are extremely 
distinctive and provide attackers with a wealth of different ways to characterise 
individuals and deanonymize their Tor traffic. As they mapped these patterns in 
practice, they realised that protecting against traffic analysis attacks would require a 
degree of padding so onerous that the network would become unable to support 
everyday browsing: 
Here's my point about padding. Right now I'm not convinced there can be 
padding/throttling regimen that is both useful and practical, or maybe even either 
useful or practical. 
Developer, tor-dev mailing list, 2002 
Secondly, as they refined their adversary categories, they realised that the idea of 
the global passive adversary was both too weak, and too strong. In practice, a global 
view of the Internet is extremely hard for even nation states to attain. Equally, they 
realised that any adversary who is able to maintain a global view of the Internet 
passively will have access to a range of other, ‘active’ attacks, such as delaying or 
modulating signals entering and leaving Tor nodes, which padding does nothing to 
stop. 
 I have a basic problem with the idea of global passive adversaries. As an academic 
exercise, it seems fine, but it is hard for me to imagine an adversary that is powerful 
enough to be global but weak enough to be entirely passive... The global passive 
adversary is a fairly clean notion so perhaps it should still be pursued for abstract 
analysis purposes, but I need way more convincing than I've seen to design against 
it. 
Developer, tor-dev mailing list, 2002 
In the end, what we said was…  because it’s so easy to do the end-to-end timing 
correlations, we weren’t going to bother to add overhead of any… padding, until 
somebody could come up with a design where we thought that it was reasonably 
helping to raise the bar. You know, so that it was actually worth it. 
Participant I – Tor core developer 
This led the developers to make the decision to remove padding traffic from the 
design of Tor. This was deeply consequential, enabling Tor to provide a relatively fast 
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network which was usable for everyday browsing of the Internet. This has continued 
to the present day, where Tor is able to be used even for file transfer and video 
streaming. By maximising speed, Tor removes a potential restriction on the kinds of 
activities for which Tor can be used. For example, had they kept Tor a medium-
latency network by adding padding, it could be used for email, hosting forums, and 
slow text-based browsing, but not easily for file sharing, video streaming, real-time 
chat, or commerce. This would undermine its claims to provide ‘everyday privacy’, 
restricting its users to those who require high security and don’t mind extremely 
slow connections, thus reducing the anonymity provided by the system and making 
use of the system itself far more suspicious. Tor, as a result, has the widest possible 
spectrum of use cases for an anonymity network which also offers high levels of 
security against all but the most well-resourced attackers. 
 
Growing a social world 
Through this process, the developers pulled together a design for the infrastructure, 
of Tor, but also a social world. The two precursor worlds of Tor, the cypherpunks and 
the military researchers, provided a range of conceptual resources for this process. 
The developers began with a range of ideas, thoughts, values, category systems and 
design elements from these worlds, which constituted shared conceptual resources 
on which they could draw. These began in the abstract and needed to be pulled into 
focus around a design for Tor through development processes. Through working out 
the practical consequences of different design decisions, they translated these 
values into the hard language of engineering and into the specific context of Tor, 
discarding those which didn’t fit the material design or clashed with other key values, 
and iteratively sharpening and refining those which did, arriving at a coherent social 
world which was stabilised in the material infrastructure of Tor. These development 
practices themselves perform a particular understanding of privacy technology in 
two key ways.  
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Firstly, technical elements which ended up being incorporated into the design (and 
those which didn’t) corresponded to particular components of Tor’s construction of 
privacy. The users of Tor won out over the adversaries in this discussion: Tor firmly 
retained its commitment to a low-latency design, and although Tor’s remained a 
platform with formidable security properties, it prioritised its commitment to a 
privacy which is open to everyone over its status as a high-security tool. Secondly, 
the logics of the design process itself became an important part of this social world, 
underpinning the way they frame the relationships between privacy technologies, 
politics and power. As they engaged in these design processes, the Tor engineers 
performed and reinforced an understanding of Tor as doing politics through 
architecture, working through their privacy values and design elements as structural 
forms in technological networks. Tor’s engineers frame their vision of privacy 
through patterns of power and control in the structures of technical systems, making 
it tractable to design and engineering processes. This topological construction of 
privacy is one of the key elements of the engineers’ social world, as described in 
Chapter 6. 
The coming-together of Tor’s design and the social world of its engineers I describe 
in this article is not linear. It bears, rather, some similarity to what Star describes as 
“convergence”, the gradual converging of the category systems embedded in 
infrastructures and those of the people who use them (Star, Bowker, and Neumann, 
1998). Here we can observe a similar process taking place during the creation of a 
new infrastructure and a new social world. Milan (2016) describes a related process, 
arguing that the practices and community structures within technological activist 
communities and the ethics and values of the technologies themselves exist in a 
dialectic, fusing through the process of design.  Tor’s design constituted an iterative, 
non-linear process through which pre-existing cultural forms, working practices and 
design frameworks, were brought together, refined and stabilised as a Tor-specific 
world of discourse. This entailed the creation of a form of knowledge very different 
from that imagined by more ‘scientific’ models of engineering, where a pre-made 
theoretical model is realised in a material form. Instead, the Tor engineers were 
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engaged in the production of a much deeper form of material knowledge, iterating 
back and forth between abstract understandings of the system’s values and the 
practicalities of technical design and social factors. I argue, therefore, that design 
processes constitute a special case of ‘convergence’, through which infrastructures 
and social worlds mutually create one another. 
This social world has changed in recent years. Tor is not, and could never be, 
separate from the wider political context of the Internet. The infrastructures and 
platforms of the Internet are increasingly clashing with the reality of social 
differences and political power around the world, with generic, one-size-fits-all 
systems increasingly encountering tension and resistance (Gillespie, 2018). Equally, 
an explosion in the volume of information which security researchers have about 
threat actors and user behaviour has shaped Tor’s approach to design and the 
underpinning logics and values of the Tor engineers’ social world. As Tor has grown, 
becoming implicated in a wider range of people’s lives across the world, its core 
values haven’t changed, but its practices and systems of understanding have been 
refined. As more real data about users and adversaries has accrued, it has been 
worked into this topological understanding of power, shifting it from an abstract, 
globalising picture to a collage of local contexts, mechanisms and constructions of 
privacy, still understood through topological patterns in the network.  
 
Revisiting Tor’s design in a post-Snowden world 
The return of padding 
The initial design discussions for Tor took place in the aftermath of the 2001 attacks 
on the World Trade Centre in New York. Across the next twelve years, the US and 
other nations ramped up their surveillance capabilities, building systems to collect 
huge amounts of data about domestic and foreign citizens’ use of 
telecommunications. In 2013, a defence contractor, Edward Snowden, released a 
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trove of highly classified documents which laid bare these arrangements, and for the 
first time allowed security researchers material intelligence about the actual 
capabilities of US security services. This marked a sea-change for systems like Tor, 
and a series of leaks, disclosures, and research since have further refined this picture 
of intelligence agencies and other threat actors, such as organised crime groups, 
around the world. Despite the revelation of a vast worldwide traffic metadata 
collection effort which looked very similar to a global adversary, a much-cited Top 
Secret NSA slide from the Snowden leaks still declared Tor the “king of high-secure 
low-latency anonymity – there are no contenders to the throne in waiting” (Ball, 
2013). However, in August of 2015, the developers were made aware of a particular 
surveillance mechanism which was potentially being used to mount these traffic 
analysis attacks on the Tor network. The developers began to discuss ways in which 
they could thwart this, eventually deciding to implement a light form of padding. By 
briefly comparing this with the initial design discussion, this section analyses how the 
social world of the engineers has changed since the early days of Tor.  
Tor received news in 2015 that the US may have been attempting to collect the 
information necessary to perform timing attacks on Tor users. Alternative media site 
BoingBoing had been running a high-traffic Tor exit node for several years, and, as 
reported by Cory Doctorow in a post on their site, they received a subpoena from 
the FBI, asking them to “testify before a federal grand jury in New Jersey, with all our 
logs for our Tor exit node” (Doctorow 2015). In a comment on this story (later 
deleted), a university-based exit relay operator related their own experience of being 
subpoenaed by Homeland Security to produce three months of records for the IP 
address of their Tor exit node. This indicated to the Tor developers that these 
“netflow” logs commonly collected by internet service providers were being actively 
sought by law enforcement in the US: 
I would expect most US universities to be logging netflow in the very least. Even if 
the Tor operator isn't keeping logs, it seems safe to assume the network operator is. 
Developer, Tor-dev mailing list, 2015 
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Netflow logs are administrative logs collected by internet service providers from 
routers – they provide timestamps for activity, indicating when a router is inactive 
and when it is sending information. This is particularly damaging for Tor, as 
information on the timings of signals sent to and from Tor routers is exactly what is 
needed to perform the correlation attacks imagined in the padding discussion. 
I think for various reasons (including this one), we’re soon going to want some 
degree of padding traffic on the Tor network at some point relatively soon, and 
having more information about what is typically recorded in these cases would be 
very useful to inform how we might want to design padding and connection usage 
against this and other issues. 
Developer, Tor-dev mailing list, 2015 
The developers asked the mailing list for any expertise from people working at ISPs, 
or other work dealing with netflow capture about the technical details of these 
collection mechanisms. This collected a fantastic level of mechanical detail, down to 
the variation in the lengths of netflow timers in different router models, and the 
precise formats in which the records are stored. The developers, by mapping this 
information, realised that they could reduce the resolution of this timing information 
substantially at a very low cost by introducing a small amount of ’netflow padding’ 
traffic into the network. The developers arrived at this though similar attack 
brainstorming practices to those they used in the initial design discussion, but using 
real, material intelligence about what adversaries are doing and how, instead of 
decomposing abstract categories as they did before. The proposal itself even named 
a specific adversary, in contrast to the 2002 discussion. 
It is also likely that defenses for this problem will prove useful against proposed data 
retention plans in the EU and elsewhere, since these schemes will likely rely on the 
same technology... Nonetheless, it is still worthwhile to consider what the adversary 
is capable of, especially in light of looming data retention regulation. 
Netflow padding protocol specification, Tor Project website 
The developer in charge of leading this discussion designed an initial padding 
implementation, then uploaded this as a patch in progress. Roger Dingledine, the 
lead developer on Tor, suggested that this could be taken as an opportunity to 
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explore broader padding schemes for Tor, revisiting the earlier design discussion in 
its entirety, however the developers decided that this fix should be restricted to a 
specific, small-scale change designed to thwart this particular collection mechanism 
rather than revisiting the core design assumptions of Tor with a more abstract 
discussion. Following this decision, Tor now includes a limited form of padding traffic 
for the first time. 
The practices on which the developers draw in this design process have evolved 
substantially since the early days of development. They now need to achieve 
consensus between a much larger number of people, and have instituted more 
formal processes of code review, change requests, proposal systems and project 
management. This inherently shapes the ways that decisions are made. As it has 
become a more mature technical project, this has also changed the kinds of 
decisions involved in Tor’s development work. As Tor grows, and development work 
continues to build on earlier elements, so too does a form of inertia arise at the 
heart of the Tor design. This means that changes in the fundamental ways in which 
Tor works become increasingly hard as more systems are built atop them, and more 
people come to rely on them. The risk associated with changing, and potentially 
breaking, fundamental aspects of how Tor works means that design work now 
focuses more on higher level implementation questions, rather than the paradigms 
underpinning Tor itself. Despite the changing sensibilities in the engineer world, 
important aspects of its initial visions and frameworks of understanding, therefore, 
are largely permanently stabilised in Tor’s infrastructure. 
 
A shift in the engineer social world 
This discussion reveals a change in the social world of the Tor engineers as well as in 
Tor’s design. As the knowledge and intelligence available to Tor’s designers has 
changed, so has this shaped its social world, leading design to shift from breaking 
down abstract categories into hypothetical patterns to engagement with specific 
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mechanisms of surveillance (and hence specific adversaries). This has shaped how 
the Tor developers understand the world, evolving their fairly high-level 
understanding of Tor as redistributing topologies of informational power online. This 
still understands power as topological, but it is far more concerned with engaging 
with these novel information sources about actual mechanisms and capabilities. 
There has been a complementary shift towards collecting this information 
themselves where necessary, as demonstrated in the padding case but also through 
a variety of more formal projects. Firstly, they have accepted that the ways in which 
they understand privacy may not match those of their users, and this has led them to 
conduct a substantial programme of user research, outreach work in the global 
South and East, and devoting substantial development time to improving usability 
and accessibility for a wider range of users: 
A lot of the problems that the Tor Project faces are similar to other companies – 
promoting user growth and user retention. Currently, our product works in a way 
that can be confusing. The main difference in terms of UX development is that the 
Tor Browser doesn’t collect any information or data about you or how you use it, so 
they miss out on a big resource that other companies have in seeing how people use 
their product. This means that they need to rely more on user research and 
conducting experiments with volunteers and staff. 
 Participant B - Core Tor developer (paraphrased) 
This has led to the developers not just making improvements to Tor’s usability, but in 
fact to developing new category systems for understanding and representing their 
users, beyond the dyadic ‘everyday privacy versus high security’ category system 
which has been at the heart of Tor for so long. This work, beginning as mapping out 
‘user journeys’, is still in its early stages, however Tor have moved on to more formal 
categorisations, distilling their user research into an initial series of ‘personas’ which 
act as ‘ideal type’ examples of potential users of Tor. This is a way of organising the 
substantial amount of information which Tor has been gathering through outreach 
and interviews about its current and potential users around the world. The initial set 
of “user journeys” and personas developed by the Tor Project form the beginnings of 
a prospective category system for their users going forward. 
 208 
This initial set includes five personas: Jelani, an LGBTQ activist in Uganda, Fanisa, a 
person experiencing domestic abuse in Russia, Fernanda, a women’s rights activist in 
Colombia, Fatima, a political researcher in Egypt, and Alex, a journalist in the US. As 
can be seen, this is immediately reflective of the kinds of user on which the activist 
social world in Tor might focus, embodying a vision of Tor which promotes its use for 
activism, journalism, and social justice. These package up and quantify a range of 
factors, including levels of risk, technological proficiency, their trust of Tor, 
background, income, connectivity, the languages they speak, the censorship regime 
in their country, and the devices they use. These are both an attempt to democratise 
and decolonise Tor’s design processes as well as a statement of Tor’s changing 
values. The documentation around these describes them as a “vision for who we are 
designing for”.  
This is very different to the abstract reasoning and attack brainstorming I describe 
earlier in this chapter, explicitly packaging up ideas about particular use cases and 
people Tor is for, rather than beginning with abstract structural ideas about traffic 
patterns. Instead, while these personas are still tractable to engineer mappings of 
structures and power, through the inclusion of these different components, they are 
a much more open attempt to develop a framework for systematically reasoning 
about the ‘human’ side of the design process, which allows more direct links to be 
drawn between these structures and the particular political salience and values to 
which they are connected. This is a direct attempt to address Star’s (1990) problem 
of outsiders in categorisation systems, ensuring that in future design work these 
under-represented people do not fall through the cracks. This change in the engineer 
world is reflective of the broader prominence of the activist social world in Tor, and 
the way in which it is shaping the engineer world. As I explore in more depth in 
Chapter 10, this also represents the beginnings of a transformation in privacy as a 
boundary object at the heart of Tor, and has important consequences for the social 
role it is attempting to inhabit. 
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Feeding into this user research, the Tor Project increasingly contributes to 
subprojects like OONI, a team operating under the Tor Project umbrella, who 
develop and deploy software to collect information about internet censorship 
around the world. 
Yeah, so that’s actually something that we’re trying to strengthen, and make OONI a 
tool that is also useful for Tor developers or people researching about the Tor 
network to understand better what is happening. And to that end we do have some 
tests that are, for example, checking to see if Tor is blocked, and I guess currently it 
has been more of a reactive approach, where somebody from Tor says, ah, we 
suspect that there’s something weird going on in this country, or we saw a drop in 
users from Tor in this country, can you look in the OONI data to see… Um, but yeah, 
I think the end goal is to reach a point where we’re able to do this in a way that is a 
bit more proactive. 
Participant H - Core Tor developer 
Finally, they make use of whistleblowers and leaks to collect more information about 
the capabilities of Tor’s adversaries. 
I think in terms of what capabilities they have, we rely a lot on the various 
whistleblowing and leaks that come out of them. I was reading through some of the 
documents from the CIA stuff [the Vault 7 leaks] last night, which *laughs* there’s a 
lot there. … the most… minute comment on a page could change how you use 
different tools when they come from sources like this. 
Participant A - Tor core developer 
In Tor’s case, the core values of the engineers have not changed, but the maturing of 
the organisation, the rise in prominence of the activist social world (as I discuss in 
Chapter 6), the incorporation of new people and perspectives, and major changes in 
their understanding of the threat landscape and user behaviours have reshaped their 
understanding of exactly how Tor ‘does politics’ through architecture (Musiani 
2012). As the developers are exposed to this growing pool of information, so too do 
they begin to realise that their apparently-universal abstract categories are in fact 
not sufficient to cover all cases, and embed their own subjective values and 
assumptions.  
I think as an outsider it’s quite hard to understand what the peculiarities of a certain 
country are. And I think there are for sure some common principles, and things that 
motivate our work, which is, you know, we believe in the right to privacy… and that 
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in the end, people should have the right to access all information, but at the same 
time trying to not get too much into complex socio-political issues in a particular 
country. And trying to balance that, so that we can ensure that those that give 
colour to the things that we promote are actually the people that are from that 
country, that have a better understanding of what is happening there. 
Participant H – Tor core developer 
The social worlds of privacy technologies, their material privacy properties, and the 
working practices through which their developers build them in practice are 
interconnected, mutually shaping one another. Tor’s engineers still view privacy 
technology as redistributing power, but now recognise that power manifests in 
infrastructures in practice in complex ways shaped by different contexts. They now 
attempt to reshape this terrain through a deep understanding of particular local 
contexts rather than through broad, simplifying abstractions. This amounts to a 
transformation in the practices of the engineer world which reflects their changing 
ways of making sense of Tor as a site of social action. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have discussed how Tor’s values and its design shape one another. I 
have outlined the vision of privacy which underpins Tor design, and its complex 
relationship with the privacy properties of Tor as a technology. In mapping the 
interplay between meaning and materiality, I have chosen to focus on a single world 
of Tor: that of the engineers. In these early years of Tor, before the rise of the Tor 
infrastructure and its growth into a larger community, the engineer world was the 
main force in shaping Tor’s design. In fusing the precursor worlds of the cypherpunks 
and the military cryptographers, the engineer world actually arose across the work of 
developing Tor, forming as part of the same process which formed Tor’s material 
design through iterative tacking-between ideas, technical practices, 
experimentation, and creation. The engineer social world which formed embodies a 
set of understandings of privacy which are framed through the organising logics of 
the design practices the developers used, which translate human factors into 
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structural patterns and paradigms in information networks. I have explored this 
through the study of a particularly important design decision (though one of many): 
the decision not to include padding traffic in Tor. 
Tor’s worlds, however, are not static, and as the organisation has changed from a 
tiny development team working on a mailing list to a modern tech NGO with a 
sizeable community and an infrastructure used by two million people every day, so 
too have its design and development practices and the social world which underpins 
them begun to change. As I discussed in Chapter 6, Tor’s engineer world has seen a 
transformation in recent years, shifting to a more reflective and critical perspective 
on their own power to shape the world through design. Partly shaped by the 
increasing prominence of the activist world, partly by broader changes in the culture 
of information security research, and partly by the maturing of Tor as an organisation 
and the increased information which they have about user and adversary 
capabilities, this has led to a change in development practices. As I discuss in Chapter 
10, this is of profound importance to Tor’s relationship with governance and power. 
However, as Star (1999) argues, processes of design are not the only important 
factor in understanding infrastructure. These cannot shape the world alone: they rely 
on a range of different kinds of hidden work to materialise and perform the ideas, 
category systems, and frameworks of representation which they embed in 
infrastructure. In the following chapter, I explore this hidden work and its salience to 
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Understanding the work of design and development is crucial to making sense of 
infrastructures as sites of social action. It is on this kind of work which much scrutiny 
has been focused in critiquing power and control in online platforms and 
infrastructures, and this has the capacity to surface important aspects of how design 
features of infrastructure shape society and social justice. However, in moving from a 
prototype or proof-of-concept to a system which spans the world, design needs to 
be materialised as infrastructure, and hence pulls in a range of other considerations 
and kinds of work which often remain hidden. In my research, I found that Tor relies 
on a great deal of this hidden work to realise the different design visions embedded 
in its technology and its community, and it is this hidden work which I explore in this 
chapter. 
While Tor is a home for many kinds of hidden work, I focus in this chapter on the 
different kinds of resilience work on which Tor relies, as this also ties into Tor’s 
relationship with the mechanisms used by law enforcement to establish control over 
the Internet infrastructure. I focus particularly on how Tor understands and attempts 
to resist ‘high policing’ (which I discuss in Chapter 3) (Brodeur, 2007), attempts made 
by secret services to undermine or compromise Tor and its community. In doing this, 
I aim to explore the relationship between design and its realisation in Tor and draw 
out the links between its three social worlds. First, I discuss Tor’s attempts to 
‘design-in’ resilience to its community. This draws on the ‘structural’ understandings 
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of the engineer social world, which aims to use openness and decentralisation to 
cultivate resilience. I then explore how this design is actually negotiated and realised 
in practice, and the hidden work involved in balancing the different considerations 
which come into play. In the next section, I turn to the resilience of the material 
infrastructure of Tor itself, and the hidden work of the relay operators which 
underpins this. Finally, I discuss the practices of maintenance and bugfixing which, 
although often ignored, are vital to ensuring Tor’s security, and an important site 
where values are negotiated and performed. 
 
Technosocial threats and designing a community – resilience 
through openness and decentralisation 
As a security technology, resilience is a fundamental quality of Tor’s design, written 
through every decision the developers made about the project when working out 
how it was going to work in practice. This resilience design work extends well beyond 
the technological components and protocols of Tor into the human infrastructure of 
the Tor community. Tor is a technosocial system: its technical components depend 
on human factors which could prove either fatal weak links or key sites of resilience. 
For example, those wishing to attack Tor could either devote substantial technical 
resources to overcoming its protections or could far more easily target a developer 
or relay operator through threats and blackmail to introduce a vulnerability into the 
system. This makes the community on which Tor depends to develop its code, 
manage its finances, administer its networks, and make the case for it in public as 
important to protect as the technology itself. The ways in which Tor attempts to 
guard against these social threats draws largely from its engineer social world, 
turning the same rationalities and logics which the developers use to secure Tor’s 
technological design on the community itself. In this section, I explore this 
conceptualisation of resilience and how it has shaped the Tor Project’s attempts to 
defend itself against a range of social threats. 
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The ‘social’ threats which Tor faces are lurid in their scope and seriousness. In 
particular, Tor is deeply worried about compromise by security services. Tor’s 
potential adversaries include a range of organisations (for illustration, this includes 
but is not limited to nation state secret services and organised crime groups around 
the world) with massive budgets, advanced intelligence capabilities, and a long 
history of espionage, infiltration, and disruption targeted at resistance groups. These 
nation state adversaries have the capacity to engage in a range of actions against Tor 
as an organisation, ranging from high policing to active espionage or disruption (BBC, 
2019). This goes beyond hacking and wiretapping to include attempts to compromise 
the human side of the organisation. Many of the conventional infrastructural 
organisations and platforms which support the Internet come to some sort of 
accommodation with security services, in which liaison groups or individuals are set 
up who can respond to requests for data on particular users or entire populations for 
crime fighting and security purposes (Lyon, 2014). This can even extend to pressuring 
organisations to install backdoors in their software, either covertly or overtly (BBC, 
2018). This use of liaison contacts extends further, to the police and NCA, and 
facilitates inter-organisational collaboration. The Tor Project understandably refuses 
this kind of co-operation entirely, and as a result feel the need to defend themselves 
against more forceful strategies. 
In understanding how to design for resilience in the Tor community, the engineers 
adopt very similar approaches to those which they use to reason about Tor’s code. 
To an engineer view, social factors like friendships, hierarchies, organisational 
structure, working practices, communication, and social interaction can be reasoned 
about as structural patterns of power and information which can be arranged to 
promote resilience. This leads them to turn their design practices on the community 
itself, explicitly engineering its social structures in ways which are protective. 





The first design strategy Tor uses to counter this, paradoxically, is the opposite of the 
secrecy which one might expect from such an organisation. Instead, Tor designs its 
community around a principle of radical openness to minimize any concentrations of 
secret information within the organisation. This openness takes traditional open 
source software values and turns them into the primary resilience design principle 
which protects their community (Berry, 2008).  
Tor extends this openness well beyond what might be expected of a privacy project, 
putting an enormous amount of other information in the public domain, from the 
names and email addresses of most of the key members of their communities, to 
financial records, to the full internal mailing lists and design discussions of their 
development team in addition to Tor’s source code. This means that Tor’s source 
code, financial details, internal bug-tracking and work-tracking systems, design 
discussions, internal mail, meeting minutes, and the majority of its developers’ 
identities are published openly on the Web. Tor’s developers see structuring their 
community around ‘radical openness’ as protecting them from a range of 
sociotechnical threats: ways to undermine the technology of Tor through the people 
embedded in it. I identify here four core threats against which they feel this defends: 
infiltration, coercion, misinformation, and disruption. 
First, they are worried that malicious actors will try to infiltrate the Tor community. 
As imagined, this would involve a hostile agent attempting to become part of the Tor 
Project, becoming a developer or attaining another position of influence, reporting 
back secret information and attempting to undermine Tor’s technology. This means 
that Tor needs to be careful in managing who contributes to the project, and how. 
On the other hand, they also don’t want to have barriers to new people: as a small 
organisation dependent on volunteer labour to survive, Tor get a lot of their power 
and vibrancy from the constant flow of new people, skills and ideas into their 
community. They see radical openness as an elegant solution to this problem, as 
having the code open source allows them to get the measure of putative 
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collaborators and build trust, and allows those with an interest in Tor the 
opportunity to follow the development and propose their own changes which can be 
scrutinised by the community.  
Tor as, as a project is something that’s, I think it could not… maybe it would exist, 
but it would not be able to do all the things that it does if it were not for the huge 
community that we have around it of people that just show up and are aligned with 
our ideals and believe in what we are doing, and contribute as just a labour of love 
to the project and to what we are doing. Like, I think, uh, without that we would 
definitely be much, much weaker and be able to do much less than what we do. So 
that I think is definitely something that would not be possible if, if we were to have a 
much more… closed and siloed approach to development discussions and whatnot. 
Participant H - Tor core developer 
This also allows them to punch above their weight as a relatively small organisation. 
Academics at the top of their fields from all over the world are able to contribute to 
Tor in ways which would be impossible if the code was closed-source. The proposal 
system means that  ideas from the community are subject to the same scrutiny as 
the rest of the project’s work, making it more likely that malicious changes will be 
spotted and helping to build trust with potential new members. This also helps Tor 
reckon with its own power to shape people’s lives, as they can bring more people 
into the design discussions, allowing Tor to be more representative. 
The second threat with which the Tor Project are concerned is blackmail or coercion 
of its developers. There is a perception within the Tor community that there is a risk 
of external actors blackmailing or coercing individual members to compromise the 
technology or pass on secret information. This is a common anxiety of the 
developers of privacy technologies, given the repeated public assertions by 
politicians in most countries that these technologies should insert ‘backdoors’ which 
allow law enforcement access. A policy of radical openness, they hypothesise, helps 
this as it dramatically reduces the amount of secret information which is actually 
held by the organisation, and hence makes it both very obvious if someone has been 
blackmailed, reducing the damage they can do (and their attractiveness as a target) if 
it does happen.  
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I would say that… I take some precautions. But I think actually the biggest protection 
is that it is Open Source… So, if there was an attempt to, let’s say, coerce me into 
writing a patch that would be malicious or whatever, then that would, I very much 
hope that would be spotted by somebody *laughs*... I mean I also hope that I would 
just not do it. But if there was some way that I was actually coerced into doing it, my 
feeling is that it’s actually *sighs* there’s not that much value in targeting me, 
actually? So if somebody did try to target me, that would probably be because they 
didn’t understand the structure of what I’m doing …I think… if I had to sort of keep a 
lot of things… secret in general, or if we were working closed, then it would be a very 
different kind of threat model. 
Participant C - core Tor developer (emphasis added) 
Third, they are particularly worried about the spread of misinformation about Tor, 
which is often referred to within the community as ‘FUD’, or fear, uncertainty, and 
doubt. This entails spreading rumours that Tor has been compromised or is 
fundamentally insecure,  undermining trust in Tor in the broader information 
security community and with its potential users. This is one of the more serious 
threats to Tor. The media apparatus which has grown up around information 
security, along with Tor’s prominence as an attractive target, means that the 
discovery of even small vulnerabilities in Tor are accompanied by significant press 
attention. Similarly, the money which Tor accepts from the US government and its 
history with the US Naval Research Institute means that there are large sections of 
the information security community who instinctively distrust it, and may 
recommend not using Tor to people who could in fact benefit from it. 
I think it’s actually more dangerous, all this talk internally in, kind of, the more 
technical scenes, the, kind of, talk about backdoors, about US government funding, 
about, you cannot trust Tor, um, on various levels and with various intensity. 
Because I think in the hacker community,  there’s a growing number of people that 
don’t like Tor anymore. Uh, or never liked it, or are now more vocal about not 
recommending Tor… that of course when you’re in a technical crowd and you can 
have these conversations, and you can say, OK there’s certain, kind of, downsides to 
this technology, and certain risks that replace other risks… But  what ends up 
happening is that people who ask their friends,  and they ask  their tech guys, and 
they say no, don’t use Tor, then people end up using something that is  worse  for 
them. Um, and that’s in some respect, for me, more dangerous, to kind of lose this 
core group, and I think it’s the most relevant group because it spreads the 
knowledge. Um, it’s like, if you don’t know shit, you will ask the person you know 
that knows a bit more, and it’s like a cascade that will end up somewhere in the 
hacker scene. And that guy says “oh no, Tor is shit”, over a beer or something, and 
then this will have consequences for users. 
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Participant L - Tor core contributor 
Openness helps in part to mitigate this, as it cultivates community trust and 
legitimacy. Tor’s code is sifted over by large numbers of computer security 
professionals around the world, and this makes it in theory ‘trust-neutral’, so users 
don’t need to trust the developers in order to use it. This also turns the natural 
scepticism of the information security community into an asset: the discovery of a 
vulnerability in Tor is a route to high-impact research and widespread media 
reporting, and thus this encourages this community to work on finding and fixing 
these vulnerabilities, increasing the scrutiny of the code, improving Tor’s security, 
and hence its legitimacy with its users. 
The fourth and final way in which the Tor developers understand the protective 
value of radical openness is possibly the most important of these: disruption. The 
state security actors against which they are attempting to defend have a long history 
of skilfully disrupting undesirable activist or resistance groups through stirring up 
internal conflict and stoking paranoia. This poses a particularly serious threat to Tor, 
as given the well-trodden history of activist community dynamics, this also has the 
potential to occur even without external provocation. Openness helps this as it 
encourages positive social dynamics rather than an economy of secret information 
which they see as easily exploited by outside actors. 
Uh, so it kind of, it, you know, I mean I think you see this in organisations where 
they, they keep things secret, not just from the outside world, but because they’re 
keeping things secret from the outside world, they end up being secret from 
eachother too, and it makes it harder for them to, you know, work, work together 
smoothly. 
Participant C - Tor core developer 
This radical openness has been part of Tor’s design since its precursor projects in the 
US Naval Research lab. In order to attract the everyday users in countries around the 
world and hence generate enough cover traffic to protect high-security users, the 
system has to provide genuine, demonstrable protections which do not rely on 
trusting the US government, and so a radically open design is necessary: 
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[Tor has said from the start that] this can’t be a Navy-only system, it can’t be just 
[Navy] stuff, or it won’t have the protections you need. Um, and so you need to 
carry traffic for other people…and then following on that, you also can’t say, oh, 
here’s this binary blob of code we wrote, you know, we’re the Navy, trust us, it’s 
great! Um, you need to have it be Open Source, you know, in order for people to 
know it’s OK, and not just Open Source, which is, you know, I guess originally we 
were probably just thinking that, but, uh, evolving a bit we realised, OK, not just 
Open Source, but it has to be well-documented, and you have to encourage various 
researchers to, to pound on it, and then publish anything that they find. And, so, the 
point is, the idea that you need to have Open Source, freely-available, uh, system 
design, and code, was in from the very beginning, and… that was part and parcel to 
the security protections you wanted the system to provide.  
Participant I - Tor core developer 
This has been particularly successful, as it resonates with the values of the Open 
Source hackers and liberal, libertarian, and anarchist community members who have 
joined along the way. This is equally the case for its second community design 
principle: decentralisation. 
 
Decentralisation and non-hierarchical structures 
The second design principle through which Tor attempts an engineer approach to 
community resilience is decentralisation, minimising concentrations of power and 
influence, and distributing key responsibilities among separate groups. This operates 
in two ways: the separation of Tor’s volunteer-run infrastructure and its developers, 
and the adoption of an anti-hierarchical approach within the Tor Project itself. 
The infrastructure of Tor is not administered or controlled by the Tor Project or its 
developers, in fact, they minimize their involvement with the network as much as 
possible. Instead of centralised provision, the Tor network is owned and operated by 
a community of volunteers around the world who purchase servers, set them up as 
Tor relays themselves, and make a range of decisions about how they work and the 
kinds of traffic which they carry. This means that trust in the network and the risks of 
supporting Tor are spread among a wide variety of different actors. There is no 
central authority for police to subpoena for traffic records, and it is impossible for 
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anyone in the Tor Project or Tor network to provide useful information on its users 
to law enforcement. It also means that users don’t need to trust the Tor Project, and 
as Tor’s design means that its anonymity protections improve with larger numbers of 
more diverse users, opening its use up to people who don’t trust the US government 
is particularly useful.  
But if we’re the only ones running the system, then the only people you’re going to 
get is the people who are inclined to trust us. You know, and so maybe it’s not quite 
as narrow, but it’s still probably limiting in a way you don’t want…So, you need to let 
diversely trusting people run different parts of the infrastructure. And that actually 
also underscores its security, because if they’re running it, and it’s run by different 
entities, which are perhaps, you know, might have, be reputable, but are still not 
ones that you would expect to fully co-operate if somebody wanted to pull this 
apart. Uh, that goes into it. So, you need to let mutually mistrusting people run 
different parts of the infrastructure. 
Participant I - Tor core developer 
The other key way in which the Tor Project attempts to decentralise power within its 
community is within the structure of the core Tor Project organisation. Tor are 
concerned with the ability of malicious actors to concentrate power around 
themselves, either as an active measure of disrupting Tor by its adversaries, or 
through internal issues which arise without the intervention of hostile external 
actors. As a result, while some aspects of decision making are fairly centralised, they 
try to keep as much as possible a balance of power within the organisation, with 
individuals having a great deal of control over their own projects and the things they 
work on, rather than a strong centralised hierarchy, and broader decisions being 
made through consensus. 
Yeah, well I think one of the things that’s quite good about Tor, especially these 
days, is that we don’t have kind of a really strong personality cult or something like 
that, where, you know, I think that Wikileaks partly suffers from that. I think, you 
know, any one person could have an issue or whatever, but it doesn’t necessarily 
undermine the whole organisation… So you’re more, I think it’s more fragile [when 
power become concentrated], because it’s really much more exposed to the 
mistakes of one person, let’s say. I mean, Wikileaks might also be an example. But I 
think in Tor, it’s not that there’s no hierarchy, but there’s a general feeling, I mean, 
we talk about a “do-ocracy” in Tor *laughs* which is, I don’t think originates from 
Tor, I’m not sure where it comes from, but basically, like, you know, if you want 
something to happen, you just do it. And, and you don’t have to ask permission for 
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things, to do things, and generally speaking, people will respect you for the effort of 
trying to do something and, um… you know, and if someone does something really 
bad then the other people will try to fix it. It’s like, there’s not really a single point of 
failure.  
Participant C - Tor core developer 
Tor’s engineers see this decentralisation of power as both promoting positive social 
relationships (and hence reducing the capacity for disrupting the community) and 
reducing the importance of any individual within the organisation in order to avoid 
creating natural targets for their adversaries. Not only does this mean that 
compromising an individual within Tor is less useful (as no one should have undue 
influence or be able to overrule the collective will), it also means that if they lose a 
member of the community, the organisation is more able to survive.  
This open and decentralised community design works in practice because it stems 
from the core cultural values of the Tor community, resonating both with its 
technical design, and with the practices and logics of the Open Source hackers who 
make up much of its natural constituency. These design elements of Tor’s 
community are important, but they have realised over the years, through sometimes 
substantial hardship, that maintaining these community designs of openness and 
decentralisation relies on complex negotiation and a substantial amount of support 
and maintenance in practice.  
 
Negotiating community design in practice 
These approaches stem from practices of design, and the rationales behind them 
imply a kind of structural determinism, where decentralised, open structures 
inherently ‘beat’ the centralised, closed structures of those attempting to attack Tor, 
however these structures do not operate deterministically. In fact, they require a 
substantial amount of hidden work to be achieved in practice and pose serious issues 
which need to be navigated. Striking a balance between the protective dimension of 
openness and the risks it brings is not easy and requires active negotiation. Similarly, 
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the full decentralisation of power can be somewhat elusive for a community where 
tough decisions need to be made quickly, and which relies on key individuals as 
’translators’ to bridge the different parts of the community. These structural designs 
are therefore negotiated carefully in practice, with an eye to pragmatic compromises 
where they prove in the interests of the security and safety of the organisation and 
its users. 
For example, Tor’s radical openness is not as complete as it may appear. Not all of 
Tor’s inner workings are in practice laid bare to the eyes of the world. Some 
elements of the functioning of Tor are kept secret, especially the tools which it uses 
to detect malicious relays in its network, in order to make them harder for 
adversaries to circumvent. While Tor’s developers minimise the amount of “security 
through obscurity” (Hoepman and Jacobs, 2008) which they employ, sometimes they 
do judge this necessary. This also includes pragmatic decisions to protect Tor’s users. 
For example, in the event of a major vulnerability being discovered in Tor, the team 
have in the past practiced ‘responsible disclosure’, waiting until they have a patch 
ready to fix it before revealing its existence to the community so that its users were 
not exposed to unnecessary danger. This means that, rather than an absolutist 
approach to openness, in practice maintaining this balance requires careful 
judgement and discussion. 
It’s a very fine line that we walk. And we basically weigh that decision at every single 
point and as much as possible, we publish and make available everything up to, but 
not including whatever information could harm the Tor network. And, finding that, 
that line that we shouldn’t cross is… difficult, but I would say most people agree. 
There are certainly some people that think we should be 100% transparent, but… 
we’ve, as a group we’ve generally decided that it’s better to be slightly closed and 
reap some of the benefit from that, rather than be completely open and not be able 
to protect the Tor network as much. 
Participant A – Tor core developer 
Equally, not all of Tor’s development discussions are carried out in the open for 
practical reasons. Where criticism is potentially contentious, or ideas are suggested 
by newer developers, discussion is sometimes worked out internally at first so as not 
to expose the developers to unnecessarily harsh criticism without carrying out 
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internal scrutiny first. The Tor developers don’t feel that this undermines their 
commitment to open development, as the result is still put out to the community for 
open discussion, but some of the messiness is redacted to help the discussion 
proceed in a constructive way. Equally, given the often-toxic culture of the 
information security community, there need to be mechanisms for newer or less-
experienced developers to express opinions, get things wrong, or ask questions 
without being subject to abuse. As a result, some internal discussions are kept 
private so that developers can learn and work in a collaborative and productive 
environment. 
I guess I would say, I think there is scope for, like, private advice on occasion. Um, so 
maybe that’s a slightly… I don’t know, that’s an interesting one. Because pretty 
much, almost everything I do is public, and I do get a certain amount of like… um, 
ridicule *laughs* for the things I say. Or, like, or harsh criticism. I mean there’s 
definitely a certain, like, culture, at least among, I mean obviously online there’s a 
culture of abuse, right, but, you know, even just among, particularly security people 
I’ve noticed…I mean, I don’t know how to put this politely, but there’s a lot of know-
it-alls basically *laughs* right? Who like to sort of, demean people who ask them 
questions or whatever… But there is a little bit of exposure there and so it is true 
that sometimes I try not to expose other people that way. Like, I’ll say something 
privately to them rather than saying it, you know, our ticketing system. Because of 
course we’re all just human beings and nobody knows everything, so…  
Participant C - Tor core developer 
Another problem with a truly open design is that it potentially opens Tor up to being 
steered in directions it doesn’t want to go (for example, prioritising too much 
security over usability), and coordinating actual debate about decisions with a huge 
community is difficult. In practice, a set of natural exclusionary mechanisms, 
particularly the complexity of the Tor technical design and the cryptographic 
protocols on which it depends, reduces contribution to a manageable level. This also 
helps maintain the separation between the roles of developer and infrastructure 
maintainer, as it dissuades the relay operators from seizing control of the project, or 
leaving to form a splinter group (what Open Source organisations call a ‘fork’). Most 
of the Tor community is largely happy to let the developers do their own thing, as 
long as it is open to expert scrutiny, and the complexity of these discussions means 
that public debate is often fiercest around the less important areas. While the 
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developers are happy to explain their decisions and engage with the community, 
they are also well able to push back where they feel that a design decision might 
endanger their vision for Tor. 
Um, what colour do we paint the bike shed? *laughs* If it’s an easy question, 
everyone has an opinion. If it’s a more technical question then less people have an 
opinion… If people have strong opinions about the way it should be done they’ll 
come forward and they’ll argue it out, but it’ll be a shorter discussion and you’ll have 
less people involved. 
Participant D – Tor core developer 
Similarly, decentralising human social structures is not always easy in practice, and 
relies on a degree of pragmatism. Many of Tor’s users depend upon it in potentially 
life-and-death situations, and so its design processes require stability and careful 
judgement before radical shifts in design are made, in case these users might be 
endangered. A rigidly decentralised structure could potentially open Tor up to 
entryism, or to well-meaning new community members banding together to push 
through a change which inadvertently put Tor’s high-risk users in danger. As a result, 
in practice, a few key people within the organisation have ultimate veto over the 
direction Tor takes, even if this operates more as ‘institutional conscience’ than the 
‘benevolent dictators’ which lead many Open Source software projects (Ljungberg, 
2000).  Other people can fork the code and set up their own projects, but internal 
trust is a key factor in whether something actually gets integrated into the code, or 
becomes an official Tor Project project. 
In terms of the community, it’s kind of interesting how projects become ‘official’ Tor 
projects as opposed to just community projects. Generally, it’s if the project is 
created by someone who is already… viewed as a core ‘Tor person’, an integral Tor 
person, then it’s kind of by default, their project then becomes kind of a Tor Project 
project, whereas if it’s someone in the community, then that just kind of like a 
community project. Unfortunately, not all core Tor people… necessarily write the 
best, you know, create the best projects, whereas some community people may 
make much better projects, but it’s just… the core person… I think, their projects 
hold more weight. And so, it’s just by default we kind of trust them more I guess – 
for better or for worse. 
Participant A - Tor core developer  
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But it’s, there within the Tor Project it’s not easy to do any takeovers because it’s 
the main core developers. And I don’t see why Nick Mathewson would have a 
change of opinion in how he thinks about Tor. Or Roger. Ultimately, I mean Roger’s 
very accepting and very, kind of, trying to stay out of decisions now. And, kind of, 
secretly, I think, if there was something happening in that respect that would 
endanger, kind of, how everything is working technically, uh, they wouldn’t accept 
that. So, I don’t think there’s a threat there or even a possibility of manipulation or 
anything. 
Participant L - Tor core developer 
This decentralisation has in itself proven problematic. Known within the information 
security community as the ‘rock star’ (Honeywell, 2016) problem, there is a well-
documented tendency in disruptive tech organisations like Tor (and in activist 
communities), which often grow from small, agile beginnings, eschewing formal HR 
and workload management processes, to attract abusive, manipulative individuals 
who seek to concentrate power around themselves for personal gain. For much of its 
history, Tor has attempted to cultivate decentralisation and anti-hierarchy ‘by 
default’, eschewing formal mechanisms and assuming that not imposing structure 
would lead to a decentralised structure in practice.  
This was shaken by a crisis when one of Tor’s developers was fired. Jacob Appelbaum 
was accused by several members of the Tor community of sexual assault, rape, and 
abusive behaviour. These community members described Appelbaum as having 
abused Tor’s lack of formal structure to cultivate his own informal power structures 
within the Tor community, stealing others’ work, and presenting himself as the face 
of the organisation. After firing Appelbaum, the Tor Project brought in a new board, 
including a director who had substantial experience in the NGO sector. This led to a 
restructuring of Tor, with formal processes being developed with an aim to help 
maintain this decentralised structure, prevent harmful informal hierarchies 
developing, and work through issues as they arose. There is, in practice, a serious 
difference between ‘structurelessness’ and decentralisation of power: structureless 
communities often form informal hierarchies over time, while true decentralisation 
of power requires reflection, maintenance, and formal negotiation (Freeman, 1972). 
This was a major part of the Tor Project’s attempts at professionalisation, inscribing 
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these structures into their organisation actively by, for example, ensuring a regular 
rotation of speaking engagements among the core team. This led to more formalised 
community structures rather than the previous approach, which was characterised 
by a lassiez-faire structurelessness which assumed that a lack of formal hierarchies 
would be enough to prevent informal ones developing. 
I think these organisations come together, and there’s all this idealism, and things 
that come in. And then there’s personality types that, not necessarily trolls per se, 
but… where the, the goal is much more, sort of, self-centred, that kind of undermine 
the original ideals and things, but because by its nature it’s, sort of, open and 
accepting, and then they basically, it doesn’t take many of them to break the 
organisation apart. Unless it has, sort of, structural things in place, and has 
community management and HR and whatnot, so that that’s less likely to be an 
issue. Uh, I’m sure you’re aware, Tor’s had some horrible things, and, uh… you 
know, that was, that was excruciating. That was awful. Um… it’s hard to use 
adequate terminology about, about some of those things. And it’s not the only thing 
but having… ways to deal with that, and not have it pull the organisation apart is 
important, and I suspect that if it had, you know, happened, I don’t know, hard to 
say, but if it had happened five years earlier, maybe it, it would have, you know, just 
pulled everything apart. 
Participant I – Tor core developer 
Navigating the complexities of ‘designing in’ openness and decentralisation in 
practice goes beyond design work, and the Tor Project has relied on a different set of 
sensibilities and expertise in negotiating this: the activist world. This stems from the 
practices and perspectives of the activists, HR people, policy workers and NGO 
workers, many of whom (though not all) have joined the community since the 
Snowden revelations. The activist world sees privacy technologies as explicitly 
political, driven by strong values which have a discursive power of their own. Thus, 
they see Tor as part of a social movement and with a responsibility to intervene in 
public discourse about privacy and other political arenas. In navigating the issues 
which arise when these design elements enter the world, the activist perspective 
aims to draw on shared values to shape how they make these decisions in practice, 
how open is open, and whose projects and suggestions get approved.  
In doing this, they seek to actively cultivate, reflect upon, debate, and critique a set 
of values within the community which they can use to guide them through these 
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decisions. This has occasionally proven contentious: the Tor community is 
characterised by a range of different perspectives, values and understandings, and so 
attempting to find a set of common values has in the past proven difficult. The 
recent social contract drawn up by the Tor Project is one example of how this has 
progressed from Tor’s originally more lassiez-faire approach. Following the crisis 
around Appelbaum’s alleged behaviours and expulsion, there was a concerted effort 
within the organisation to assert Tor’s values as a feminist organisation and embed 
this into formal structures, such as the social contract. Drawing these practices into 
the terrain of debate, politics, and values may be difficult, however (as I explore in 
the following section) it has a range of benefits for Tor’s community and its technical 
work. It allows essentially structurally conceived values such as openness and 
decentralisation to be brought into conversation with other political questions and 
ways of thinking, ultimately reshaping the ways decisions are made in Tor. 
While community and human factors are often portrayed as the “weak link” in 
security engineering, the Tor Project is an example of how they can become a 
powerful site of resilience. As the Tor Project have attempted to ‘design’ their 
community, they have realised that although these strategies are effective, they 
require a lot of active negotiation in practice. I argue that this negotiation constitutes 
a form of hidden work which is crucial in maintaining the human infrastructure of Tor 
and ‘performing’ the ideas of openness and decentralisation embedded in the design 
of its community structures. In navigating these issues, the Tor Project have found 
the need to draw on other ways of understanding resilience and community, 
drawing on a more activist perspective which pulls these issues and decisions into 
the realm of value discussions. While this holds true for these ‘community design’ 
issues, these problems of how to move ‘beyond design’ are also important for the 
technologies of Tor themselves, which I discuss in the next section. 
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Technical threats and the hidden work of Tor: administration 
and maintenance as resilience practices 
In addition to attacks on the Tor community, there are a range of ways in which it 
attempts to defend against more technically-focused attacks. I explore Tor’s 
technical design in the previous chapter, and there are a wealth of papers by the Tor 
Project and others which set out the technical ways in which Tor is engineered for 
resilience and security by design (Dingledine, Matthewson, and Syverson, 2004). As 
one might expect, the engineer world is foundational to this technical design work. 
The way in which Tor’s technology is designed is important in conferring on it 
resilience properties, however (much like the community design elements I discuss 
above) these design effects similarly require a substantial amount of supportive work 
to be produced in practice. Tor relies on a huge amount of invisible work, not only 
from the infrastructural workers who administer its infrastructure, but also from the 
developers who carry out maintenance work on the code. 
There is plentiful evidence, from reporting, leaks, and research, that the security 
services of nation states around the world are attempting to compromise the 
technological functioning of Tor in order to develop the capacity to identify its users 
(Lyon, 2014). As Tor has remained firm against any attempts to create ‘backdoors’ in 
its code to allow access to state security services, this has involved a certain amount 
of subterfuge. There are three primary ways in which Tor’s design is subject to 
attack. Firstly, they can target the infrastructure of the Tor network, as Tor is 
vulnerable to ‘traffic analysis’ attacks, through which adversaries compromise relays 
or Internet Service Providers, or surveil enough of the global internet traffic to get a 
full view of the Tor network, allowing them to time the signals travelling therein and 
trace them back to their origin.  
The second involves adversaries setting up their own relays and spying on traffic (a 
practice Tor counters through the Bad Relay Team which removes suspicious relays 
from the network). The third is targeted at the users themselves, and involves either 
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compromising the computers of Tor users through spreading large amounts of 
malware on citizens’ computers (so-called bulk equipment interference), or 
exploiting bugs and oversights in the implementation of the Tor Browser in order to 
leak small amounts of information about the target when they visit these pages. In 
this section, I explore a by no means exhaustive selection of examples of the hidden 
work beyond the design of Tor itself through which Tor defends against attacks on its 
network and users, and the rationalities which underpin them. 
 
Beyond design: hidden work and the Tor infrastructure 
The first domain of technical ‘hidden work’ on which Tor relies is that undertaken by 
the people who run and administer Tor’s infrastructure. As I describe above, Tor’s 
infrastructure is not run by the Tor Project, rather it is in the hands of a community 
of volunteers around the world. Anyone with sufficient resource to rent a private 
server can set up a Tor relay. This involves downloading some free programs from 
the Tor Project website, installing them on either one’s home machine or on a 
rented server, and running them. Although this infrastructure is dependent on 
maintenance and administration practices for its resilience and stability, it too is 
underpinned by design principles shaped by the engineer world. For example, the 
relay network is structured to spread the risk of carrying potentially-illicit traffic 
around everyone in the network, and has a range of features which allow individuals 
to tailor their own individual engagement with this risk. Operators can choose to run 
entry, middle, or exit nodes, with middle nodes carrying very little risk (as they just 
pass traffic through the Tor network), and exit nodes accruing more (as they make 
the final request to the destination, so risk law enforcement attention). Equally, 
operators are allowed to set their own ‘exit policies’, blocking certain commonly-
known abusive services or certain types of traffic (such as email or Internet Relay 
Chat), depending on what they are comfortable carrying through their relay 
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As important as these design considerations are, though, the work of relay operation 
is in itself important for the resilience of the network. The day-to-day of running a 
node involves a small amount of basic maintenance, such as updating relays when 
new patches come out, however this is more akin to gardening than hacking: they 
mostly just sit in a box or on a virtual server. This means that relay ops don’t feel 
obliged to get deeply into the politics of Tor, and similarly the commitment is small 
enough that anything less than major scandals or value conflicts don’t usually stop 
operators from running nodes. Additionally, the level of involvement is enough to 
provide a sense of satisfaction, much like gardening or volunteering, but not 
particularly arduous. This sensibility is linked to (but based around a different set of 
practices from) classic “hacker” sensibilities, and encourages experimentation and 
the development of clever and creative administrative practices to get the relays to 
work better, which are shared between the operators in documents, wikis and 
mailing list discussions. 
I've begun to realize that running a fast Tor relay is a pretty black art, with a lot of 
ad-hoc practice. Only a few people know how to do it, and if you just use Linux and 
Tor out of the box, your relay will likely underperform… In the interest of trying to 
help grow and distribute the network, my ultimate plan is to try to collect all of this 
lore, use Science to divine out what actually matters, and then write a more succinct 
blog post about it. However, that is a lot of work. It's also not totally necessary to do 
all this work, when you can get a pretty good setup with a rough superset of all of 
the ad-hoc voodoo. This post is thus about that voodoo. 
Relay operator, Tor-relays mailing list, 200X 
This hidden work all promotes the resilience of the Tor network, underpinning its 
stability. As Star argues, this kind of hidden work is vital to all infrastructures, 
allowing them to become “transparent” to the user, and appear to operate smoothly 
and reliably, becoming visible (to the user) only on breakdown. These practices are 
crucial in underpinning the infrastructuralist world in Tor.  
This hidden work also includes a range of strategies for undermining ‘high policing’ 
attempts to compromise the Tor relay network. Among the practices shared and 
developed by the Tor relay operator community is the strategy of ‘relay diversity’. If 
all Tor relays run on Windows, and a serious vulnerability in Windows is secretly 
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discovered, this allows hostile actors to spy on or take down all Tor relays. Equally, if 
all the worlds’ Tor relays are concentrated in Europe, this allows European nations to 
block or surveil them easily. Hence, a key part of the administration of the Tor 
network is encouraging relay diversity by hosting them in a variety of different 
countries, on a variety of different operating systems, and in a variety of different 
configurations. This aims to make the relays of the Tor network as heterogeneous as 
possible, running on different kinds of computers, operating systems, in different 
countries, and through different kinds of organisation, in order to minimise the 
damage to the network if GCHQ’s hackers find an exploit for a particular type of 
system, or if a particular country decides to seize or surveil all its Tor relays. 
This hidden work is not only vital to Tor’s survival, but also itself performs a distinct 
vision of Tor as a site of social action. This vision of resilience isn’t structural like that 
of the engineers, or value-driven like that of the activists, it is agile, creative, and 
‘hackery’, driven by the confluence of pragmatic practices of administration and a 
subversive hacker ethic. Rather than negotiating the reality of Tor’s design through 
values or structure-writ-large, the infrastructuralists do so by attempting to find 
clever loopholes, creative, partial, ’edge-case’ solutions, and through a focus on 
keeping the technology working in practice. This work is therefore important not 
only in ‘maintaining’ Tor’s infrastructure, but also in ‘maintaining’ and performing 
the infrastructuralist social world’s values and frameworks of understanding.  
 
Maintenance as resilience practice: “is this going to be a stand-up fight or 
another bug hunt?”24 
The final area of resilience practice I discuss herein concerns the code of Tor itself. 
Code is the implementation of design: people can come up with understandings of 
how the system works and is structured at different levels of abstraction, but this is 
 
24 Quote from Cameron, J. (1983) Aliens, 20th Century Fox 
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materialised in practice at the level of code. However, this code is not static - 
information technologies and infrastructures like Tor are not frozen in time at the 
moment of their creation, rather they need constant development, revision, 
updating, and a myriad of much smaller maintenance practices which all constitute 
the ongoing processes of development which enable them to continue to function. 
These maintenance practices, such as fixing bugs or finding loopholes in the code  
are in themselves part of the implementation of Tor, and hence sites where a 
multitude of small but important decisions need to be made. In this section, I briefly 
describe these maintenance practices and how the developers understand and 
navigate them in practice. 
Although much-mythologised, the work of “hackers” attempting to compromise 
information systems rarely involves the often-costly development of pathbreaking 
new attacks which undermine the very way a system is designed. In fact, much of 
what is exploited in practice are edge cases, bugs, and blind spots which 
inadvertently allow the attacker to gain control of the system, or in Tor’s case, to 
cause information about the user’s identity to be leaked or tracked. The often-
tedious work of bugfixing and code maintenance is therefore enormously important 
for Tor’s security. Accordingly, the Tor Project recently ran a large fundraising 
campaign to raise additional funds for bugfixing work. 
I mean the design, of course, uh, it’s, it’s kind of fundamental to the whole thing, I 
mean the thing about this is, like, so it started with a very simple idea of the Tor 
network. Of how to, which, OK maybe is not super simple, but, I shouldn’t even call 
that simple, but at least the, you can describe the idea in a few sentences, what it 
does, let’s say, in broad terms. But then the resulting work, you know, they have 
dozens of people working on it over many years, and… you know, and it turns out 
that you don’t just have to fix the network, you also have to fix the browser in many 
ways, because even though the network is… protecting your privacy in one way, that 
doesn’t help if you’re not protecting privacy in all the other ways it can be lost. Uh, 
that’s kind of the thing about privacy is that it’s like you’re securing a house, right, 
and you have to lock all the windows, you can’t just lock some of the windows 
*laughs*. Um, so that’s where the kind of initial design is not enough, because we 
have to constantly be going through and looking for, what are all the privacy holes, 
what are all the problems? What are all the sort of, like, corner cases and so on 
Participant C - Tor core developer 
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The practices through which this kind of work is done are far from the “structural” 
vision of design work, and involve systematically combing through edge cases, 
exhaustively testing how the Tor browser and network perform in a myriad different 
conditions and environments, and hardening and fixing tiny, subtle aspects of the 
implementation of Tor. 
Um, I also have another project in mind, that I haven’t gotten to, where I want to go 
through every single [call in an API framework with which Tor interacts] and just 
manually go through every one of them, I think there’s probably, you know, several 
hundred, um, and just see if there’s anything we’re missing. I think we’re covering 
pretty much, I mean anything that people are using. I wouldn’t be surprised, though, 
if there’s something that we’ve missed. That everybody, kind of, has missed.  
Participant C - Tor core developer. 
Yeah. I mean my goals and the goals of the [Onion Service project] for the next, like, 
three months are basically just clean-up. Um, to reduce technical debt and… get 
things on a more solid footing in terms of testing and quality assurance, kind of like 
boring stuff *laughs*. Like, a lot of people want new features in [Onion Service 
project] and I’m just like “no, no, no” *laughs* “that sounds great, but we’re not 
going to be doing that!” *laughs* Um, just because, you know, as we want to evolve 
things and move things forward, we need to make sure that the foundation is as 
solid as possible. And so we’ve spent a lot of time, and are continuing to do things 
like making sure that we have good test coverage, that the kind of cludgy bits of the 
code are rewritten. 
Participant X - Onion Service developer 
This work is taken up by Tor developers working in a range of teams across the 
organisation, each specialising in a different part of Tor, such as the browser, the 
encryption protocols, or the network. Given the volume of this kind of work, this 
leads to a huge sea of micro-decisions which would be impractical to subject to full 
community scrutiny and debate every time, unlike the top-level design of Tor. As a 
result, these developers need a way of making these decisions in practice. 
Surprisingly, despite the “maintenance” nature of this work, the developers I 
interviewed did not view this through an infrastructuralist sensibility, but rather 
understood the salience of this work through the cultivation and curation of mutual 
trust, based around a shared set of values between the core members of the Tor 
Project. 
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I guess that’s where the values come in, because, you know, we have to trust 
eachother, that we’re all doing the right thing in each detailed case, that we don’t 
necessarily at all, I mean I don’t follow every ticket on our ticket tracker, by any 
means. Uh, I follow probably one percent of the tickets, so all the other people who 
are working on other privacy leaks, like, basically I have to trust they’re locking those 
windows when I’m locking this window over here. And so it’s this general principle, 
we know, like… basically what are we all trying to do, we’re all following that 
principle, to fix it everywhere. So I guess that’s where the… it’s more of a value than 
a design thing then, in that respect, maybe. Um, and that, you know, it’s a fairly clear 
principle, I think, actually, for Tor. I feel like it’s less clear for somebody like Mozilla, 
what are your guiding principles. I mean they have a list of them, but… those are 
sometimes competing with eachother, those values… So we’re lucky, we’re lucky in 
that way, maybe, that we have kind of a… a fairly clear purpose, I think. 
Participant C - Tor core developer (emphasis added) 
This is deeply thoughtful explanation of how these decisions are made. It is 
important to highlight how this conceptualises the links between resilience and trust: 
the hidden, solitary nature of this work means that, as opposed to a ‘structural’ 
approach, these micro-design decisions in fact rely on a shared set of values and 
sense of community and purpose. This kind of trust and its role in resilience is very 
different to the ‘trust-neutral’ approach through which Tor’s engineer rationality 
understands resilience – that through radical openness and decentralisation, no user 
of the system should have to trust any individual member of the Tor Project or relay 
network by design, or its sponsors or developers. It is also very different to the 
infrastructuralist perspective, which is deeply suspicious of any attempt to develop, 
assert, or even discuss a shared set of values for Tor, preferring to exist as an 
autonomous collective of individuals. This activist sensibility takes these hidden 
development practices, which are worked out through tedious, isolated, and 
systematic work, and connects them to a broader arena of values where they can be 
debated, disagreed-out, and linked to more political discussions. This means that 
these maintenance practices are seen not only as sites where the initial values and 
design of Tor are maintained, but active sites where they can be contested, reflected 




In this chapter, I have taken the picture of the materiality of Tor’s infrastructure (in 
both its human and technical components) and moved it beyond the perspective of 
design into the hidden work and resilience practices which allow it to realise its 
visions of privacy in the world. However, these practices are not simply vehicles 
through which the logics of design are realised, but also give rise to their own means 
of understanding Tor and its vision of the world. They are important sites at which 
values are performed and negotiated, and at which the worlds of Tor meet one 
another.  
Tor faces a range of threats, ranging from the quotidian to the extreme, 
necessitating resilience design in the human and non-human elements of Tor’s 
infrastructure. However, the ‘structural’ view of the engineer world, although 
worked out in meticulous and nuanced detail in practice, leans on ideas about the 
inherent primacy of open and decentralised structures, over others. In fact, realising 
these structures in practices involves a range of complex negotiations, balancing 
between different priorities, and conflicts in domains outside design. The hidden 
work which is required, both within the community and in working with the 
technologies of Tor, to realise these visions is vital to making sense of Tor as a site of 
social action. This hidden work draws not only on the infrastructuralist social world, 
as might be expected of maintenance practices, but in some cases also draws on the 
activist social world. This is reflective of the broader shifts within the social worlds of 
Tor, and the increasing prominence of the activist perspective, which I discuss in 
more depth in Chapter 6. 
In the following chapter, I conclude the presentation of the results of my research 
with an exploration of the problems which Tor faces in practice in realising this 
vision, in particular, with crime, harm, and criminal justice. This uses the social 
worlds framework and the rich maps of Tor’s meanings and materiality which I have 
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sketched across the course of the thesis to make sense of the problems with crime, 





chapter 9  
allergic to onions? Tor, 
crime, power and harm 
 
Introduction 
All Internet infrastructures and platforms, from Google, to Facebook, to internet 
service providers, face problems with crime. These problems arise from the different 
ways in which people use these platforms but are also shaped by the decisions made 
by the developers of these technologies at the design stage, the continuing 
processes of development and administration, and public perceptions of the 
technology. How these infrastructural organisations and platforms approach and 
make sense of these issues plays a crucial role in shaping the salience of these 
infrastructures to crime, power, and harm. In this chapter, I address my final 
research question, exploring the crime problems which Tor faces, the different ways 
in which it makes sense of them, and the strategies through which it attempts to 
navigate them. 
Having mapped out the main social worlds of Tor, how they shaped its design, and 
the hidden kinds of work which allow Tor to ‘perform’ this design in practice, and to 
survive and thrive despite its powerful enemies, we are now equipped with a rich set 
of maps of Tor as a site of social action. These are a powerful resource for exploring 
other questions about Tor and its place in the world. In this final results chapter I 
bring these maps to bear on more criminological subjects. In doing so, I endeavour to 
demonstrate the value of a social worlds approach for criminological research on the 
Internet and its infrastructures, and for understanding crime and control in 
contemporary societies. 
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This chapter is divided into two halves. In the first, I discuss the problems with crime, 
harm, and criminal justice in which Tor becomes caught up when its attempts at 
‘infrastructural politics’ meet the forces of power and control which they are trying 
to subvert. I begin with a brief discussion of how Tor has become implicated in online 
crime and harm. I then move onto the findings from my own research, exploring the 
ways in which Tor has become tangled up in the processes and mechanisms through 
which crime on the Internet is governed. I discuss the consequences which this has 
for the Tor community and the broader ways in which Tor plays a role in global 
power relations. In the second half of this chapter, I use my mapping of Tor’s social 
worlds to explore the often-contradictory ways in which Tor attempts to navigate 
these issues, characterising in turn how the activist, infrastructuralist, and engineer 
worlds make sense of them and their strategies for negotiating this terrain. 
 
The Darknet, crime and moral reaction 
The design of Tor explicitly attempts to frustrate mass surveillance. As I describe in 
more detail in Chapter 7, the design choices made by its developers, through 
maintaining low latency and designing out any opportunities for control over how 
people use it, make it a powerful tool for privacy-conscious citizens, activists and 
journalists, but also potentially for harmful and illegal conduct. Tor has become 
associated in the public eye with a wide range of use cases unintended by its original 
designers. The way that Tor builds circuits through its anonymity network is designed 
to protect user browsing information, however, Tor can be used not only to access 
web services anonymously, but also to host them anonymously through the creation 
of Onion Services . These websites are extremely difficult to shut down or censor, 
and can only be accessed through the Tor network. While this has obvious utility for 
journalists seeking to take submissions from whistleblowers or news organisations 
looking to circumvent censorship (with the New York Times, the BBC, and the 
Guardian all hosting Onion Services, and SecureDrop providing one as a platform for 
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whistleblowers), it has also been adopted by those looking to commit crime, access 
illegal materials, and trade in illegal goods. Tor has also received substantial media 
attention as a tool for organisation by terror groups and child sexual abusers, and for 
hate speech and other harmful conduct. 
Where countries exercise an ethos of centralised state control of the Internet, Tor is 
often illegal, prohibited by legislation which often also criminalises the use of VPNs 
and other technologies. As of 2018, Tor was prohibited or blocked in Bahrain, 
Belarus, China, Iran, Iraq, Oman, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Uganda, the UAE, and 
Venezuela. Russia notably made the news in 2017 for the imprisonment of an exit 
relay operator (The Register, 2017), and China has banned Tor use, engaging in a 
wealth of complex technical mechanisms to prevent people from accessing it. 
Blocking Tor is in principle easy for nation states: a list of all Tor relays is published 
online, and so they can simply find these and block them. Tor implements a wide 
array of circumvention technologies to get around this, including bridges, which 
provide alternative, secret routes into the Tor network, and pluggable transports, 
which disguise Tor traffic as other kinds of signals. 
In 2014, journalist Jamie Bartlett published a book with the title The Dark Net: Inside 
the Digital Underworld (Bartlett, 2014; Gehl and McKelvey, 2019). This documented 
the rise of, among other things, the early cryptomarkets, anonymous marketplaces 
for illegal goods and services hosted on the Tor network. This was part of a wave of 
media accounts which brought Tor to the attention of the public in a form which was 
far more easily communicated than the technical complexities of anonymity 
networks. The deviant connotations suggested by the name ‘Dark Net’ and Tor’s 
radical ability to undermine surveillance even by nation states online proved 
irresistible for narratives about online crime, conjuring an image of an online 
demimonde (Maddox, 2016). Depicted vividly as a ‘Wild West’ in which hackers, 
paedophiles, terrorists, and drug dealers operated with impunity from law 
enforcement, Tor became a proxy for broader anxieties about the internet, with 
many of these depictions echoing anxieties about the rise of the Internet circulating 
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in the 1990s. The rise and fall of the Silk Road, a particularly prominent illegal 
anonymous marketplace for drugs hosted on a Tor Onion Service, was reported 
widely in the press, along with romanticised descriptions of its owner, the self-styled 
Dread Pirate Roberts (Munksgaard and Demant, 2016). This has led to stories in the 
press and political statements which seek to whip up popular sentiment about 
criminal activity found in Tor Hidden Services: 
The so-called ‘dark-net’ is increasingly used by paedophiles to view sickening images. 
I want them to hear loud and clear: we are shining a light on the web’s darkest 
corners; if you are thinking of offending, there will be nowhere for you to hide. 
David Cameron, UK Prime Minister, 2015 
Criminological work has largely followed this characterisation, focusing on 
cryptomarkets and crime rather than the broader implications of anonymous 
browsing, censorship circumvention, and liberal challenges to authoritarian trends in 
internet governance. As a result, the term ‘Dark Net’ has now become synonymous 
with online crime in public discourse, used both to refer to Tor and other anonymity 
networks, but also as a general term for crime online, encompassing even illegal 
activity which occurs over the regular internet rather than Tor. This association with 
crime has caused problems for Tor, putting off new users who could benefit from its 
protections, causing problems for its relay operator community, and dissuading 
potential funders who would allow it to move away from US government funding. 
In more recent years, the counter-narrative to this depiction of Tor has emerged 
more strongly, framing Tor as a potent moral force in condemning and resisting mass 
surveillance. Since the Snowden leaks (Lyon, 2014), the alleged interference by 
Russia in the 2016 US election (Mueller, 2019), the Cambridge Analytica scandal 
(ref), and a range of other widely-reported cases (Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison, 
2018), the harms associated with surveillance by governments and social media 
platforms have become equally the focus of public scrutiny. This has given Tor an 
opportunity to reframe its public image. Tor is an increasingly important actor in 
these debates, on the frontlines of the struggle between attempts to control 
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cyberspace and attempts to liberate it, between anxieties about harm and order, and 
anxieties about authoritarianism, control, and exploitation. 
 
Tangling-up in technologies of control 
Tor’s developers aim to redistribute online power, ’flattening’ the topologies of the 
Internet and its technologies of control through its design. In reality, when Tor comes 
into contact with these technologies of control this does not occur smoothly. While 
Tor is remarkably effective in achieving anonymity and censorship circumvention for 
its users, it faces a number of obstacles in practice. Even in nations which do not 
criminalise or block Tor, it experiences consequences for its attempts to subvert 
control. This amounts to a kind of partial or indirect criminalisation which stems from 
its entanglement in the administrative processes through which nation states and 
private companies attempt to govern the Internet. Tor has little effect on 
governments’ attempts to carry out physical targeted surveillance, to intercept 
packages, or to cultivate human intelligence, and has similarly little effect on the way 
in which Facebook and Twitter monetise the personal data provided willingly by their 
users. Rather, it aims to subvert a specific mechanism of control: the mass-scale 
tracking, surveillance, and censorship of populations. Tor’s tangling-up in these 
mechanisms both protects its users and brings with it this partial criminalisation. This 
occurs in two main ways: firstly, through action by non-criminal justice actors who 
have been devolved responsibility for governing parts of the Internet, and secondly, 
through the ways in which Tor comes into contact with policing investigations. 
The first technology of control in which Tor becomes entangled lies outside the 
formal criminal justice system. The primary rule enforcers for online conduct for 
most of the Internet’s history have not, in practice, been the police, but the 
infrastructure providers who maintain the technologies of the Internet (Gillespie, 
2010; Kohl, 2013). Chief among these are the owners of large-scale platforms such as 
Facebook and Twitter, and Internet service providers who manage users’ Internet 
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access. The view which Internet service providers have of the Internet is an 
essentially administrative one. They run banks of servers which host web sites and 
services, manage requests from users of the Internet, and keep extensive records of 
all of this activity. This makes them the first point of call for the various automated 
complaints generated when users of the Internet illegally download copyrighted 
films, send abusive messages, or commit other kinds of crime online. For traffic 
originating from Tor relays, these complaints are then served to the operators. This 
generates what can be a large amount of tedious work for operators responding to 
complaint notices, and has been a problem for Tor since its early days: 
I came home today to find a rather unpleasant e-mail sitting in my inbox. It was a 
DMCA Complaint from the MPAA, for "CHRONICLES OF RIDDICK, THE". I scratched 
my head for a few minutes, trying to figure out if I had downloaded that movie on 
my server. I was really quite sure that I hadn't downloaded it, or any movies at all. I 
wondered if they might have misidentified a legitimate torrent. Then it dawned on 
me - with the recent talk about BitTorrent over tor, it probably was someone using 
BitTorrent over tor… I'd very much like to continue running a tor server, but I can't 
afford to do it if I'm going to receive DMCA Takedown notices. Has anyone else had 
this problem? Any suggestions? 
Tor-talk mailing list, 2004 
Lately, more and more, systems are set up to send out notifications if there was 
some kind of [hacking] attempt like scanning all ports or scanning URLs for like, the 
typical exploit stuff… So when there’s filesharing stuff happening, you are required 
to reply, and that could mean, basically what we do is, is respond and say sorry, we 
can’t identify the customer. So, last time I looked we get a thousand DMCA 
complaints every day… Um, but a lot of ISPs don’t like that workload, when they see 
a lot of these emails. And they are not really happy about putting you in the abuse 
contact, because they don’t know how you will deal with the more severe cases. 
Participant L - Tor core contributor 
Once these build up, this becomes a nuisance for Internet service providers. IP 
addresses, the identifiers which allow information to be routed around the Internet, 
are in fact a relatively scarce resource. A proliferation of abuse complaints by a relay, 
if not properly handled, can lead to the blacklisting or banning of many of the IP 
addresses held by the Internet service provider. This can result in either the relay 
operator’s accounts being punitively banned (and the loss of paid subscription 
money for the operator), or even the implementation of wider policies prohibiting 
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relay operation with that service provider. As a result of this, relay operators are 
finding it increasingly difficult to find ISPs who are willing to host a Tor exit node. 
It can generate flak *laughs*. And, I mean, my basic idea is, my basic position is, and 
always has been, is it’s none of my business what people use their Internet access 
for. Right? They want to run a Tor node, they want to do, you know, whatever 
*laughs*… that’s my basic position, but there’s two caveats with that. One is, you 
don’t do things that harm the ability of other people to use the network. And you 
don’t do things that cause me excessive work *laughs*… Uh, and running a Tor exit 
node will get… first of all, if that’s what you’re doing, because, it will generate 
complaints and things, and I need to be able to respond to these complaints, so, I 
should know, let me know, right? Um, ideally, deal with your own complaints.  
Participant U – Tor relay operator and ISP sysadmin 
So there’s different kinds of ISPs, right? You know, residential ISPs, I would be 
surprised if any of them liked [Tor relays] at all. Right? … So you’ll more want to put 
them in places where you can… rent a server, co-locate a server, something like that. 
Now those providers are going to be worried about the reputation of their 
addresses. What they don’t want is to get on blacklists and things, and sometimes 
the blacklists can be a little bit heavy-handed, and you might suffer collective 
punishment, and they might say, well this entire [range] of addresses is going in the 
blacklist, and not just this one address that’s a Tor exit node… And that’s a risk. I 
mean, addresses are scarce, you don’t want them to become unusable, because that 
means the people adjacent to you have trouble using the network, right? So that 
sort of breaks that rule of causing other people problems. It’s manageable if the ISP 
knows what’s going on. They have to know what’s going on and also be willing to do 
the extra work to manage it. And whether they are or not… 
Participant U – Tor relay operator and ISP sysadmin 
The second technology of control in which Tor becomes entangled is the formal 
investigative processes of criminal justice systems. This is the result of rule 
enforcement against Internet crime more generally, rather than directly targeted 
action against Tor. In particular, the operators of the “exit” relays described above 
face substantial exposure to law enforcement action in practice. Tor provides privacy 
for its users by obscuring the administrative traces of Internet browsing, requests to 
visit particular sites or speak to particular people, from law enforcement and 
Internet service providers. The consequences of this for the relay operator are that 
these administrative traces become associated with them, rather than the user. 
When a police officer or intelligence analyst is investigating crime online, they rely on 
these administrative records: they go to the Internet Service Provider, request the 
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records, and follow the trail of suspicious activity back to the user who appears to 
have made the connection. If the offence is serious then they may request the 
details of the rest of their browsing history and communications. Equally, as policing 
the Internet becomes increasingly automated, and algorithms scan for attacks, 
requests to illegal websites, and other criminalised activities automatically and flag 
up suspicious patterns, Tor relays can appear to be particularly potent generators of 
these patterns. To anyone who looks through the administrative records, it appears 
that every abusive, illegal, or unpleasant action undertaken by Tor users has been 
committed by the person running the exit node. For a Tor relay operator, this can 
lead to substantial difficulties, including arrest and seizure of equipment: 
Because the moment where, kind of, if there’s a small police, law enforcement office 
somewhere and they get an IP address and they ask the ISP who was the customer 
who was using that IP address, and then they get a customer record, and then some 
small town policemen go and get some small town court to, say OK, and they come 
to your door, it’s already too late. Like, you have to kind of sit back and allow them 
to, basically, take all your hardware, and then later argue that there’s enough proof 
that you weren’t related to the crime. 
Participant L - Relay operator 
It is actually a terrifying experience. Um, I wouldn’t wish that to my worst enemies… 
They wake you up, at five minutes to seven in the morning, after, with my sleep 
cycle, I’d had two hours of sleep that day… And then, uh, ding-dong, welcome… we 
have a… search warrant, yes, that’s it. Um, and they’re standing at your door, with 
four people, and once you open the door, there’s a foot in the door. 
Participant W - Relay operator 
A number of my participants reported having some level of conflict with law 
enforcement as the result of running an exit relay, and most of the relay operators 
identified it as a source of anxiety for them. For one operator, involved in a 
particularly high profile case which involved an attack on critical national 
infrastructure, this had particularly serious consequences. 
In my case [a major company], classified as "vital importance company" in [my home 
nation] (but apparently without any basic security practices...), was infected by [a 
ransomware virus] After infection, [this virus] try to contact its [command and 
control server], which is a Tor hidden service. So infected machines starts a Tor 
client, which connect to guard nodes to established Tor circuit to the [command and 
control server]. After infection, the IT service flag all outgoing traffic as evil, and 
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complaint to [law enforcement] about hacking. 24h later, [all of the] guard nodes 
joined by an infected computer was seized by the [law enforcement agency]. The 
main problem is [law enforcement] ask for a gag order around my case, and 
I officially have no information at all of what are charges against me or what I risk on 
this case. No warning at all. Machines vanished without reason a Sunday morning, 
no information from my provider during two days, before agreeing to tell me that I 
had legal action against me.  
Participant T - Tor relay operator 
Tor’s design disrupts a particular set of strategies employed by law enforcement in 
controlling crime online. It is crucial to emphasise that these law enforcement 
processes are not directed actively at Tor. Rather, they are the result of the 
particular administrative traces generated by a Tor relay and how these become 
entangled in criminal justice attempts to take enforcement action against online 
crime more generally. By shielding its users from these processes of enforcement, 
Tor itself becomes subject to the disciplinary power wielded against their illegal 
online activities. This has a number of consequences for the Tor community. 
 
Stigma and the tarnishing of the ‘free Internet’ 
In many ways, Tor has been quite successful at resisting mass surveillance and mass 
censorship on behalf of its users, but, as I describe above, it faces a number of 
challenges in practice. In this section, I outline the consequences of these for Tor. 
The threat of law enforcement action is a particularly worrying issue for Tor. Relay 
operators employ a wide range of strategies to avoid this, which I describe in more 
detail in a subsequent section of this chapter. 
Despite these mitigation efforts, smaller or less experienced operators can still 
receive a lot of unwanted attention. Recent police raids on a relay operator 
organisation in Germany suggest that anxiety over police action may be well-
founded even where mitigation efforts have been attempted. Although there has 
been a lack of successful prosecutions, this can result in substantial stigma for the 
people involved: 
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Even if… once you’ve had a police raid for child porn, that’s, you can’t burn your 
name more than that. Something always sticks. 
Participant W - Tor relay operator 
I have some people asking me “Hey, some weeks ago you told about Tor Browsers 
and something, what are you doing there? Are you buying drugs, are you buying 
guns?” And I told them, no – I was looking for some alternative, uh, news and I visit 
some websites, I don’t want to leave any footprint. That’s my reason I’m going 
there. And they all asked “Huh? I thought myself it’s just for buying guns and abusing 
children!” and I said to them “no! it’s just an Internet without Google and 
Facebook.” 
Participant Q- Tor relay operator 
Even for those who claim to brush this off, it can still lend a “deviant” air to Tor, 
which undermines its self-image as a force for good: 
It feels like you’re wearing an Anonymous mask and it feels like you’re doing a little… 
you’re a bad guy. That’s the feeling when going there, yeah… It’s more an 
excitement. It’s like being in your car and, know you are going a little too fast now or 
something. It’s like, it’s like having a joint, going to the park and smoking, yeah?  
Participant Q - Tor relay operator 
This stigma, and the broader association of Tor (and hence, themselves) with crime, 
are a problem, as relay operators and the network itself rely on not being culpable 
for the content of the communications which their Tor nodes carry. Combined with 
the administrative issues with ISPs, this produces a sizeable barrier to running the 
valuable exit nodes on which the network depends. As Internet hosting becomes 
more centralised, with smaller providers coming under the auspices of larger 
corporations, they are increasingly bound to follow restrictive policies as these 
corporations are less sympathetic to the complaints generated by Tor nodes. In 
practice, this means that a lot of exit nodes are concentrated around a few cheap 
and tolerant hosting providers. There is speculation within the Tor community that 
this may have ultimately dire consequences, making it possible for hostile actors to 
shut off large parts of the Tor network by targeting a relatively small number of 
providers. 
So OVH is a French company, has, uh lots of European data centres, and they have 
very, very cheap virtual servers. Um, so there’s lots of fast, fast relays, but they’re all 
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in the same network and this isn’t really adding any diversity. Even though there’s 
maybe four, five hundred people running them, um, they’re all, maybe even in the 
same rack. Which is *laughs* sub-optimal. 
Participant D - Tor developer 
As an attempt to realise a particular vision of the world, it is problematic for Tor if 
others, such those who use it for illegal or harmful activities, or those who wish to 
paint it as criminal, attempt to subvert this. Similarly, its use for harm, especially 
deeply emotive issues such as child sex abuse imagery, terrorist organising, and 
racist hate crime undermines the utopian vision of the society it is meant to be 
creating. This stigma limits the growth in Tor users, and hence the spread of its vision 
of the world. Its tangling up in mechanisms of control only compounds this, adding 
further stigma and association with crime.  
While Tor’s reputation as the ‘Darknet’ is a problem for attracting more users and 
funders, it is largely ignored by the people in the relay operator community, who 
view this as scaremongering. What limits the size of the relay network and the 
resilience of its infrastructure in practice are these ancillary mechanisms of tangling-
up: the secondary, administrative consequences of Tor becoming implicated in illegal 
activities. All-in-all, this amounts to a weakening of the Tor network, rather than full 
criminalisation.  This is one way in which the politics-through-infrastructure imagined 
by Tor’s design meets challenges in practice, spilling over into other domains 
separate from the power structures built into the design of the Internet, such as 
public opinion and fine-grain mechanisms of administration and enforcement. But 
this tangling-up not only occurs where Tor conflicts with mechanisms of internal 
state power, rather, it also happens at the points of concordance at which Tor’s 
vision of the world and that of powerful nation states overlap. 
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Broader stages of power 
Tor acts not only on power relations and technologies of control within nation states, 
but also between them, in the terrain of global power (Moore and Rid, 2016). Tor 
becomes tangled up in these rather differently, becoming implicated in questions of 
geopolitics and sovereign power in ways which may illuminate further why most 
liberal democracies (and the US in particular) have largely not attempted to formally 
criminalise its use. Tor was originally developed by the US government’s Naval 
Research Laboratory and has received substantial funding and expertise throughout 
its life from the US state. As well as fulfilling its original purpose to allow field agents 
in hostile nations to communicate with their handlers over the regular Internet 
without raising suspicion, its broader adoption around the world potentially operates 
in the interests of US soft power.  
In this framing, Tor (much as the Internet more generally) becomes one of the many 
efforts made by the US globally to spread its culture, way of life, and model of 
society (Nye, 2004). By broadening access to information and communication, Tor 
allows the everyday citizens of more ‘closed’ societies access to the global internet 
without censors’ determining what information is fit for them to consume, and 
allows political dissidents, freedom fighters, and activist groups to communicate and 
organise. It is therefore no surprise that the nations which have attempted to 
formally criminalise or block Tor are largely more authoritarian states with 
adversarial relationships with the US. Some extremely powerful actors with little 
interest in preserving the right to privacy have set up sites on Tor, with the Onion 
Services set up by Facebook and the CIA perhaps the most telling examples of these 
attempts at the co-option of Tor in the interests of existing power structures. This 
contradiction is keenly felt by Tor’s developers: 
I think one of the main challenges at the end of the day is that the incentives of 
private companies are oftentimes not necessarily that much aligned with the 
incentives of the public. And so it’s sort of hard to push for something that is going 
to significantly damage the business model that they are based on. So I think… the 
sad truth is that in the end, on the Internet, unfortunately, still the prevalent 
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business model is based on advertisement. And advertisement depends on being 
able to collect as much personally identifiable information as you can, from 
everybody. So… I mean, sure, Facebook has made an important step in terms of… 
you know, running their own Tor Hidden Service... but I’m… I’m not sure that is 
necessarily that much of a big win, in terms of the information that they still are able 
to gather and collect about them and how Facebook uses this. 
Participant H - Tor core developer 
This is, oddly, an area in which Tor’s vision of the future and that of the US 
government have historically overlapped, with the Internet cast as a force for 
liberalisation, breaking down the barriers between nation states, facilitating free 
trade, political organisation, and freedom of expression. As abortively realised in the 
discourse around the Arab Spring, there has long been a tendency within US global 
policymaking circles to have faith in the capacity of the Internet to play a role in 
exactly this structural redistribution of power which Tor seeks: moving societies from 
‘closed’ to ‘open’. While the developers of Tor are very much alive to this critique of 
their infrastructure, they also accept that many of their own visions of Tor’s role in 
the world overlap with this ‘democratising’ sensibility. 
I think some Tor people maybe disagree with this view, but… so, one of the things 
that Tor gets its funding for is helping dissidents in countries with repressive 
governments. Like, Iran is an example. And… I actually agree with the idea of doing 
this, and it can sound a little, maybe… colonialist, and I see that point of view, but on 
the other hand we’re not forcing anyone to use this tool. This is a tool for individuals 
and an individual anywhere in the world is allowed to use it, so I’m quite enthusiastic 
about, let’s say, translating it into whatever language, Farsi or whatever. Localising it 
for people from… whatever country, and so that’s part of our funding, and it comes 
from the US government. And I think it’s a valid thing to do. 
Participant C - Tor core developer 
I think there are for sure some common principles… but at the same time trying to 
not get too much into those that are complex socio-political issues in a particular 
country and trying to, sort of, balance that, so that we can ensure that those that 
give colour, in a way, to the things that we promote are actually the people that are 
from that country, that have a better understanding of what is happening there. 
Participant H - Tor core developer 
This presents a somewhat counter-intuitive but crucial challenge for Tor: it needs a 
way to distinguish its vision of the Internet from that of the US state, and prevent 
itself from being co-opted as a technology of power. 
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Navigating crime and power as a rebel infrastructure 
Having set out some of the main issues of crime, harm, and power which Tor is 
facing, I now explore the ways in which the Tor community makes sense of this 
‘crime problem’, and how they attempt to navigate it. Each of Tor’s social worlds 
frames crime and harm rather differently: in my interviews, adopting different 
strategies to deal with it. As will be seen, these strategies are often opposed and 
mutually-exclusive, which is reflected in the often-conflicted way in which Tor has 
attempted to deal with these issues over its history. 
Most Internet infrastructures have three avenues in which to engage in dealing with 
crime, harm, and abuse of their services. The first of these is the route of design, 
making changes to the design of the technology in order to shape its affordances for 
its users and the kinds of action and interaction which are possible. This is effectively 
an ‘online’ version of Situational Crime Prevention techniques, making changes to 
the built environment in order to alter opportunities for criminal offending, or to 
increase possibilities for guardianship (Reynes, 2010). There are many examples of 
this, including automated detection systems which scan messages on social media 
platforms for hate speech or child abuse images and remove them, systems for 
collecting information on users’ real identities, and more subtle changes which can 
be made to the user experience to ‘nudge’ people away from abusive or illegal 
behaviour (see for example, Reynes, 2010; Pothineni, 2014; Blackwell et al., 2017; 
Suzor et al., 2019; ).  
The second approach involves moderation and administration, including a range of 
techniques through which platforms directly police user behaviour. Many platforms 
make use of moderators and administrators to handle abuse reports, make decisions 
about suitable sanctions, such as posting restrictions or exile from the platform, and 
some adopt a more community-based approach, with moderation of norms and 
conduct left up to particularly well-established users. These processes effectively set 
up internal policing and governance mechanisms and systems of sanctions for the 
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users of the site through which behaviour is observed (by automated systems, paid 
administrators, or community members) and unwanted behaviour sanctioned. 
Finally, as I discuss in Chapter 8, platforms can engage with the formal institutions of 
law enforcement and criminal justice. This involves storing and collecting user data 
which can be used as evidence in investigations, the establishment of reporting 
mechanisms where illegal behaviour is detected, and either replying to subpoenas 
for user data or, on occasion, developing more active collaboration regimes with 
secret services (Lyon, 2014). As revealed in the Snowden leaks, and as has become 
increasingly prominent in discussions about the operation of contemporary criminal 
justice systems, this kind of collaboration has only been deepening, with some 
exceptions where companies, such as Apple, have tried to assert the rights of their 
users against state intrusion (Schulze, 2017). 
Tor, however, has deliberately limited its ability to engage in any of these. Its design 
deliberately removes any of the control points through which user behaviour might 
be surveilled, and its foundational design decisions, based around maximising the 
number of use cases in which it can be employed, all seek to design out control 
rather than designing out crime. This is both as a matter of principle, and to prevent 
the people who run its infrastructure and design its code becoming targets 
themselves. By extension, it has also ‘designed out’ its ability to administer or 
moderate user behaviour to a large extent, and this, and the anti-authoritarian 
sensibility of its community, makes collaboration with law enforcement both a 
technical impossibility (as the infrastructure collects no useful data on its users) and 
escheded as a matter of principle. This makes it a particularly interesting case to 
study. In the following half of this chapter, I explore how issues of crime and harm fit 
into each of Tor’s social worlds, and the strategies which arise from these ways of 
understanding these problems. 
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Privacy as a struggle: the activist world and reclaiming Tor 
For much of Tor’s life, the Tor Project has avoided making strong public 
commitments to a particular set of values other than a dedication to privacy, 
preferring to frame the technology itself as neutral in order to permit the widest 
possible community of contributors and users. This in fact goes back to its original 
design, when the US naval researchers who developed it envisioned it as enrolling 
the largest and most diverse possible user community to provide effective cover 
traffic in which US military agents could disguise themselves. The rise of the activist 
social world, however, has caused a reorientation of this strategy, and Tor has 
become much more engaged in public discussions about the values it represents. 
The activist world views privacy as a struggle, and privacy technologies as part of a 
political movement for civil rights, wielding political power, and embodying a 
coherent set of values of their own. Asserting these values in public is therefore, for 
this world, an important way in which privacy technologies exert power and shape 
societies. 
Tor is not just software, but a labor of love produced by an international community 
of people devoted to human rights… We advance human rights by creating and 
deploying usable anonymity and privacy technologies. We believe that privacy, the 
free exchange of ideas, and access to information are essential to free societies… 
We are not just people who build software, but ambassadors for online freedom. 
We want everybody in the world to understand that their human rights -- 
particularly their rights to free speech, freedom to access information, and privacy -- 
can be preserved when they use the Internet… Our vision of a more free society will 
not be accomplished simply behind a computer screen, and so in addition to writing 
good code, we also prioritize community outreach and advocacy. 
Excerpts from the Tor Social Contract 
The problems of crime which technologies face, accordingly, are also framed as 
stemming from questions of public image and perceived values. In this framing, 
technologies like Tor attract crime problems (and the attention of the criminal justice 
system) when they become associated with crime and deviance, and legitimate users 
become dissuaded. Hence, they feel that Tor’s reputation as a ‘Dark Web’ full of 
illegal content is the prime factor in shaping its use for crime, and if it becomes 
 255 
known as a tool for free speech and liberal democracy it is likely to attract a wider 
range of more positive use cases. Promoting Tor’s socially beneficial use cases, and 
encouraging more journalistic organisations to set up Onion Service versions of their 
websites is a large part of this effort at changing Tor’s image. The activist social world 
is also the only one of Tor’s social worlds which is occasionally (though not always) 
willing to condemn Onion Services outright, arguing that they pose too great a risk of 
abuse, unlike Tor’s capability as a browser. 
I’m not really a fan of onion services myself. I think it’s nice from a technology point 
of view. It’s nice if you can think about systems, and that’s kind of the classical 
thinking that I was used to before all this public visibility. That kind of, the technical 
community accepts that it’s currently all crap, and all shit happening on the Darknet. 
Because it’s technically so neat… I’m not sure that just because there are potential 
worlds where Hidden Services would save the planet, um, it’s maybe not the world 
we live in. 
Participant L - Core Tor contributor 
I think it’s an absolute disaster… Tor’s public perception has been really bad… I think 
the most important thing they could do is, like, rebrand, and have a decent PR 
person… like, if you look at it from the outside, it feels like some underground, 
dodgy, like, drugs trading thing. My really specific recommendation to them is to 
separate Hidden Services, because this whole, like “Dark Web” bullshit has come 
about from the fact that Tor enables Hidden Services, means that Tor gets lumped in 
with Silk Road. And that’s not helpful, and I think the Tor Browser could really do 
with a rebrand… Tor Browser is about browsing without censorship. 
Participant R – Tor advocate and relay operator 
This conceives of privacy technologies as possessing substantial power to act as 
moral agents, shaping public debate and influencing policy and legislation. The 
activist strategy is to engage directly in these public debates, making explicit cases 
for Tor as possessing intrinsic political values, and being intended for particular uses 
and political causes. In doing this, they seek to reclaim Tor as not about crime, but 
about control, itself at the vanguard of a wave of moral reaction against mass 
surveillance and authoritarian attempts by powerful groups to control the internet. 
By engaging in these public conversations, they attempt to get governments, 
institutions, and public opinion on their side. This involves promoting particular 
positive use cases of Tor, making the case that Tor ‘isn’t about’ the cryptomarkets 
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and illegal pornography (and arguing that this represents a very small percentage of 
Tor’s actual users). Rather, they claim that Tor was designed for a particular set of 
intended uses – namely, for journalism, human rights work, and the protection of 
everyday internet browsing from mass surveillance. 
You need to be working out how to present the good use cases along with the bad 
ones. Um, I think they’re still learning as an organisation how to do that, they’ve not 
really had to do that for the last decade, because they’ve had a bunch of 
government funding, and they’ve been able to tailor it to what they want to do. Now 
that they’re more reliant on people and outside organisations for funding, well it 
looks like it’s going to be that way, especially in the next few years, they have to get 
better at selling the technology as a whole to society. 
Participant Z - Tor Onion Services developer 
As a result, they articulate a vision for Tor which is rather different from the neutral 
status Tor has asserted over the years, or the structural change through engineering 
imagined by its designers. This world of discourse is more likely to accept publicly 
that harmful uses of Tor are a problem, and to condemn particular use cases of Tor, 
especially those which are associated with crime or the far right: 
By explicitly allying Tor with other social movements, such as women’s rights, LGBT 
liberation, civil rights, they attempt to ensure that the social meaning of Tor 
becomes steered by its community and reclaim Tor’s values. They do this by 
promoting particular use cases, allying with particular causes, and partnering with 
the particular groups which the activists choose to train in how to use Tor. This has 
the advantage of empowering Tor to use its substantial clout in lobbying for privacy 
as a political cause, and shaping public perceptions of Tor to improve its image. This, 
however, faces problems in practice, clashing with infrastructuralist sensibilities in 
the Tor community who are both unused to acting in the domain of public 
discussion, and deeply suspicious of associating technologies with an explicit politics. 
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Privacy as a service: the infrastructuralist world and becoming 
invisible 
These attempts to assert Tor’s values and engage in public debates over the politics 
of privacy come up against the strategy on which Tor relied for much of its life: to 
assert itself as a neutral facilitator of the actions of its users in order to build as 
broad a community of contributors as possible. This sensibility is particularly 
embodied in the infrastructuralist world, which stems from the various practices of 
maintenance, network administration and invisible work on which the Tor network 
relies, giving rise to an ethic of “privacy as a service”. In contrast to the value 
assertions of the activist world, the infrastructuralist world aims to denude Tor of 
explicit values, withdrawing it from public conversations about politics and social 
meaning as much as possible. 
This perspective baulks at the assertion that Tor it should take any view at all on the 
particular types of things for which it is used. The majority of the relay operators 
whom I interviewed felt this way, often comparing Tor with a knife or similar tool, 
with no intrinsic politics or values. This amounts to an assertion of ‘technological 
neutrality’, the argument that technologies themselves possess no agency, and are 
mere conduits of human action. 
It’s like, *sighs* it’s like having a knife – with a knife you can cut an apple and with a 
knife you can kill a man… so the Tor network is just a knife which is laying on the 
table without anyone touching it. That’s my opinion. 
Participant Q - Tor relay operator 
Because the tool is something that does, something that helps you to do something. 
But what you will do with this tool is up to you. Crime happens not on the hard drive 
of the Bond movie producer, crime happens not on the Silk Road drug store, no. 
Crime happens inside people’s mind. The criminal mind is a way of thinking. It’s 
actually confirmed even by psychiatry and medicine. Some maniacs have special 
genetic markers or special protein markers that these potentials can be identified 
from just a newborn child. It’s true… Neither Tor or other software authors, nor 
people who are running even exit nodes, no they’re not responsible. They are not 
responsible for another people’s thoughts and actions. They are not. Tor is just a 
tool. 
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Participant N - Tor relay operator and open source contributor 
This framing has a practical purpose. While Tor is not explicitly criminalised in many 
countries, it does become entangled in criminal justice processes, which brings it into 
conflict with the technologies of control through which states maintain online order. 
This is primarily experienced by Tor’s relay operators, as I describe above. These 
practical concerns and risks, and the intrinsic distrust of politics of this world, leads 
them to a set of strategies which I characterise as ‘making Tor invisible’, a powerful 
set of  tactics for enabling Tor to sit under the radar, and untangle themselves from 
the criminal justice processes which put them at risk. This resonates with hacker 
sensibilities about oppositional technologies, using clever tricks, loopholes and 
creativity to slip the infrastructure of Tor through the cracks and edge cases in the 
law and police procedure, rather than attempting to change people’s minds through 
political debate: 
Problem: immunicity takedown. Solution is to do the exact same thing without 
"encouraging an offence". Answer: let people choose their own websites to proxy… 
Problem: Internet Connection Records. Solution: An unsurveillable ADSL 
connection… Answer: overlay network out of the operators control… Problem: ISPs 
take down Tor exits because they are scared of abuse complaints. Solution: Be your 
own ISP… I'm a professional problem solver, government attempts at controlling the 
Internet is a problem. As I've said many a time: I can innovate faster than they can 
legislate. 
Participant S - Relay operator 
To mitigate the problems with administration and law enforcement I describe above, 
relay operators cultivate a range of practices which attempt to allow them to slip 
between the cracks. Prospective relay operators are advised to avoid running a Tor 
relay from their home connection, instead setting it up in a datacentre on a rented 
server. These servers tend to be clustered within countries and service providers 
who are sympathetic to Tor, don’t bother to ban nodes over abuse complaints, or 
have jurisdictions where investigating foreign cybercrime cases is not a police 
priority. Although successful prosecutions are rare, especially as Tor provides a 
service which allows investigators to establish proof that the traffic originated from 
their Tor relay, rather than their personal computer, operators understandably try to 
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avoid getting caught in this process to begin with. For ISPs who host Tor nodes on 
their network, the experience with law enforcement is very different: 
The NCA contacted [the Internet Service Provider we run] and said, preserve this Tor 
node! *laughs* It used to be the case that whatever police, wherever, that was 
dealing with a thing would like, oh, it’s an Internet thing, I’ll call the ISP and not 
really understand what’s going on, and ask them for ridiculous stuff. Now, that kind 
of communication needs to be funnelled through the NCA. And they have a group, a 
specialised group that understands how the Internet works, and what Tor nodes are, 
and these sorts of things, and so you know… that’s good. Right? Because, I mean, it 
means that when you do, as an ISP, at least, interact with law enforcement, you’re 
interacting with people who know what they’re dealing with … Like, literally, the only 
contact I have had with them is on that kind of level, where somebody is doing 
something bad on the Internet, oh, it’s a Tor node, oh, OK, we know what that is, 
we’ll… go find evidence some other way! Right? *laughs* Um, and that’s kind of the 
way it should be. 
Participant U - Tor relay operator 
We need to advocate companies and ask them to run more exits by covering costs 
(infrastructures, bandwidth...) and troubles (abuse, seizure, law 
enforcement requests...). 
Exit nodes are currently too risky for a single person without a structure (company 
or association) above. 
Participant T - Tor relay operator 
As a result, Tor’s relay operators have attempted to mitigate this threat through the 
cultivation of fairly sophisticated mechanisms to de-intersect Tor from the particular 
parts of these administrative processes which result in trouble for its operators, 
while keeping it interposed between the users and state technologies of control.  
Relay operators draw on the classic hacker techniques of social engineering to shape 
the way Tor appears to the world through the use of what relay operators call ‘legal 
entities’.  Tor’s operators have realised that having a relay in their own name 
operating from a home internet connection appears very different to less 
technically-minded police than a relay owned by an Internet Service Provider hosted 
in a private datacentre. Accordingly, Tor’s exit operators often set up small 
companies or charitable organisations which they register as a service provider and 
use to host their relay. This means that when police look up an IP address associated 
with illegal activities, they find what appears to be a company providing hosting for 
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its customers, rather than an individual’s home connection. For the relay operator, 
this is the difference between a dawn raid for child pornography charges, including 
the seizure of computers and a potential court case, and a polite letter informing 
them that one of their customers has broken the law. Relay operators are now 
actively advised by the Tor Project to avoid running an exit relay on their home 
connection, and a range of organisations exist which can help new operators get set 
up safely. 
That’s why we always try to teach everyone to get them listed in the whois records, 
so you are not the end user, you are not the customer, but you are looked at as an 
intermediary.” 
Participant L - Tor core contributor 
 When I run an exit, I want it to be owned by a legal entity that’s not me. And that’s 
for the risk of it being, if someone uses that, when someone uses that exit for 
something bad, and some police investigation happens, which unfortunately might 
happen, I want the chain of, I want it to go to the company that owns it, and then at 
least it’ll mean that they’ll ask a question before they bash my door down…. I want it 
to be obvious when a police investigation is happening that this is a proxy, and so 
incorporating it is essential for me – I’m not going to run it in my own name. 
Participant R - Tor relay operator 
Tor is designed specifically to preclude any mechanisms for censorship on the basis 
of content, allowing Tor to take advantage of laws which offer ‘mere conduit’ 
protections, and absolving them as service providers from responsibility or liability 
for the actions of their users. This legal and moral neutrality is very important from 
the people who run the Tor network, given the content which flows through their 
servers. The reality of Tor is that as well as providing substantial social benefits, it 
also facilitates (as is common with any infrastructure) a range of activities which are 
unambiguously harmful. Although the relay community justifiably defends their 
decision to help Tor, they do need ways to reconcile this tension, and the stigma it 
brings. This makes taking a view on user traffic of any kind is dangerous, preferring to 
recuse themselves from any moral judgement or articulation of Tor being ‘about’ 
one particular use case or another. 
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Under European law I am not allowed to alter the packetflow. As long as I am 
pushing packets from A to B I am protected as a ISP. Would I like to kick the botnets 
out? Yes! Am I allowed to do this? I don’t think so. 
Participant P - Relay operator 
Adopting this way of understanding provides them with a way of coming to terms 
with this reality. The more diverse groups which use Tor, even including the police, 
or those who use it for criminal purposes, the more its relay operators feel they can 
abrogate responsibility for the traffic which flows through and maintain their 
‘neutral’ status: as soon as they begin to take a moral view on this traffic or try to 
shape how Tor is used, they risk becoming culpable. The dissonance at the heart of 
this understanding, which tries to square a deep distaste with over politics with the 
explicitly political act of running a Tor relay, is reflective of the complex ways in 
which Tor becomes implicated in structures of power. 
 
Privacy as a structure: the engineer world from subversion, to 
standardisation, to sovereignty  
The foundational social world which underpins the design of Tor and the core of its 
attempt to “do politics” through architecture is that of the engineers. This engineer 
world began with the researchers and developers who first set out Tor’s design, and 
views power as a function of the topology of technical networks. They see the design 
of the internet, in particular, the traceability of internet traffic, as concentrating 
power in “choke points” in these systems, and privacy technology as flattening this 
terrain of structural power. When its attempts to reshape this power run into 
challenges in practice, Tor’s engineer world has its own distinct understanding of 
these issues of crime, harm, and control, and its own strategies for reclaiming Tor’s 
vision of the world. 
From this perspective, conversations about the crime, deviance, and harm with 
which Tor is associated are a red herring. Their understanding of these concepts 
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mirrors that of critical criminologists such as Box (2002), arguing that “crime” is in 
fact constructed and enforced by and in the interests of the powerful, designed to 
distract the public from real questions of power in society. They see crime and harm 
as an unfortunate but unavoidable consequence of disrupting these vested power 
interests - rather than promoting positive or negative use cases, Tor works in the 
interests of those without power over those with power.  
It’s kind of a bit like MP3, where you say, OK, society might not be ready yet and we 
will kill a lot of stuff and, and… video killed the radio star! And it’s like, technology 
comes first and then there’s a struggle in society on how to restructure itself to be 
able to cope with that change. And I think a lot of the hacker ethos is about seeing 
what would be possible with technology. And, and seeing that there’s all these 
forces that drag down the change, because they want to survive… All these 
structures are becoming more and more stale and static and, and, uh, the only way 
to change them would be to break them. And I like fluid systems. I like, this kind of 
structurelessness and, and chaos, and I think that’s a value by itself, and… maybe 
that’s the way to go, is to build these systems and then say, OK, maybe we will be 
fucked for thirty years because of these systems, and everything will go to shit, but 
afterwards we will rise again and a new society will evolve that is much better than 
the old one! I don’t know. 
Participant L – Tor core contributor  
If Tor were to go away tomorrow, the bad people would not really be 
inconvenienced very much… I think the only people who’ll be significantly 
inconvenienced by the lack of Tor will be the, the relatively vulnerable people who 
aren’t able to run their own network, and they’ll be the people who don’t want to 
break the law. So, I think, in that sense, Tor is, is overall positive. Um, regardless of 
how people are actually using it. 
Participant F - Tor core developer 
Engineer discourse is not as anti-policing as might be expected, and in fact many 
expressing this perspective were in favour of the use of targeted police powers to 
tackle crime. What it opposes is the adoption of engineering and architectural 
solutions for social control. They argue that policing through automated mass online 
surveillance is a dangerous and authoritarian centralisation of power to the state and 
the unelected software developers who build these platforms, and that social issues 
should be tackled through democratically-accountable institutions.  
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While the infrastructuralists seek to master administrative processes in order to de-
intersect Tor from them so that they can run it smoothly, the engineers seek to 
undermine the strategies of control more fundamentally through disruptive 
technological innovation. Tor began as an attempt to ‘fight fire with fire’, using the 
same engineering techniques to redistribute this power back to everyday Internet 
users. As I describe above, however, they soon find that these engineering design 
techniques promote change in unexpected, unpredictable ways, and run into 
problems in practice. Tor’s performance of these values relies on people using it and 
it working smoothly: its negative public image, association with crime, and tangling-
up in criminal justice processes undermine its practical attempts to redistribute 
power. As a result, the engineer world adopts a range of strategies to steer Tor’s 
efforts and reassert its attempts to “do politics” through architecture. 
 
From subversion to standardisation 
This entails a conceptual move from subversion, creating a technology which 
undermines mechanisms of control for its users, to standardisation, fundamentally 
shifting the way that the Internet itself works. Rather than slipping Tor through the 
cracks in the criminal justice system, this involves trying to get Tor “built in” to other 
technologies, a toolkit for developers rather than only a tool. This has the benefit of 
reframing Tor’s crime problems as consequences of a broader shift in the dynamics 
of power embedded in the Internet, rather than the result of an upstart activist 
technology. Tor was designed with this in mind from the beginning, much like the 
Internet itself. Many of Tor’s core design decisions (such as allowing it to browse the 
regular internet) are aimed at enabling these interfaces with other technologies, and 
there is a substantial degree of work undertaken by the Tor Project in convincing 
other developers to make use of Tor in their own platforms. 
Part of [the work we are doing], does… just as a side thing, kind of, integrate Tor, 
and Onion Routing, and Onion Addresses more into the everyday… I see Tor and 
Onion space right now roughly where… web encryption was around, like 2001 or so. 
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You know, back then if you, if you set up encryption for a webpage, people said, you 
know, what are you doing, this is, are you kidding me? You know, what are you 
trying to hide, this is, what kind of criminal thing do you have going on? And now it’s 
recognised as the fundamental enabler of e-commerce... you know, ideally [in the 
long term], I’m out of a job, or doing something else, because this is [now] just the 
way the internet works. 
Participant I – Tor core developer 
Particularly successful examples of this are the Onion Toolkit, developed by Alec 
Muffet, which allows anyone to easily set up an Onion Service. Onion Services (and 
the Tor relay network) are a key tool for developers and researchers for whom 
anonymity is important, and have also been built into chat messaging apps such as 
Ricochet and Cwytch. The whistleblowing platform SecureDrop is another example of 
an Onion Service technology, which has been widely used by news organisations to 
take anonymous submissions. Tor has become a go-to tool for security researchers 
who research adversarial websites as it allows them to collect information without 
being blocked or revealing their location.  
Most importantly, Tor has also begun to try to get incorporated into other browsers, 
with Brave Browser recently integrating Tor into its private browsing mode, so that 
its users can access Tor in their browser with the click of a button. The much more 
widely used browser Firefox (which has 250 million users) is considering a similar 
move, in the meantime incorporating a range of Tor’s security improvements and 
anti-tracking technologies. As Google increasingly becomes known for its surveillance 
operations, competitors to its Chrome browser are increasingly using privacy and 
anonymity protections as a distinguishing feature. 
Yeah. They’re not all these, these drugs undergrounds. Like, the majority of them 
are these ephemeral things that are just in the background. And I think we’re going 
to start seeing a lot more of them as Tor is sort of built into things in ways where 
you don’t even know it’s there… , I think this is where Tor is heading towards… 
things where Tor is more of a security toolbox, where you can pick and choose which 
features you want, um, which makes it a lot more applicable to a lot more use cases, 
um, and I think this is, this is what’s needed to get Tor into everything as the… the 
underlying technology for communication. 
Participant D - Tor core developer 
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This normalisation, in this framing, would entail a reorganisation of social power 
which, though disruptive, would shift the ways in which power is exercised over the 
Internet outside the domain of mass surveillance of traffic. External factors may in 
fact make this more likely. A core reason that strong encryption became the norm 
for online technologies (despite much resistance from the US government) was not 
only due to the tireless campaigning work of activists, but also to the enormous 
security benefits which this offered to online banking and commerce. The increasing 
preponderance of high-profile cyberattacks and breaches against corporations, and 
the rise of connected homes and Internet of Things technologies, could well lead to 
the protections which Onion Services offer being increasingly in demand. These 
attempts to extend this “politics through architecture” beyond Tor itself do not only 
rely on engineering, however. The efforts of Tor’s activists to improve Tor’s public 
image, and of the infrastructuralists to smooth the practical realities the Tor network 
faces in running day to day, are both important factors in convincing the developers 
of other technologies to incorporate Tor into their infrastructures and platforms. 
 
From disruption to sovereignty 
As well as its unfortunate public association with crime and the ways in which it 
becomes tangled up in criminal justice processes, Tor also faces challenges to 
realising its vision in the domain of power. This involves co-opting Tor rather than 
undermining it. While Tor’s success in becoming a security standard is still in its initial 
stages, far more evident has been the growth in its users since it launched in 2002; 
on average, (at the time of writing) two million people now use the Tor network 
every day. As Tor has grown as an infrastructure, it has increasingly taken on 
responsibility for a global population of users the size of a small country. Tor has the 
power to shape the way the internet works for these users, but much of its design 
reflects the sensibilities and decisions made by a group of largely American engineers 
around the turn of the last millennium. These developers, alive to the increasingly 
critical turn in information security research, have engaged in the past few years in 
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substantial efforts to critique and understand their own place in the world and the 
power they wield.  
Features of Tor’s security design, the languages in which it is available, and the 
usability properties of the browser all shape who is able to actually make use of it in 
practice, and how it shapes their action. As Tor is a powerful technology for political 
actors, if its design favours one group in a conflict over another (for example, groups 
with a knowledge of English, or who have the technical skill to use Tor) then its 
developers may be making unintended interventions in power struggles. Equally, Tor 
has the capacity to be co-opted as a potent tool of US soft power, opening up 
citizens of authoritarian countries to American media, Internet platforms, and news. 
Leaving Tor’s moves in this domain up to chance, or up to others who may have less-
positive motivations, opens it up to become simply another tool of power. The 
growing awareness of this has led to a shift in how the engineer world conceives of 
its attempts to “do politics through architecture”: 
I think that’s a valid argument against Tor. That no matter how much you try to 
educate people to be able to use it, ultimately you are supporting the power 
structures. Because only they can understand and teach it. It’s like… you have all 
these organisations that teach other organisations about encryption and how to use 
it. But someone is paying them, right? Someone is deciding what kind of opposition 
groups they will teach. They can make the decision themselves, maybe. Um, but 
ultimately someone has to make that very political decision. Of who will be trained 
to be able to use that. And in that sense, then Tor becomes a weapon against those 
that just don’t know how to use it, right? 
Participant L - Tor core contributor 
Tor is partly navigating this challenge through a reframing of its core values, and an 
increased engagement in active public discussion of what it represents, making the 
case for its view of the world as a set of explicit political positions. At the same time, 
debates around the governance of online space have shifted, and the sensibilities of 
the information security community have become more attuned to the political 
character of their work (Rogaway, 2015), so too has Tor’s own role within these 
discussions changed. Since the Snowden leaks, the alleged interference by Russia in 
the 2016 US election, the Cambridge Analytica scandal, and a range of other widely-
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reported cases, the harms associated with online surveillance by state actors and 
social media platforms have become the focus of substantial public debate (ref 
Coleman). This has given Tor an opportunity to reframe its public image, 
repositioning itself at the frontlines of the struggle between attempts to control 
cyberspace and attempts to liberate it, between anxieties about harm and order, and 
concern with rising authoritarianism, control, and exploitation. From a technology 
largely happy to frame itself as a neutral facilitator of the actions of its users, Tor 
now increasingly acts as a potent moral force and value-led community in 
condemning and resisting mass surveillance. 
Tor’s engineers increasingly believe that if they are to avoid this, they need to 
actively assert control over these more subtle design considerations which shape 
and support the lives of the people who use it. This in itself poses a serious issue, 
forcing them to reckon directly with the power they themselves wield over their user 
community and work out ways of democratising this. There is a substantial 
knowledge barrier to participating in Tor’s development, and online privacy and 
security needs (and the concepts of privacy and security themselves) are very 
different for different people. Privacy and security are shaped by gender, race, 
sexuality, and social class, and are constructed differently in different cultures and 
situations around the world: the private protections which an abuse survivor, an 
activist in Iran, an LGBT person in Scotland or a videogame enthusiast in China 
require from Tor may differ enormously. Tor’s engineers frame these more nuanced 
issues of design through the idea of usability: 
When I wrote my first email to tor-project as ED nine months ago, we were finalizing 
a long phase of work to bring a new user experience to Tor users. We put together 
an ambitious project to meet our users where they are to learn how to improve Tor 
for them. Every team inside of Tor did something to improve their users’ 
experience…Making Tor easier to use for our dedicated user base was a big step for 
us, because it required the creation of an iterative feedback loop that centers the 
user at every step of our development process. This has fundamentally changed how 
we work with one another as a team and community, improved usability for our 
core users, and set us up to prepare Tor for mainstream adoption. 
Tor executive director, post on Tor-project mailing list, 2019 
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Unlike other web browsers, Tor cannot collect information about its users through 
surveillance as a matter of principle, and so democratising Tor’s design properties 
has involved a substantial degree of outreach and user research around the world as 
part of an enormous recent usability improvement campaign, which has included the 
redesign of Tor’s website and browser. These attempts to cultivate knowledge about 
its users and incorporate their lives into Tor’s design constructs them as subjects of 
Tor, staking a claim over them and invoking usability as biopolitics, cementing Tor’s 
status as an alternative site of authority and power. As might be expected, some who 
are particularly aligned with the infrastructuralist community have baulked at this 
shift in focus, arguing, for example, that changes to the website to make it more 
accessible to non-technical users are ‘dumbing down’ Tor and attempting to 
influence how it is used, rather than maintaining neutrality. This has been, however, 
a minority view. 
As I describe in more depth in Chapter 7, an important result of this usability drive 
has been a reframing of Tor’s user categories around particular “user journeys” and 
“personas” which are reflective of those users of Tor who may have been poorly-
served by its design in the past, but whom the Tor Project feels are important to 
bring into design considerations. This constitutes both a genuine desire to 
democratise the Tor’s infrastructure, but also in itself creates category systems and 
frameworks of representation which shape Tor’s users and exert a form of 
subjectifying power.  This is an important consequence of how the engineer world in 
Tor is attempting to deal with crime, and forms part of this assertion of sovereignty, 
the claim that Tor is in some important ways outside the purview of nation state 
control. This is also important in showing how the engineer world and the activist 
world have shaped one another, and how the boundary objects which supported 
Tor’s détente between worlds are shifting. These tentative changes to aspects of 
Tor’s user categories are reflective of a desire both to be more assertive over who 




In this chapter, I have used the maps I have developed across the course of the 
thesis to answer more criminological questions about Tor and how it is coming to 
terms with its responsibilities for the governance of crime. While the issues of crime 
which Tor faces are the subject (almost to the exclusion of all others) which has 
received the most criminological attention, research has tended to focus on 
exploring the kinds of crime which Tor is used for and its affordances for criminal 
opportunity. Conversely, my research aims, through a more appreciative study of Tor 
itself, to understand the role of Tor itself as a place where visions of crime and its 
governance are produced. 
Tor’s use for crime has brought with it a number of problems for the organisation. 
Despite attempts to assert ‘technological neutrality’ in the past, the association with 
crime has brought with it a host of image problems for Tor, to the extent that it is 
now widely known as the “Dark Web” or “Dark Net”. This deviant labelling is not only 
self-fulfilling, putting off legitimate use cases and encouraging illegal or harmful 
ones, but also harms Tor’s efforts to grow and access funding outwith that provided 
by the US government. Secondly, it has brought the infrastructure of Tor into contact 
with the technologies of control through which the Internet is governed, and Tor’s 
relay operators risk being caught up in criminal justice processes despite the fact that 
they are largely not breaking the law. Finally, Tor has become implicated in power on 
a geopolitical stage, and its potential for use as a technology of disruption and US 
soft power brings into question how, and by whom, its role in global society is being 
shaped. 
All three of Tor’s social worlds are heavily engaged in dealing with crime and its 
consequences. Practices of design and development, image management and 
administration are all implicated in how Tor is trying to deal with crime. None of 
these actually attempt to stop Tor being used for crime, rather they attempt to 
change other things: the activists try to encourage more socially beneficial use, the 
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infrastructuralists attempt to mitigate some of the problems which this criminal use 
causes for the operation of the network, and the engineers work towards the 
standardisation of Tor as a set of logics, standards, and protocols which can be 
worked, in part or in whole, into other technologies, eventually so ubiquitous that it 
becomes part of the fabric of daily online life and so cannot be constructed as a 
‘crime problem’. Each of these also entails the realisation of their social world’s 
vision of privacy: the activists see this as realising a world where privacy values are 
taken more seriously by people and the national conversation on privacy is won, the 
infrastructuralists see the maintenance of a service which can be used by anyone for 
anything, and the engineers envision the wholesale structural transformation of 
relations of power through changing how the Internet works. Hence, as ideas about 
privacy are inherently bound up with ideas about power, governance, and control, 
they also necessarily shape how Tor deals with crime and harm. 
The next chapter draws from across the thesis to fit these results into a broader view 





of power and the 
power of technology 
 
Introduction 
Having set out the main findings of my thesis, in this chapter I discuss my results and 
their implications for criminology, STS, and digital society scholarship in depth. In 
doing so, I draw connections across and between my findings chapters (Chapters 6-
9), pulling out the main points and contributions and fitting them back into the 
literature and key debates which I identify in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Bringing all this 
together, I outline my explorations of the four research questions which I set out in 
Chapter 5: 
1. What are the key social worlds of the Tor community, how do they relate to 
one another, and how do they come into conflict, conversation, and 
collaboration? 
2. How do these social worlds shape the material form and design of Tor; how 
are these values realised as properties of the Tor network? 
3. When this design is materialised as infrastructure, what other kinds of work 
are needed so that this infrastructure can create Tor’s visions of privacy for 
its millions of users, especially given the considerable opposition it faces?  
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4. What problems with crime, power and harm arise when Tor begins to realise 
its visions? How do the social worlds of the Tor community make sense of 
these issues, and through what strategies do they navigate them? 
One of the main findings of this thesis is that Tor is not characterised by a single 
vision of the world, but rather is composed of three distinct social worlds. These 
worlds are united by cypherpunk values which place privacy at the heart of realising 
the transformative potential of the Internet. However, these values are refracted 
into distinct framings of how privacy technologies constitute sites of social action 
and how they link to power and politics. These three social worlds package up 
particular practices, sensibilities, rationalities and perspectives about a range of 
issues. These hence constitute distinct ‘visions’ of privacy in Tor: the engineer, 
infrastructuralist, and activist social worlds, each of which involves attempting to act 
in one of three distinct domains. I describe these in depth in Chapter 6, but they can 
be summarised respectively as ‘privacy as a structure’, ‘privacy as a service’, and 
‘privacy as a struggle’. 
An interesting and unintended aspect of these worlds is that they correspond 
roughly to the framings of technological political action attested by each of the three 
main researchers whose work I used to contextualise this thesis in Chapters 1 and 2 
(something which I only realised late in the writing-up of this research): Coleman, 
Musiani, and Milan. Coleman (2017) is interested in the hackery, creative, often 
politically-agnostic world of hackers, Musiani (2012) investigates how developers try 
to do politics through restructuring the architectures of the Internet, and Milan 
(2016) understands these groups through the lens of social movements. Although a 
social worlds approach engages with these framings at a much lower level, exploring 
how different ways of making sense of technology are worked out in relation to Tor 
itself and its community, I draw out in this section some tentative links to these 
broader perspectives. Considering these different kinds of action together rather 
than separately shows how they influence and shape one another, how they conflict, 
and how the tension between them drives Tor as a site of social action. This gives us 
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substantial insight into the often-contradictory and contested ways in which Tor 
engages with the world. 
Rather than simply drawing these social worlds from my research interviews and 
presenting them as a static map, they are in fact best understood when grounded in 
the history of Tor as an organisation. Mapping the early history of Tor and its design 
(as I do in Chapters 3 and 7 respectively) brings to the surface the ‘non-linear’ 
relationship between Tor’s values and its material form, and hence between the 
different research questions I address in this thesis and the picture of social action 
which they depict. As such, this chapter does not attempt to reckon with the four 
core research questions of this thesis individually, rather, it draws them together into 
five sections framed around particular themes and findings of interest which sit 
across these questions. Maps of some of these relationships can be found in 
Appendixes E and F. 
I begin with a discussion of the role of design across my results as a mediating 
process between meaning and materiality. I then expand this picture to the hidden 
work of Tor which helps to realise this design in the world, and which becomes 
caught up in the processes of criminal justice. Next, I discuss how Tor’s social worlds 
have changed and shaped one another over time, and the relevance of this for how 
it deals with crime and power. In the fourth section, I draw these together to explore 
how Tor fits into wider questions of power, governance and geopolitics in 
contemporary societies. I reflect in a fifth and final section on what the social worlds 
framework might offer for criminological understanding of the Internet and its 
infrastructures, arguing for a programme of ‘infrastructural criminology’. 
Designing privacy 
The first theme I explore in this discussion is the role of design: the links between 
development practices, Tor’s values and vision of the world, its material properties, 
and the broader consequences of these for crime and governance. Although this 
most directly addresses my second research question, in fact, as I discuss in this 
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section, it plays an important role in all four. Placing this design and the values it 
embodies in their historical context by tracking how they emerged and where they 
came from is crucial to making sense of Tor as an infrastructure and a site of social 
action. 
Tor’s precursor, the Onion Routing project, brought together two distinct social 
worlds: those of the US Naval researchers and the cypherpunks. These worlds fused 
together in the Onion Routing design, with the remnants of these two precursor 
worlds each providing one half of the shared category system of users at the heart of 
Onion Routing. It is this category system, which distinguishes between high security 
users and those seeking everyday privacy, which allowed the three main social 
worlds of Tor a common point with to bridge together and collaborate. The 
cypherpunk and military researcher precursor worlds, along with a host of other 
practices, discourses, abstract theories, sensibilities, frameworks, and values then 
went on to become the engineer world through the process of shaping Tor’s design. 
This social world’s vision of privacy views battles over privacy as inherently about 
battles between structures: open systems versus closed ones, centralised versus 
decentralised systems, and flattened topologies over those structured around 
control points. This vision of social action through technology corresponds most 
closely to the perspectives reflected in Musiani’s (2012) work, through which 
engineers and software developers shape societies through the logics of structure, 
attempting to decentralise power through a technical fix to the Internet’s design.  
As I describe in Chapter 7, this view of Tor developed through an iterative tacking 
back-and-forth between attempts to represent and reason about the system and its 
context, discussions of purpose and values, creative design work, and 
implementation; a gradual convergence between meaning and materiality rather 
than a linear progression from a set of values to a final design (Star, Bowker, and 
Neumann, 1998; Williams, Stewart, and Slack, 2005). As this ‘Tor’s eye view’ of the 
world was forming in Tor’s design, the developers were also performing a way of 
seeing and making sense of the world: a set of frameworks, representations, and 
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category systems which become stabilised in the infrastructure as a way of 
understanding and doing development work with Tor, embodied in the engineer 
social world. This picture of collaboration, consensus-building and fusion between 
distinct perspectives is a far cry from the ‘agonistic’ depiction of the creation of 
infrastructures in Actor-Network Theory, foregrounding instead the role of 
communication, interpretation, and practice (Latour, 2005; Star and Clarke, 2008). It 
is also important to note that the ‘engineer’ world of Tor isn’t a social world common 
to all engineers and developers around the world. Rather, it is a set of Tor-specific 
discourses, category systems, and ways of making sense of infrastructure which stem 
from the coming-together of particular practices and values in the process of 
creating Tor. While it may have commonalities with the social worlds of the 
developers of other privacy technologies, other infrastructures, or computer 
scientists more broadly, it is in its specificity to Tor that it achieves its power as an 
analytic framework (Star, 2010). 
Tor’s disruption of the mechanisms through which powerful actors control and 
surveil the Internet and the high-risk nature of many of its users mean that its 
potential adversaries are extremely powerful, and potentially capable of attacking 
not only Tor as a technology, but the people in its community. As a result, Tor’s 
design practices do not stop at the technologies of Tor, extending as well to the Tor 
community itself. This fits naturally into the engineer world’s frameworks for making 
sense of human and social factors in terms tractable to engineering solutions. Their 
approach to security, threat modelling, and design extended the engineer world’s 
representative frameworks and design processes to the human factors of Tor’s 
community, reasoning about them as patterns in systems. As Milan (2016) argues, 
these community structures are reflective of both the values and visions of 
communal action of technical communities as well as the ideas, in this case of 
openness and decentralisation, embedded in the design of Tor. Once again, 
however, these designs work through structural paradigms, assuming the inherent 
primacy of decentralised and open systems over closed ones. Hence, the structure 
itself and the value it represents are mutually constitutive. 
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As Tor’s developers were pulling together the engineer social world through Tor’s 
initial design decisions and processes, they were also embedding a set of rationalities 
about crime and control within this social world and within Tor’s design. Our maps of 
the engineer world and Tor’s initial design decisions are therefore a useful resource 
for understanding parts of how it engages with issues of crime and harm. As I 
describe in Chapter 7, Tor incorporates a range of design decisions which play an 
important role in shaping its potential for criminal and harmful uses, particularly its 
low-latency design and the decentralisation of control which is built into the 
network. Tor’s relatively high speed and the decentralisation of its ‘trust-free’ 
network across a range of volunteers aim to maximise its usability and minimise the 
trust which users need to place in the Tor Project to use it. This increases its 
potential user base substantially to include everyday users of the Internet, which 
provide the ‘cover traffic’ for Tor’s high-security users. It also increases its potential 
for harm, allowing it to host marketplaces, share images and files, and be used for a 
range of other near-real time network applications. By removing the ability to 
control or surveil network traffic by design, the developers also remove their ability 
to police the traffic which flows over the network, or to hand it over to law 
enforcement. 
Equally, the engineer construction of privacy as about structures of power in 
information networks has important implications for how the developers make sense 
of Tor’s implication in crime and harm. Their view of crime and harm is focused on 
abuses of power: the establishment of relations of exploitation and domination over 
networks, and hence the people who use them. This conjures, through the engineer 
world, a vision of criminal justice and control as working through the establishment 
of control points in network topologies (see also DeNardis, 2014, for an academic 
framing resonant with this).Throughout Tor’s life, as these forms of governance and 
policing have become increasingly prominent, Tor has become more explicitly a 
reaction to the increasing use of these technocratic solutions. Tor’s engineer social 
world sees its relationship with crime and criminal justice as attempt to shift 
governance and control into other spheres of action which are more open to 
 277 
democratic oversight. They believe, drawing again from this structural view of social 
life, that moving towards governing societies in this ‘structural’ domain inherently 
takes societies along a path towards authoritarianism and dystopia. In a reversal of 
traditional Situational Crime Prevention approaches (Hayward, 2007), Tor attempts 
to ‘design out control’ through technical changes to the built environment of the 
Internet, rather than ‘designing out crime’. In practice, it does this extremely well, 
reliably decoupling the administrative information which allows signals to navigate 
the Internet from the identity of their users and pushing law enforcement to fall back 
to more traditional approaches which don’t rely on mass-scale surveillance: human 
intelligence gathering, targeting offline distribution networks, and targeted 
surveillance. 
Practices of design are implicated in all four of my research questions, forming the 
underpinnings of one of Tor’s core social worlds (my first research question), shaping 
Tor’s material form (my second research question), forming an important part of 
Tor’s ‘resilience work’ (my third research question) and setting the context for how 
Tor comes into contact with issues of crime, harm, and power (my fourth research 
question). Studying Tor’s design, the values of its developers, and the processes 
through which the two converged gives us a very ‘pure’ depiction of Tor as a site of 
social action and the vision of privacy which it attempts to realise. This gives us a 
window into the underpinnings of Tor’s attempt to ‘steal the fire’ through creating 
infrastructure (Milan, 2016). Rather than a unidirectional ‘translation’ of a vision of 
privacy into material forms, the very processes of design and development through 
which Tor was created were themselves important factors in shaping the values its 
developer were trying to embed in it: how the Tor developers themselves make 
sense of concepts like privacy or crime. The ‘architecturalisation’ of social concepts 
like privacy, control, and crime which I document in Tor’s design work, rendering 
them in terms tractable to engineering solutions, is reflective of what Musiani 
describes as “doing politics” through architecture (Musiani, 2012). My research 
places design within Tor’s attempt at technological activism not only as a vehicle for 
the realisation of values, but as a way of making sense of the world in its own right. 
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However, as I argue in the following section, Tor’s status as a site of social action 
cannot be understood through design alone.  
 
Hidden work and hidden worlds 
Hidden work plays an important role in Star’s infrastructural studies scholarship, a 
key part of what makes infrastructures work and a home for important but neglected 
perspectives (Star 1999). While Musiani focuses of the hidden work of design, in fact, 
development work is some of the most visible in Tor. Rather, the values, visions and 
structures which these design processes embed in Tor rely on a range of yet-more 
hidden practices to be realised in the world. In this section, I explore these forms of 
hidden work. As with my discussion of design in Tor, although this theme focuses 
directly on my third research question it ties into the others as well, as hidden work 
in Tor contributes to its values and visions in important ways, plays a key role in how 
Tor’s values are materialised, shapes its infrastructure, and is one of the primary 
sites at which its interactions with crime, harm, control, and power are worked out in 
practice.  
As Tor began to grow, the maintenance and administration work of its infrastructure 
became vital to its continued success, allowing the network to function reliably and 
hence to materialise Tor’s vision of privacy for its users. The administration of Tor’s 
infrastructure cannot be carried out by the developers, as this would create a single 
point of failure, an easy target for adversaries, and be too great a centralisation of 
power. As a result, this vital work which allows the vision of the world embedded in 
Tor’s design to become a reality is carried out by Tor’s large community of volunteer 
relay operators. The relay operator community, unlike the developers, largely do not 
know one another, functioning as an ‘autonomous collective’ whose members are 
only united by a belief in privacy. Keeping this hidden work hidden, so that the 
infrastructure runs without friction for its users and blends into the background (or 
as Star terms it, achieves ‘transparency’) is a key part of how infrastructures work 
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(Star, 1999). This is equally true for the design ideas which touch on Tor’s community 
structures, and many of these elements of resilience design in both the community 
and the technologies of Tor in fact require hidden work and careful negotiation and 
management to successfully ‘perform’ these designed-in structures (as I discuss at 
length in Chapter 8).   
While it is interesting to note that Tor relies on hidden work, this is not a hugely 
productive finding in itself, as this is a common characteristic of infrastructure (Star, 
1999). Rather, what is important is exploring the character of this work and how it 
shapes Tor in important ways as a site of social action. Despite the extremely diverse 
politics and motivations of the relay operator community, I found that they drew on 
a common way of understanding Tor as a site of social action which was rather 
different to that of the engineers. As I discuss in Chapter 6, this hidden work gave 
rise to a distinct set of sensibilities and practices of its own, and formed into what I 
characterise as the infrastructuralist social world as the relay operator community 
grew. This world is steeped in the practices of system administration and 
maintenance, rather than design or engineering. When refracted through these 
practices, the cypherpunk vision of privacy at the heart of the Internet becomes one 
of ‘privacy as a service’, with the role of the infrastructure being as a neutral enabler 
of the political action of users rather than a political actor in its own right. Although 
this work is hidden, the infrastructuralist sensibility has played a major role in 
shaping Tor’s public life for much of its history. 
This way of understanding privacy, as a service which enables the action of others, is 
partly a response to the particular situation of Tor and the need for the people who 
run its infrastructure to come to terms with the often illegal or harmful content 
which their relays serve. The substantial stigma which this, and the law enforcement 
action to which exit relay operators expose themselves, incurs is important in 
shaping the infrastructuralist social world, as the operators need to come to terms 
with the sometimes harmful or illegal content which their relays carry. This is one 
potential explanation for this world’s sensibility of deep suspicion, bordering on 
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outrage, towards asserting Tor as political. However, this is not only a ‘neutralisation’ 
(Sykes and Matza, 1957): it is also a self-consistent position on Tor as a site of social 
action, and one which resonates with classically liberal sensibilities about a ‘free 
market of ideas’. 
Tor not only comes into contact with crime and harm, but also with the technologies 
of power through which the administration and governance of online crime and 
conduct are managed. The social worlds approach, in bringing these hidden forms of 
work and perspectives into view, gives us powerful ways of exploring what happens 
when the material forms, practices, and visions of the world embodied in Tor meet 
those of the dominant technologies of power which its design attempts to 
undermine. Although the engineer world sees this as a clash of structures, with the 
logics of Tor’s decentralised, privacy-protecting topology coming up against the 
centralised structures of the Internet and doing battle, when Tor comes up against 
the Internet’s technologies of power, these conflicts spill into other domains. 
Although Tor’s design aims to separate identity from routing information, it achieves 
this through an infrastructure which needs to be maintained and administered. 
While Tor’s infrastructure effectively produces this ‘flattened’ structure of power for 
its users, it itself sits on top of an Internet with a well-defined topology of power and 
control, in which these control points very much still exist. The traces of illegal or 
harmful activity which Tor separates from its users do not disappear, and as such the 
administrative and investigative processes through which the ‘structures’ of control 
are enacted (and hence through which the Internet is policed) are brought to bear 
on the Tor relays and their operators. 
Tor can’t design its way out of these problems as they aren’t tractable to engineering 
solutions. Instead, this shifts the conflict out of the domain of network structures 
and design, and into that of administrative practices. Through experimentation and 
the cultivation of expertise, the Tor relay operators have developed a shared set of 
resources and practices which aim to cleverly disentangle themselves from these 
processes of online enforcement. This involves properly arranging administrative 
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information, siting relays tactically at sympathetic or hard-to-reach providers, finding 
clever loopholes and edge cases, and exploiting the dynamics of police investigation 
using ‘legal entities’ in order to allow Tor to slip past these processes without 
scraping up against them. It also involves more prosaic practices of administration, 
where relay operation becomes like tending a Bonsai tree: dealing with complaints 
properly, applying updates, and regular maintenance. This all contributes to a 
distinctly ‘hacker’ sensibility, though refracted through processes of system 
administration rather than coding, giving rise to a peculiarly ‘hacker values’-infused 
ethic of ‘service provision’ in the infrastructuralist world.  
The commitment to ‘political neutrality’ which is bound to this ethic of service 
provision also resonates with what Coleman (2004) describes as a ‘political 
agnosticism’ in Open Source hacking communities. This frames this as the result of 
the articulation of cultural liberalism through the logics and rhythms of hacker 
practices, and an analogous social process appears to be occurring in the formation 
and enaction of the infrastructuralist social world (Coleman and Golub, 2008). The 
infrastructuralist world is, in fact, a distinctly ‘hacker’ instantiation of cypherpunk 
values. Although framed through practices of systems administration rather than 
coding, the problems from law enforcement and other forces of control which Tor 
faces has led these administrative practices to take on a rather ‘hackery’ form, based 
around finding clever edge cases, social engineering, and experimentation. As an 
interesting parallel between the infrastructuralists and Coleman’s hackers, the 
experience of law enforcement action and opposition from powerful state actors is 
an important factor in the development of a ‘political’ sensibility in the 
infrastructuralist work of Tor as well (Coleman, 2017). In this case, however, it causes 
them to double down on their construction of their social action as politically 
neutral, on which they insist with the vehemence of a deeply-held political 
conviction.  
That this work is so grounded in the idea of neutrality, yet motivated by such political 
sensibilities about privacy says a lot about the ability of privacy to appear to be a 
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‘neutral’ concept when it in fact packages up deeply political values. Part of what 
makes this possible is that privacy in this case is being produced through 
infrastructure, and this technological housing makes it easier to cast deeply political 
social facts such as not only privacy, but also crime, as devoid of politics. This has 
historically been an important tactic used not only by Tor, but by other Internet 
platforms and infrastructures to offset questions about the crime and harm in which 
these become implicated. While this infrastructuralist sensibility has contributed to a 
broad-church community for Tor, the tolerance for working across ideological 
boundaries which this ‘neutrality’ mandates relies on shared understandings of Tor 
as a site of social action, and where other social worlds attempt to assert more fixed 
understandings of Tor’s politics, it begins to break down. 
Administration and maintenance are key practices through which power and values 
are enacted. Changing the world through architecture and realising the values and 
visions present in a design requires a lot of supporting work: power doesn’t just 
operate in this structural dimension, but is realised by a range of other practices. 
While this hidden work is crucial in realising the values embedded in Tor’s design 
(research question three), it also gives rise to a particular social world of its own, 
shaping the visions of privacy and the Internet which characterise the Tor community 
(research question one). As it materialises Tor’s design and privacy properties for its 
users, the infrastructure of Tor also becomes an important site at which the 
problems of crime and their consequences manifest themselves, itself coming into 
contact with and navigating the control structures of the Internet and the 
technologies of power through which it is governed (research question four).  Many 
of the problems which Tor faces from powerful actors aren’t even deliberate 
attempts to frustrate Tor. Instead, they are the consequences of the fact that even 
though Tor can create this ‘surveillance-free’ Internet for its users, the infrastructure 
of Tor needs to sit on top of an Internet which still has these control points and 
topologies of power, so they become directed at Tor itself.  
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These forms of hidden work are therefore important places where Tor’s visions of 
society and ideas about crime and harm are worked out, and an important part of 
how social facts like privacy, crime, control are ‘produced’ from Tor’s design. Equally, 
this means that democratic scrutiny of technologies and infrastructures and how 
they shape social life cannot be limited to their design features (though these are 
undoubtedly important). While a wide-ranging literature argues that the design of 
these infrastructures are important sites where power is enacted (Winner 1999; 
Lessig 1999a; Musiani 2012; Coleman 2012; Milan, 2016), in addition to these, the 
forms of hidden maintenance and administrative work are clearly important sites of 
power as well, where the logics and visions in these design elements are realised in 
practice. I argue that these kinds of work are therefore also important forms of social 
action, and also deserving of scrutiny. 
 
Transforming worlds and the sovereign Onion 
The map of Tor’s social worlds which I sketch across the course of this thesis is not a 
static one. Rather, as I show in Chapters 6, 7, and 9 in particular, although the three 
main social worlds of Tor still exist, they have changed substantially, as has the 
relationship between them. As new kinds of work have become necessary 
throughout Tor’s life, Tor’s values have been refracted through the logics of these 
different relationships with infrastructure and different forms of technological 
practice, giving rise to new perspectives which exert their own shaping forces on Tor. 
For much of its life, Tor’s approach to questions of the politics of privacy technology 
was one of ‘productive ambiguity’, strongly influenced by the need to square these 
conflicting understandings of Tor. As Tor grew (much as with other major online 
platforms), this affected neutrality provided a useful cover for dealing with the 
inevitable issues of crime and harm which accompanied its partial disruption of the 
technologies of control through which the Internet is governed. The rise in 
prominence of the activist world has begun to change this approach. It has also 
 284 
begun to shape and influence the other worlds as well, holding as it does a range of 
skills and strategies which are more well-suited and comfortable in engaging in the 
discussions about values and politics with which Tor is increasingly confronted. In 
this section, I discuss the rise of the activist world, how the social worlds of Tor have 
changed and shaped one another, the implications for this for how Tor navigates its 
implication in crime, and how this has begun to shift Tor into a new era. 
The growth of Tor and its adoption around the world has given rise to a host of 
‘problems of success’ with which the engineer and infrastructuralist perspectives 
have been ill-equipped to deal. In particular, its association with crime and harm has 
been an increasing problem for Tor as it has grown. While asserting ‘technological 
neutrality’ may have worked for much of Tor’s life, this has begun, as it has for other 
platforms, to cause a host of PR problems which impede Tor’s attempts to grow and 
provide its protections to more people around the world. Tor’s association with 
crime and reputation as the ‘Dark Web’ puts off potential users who might benefit 
from its protections, and as the organisation attempts to diversify its funding away 
from reliance on the US government, also harms its ability to raise funds from 
organisations and through crowdfunding. This is another way in which Tor’s action in 
the domain of design ‘spills out’ into other domains: this time the domain of public 
perceptions and political values. Fortunately, the wave of contributors with a more 
activist sensibility and skills who have joined Tor in the wake of the Snowden 
revelations are more well-equipped to deal with these issues of public image and 
conversations about organisational values, and Tor has been far more willing to 
engage in these debates in the last few years. This activist social world is most 
reflected by Milan’s (2016) characterisation of technological social action, tied 
directly to values, and framing privacy technologies as part of a social movement. It 
explicitly attempts to pull the hidden design and maintenance work of Tor into this 
sphere, pulling the values and visions inherent within Tor to the surface where they 
can be engaged in public debate.  
 285 
The confluence of the three social worlds of Tor means that Tor is reliant on three 
distinct and contradictory ways of making sense of its construction of privacy and 
social action. In particular, the activist and infrastructuralist worlds give rise to 
directly contradictory strategies and sensibilities, arguing (respectively) for asserting 
and denying Tor’s values and politics. The work of these worlds is not siloed, rather, 
they all need to work with one another. This has been successful because of key 
translators who have been able to bridge these worlds and do boundary 
maintenance work, aided by the establishment of privacy as a boundary object as I 
describe in Chapter 6. However, as these worlds have worked together, they have 
also shaped one another, and due to changes in the broader context of Tor, this 
détente, too, has evolved. 
When I was carrying out my interviews and finishing my analysis, I had already 
alighted on the construction of Tor’s users as a shared core between Tor’s social 
worlds which allowed privacy to function as a boundary object between them. While 
Star (2010) argues that changes in social worlds often necessitate the creation of 
new boundary objects or the transformation of existing ones, I was yet to observe 
any transformations in the core ‘everyday users and high-security users’ category 
system at the heart of Tor’s design and its community’s understanding of their user 
communities. I did observe, along with a shift in the engineer world to a more critical 
understanding of their own power to shape the world, changes in engineer design 
practices associated with the increasing maturity of Tor as a technical project and 
the increasing wealth of information about users and adversaries which was 
becoming available. In particular, a major drive towards making Tor more usable and 
carrying out substantial global research into both its current users and those non-
users who might benefit from it the most has been underway for the last few years. I 
predicted that as the social worlds of Tor shifted, so would the framing of the user 
categories at the heart of Tor’s détente between its worlds, and the new push for 
usability research appeared to be a herald of exactly this change. 
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In the final months of writing up this thesis, I found that the outputs of this user 
research, released in a set of five preliminary ‘personas’, appeared to confirm that 
this category system (and hence, the boundary object at the heart of Tor) was 
beginning to change. This constituted the beginnings of a category system of ideal-
type users, intended to both shape Tor’s communication efforts, but also to feed 
into the ongoing processes of development. The content of these is clearly and 
explicitly value-driven, a statement of Tor’s own values and perspectives as well as 
an attempt to be representative of its global user community.  This constitutes a 
powerful critique from within of the limited nature of Tor’s existing category 
systems, representing groups of people who may have been excluded from these in 
the past and envisioning constructions of privacy beyond those of the white Western 
tech elite. Tor’s attempts to represent its users are part of a broader acceptance that 
Tor, as an infrastructure, itself is and must always be a site of governance. This 
means that rather than becoming the very kind of technocratic platform they are 
trying to disrupt, they try to democratise the power of design by bringing their users 
into these processes. The force of infrastructural power from an infrastructural 
studies approach (as I use here) is in the category systems which become embedded 
in these infrastructures, how they are enacted through the materiality of the 
infrastructure and the hidden work on which it relies, and how they subjectify 
populations and create outsiders who don’t fit into these categories, those who, to 
appropriate Star’s phrase, may be ‘allergic to Onions’ (Star, 1990).  
Drawing a Foucauldian framing of power into these questions of usability is useful for 
understanding this dimension of infrastructural power. For the surveillance capitalist 
giants, this user research is more obviously a technology of governance: the 
collection of vast amounts of information in order to shape platforms around their 
users, to know them more intimately, to appropriate and exploit this knowledge for 
power and financial gain, and to shape them as consumer-subjects. As Tor turns to 
more critical understandings of its own power, its attempts to gather information 
about and characterise its users reflect exactly this kind of subjectifying power, 
imagined in the service of a very different set of governmental rationalities. That is 
 287 
not to say that this does not itself create outsiders. As Star (1990) argues, where the 
category systems embedded in boundary objects change, they always also exclude. 
In fact, as this is linked to Tor’s reckoning with its use for crime, these new category 
systems are likely to render its criminal users as outsiders, as people looking to buy 
drugs and guns on Onion Services, for example, are unlikely to find a place for 
themselves in Tor’s user research publications.  In blending the activist and engineer 
worlds to shape Tor’s design around particular desired user categories and values, 
this is effectively an assertion of a form of infrastructural ‘sovereign’ power. 
Although STS scholarship often frames the work of mapping or tracing infrastructure 
as surfacing hidden work, what is posited as the essentially hidden nature of this 
infrastructural work is not always a given. In fact, many of the aspects of 
maintenance and design in Tor are brought to the surface in more or less deliberate 
ways. Infrastructure inescapably has a politics, and where it becomes implicated in 
crime or control, it also often becomes something for which a case needs to be 
made. Pulling different kinds of work, material forms, people, and distinct facets of 
Tor in or out of visibility is a deliberate and political act in which each of these groups 
are engaged, and constitutes an intervention in power relations in its own right. 
Sometimes Tor’s infrastructural work becomes visible in ways which damage the 
project, such as when it becomes entangled in criminal justice, whereas at other 
times, the developers and activists pull the hidden design work of Tor to the surface 
in the interest of democracy. The idea that the work on which infrastructures 
depend is hidden until it breaks down, therefore, places too-great an emphasis on 
transparency (the idea that this work is invisible to users) as a key component of 
infrastructure. In fact, the extent to which this work is hidden at all is reflective of the 
power relationships, motivations, and values at play within the organisations which 
create and maintain infrastructure. 
In making sense of Tor as a site of social action, it is important to recognise that its 
worlds aren’t static but shape and influence one another (research question one). 
This also fundamentally shapes the practices of design and maintenance which shape 
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the infrastructure itself (research question two), which, as they change, are also 
reshaping the category system of users embedded in Tor. Changes in these worlds 
and the relationship between them are key to understanding how Tor’s approach to 
and understanding of crime is changing (research question four). As it enters this 
new phase of its life, Tor’s shift to a more self-reflexively governmental approach is 
also fundamentally changing its relationship with power. 
 
Broader questions of crime and power 
In this section, I explore the broader terrain of power in which Tor exists. Tor’s role in 
contemporary societies extends well beyond issues of crime, touching on broader 
issues of geopolitics and power. Mapping the ways in which Tor interacts with 
power, meaning, and material infrastructures on this global stage is difficult, 
especially as I have restricted my research to the Tor community itself. Although I 
aim to address this broader context, I try to do so with my feet firmly planted in my 
empirical research, and what I can justify from analysis of my interviews and archival 
research. Hence, I discuss how Tor perceives these things and are trying to act, and 
this picture may look rather different from the vantage point of a GCHQ analyst, 
developer at Facebook, civil servant, police officer, soldier, LGBT rights activist, or 
cabinet minister. Fortunately, the Tor community is very alive to these issues, and 
anxieties about how Tor fits into a wider geopolitical context were a common theme 
in my interviews. 
The globalisation of human societies, partly achieved through the creation of the 
international Internet infrastructure, has complicated many of the taken-for-granted 
boundaries between the national and international domains, and hence between 
how states govern crime and how they deal with issues of national security (Castells, 
2002, 2004). The mass collection of personal data as a means of getting a handle on 
the complexity of contemporary societies and the connecting up of the 
communication systems of different nations have been part of the increasing 
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securitisation of issues of crime, with policing taking up the tools and practices which 
were historically the purview of espionage and national security (Brodeur, 2007; 
Lyon, 2014). The rise of technologies of power based around mass surveillance and 
censorship have therefore fixed online infrastructures and platforms as central 
points in the topology of the Internet where social control, the governance of 
populations, and relationships between nation states are negotiated (Gillespie 2010, 
2018; DeNardis, 2009, 2014). As I have discussed at length in this thesis, Tor (and 
particularly its engineer social world) sets itself directly against this ‘topological’ form 
of power. 
On a global stage, many of the most successful of these online international 
platforms and infrastructures are engaged in a set of apparently-contradictory 
movements, on one hand attempting to assert themselves in important ways as 
outside the purview of nation state regulation, while on the other pulling themselves 
to the heart of nation states’ attempts to govern their societies (Gillespie, 2018, 
Zuboff, 2019). What ties these together is the implication of these platforms in 
governmental relations, not only as things to be governed but as sites themselves 
where governance is enacted, by themselves and by nation states as well (Foucault 
2007). As I describe in Chapter 3, the curators of these platforms and the algorithms 
which make sense of the data which they generate are giving rise to a new set of 
“platonic guardians” (Loader, 2004) in the global tech elite, whose expert knowledge 
and neutral, technocratic, and science-based approaches to governing societies 
through design have been particularly attractive to governments desperate to assert 
control over late modern societies. These ‘platonic guardians’ are able to represent 
themselves as neutral administrators of society, bringing expert knowledge to the 
business of government.  
As global Internet platforms such as Google and Facebook employ engineering and 
design-based strategies for governing their billion-strong user populations, 
governments in the West are increasingly using these ‘smart governance’ solutions 
based around predictive analytics to deliver and target public services and control 
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(Ferguson, 2016; 2019). Meanwhile, private companies like Palantir are exporting 
these capabilities to the rest of the world, and more authoritarian nations such as 
China are embedding them in the heart of their technologies of government (Biddle, 
2017; Liang et al., 2018). This has allowed these ‘new platonic guardians’ to amass 
substantial power, money, and influence outside traditional mechanisms of 
democratic scrutiny (Loader, 2004). However, if these infrastructures are becoming 
central to control, they are at the same time becoming important points at which 
control is resisted. In the present day, and as these issues have moved to the 
forefront of political life, Tor has effectively become a critique of this rising global 
tech elite from within, part of a broader shift in the information security research 
community towards aiming for research which addresses and impacts social and 
political issues (Rogaway, 2015).  
While many in Tor see themselves as explicitly fighting this technocratic form of 
governance, which they understand as dangerous and authoritarian, they are also 
alive to their own role in wielding the same kind of power. For a group aiming to 
protect the Internet as a home for democratic liberal values, it is potentially 
uncomfortable for them to be enacting this kind of structural change through design 
themselves. If the battle over the future of the Internet is only being fought between 
different factions within the US tech elite, this potentially only serves to concentrate 
the power to determine the Internet’s future in the hands of this elite class. Tor is 
also open to the criticism that its values and visions are grounded in US-centric 
notions of privacy and essentially promote US global interests. By promoting open 
models of society over closed ones, establishing globally accessible tools for 
resistance and free speech and human rights activism, and preventing governments 
from censoring access to Western media, Tor is potentially a powerful tool for 
destabilising authoritarian regimes and promoting the rise of democratic, liberal 
forms of government around the world. The use of this kind of ‘soft power’ by the 
West has been criticised as a key part of how contemporary neoliberal state attempt 
to advance their geopolitical interests and spread a Western capitalist way of life 
around the world (Nye, 2002). In embedding them in infrastructure, openness, 
 291 
democracy, and privacy can be masked as politically neutral concepts while 
embodying and promoting essentially Western liberal framings of these ideas.  
As I have argued in this thesis, Tor’s developers are very alive to these issues, and 
recent efforts to conduct user research and make Tor’s vision of privacy more 
representative of its global user base are an important response to this critique. 
However, this is in itself a form of governmental power, even if a more democratised 
one. Even these explicit efforts to ‘decolonise’ the design work of privacy 
technologies like Tor can act as a form of soft power, taking the experiences and 
identities of people around the world and fitting them into Western category 
systems and conceptual frameworks. The paradox is that the more it tries to 
decolonise its framing of its users, the further it embeds itself into the lives of its 
global user community. Through collecting this information, Tor is in fact setting 
frames of categorisation, and hence power, over its users. While this is the picture in 
more authoritarian nations, the role which Tor sets for itself in liberal capitalist 
democracies is rather different. As the liberal vision of governance and democracy 
has been shaken by rising authoritarianism in the West and the spread of mass 
surveillance, Tor is in some ways acting as a resilience mechanism, part of how liberal 
societies are navigating the tensions and contradictions between freedom and 
control at their heart. This too brings Tor into the functioning of governmental 
power and how it is negotiated. As Guerses, Kundnani, and Van Hoboken (2016) 
argue, the efforts of privacy technologists to resist power themselves package up 
and reify forms of power and ideas about society: in infrastructural politics, 
governmental power is inescapable  
While the controversies aroused by the revelations of mass surveillance by Western 
liberal governments have largely passed, the role of surveillance by private 
companies and in authoritarian regimes are only increasing their prominence in 
public debates about the Internet. Tor’s commitment to privacy in a political 
landscape increasingly critical of surveillance capitalism is beginning to establish Tor 
as a powerful moral force and site of an alternative vision of governance (of a sort) in 
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its own right. Hence, issues of the harm and crime in which Tor are implicated are 
perhaps best understood in the same terms as those of other internet platforms, 
from Facebook and Google to the Internet backbone infrastructures themselves: as 
problems of infrastructural governance.  
While Tor’s implication in crime is undoubtedly overstated in many accounts, 
nonetheless, it does play host to some serious harms. This is not necessarily best 
understood as causing ‘opportunities’ for crime, rather, a more productive 
perspective might be to consider Tor as an infrastructure which is inherently 
permeable to a range of uses. In fact, Tor is only one of many ways through which 
Internet users can hide their IP address, and the majority of criminal services are 
enabled through the use of ‘bulletproof’ hosting services and VPNs, and are simply 
hosted on the ‘Clearnet’. Additionally, while Tor has become implicated in harm and 
crime, in many ways its effect has been one of harm reduction. Cryptomarkets, 
although they facilitate the trade in illegal goods, have been shown to mitigate some 
of the violence associated with street drug dealing (Barratt et al., 2016a), and as 
most crime occurs on services hosted on the regular Internet, Tor has in fact become 
a vital tool for organisations like the Internet Watch Foundation or law enforcement 
for investigating online crime while evading detection by malicious actors. Equally, 
the Tor Brower’s substantial security protections serve to protect its users from both 
malicious code and the now-ubiquitous attempts by most web services to track users 
across the Internet without consent. It also forms a vital platform for communication 
and censorship circumvention for some of the most vulnerable people in the world. 
This is not to minimise the harm caused by some users of Tor Onion Services. It is, 
however, to argue that whether one judges Tor to be a socially beneficial or harmful 
force is more a question of competing visions of future Internet societies than the 
weighing of costs versus benefits: the importance attached to crime as compared to 
harm, to freedom as compared to order, and to broader notions of social justice. The 
rise of the cryptomarkets is part of the same kind of phenomenon as Tor itself: just 
as Tor extends and subverts the infrastructures of the Internet towards its visions of 
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the future, so too do the cryptomarkets extend and subvert the Tor network in the 
service of their own. 
Tor’s attempts at more widespread adoption and its drives towards standardisation 
as a security toolkit may be more successful than might be anticipated for a 
technology still widely known as ‘the Dark Web’. The wider currents of geopolitics 
suggest that Tor’s security properties may outweigh its status as an irritant for law 
enforcement, especially as the Internet continues to splinter, and online threats 
from China and Russia continue to escalate. In a recent blog post, a former FBI 
Director spells this out, admitting to have changed their mind in favour of the social 
benefits of encryption technologies and arguing that their protective qualities are 
vital to maintaining the Internet as a viable part of human societies in the face of 
international threats (Baker, 2019). This is not only the balancing of national security 
concerns against domestic law enforcement, but part of the increasing blurring of 
the boundaries between these domains (Brodeur, 2007). This future vision of society 
is somewhat stark, involving the hardening and securitising of all areas of life and 
tight control over the global links between nations. Paradoxically, Tor is potentially 
also a counter to this isolationism. The view of the Internet which a Tor user 
experiences is inherently internationalising: one sees the Internet from one of a 
random selection of other countries (depending on the exit node selected), which 
can often look very different, with adverts in foreign languages, different ordering of 
search results, and even different prices for services. This re-establishes the 
‘globality’ of the Internet and places it in the hands of its users as a distinct sovereign 
space of its own. 
A suspicious reader might at this point ask (and many in the broader Tor user 
community have) whether there was ever a pivot in the actual purpose of Tor from a 
military technology serving the needs of US global power to a crusading human 
rights technology run by civil society groups. Is this a true case of Tor being handed 
over to the NGO sector as a technology of freedom, or is this simply a ‘front’, always 
part of the cultivation of US geopolitical goals? Unlike some reporting around Tor, 
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which presents this military connection as a ‘gotcha’ (see for example, Levine, 2014 
and rebuttal by Lee, 2014), I disagree that these two things are mutually exclusive, or 
even necessarily contradictory. The developers I spoke to, from more and from less 
establishment backgrounds, were all deeply and passionately committed to privacy 
(though some were more critical than others of Tor’s links to US soft power, which I 
discuss in Chapter 9). In fact, these two perspectives, which overlap in important 
ways around the importance of liberty, freedom of speech and association, and the 
global movement against authoritarian power are, at least as far as Tor is concerned, 
working in the service of compatible goals. 
None of this means that Tor isn’t also a powerful site of resistance. Just like the 
Internet itself, Tor is both part of how the Western liberal order is working through 
some of its internal contradictions and attempting to underwrite its vision of the 
world, as well as a crusading vision of freedom and escape from this order (Haraway, 
1991). Equally, the anti-regulation, free-market vision of many cryptomarkets shows 
how Tor might be a home for yet more visions of the world, such as those with more 
radical libertarian, anti-government sensibilities (Maddox et al., 2016). As Haraway 
(1991) argues, in her ‘cyborg’ depictions of high technology societies, these 
infrastructures, often arising from the work of military research, are the sites of a 
vast panoply of different potential meanings, possessing the potential for both 
domination and liberation. Some of the Tor developers explicitly saw Tor as 
rekindling foundational elements of liberalism within societies at risk of being driven 
by Internet technologies (through the logics of capitalism, control, and colonialism) 
to authoritarianism, while others saw it as a path to a far more radical 
transformation of the social order. The multiplicity of meaning in Tor, something 
which the social worlds framework is particularly effective at grasping, is vital to 
understanding the often-contradictory ways it acts in the world. As the global vision 
of the Internet shows signs of faltering, Tor is in fact one of the clearest articulations 
of its liberal roots, with these different visions constituting distinct instantiations of 
liberal rationalities. The problems which Tor faces are similar to those of other major 
Internet platforms, and are in fact reflective of the tensions and contradictions at the 
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heart of liberal democracies between control and freedom; technocracy and 
democracy; centralisation and decentralisation.  
 
Infrastructural criminology 
In the preceding four sections, I have discussed a set of themes which address my 
research questions but also bridge across them: design, hidden work, the 
transformation in Tor’s worlds, and its broader implication in relations of power. I 
conclude this chapter with a discussion of some of the theoretical and 
methodological implications of this research for criminological study of the Internet 
and understanding crime and control in contemporary societies. Criminology as a 
discipline is particularly well-suited to exploring the power of discourse in society. 
Drawing from a wide range of scholarship, including but by no means limited to 
Foucault’s theoretical work, frameworks for studying institutions and fields from 
Bourdieu, and symbolic interactionist approaches, there have been a wide range of 
accounts which study the links between particular ways of making sense of the 
world, the mechanisms of control and technologies of power which underpin 
contemporary societies, and the practices, material forms and relationships through 
which these are enacted. These have studied a range of professional practices, 
rationalities and sensibilities within criminal justice systems through deep qualitative 
interviewing, ethnography and archival work. However, technological infrastructures, 
particularly those which underpin the Internet, remain largely untouched by this kind 
of criminological study. Nevertheless, they are crucial sites at which governance is 
enacted, experienced, and resisted. Bringing the Internet’s platforms and 
infrastructures into these explorations of governmental power is therefore an 
important and under-explored area of research. 
One of the main contributions of this research is a reframing of Tor as an 
infrastructure rather than simply a tool for crime. As Becker (2008) studied what 
goes into ‘producing’ a work of art in Art Worlds, by exploring the conditions which 
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make Tor possible and the different elements and types of work which make it a site 
where social facts such as ‘privacy’, ‘crime’, ‘justice’ and ‘governance’ are produced, 
we can achieve a much deeper understanding of the role which it plays in 
contemporary social life. Social worlds approaches, and Star’s closely linked 
‘infrastructure studies’ scholarship provide a ‘way in’ for criminologists to study 
these processes of materialisation in technology without getting lost: what Musiani 
(2012) calls “a study… that isn’t afraid of its subject”. Foucault argues that to 
understand technologies of control, we need to understand the rationalities of 
power which underpin them: the historical currents in ways of making sense of the 
business of governing societies. But in fact, when the technologies of control take up 
position around huge technical infrastructures they accrete dense thickets of 
meaning and multiple different ways of making sense of the business of governing 
society, crime, control, and privacy. A social worlds approach allows us to connect up 
the wider currents of ideas and power (the Foucauldian framing of discourse) to the 
lower-level picture of practices, work, and materiality as they cluster around and 
shape particular infrastructures as sites where governance is produced. This allows 
us to see how these lower-level materialisations of discourse interact with 
technologies of power on a broader stage and gain insight into the apparently-
random, unpredictable effects which these ‘disruptive’ technologies have on crime 
and social control. 
In Chapter 4, I discuss the sociological literature on social life as ‘performance’, both 
as a way of understanding the structures of human interaction and the ways in which 
technologies reify the ideas and category systems which become embedded in them 
through design. The idea of ‘performance’ is a rather productive metaphor for 
understanding Tor as a site of social action. Social performances, much like theatrical 
ones, require a range of additional material elements to come off successfully: 
lighting rigs, curtains, chairs, a stage and audience seating (Pinch, 2010). Pinch 
(2010) argues that these material elements both support social performances and 
shape the conditions in which they occur in important ways, calling for further 
sociological research into the design of Internet infrastructures which shapes the 
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human interactions which take place within them. Turning this lens around to the 
‘performances’ of the infrastructure itself and the values and visions which it 
attempts to realise through changing these material settings of human interaction, 
we reveal a range of other kinds of hidden work which allow these to be successful in 
practice; the stage hands, lighting engineers, janitors and house staff, to continue 
the metaphor.  
A putative ‘infrastructural criminology’ could engage with this wide range of different 
kinds of work to achieve a deeper picture of Internet infrastructure as another 
important domain of the governance of crime and harm and the exercise of 
disciplinary power, alongside the traditional institutions of the criminal justice 
system, such as the police, courts, prisons, and community justice. It would be no 
more productive to focus solely on the design of these infrastructures than it would 
be for a criminological study of the police to focus solely on the laws they enforce. 
Further studies could extend our understanding of the role which infrastructures 
play in how governance, privacy, control, and crime are ‘produced’ in contemporary 
societies. This also opens up the terrain for more critical studies of cybercrime which 
do not necessarily frame themselves through dominant, administrative ways of 
making sense of crime and governance, and for theoretical accountings for the role 
played by technologies in cybercrime which actually engage with why they work the 
way they do, rather than getting lost in technical detail or abstracting them to a 
totalising ‘cyberspace’. By finding the interesting criminological stories in these 
“boring” (Star, 1999) aspects of social life, this project might also have something to 
contribute to Science and Technology Studies, bringing criminology’s focus on crime, 
governance, and power to bear on these appreciative studies of technology. By 
excavating the category systems, frameworks of representation, and hidden work 
embedded in these infrastructures, where they come from, how they change, and 
the visions of the world on which they depend, criminology can explore vital 
questions about who is being privileged, who is left out, and how the business of 
governance is changing in contemporary societies.  
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Conclusions 
This chapter has brought to a close my social worlds study of Tor, mapping out the 
relationships between my research questions and the themes which straddle them, 
linking my results into the broader literature. Tor is in fact a remarkable site of social 
action which has been far more successful than any other comparable project. 
Reliant on the work of a very small number of people, it has survived for nearly two 
decades and now has a large worldwide community and over two million daily users 
at the time of writing. Through its life, Tor has managed to weather a great deal of 
change, opposition, and crisis, and has kept its diverse community together despite 
their differences. Tor is a site of social action around which multiple distinct, 
overlapping visions of privacy are enacted through different kinds of work. Making 
sense of this requires accounting for all these different kinds of work and how they 
‘produce’ or ‘perform’ visions of privacy, justice, crime, and control. The cypherpunk 
visions of the world which Tor is trying to realise are multiple and changing, focused 
around privacy and the decentralisation of power, but refracted into three distinct 
social worlds. While design work is doubtless important, maintenance work, 
resilience practices, PR work and other forms of labour also play a key role in making 
its visions of privacy a reality for millions of people around the world. These forms of 
work also constitute important sites where values are performed and go on to shape 
the infrastructure in important ways. 
One can imagine five potential future directions for Tor. The first of these is failure: 
that Tor might collapse through the increasing ratcheting-up of pressures on its 
infrastructure, the compromise of its development community by hostile forces or 
internal schisms, the rise of newer and better anonymity networks, or an 
authoritarian crackdown on anonymity technologies. The second draws from the 
activist vision, with Tor becoming more a campaigning and advocacy organisation, 
and the technology working in the service of this political struggle. Thirdly, Tor might 
retreat, as the infrastructuralists envision, from these issues of values and become a 
software foundation in the more classic model. Fourthly, Tor might fulfil the visions 
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of its engineers, evolving itself out of existence as a distinct organisation, so that it 
becomes a ubiquitous standard that underpins the way the Internet works. Finally, if 
the transformation of Tor’s social worlds continues, Tor might become something 
more akin (in a limited way) to Facebook or Google, an international infrastructure 
which wields a kind of sovereign claim in its own right over its users as legitimate 
subjects whose lives it can shape in important ways. 
To understand Tor, we need to study it as an infrastructure, a site of social action 
surrounded by heterogeneous meanings, practices, and material forms. Privacy 
technologies, of which Tor is by far the most well-known and widely-used, are both 
sites of resistance to authoritarian power, but also themselves embed strong ideas 
about crime and how it should be governed in contemporary societies. A primary 
contribution of this thesis is the development of a picture of Tor’s attempts to wield 
and reckon with its own power as an infrastructure. Milan (2016) calls this ‘stealing 
the fire’, it forms a part of Coleman’s (2017) ‘weapons of the geek’, and is crucial to 
Musiani’s (2012) ‘doing politics’ through architecture, as I describe in Chapter 2. In 
further making sense of the technologies of the Internet and their implication in 
crime, governance, and control, future research might usefully explore the 
importance of the boring aspects of the Internet, and its hidden people and 
perspectives. The Internet infrastructure embeds a host of design decisions which 
are doubtless important to its role as a site of social action What is often lost is the 
role of system administrators, load balancers, maintainers, regulators, policy people, 
HR people and public relations experts, who are just as important and who exert real 
influence over the direction of these projects. These people are making decisions 
about the governance of crime and conduct, and the administration of large parts of 
our societies every day. They therefore sit at sites of vital governmental power. To 
understand infrastructural power, we need to understand it by necessity as at the 
intersection of a multiplicity of different perspectives, values, practices, and social 
worlds. 
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To do this, criminological and sociological research needs to engage with these 
hidden aspects of technology: the dense thickets of meaning which surround 
infrastructures and how they relate to their material forms. By engaging in 
appreciative, qualitative research with the people who design, maintain, and 
promote these infrastructures, and by understanding the different kinds of work and 
social action which make these infrastructures possible, we can make sense of the 
visions of the world which are being realised in them. These visions of the world can 
then be connected up to broader criminological sensibilities and frameworks at the 
more abstract level of discourse and power in order to tease out the ways in which 
these infrastructures become sites where governance, power, and control are 
contested and enacted. Turning to the final chapter, I conclude this thesis with a 
summary of its overall conclusions and some reflections on the research and its 










Across this thesis, I have explored Tor as a site of social action, exploring how it has 
tried to materialise a vision of privacy in the world, and how it has reckoned with and 
become entangled in power, crime, and harm. I have mapped Tor in detail, moving 
from a genealogical history in Chapter 3 to a deep exploration of the different social 
worlds which underpin Tor in Chapter 6, to how these have been materialised 
through practices and design decisions in Chapter 7. In Chapter 8, I then described 
what actually happens when these materialised values meet the outside world – how 
Tor attempts to defend itself, and the different kinds of invisible work which are 
required to support these in practice. In Chapter 9, I have excavated how Tor’s 
attempts to act in the domain of power work out in practice when they come into 
contact with the dominant technologies of power which they are trying to subvert.  
In Chapter 10, I discussed how these different elements fit together, drawing out key 
themes across my findings chapters and attempting to pull these together into a 
characterisation of Tor as a site of social action. In this final chapter of the thesis, I 
reflect on the broader salience of my research, its key contributions to the academic 
literature, and potential limitations and avenues for future study. 
All infrastructures are sites of power, where material resources are controlled and 
category systems enacted (Star, 1990, 1999). The visions of society which are 
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embedded in their material forms and the different kinds of work required to 
maintain them exert a force over society, structuring social life and realising these 
visions in greater or lesser ways. In doing so, they shape the people who interact 
with them to conform to these category systems and cast those who cannot as 
outsiders (Star, 1990; Foucault, 2008). When these infrastructures become 
problematised as active sites of resistance, however, visions of new and alternative 
futures come into conflict with the visions embedded in the existing infrastructures. 
The Internet is a particularly fertile site for these conflicts, as it permits new 
infrastructures to be built alongside and on top of it with relative ease.  
This makes privacy technologies powerful sites of social action, where the logics and 
practices of technological disruption and innovation can be repurposed to become 
forms of activism in their own right (Milan, 2016). The particular place of data and 
information in contemporary societies makes privacy, and privacy technologies in 
particular, a flashpoint for a wide range of political struggles. The issues which 
privacy touches on, of information about people and how it is controlled, governed, 
and who has power over it, are particularly vital due to the importance of the 
communications infrastructures which underpin our lives and the kinds of data they 
collect about us (Lyon, 2014; Raab, Jones, and Szekely, 2015). That technologies and 
infrastructures have become a key domain in which this battle is being fought is 
reflective of the ways in which contemporary societies are governed, with 
automated mass online surveillance and censorship at the heart of modern 
technologies of control (Lyon, 2014). 
Making sense of Tor as a site of social action involves making sense of it as an 
infrastructure, mapping the different visions of the world which go into it, the kinds 
of work which make it possible, and the human and technical forms and structures of 
which it is composed, and how these interrelate. Exploring Tor’s design is important, 
but is not enough, as this does not account for the conditions and relationships 
which allow it to go from an ingenious prototype to a fact of life for millions of 
people around the world, and hence to realise its vision of the world in practice. By 
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understanding the category systems, hidden work, frameworks of representation, 
and visions of privacy which make up Tor, we can better understand how it interacts 
with the other Internet infrastructures whose dominant rationalities of control and 
visions of the world it is trying to replace. 
 
Key contributions of the thesis 
A major contribution of this thesis is to the body of scholarship on Tor, the Tor 
community, and the Tor Project. Although Marechal (2018) and Gehl (2018a) have 
both studied different aspects of Tor to those I cover here as one part of 
comparative projects which look at the broader Internet freedom milieu, this thesis 
constitutes the first in-depth sociological study focused entirely on Tor of which I am 
aware. I have attempted to characterise Tor as a site of social action, drawing on the 
social worlds framework to distil the dense, heterogenous and diverse discourses in 
the Tor community into three distinct ‘ideal type’ perspectives. These three social 
worlds, which each constitute a ‘universe of discourse’ do not necessarily accord 
entirely with the perspective of any given individual in the Tor community, but, as I 
hope I have demonstrated, prove a powerful framework for making sense of Tor and 
its role in human society. 
This thesis sets out the beginnings of a potentially novel avenue of criminological 
research, drawing as it does from theoretical and methodological frameworks largely 
outside those usually employed in criminology. In arguing for an ‘infrastructural 
criminology’ approach, I have attempted to make the case for the productive use of 
frameworks from Science and Technology Studies in expanding criminological 
understanding of cybercrime, cyber security, and the Internet more broadly. I have 
tried to approach Tor not as an intrinsically criminal tool, but as an infrastructure 
deeply implicated in power, politics and governance. In some more modest ways, I 
have also contributed to social worlds theory, in particular using its concept of 
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‘convergence’ to frame not only how people interact with existing infrastructures, 
but also the processes through which they are initially designed. 
Finally, I have contributed to the literature on privacy and digital society. This has 
drawn in particular on the work of Coleman, Musiani, and Milan in different ways to 
make sense of technology as a site of social action, and different visions of privacy as 
something which can be ‘produced’ through building infrastructure. In exploring the 
different ideas, types of work, discourses, people, and technologies which go into 
‘making’ a particular vision of privacy, I have aimed to highlight some of the 
fundamental questions of values, power and justice which are implicated in these 
processes, often hidden or deliberately obscured. The social worlds approach, which, 
resonant with Haraway’s scholarship, sees infrastructures as sites of multiplicity, 
where different meanings and visions of the world overlap and interact, is a 
particularly powerful framework for conducting this research. 
 
Reflections on limitations and avenues for future work 
In this section, I reflect on the limitations of this thesis, and some potential avenues 
for future work. Although I managed to negotiate far greater access to the Tor 
community than I imagined I might when beginning, the perspective I depict here is 
by necessity a partial one. There were many members of the Tor Project with whom I 
was unable to speak, and several potentially important sites of research which I was 
either unable or decided not to access. In particular, Tor’s regular developer 
meetings would have been a potentially valuable research site, and would be an 
obvious target for future research. However, I have generally been wary about 
becoming too involved in the Tor community, in particular deciding against trying to 
observe public IRC meetings or become part of the relay operator community. This is 
because many within the broader Tor community are deeply suspicious of 
researchers, and at a time when the Tor Project are attempting to increase 
participation, I was loath to do anything which might put people off from engaging 
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with this. Other topics I decided to avoid or not include in my analysis for reasons of 
sensitivity. In particular, the analysis and discussion of resilience practices in Chapter 
8 could be considered to be sensitive, or exploitable by those who wish Tor harm, 
and as such I have thought very carefully about what I have and have not included in 
this section in particular. In particular, I made the choice not to present information 
about individuals’ security practices, even though a number of them did talk about 
this in some depth. 
In many respects, this research barely scratches the surface of Tor. It maps Tor’s 
broader contours and delves deeper in a few interesting or illustrative areas, but 
there is a vast amount of ground and further interesting questions, which remain 
largely untouched. In particular, the mailing lists of Tor constitute a vast, largely 
untapped resource for sociological researchers. Some particularly interesting aspects 
of Tor’s design, such as how it coped with its initial use for illegal downloads, the 
complex negotiations between administrative practices and censorship in relay 
operation (such as the use of blacklists and exit policies), and its attempts to cope 
with an expanding user base remain entirely untouched in this research. An early 
conflict between Tor and Wikipedia is also a fascinating example of a clash between 
two similar, but meaningfully distinct visions of Internet utopia which is well worth 
future study. As Tor has grown, the amount of data it has made available has 
increased dramatically, and more recent development work has been accompanied 
by documented changes in Tor’s source code with substantial discussion and debate 
attached. Although I engaged in some analysis of this, for reasons of time and clarity 
I have chosen to leave this work for future research. Equally, the development of 
major parts of Tor, such as the Tor Browser and the first and subsequent versions of 
Onion Services are important milestones in Tor’s story which merit study of their 
own and themselves embed important decisions about crime, governance, and social 
justice. Tor is in a moment of profound change, and I have been very lucky to 
document some of this.  
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Reasons of space have also limited the historical scope of this research, which is 
largely confined to a combination of Tor’s early years along with more recent 
developments in the wake of the Snowden revelations. The intervening years are 
lightly sketched herein, but many important controversies, crises, challenges and 
successes are left out for reasons of space.  A fuller historical accounting of Tor could 
offer a valuable contribution to better understanding the role it has played over the 
years. Equally, tracking the evolution of discourse about crime and control over the 
course of the mailing lists would itself be a valuable project. As Tor enters this new 
era, it will doubtless change and develop in yet more interesting ways. A more 
ethnographic study, building on this research to attempt to develop a closer 
collaboration with the Tor community over the next few years could be extremely 
productive in achieving a deeper picture of these changes. 
This research is also by design limited in scope to a particular community whose 
voices and perspectives I wished to bring to the fore: the immediate community of 
people who contribute directly to Tor. However, Tor is deeply linked to a range of 
other communities and projects, from major international conferences such as the 
Chaos Communications Congress and Hackers On Planet Earth, to technical 
organisations like Tails and OONI, and to campaigning organisations such as the EFF. 
Studying these organisations and the ways in which they contribute to, criticise, and 
understand Tor could unearth yet more hidden perspectives, social worlds, and 
important forms of work. Equally, while I managed to interview some developers of 
the Onion Services which make use of Tor, an in-depth study of the technical 
foundations of these projects would be valuable in more directly connecting Tor to 
its wider user base and to the ways in which its visions are actually being realised, 
taken up, and transformed by others. 
Having chosen to focus entirely on the Tor community, Tor’s users and their 
perspectives are almost completely absent in this research. The users of 
technologies and infrastructures form core parts of many social worlds studies (Star, 
1999) and related approaches (Brunton and Coleman, 2014). Their absence makes it 
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difficult to achieve a truly holistic view of Tor, or to make the final connection 
between values, materiality and the actual realities which are performed for and by 
users in practice, whose own frameworks of understanding and constructions of 
privacy and power are an equally important factor. Bancroft’s (2017) work on 
cryptomarket communities and the relationship between their own constructions of 
anonymity and those embedded in the material properties of Tor Onion Services 
point a potential way forward for this kind of research. Equally there are a range of 
other people who interact with Tor, who develop their own distinct perspectives: the 
academic research community, state intelligence agencies, cryptographers, the 
Internet governance community, policymakers, politicians, law enforcement and 
Internet Service Providers. There may well therefore be important social worlds 
which play a role in Tor which have been missed by this research, and Tor’s current 
re-appraisal of its ways of understanding its users make this a key an opportune site 
of future research. 
This approach could also profitably be turned to criminological study of other 
important technologies and infrastructure. The most obvious of these is Bitcoin, 
which shares many of Tor’s intersections with crime, governance and power, but 
navigates them in rather different ways. While Facebook and Google are unlikely to 
open themselves up to the extent that Tor does, there is the potential to do this kind 
of deep, appreciative qualitative research with other, smaller, emerging social media 
companies, many of whom are desperate to better make sense of the problems of 
crime and governance which they are facing. Some in law enforcement may be 
equally happy to discuss their attempts to develop mechanisms of governance and 
control in trying to produce ‘justice’ (or at least fight crime) through the Internet 
infrastructure. Finally, many modern cybercrime economies rely heavily on both 
legitimate and illegitimate infrastructure, such as botnets, payment systems, 
bulletproof hosting, and web services. Understanding the forms of infrastructural 
work and the social worlds which are implicated in these may open up new avenues 
of criminological enquiry to better characterise these forms of (illegal) action 
through technological infrastructure. The prospects for an ‘infrastructural 
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criminology’ to bring a more critical perspective into cybercrime research are 
exciting, and I intend to continue this programme of research in the future. 
 
Final remarks 
This research has taken place across a period of time where questions about power 
and the Internet have risen to public prominence. Even as the forces of 
authoritarianism appear to be on the rise around the world, so too are historic 
resistance movements springing up to demand radical, transformative social change 
and liberation. The power wielded by the tech giants and social media companies is 
becoming both a dominant shaping force in society and the subject of increasing 
critique in public life, as they continue to disrupt work, democracy, policing, 
governance, politics, and social life. Visons of society are clashing against one 
another, and the Internet is a place where many of these battles over different 
potential futures will be fought. Possessing the potential to be both technologies of 
domination or of liberation, Tor and the other parts of the Internet infrastructure will 
play a key role in these struggles, and understanding them as sites of social action, 
rather than deterministically acting on society, is crucial to making sense of how our 
societies are changing in the contemporary era. 
The role of infrastructure as a site of power is not new and has existed as long as 
human society. The particular dynamics of the Internet are interesting, as its capacity 
to be extended and built upon opens up this infrastructural power to a range of 
other actors, making it a site of profound social change, where relatively small 
groups can have enormous success in realising their visions of future worlds. If we 
want to build structures and societies which aren’t based around domination, we 
need to understand the mechanisms by which power works. This extends also to the 
ways in which we resist power, which themselves embed forms of power and visions 
of the world. 
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Tor is a particularly striking subject to research in that it not only represents a 
radically different vision of the world to the contemporary Internet but has managed 
to make this a reality for millions of people around the world. Much like the Internet 
itself, it is a military technology which has become an engine of social 
transformation, a place where a range of different visions, meanings, and potential 
futures are fought over, enacted, and born. Researching Tor and the Tor community 
for the past four years has been a singular pleasure, and the members of that 
community who are striving to maintain and develop the  ‘Dark Web’ whom I have 
encountered have been friendly, welcoming, and generous people fighting for 







Adams, K. (2018a) Silicon Valley’s Philosopher-King Jaron Lanier Envisions a Brave, 
New World Without Social Media, Medium, Retreived from: 
https://medium.com/@kevinsheaadams/silicon-valleys-philosopher-king-jaron-
lanier-envisions-a-brave-new-world-without-social-media-1008d787bc85 
Adams, C. (2018b). “They Go for Gender First” The nature and effect of sexist abuse 
of female technology journalists. Journalism Practice, 12(7), 850-869 
Afroz, S., & Fifield, D. (2007). Timeline of Tor censorship. Retrieved from: 
http://www1.icsi.berkeley.edu/~sadia/tor_timeline.pdf 
Afroz, S., Garg, V., McCoy, D., & Greenstadt, R. (2013, September). Honor among 
thieves: A common's analysis of cybercrime economies. In 2013 APWG eCrime 
Researchers Summit (pp. 1-11). IEEE. 
Agger, B. (2011). iTime: Labor and life in a smartphone era. Time & Society, 20(1), 
119-136. 
Akrich, M. (1992) The de-scription of technical objects, In Bijker, W.E. and Law, J. 
(editors) Shaping technology/ building society. MIT Press, pp. 205 – 224. 
Albas, C. A., Adler, P., Albas, D. C., Adler, P. A., Altheide, D. L., Altheide, D., ... & 
Clarke, A. E. (2003). Handbook of symbolic interactionism. Rowman Altamira. 
Aldridge, J., & Decary-Hétu, D. (2016). Cryptomarkets and the future of illicit drug 
markets. The Internet and drug markets, 23-32.  
Aldridge, J., & Décary-Hétu, D. (2016). Hidden wholesale: The drug diffusing capacity 
of online drug cryptomarkets. International Journal of Drug Policy, 35, 7-15. 
Alfredo Filho, S., & Johnston, D. (2005). Neoliberalism: A critical reader. University of 
Chicago Press. 
Allcott, H., & Gentzkow, M. (2017). Social media and fake news in the 2016 
election. Journal of economic perspectives, 31(2), 211-36. 
Anderson, R., Barton, C., Böhme, R., Clayton, R., Van Eeten, M. J., Levi, M., ... & 
Savage, S. (2013). Measuring the cost of cybercrime. In The economics of information 
security and privacy (pp. 265-300). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
Angouri, J. (2016). Online communities and communities of practice. The Routledge 
Handbook of Language and Digital Communication, 323-338. Routledge 
 312 
Aradau, C., Blanke, T., & Greenway, G. (2019). Acts of digital parasitism: Hacking, 
humanitarian apps and platformisation. New Media & Society, 21(11–12), 2548–
2565. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444819852589 
Armstrong, S., & Jefferson, A. M. (2017). Disavowing ‘the’prison. In Carceral 
Spatiality (pp. 237-267). Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
Aronovich, H (2012). Interpreting Weber’s ideal-types. Philosophy of the Social 
Sciences, 42(3), 356-369. 
Aycock, A. (1995), “Technologies of the Self:” Foucault and Internet Discourse, 
Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, Volume 1, Issue 2, JCMC121,  
Bachmann, M. (2012). Deciphering the hacker underground: First quantitative 
insights. In Cyber Crime: Concepts, Methodologies, Tools and Applications, 175-194. 
IGI Global. 
Badouard, R. & Mabi, C. & Sire, G. (2016). Beyond “Points of Control”: logics of digital 
governmentality. Internet Policy Review, 5(3). 
Baer, W. S., Borisov, N., Danezis, G., Guerses, S. F., Klonowski, M., Kutylowski, M., ... 
& Sadeghi, A. R. (2009). Machiavelli Confronts 21st Century Digital Technology: 
Democracy in a Network Society. Available at SSRN 1521222. 
Baker, J, (2019), Rethinking Encryption, Lawfare Blog,  
https://www.lawfareblog.com/rethinking-encryption 
Ball, J, (2013), Silk Road: The online drug marketplace that officials seem powerless 
to stop, The Guardian, Retrieved from: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/22/silk-road-online-drug-
marketplace 
Ball, K., & Webster, F. (2003). The intensification of surveillance: Crime, terrorism and 
warfare in the information era. Pluto Press. 
Ball, K., Lyon, D., & Haggerty, K. D. (Eds.). (2012). Routledge handbook of surveillance 
studies. Routledge. 
Balzacq, T., & Cavelty, M. D. (2016). A theory of actor-network for cyber-security. 
European Journal of International Security, 1(2), 176-198. 
Bancroft, A., & Scott Reid, P. (2017). Challenging the techno-politics of anonymity: 
the case of cryptomarket users. Information, Communication & Society, 20(4), 497-
512. 
Barassi, V., & Treré, E. (2012). Does Web 3.0 come after Web 2.0? Deconstructing 
theoretical assumptions through practice. New Media & Society, 14(8), 1269-1285. 
 313 
Barratt, M. J., Ferris, J. A., & Winstock, A. R. (2016a). Safer scoring? Cryptomarkets, 
social supply and drug market violence. International Journal of Drug Policy, 35, 24-
31. 
Barratt, M. J., Lenton, S., Maddox, A., & Allen, M. (2016b). ‘What if you live on top of 
a bakery and you like cakes?’—Drug use and harm trajectories before, during and 
after the emergence of Silk Road. International Journal of Drug Policy, 35, 50-57. 
Bartlett, J. (2014). The dark net: Inside the digital underworld. Melville House. 
Bartlett, J. (2016). Cypherpunks write code. American Scientist, 104(2), 120-124. 
Bauman, Z. (2000). Liquid modernity. London: Polity. 
Bayat, A., Naicker, V., & Combrinck, T. (2015). Towards an Understanding of How 
School Administrative Clerks Negotiate Their Work in Public Schools: A Social Worlds 
Perspective. International Journal of Educational Sciences, 8(2), 293-303. 
BBC News, (2018), Australia data encryption laws explained, BBC News, Retrieved 
from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-australia-46463029 
BBC News, (2019), Russian intelligence ‘targets anonymous Tor browser’, BBC News, 
Retrieved from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-49071225 
Beck, U. (2009). World at risk. Cambridge: Polity. 
Becker H. S. (1963). Outsiders. Studies in the Sociology of Deviance. New York Free 
Press 
Becker, H. S. (1986). Doing things together: Selected papers. Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press. 
Becker, H. S. (2008). Art worlds: updated and expanded. University of California 
Press. 
Becker, H. S., & McCall, M. M. (Eds.). (2009). Symbolic interaction and cultural 
studies. University of Chicago Press. 
Becker, H. S. (2017). Moral entrepreneurs. In Cultural Criminology (pp. 11-28). 
Routledge.  
Becker, H. S. (2018). Labelling theory reconsidered, In Deviance and social 
control (pp. 41-66). Routledge. 
Benedickt, M. (1991). Cyberspace: first steps., MIT Press 
Bennett, C. J., & Raab, C. D. (2017). The governance of privacy: Policy instruments in 
global perspective. Routledge. 
 314 
Berg, M., 1998. “The politics of technology: on bringing social theory into 
technological design”, Science, Technology and Human Values, 23(4), 456-490 
Berners-Lee, T., & Fischetti, M. (2001). Weaving the Web: The original design and 
ultimate destiny of the World Wide Web by its inventor. DIANE Publishing Company. 
Berry, D. M. (2008). Copy, rip, burn: The politics of copyleft and open source. Pluto 
Press. 
Biddle, S. (2017). How Peter Thiel’s Palantir helped the NSA spy on the whole world, 
The Intercept, Retrieved from: https://theintercept.com/2017/02/22/how-peter-
thiels-palantir-helped-the-nsa-spy-on-the-whole-world/ 
Bingham, N. (1996). Object-ions: from technological determinism towards 
geographies of relations. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 14(6), 635-
657. 
Blackwell, L., Dimond, J., Schoenebeck, S., & Lampe, C. (2017). Classification and its 
consequences for online harassment: Design insights from heartmob. Proceedings of 
the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction, 1(CSCW), 24. 
Bloor, M., Fincham, B., & Sampson, H. (2010). Unprepared for the worst: Risks of 
harm for qualitative researchers. Methodological Innovations Online, 5(1), 45-55. 
Bloss, W. (2007). Escalating US police surveillance after 9/11: An examination of 
causes and effects. Surveillance & Society, 4(3). 
Blumer, H. (1954). What is wrong with social theory?. American Sociological Review, 
19(1), 3-10. 
Blumer, H. (1962). Society as symbolic interaction. Contemporary Sociological 
Thought, 91. 
Blumer, H. (1986). Symbolic interactionism: Perspective and method. University of 
California Press. 
Bogner, A., Littig, B., & Menz, W. (Eds.). (2009). Interviewing experts. Springer. 
Boman, J. H., & Freng, A. (2017). Differential association theory, social learning 
theory, and technocrime. In Technocrime and Criminological Theory (pp. 55-65). 
Routledge. 
Bonnell, V. E. (1980). The uses of theory, concepts and comparison in historical 
sociology. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 22(2), 156-173. 
Bossler, A. M. (2016). 3 Cybercrime research at the crossroads: where the field 
currently stands and innovative strategies to move forward. In Cybercrime through 
an interdisciplinary lens (pp. 51-69). Routledge. 
 315 
Bosworth, M. (2017). Border criminology and the changing nature of penal 
power. The Oxford Handbook of Criminology, 373-390. 
Bowker, G. C., & Star, S. L. (2000). Sorting things out: Classification and its 
consequences. MIT press. 
Bowker, G. C., Timmermans, S., Clarke, A. E., & Balka, E. (Eds.). (2016). Boundary 
objects and beyond: Working with Leigh Star. MIT Press. 
Box, S. (2002). Power, crime and mystification. Routledge. 
Boyd, D. M. and Ellison, N. B. (2008). Social network sites: Definition, history, and 
scholarship. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 13(1): 210–230. 
Brannon, M. M. (2017). Datafied and divided: Techno‐dimensions of inequality in 
American cities. City & Community, 16(1), 20-24. 
Brayne, S. (2017). Big data surveillance: The case of policing. American Sociological 
Review, 82(5), 977-1008. 
Brewster, B., Kemp, B., Galehbakhtiari, S., & Akhgar, B. (2015). Cybercrime: attack 
motivations and implications for big data and national security. In Application of Big 
Data for National Security (pp. 108-127). Butterworth-Heinemann. 
Brinkmann, S., & Kvale, S. (2008). Ethics in qualitative psychological research. The 
Sage handbook of qualitative research in psychology, 24(2), 263-279. 
British Society of Criminology (2015). Statement of Ethics, Retrieved from: 
https://www.britsoccrim.org/ethics/ 
British Sociological Association (2017). Statement of ethical practice, Retrieved from: 
https://www.britsoc.co.uk/media/24310/bsa_statement_of_ethical_practice.pdf 
Brodeur, J.P., (2000). Cops and Spooks: The Uneasy Partnership, Police Practice and 
Research 1/3: 299–321, (reprinted in Newburn, T. (ed.) (2005). Policing: Key 
Readings, Cullompton Devon (UK): Willan Publishing, 797–812). 
Brodeur, J. P. (2007). High and low policing in post-9/11 times. Policing: A journal of 
Policy and Practice, 1(1), 25-37. 
Brown, S. (2006). The criminology of hybrids: Rethinking crime and law in 
technosocial networks. Theoretical Criminology, 10(2), 223-244. 
Brunton, F., & Coleman, G. (2014). Closer to the Metal. In Media technologies: Essays 
on communication, Materiality, and society, 77-97.  
Burgers, T., & Robinson, D. R. S. (2018). Keep Dreaming: Cyber Arms Control is Not a 
Viable Policy Option. S&F Sicherheit und Frieden, 36(3), 140-145. 
 316 
Butler, J. (2002). Gender trouble. Routledge. 
Butler, J. (2006). Performative acts and gender constitution: An essay in 
phenomenology and feminist theory. In The Routledge Falmer Reader in Gender & 
Education (pp. 73-83). Routledge. 
Butler, J. (2011). Bodies that matter: On the discursive limits of sex. routledge. 
Butler, J. (2013). Excitable speech: A politics of the performative. Routledge. 
Byrne, M. (2001). The concept of informed consent in qualitative research.(Research 
Corner). AORN journal, 74(3), 401-404. 
Cadwalladr, C., & Graham-Harrison, E. (2018). The Cambridge analytica files. The 
Guardian, 21, 6-7. 
Callon, M. (1991) “Techno-Economic Networks and Irreversibility.” In J. Law 
(Editor), a Sociology of Monsters. Essays on Power, Technology and Domination. 
London: Routledge, pp. 132–161. 
Callon, M. (2009). Elaborating the notion of performativity. Le Libellio d’AEGIS, 
Libellio d’AEGIS, 5 (1), pp.18-29. ffhal-00460877 
Cannataci, J. A. (2009). Privacy, Technology Law and religions across cultures. 
Carlson, M. (2018). Facebook in the news: Social media, journalism, and public 
responsibility following the 2016 trending topics controversy. Digital journalism, 6(1), 
4-20. 
Carroli, L. (1997). Virtual Encounters: Community or Collaboration on the 
Internet?. Leonardo, 359-363. 
Casady, T. (2011). Police legitimacy and predictive policing. Geography & Public 
Safety, 2(4), 1-2. 
Casper, Monica J. (1998) The Making of the Unborn Patient: A Social Anatomy of 
Fetal Surgery (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press). 
Castells, M. (2002). The Internet galaxy: Reflections on the Internet, business, and 
society. Oxford University Press 
Castells, M. (2004). The network society A cross-cultural perspective. Edward Elgar. 
Chaabane, A., Chen, T., Cunche, M., De Cristofaro, E., Friedman, A., & Kaafar, M. A. 
(2014). Censorship in the wild: Analyzing Internet filtering in Syria. In Proceedings of 
the 2014 Conference on Internet Measurement Conference(pp. 285-298). ACM. 
 317 
Chen, H., Chung, W., Qin, J., Reid, E., Sageman, M., & Weimann, G. (2008). 
Uncovering the dark Web: A case study of Jihad on the Web. Journal of the American 
society for information science and technology, 59(8), 1347-1359. 
Chenou, J. M. (2014). From cyber-libertarianism to neoliberalism: Internet 
exceptionalism, multi-stakeholderism, and the institutionalisation of Internet 
governance in the 1990s. Globalizations, 11(2), 205-223. 
CIA (2019), CIA’s Latest Layer: An Onion Site, CIA Homepage, Retrieved from: 
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2019-featured-story-
archive/latest-layer-an-onion-site.html 
Clarke, A. (1997). A social worlds research adventure. Grounded theory in practice, 
63. 
Clarke, A. E. (2003). Situational analyses: Grounded theory mapping after the 
postmodern turn. Symbolic interaction, 26(4), 553-576. 
Clarke, A. E., & Star, S. L. (2008). The social worlds framework: A theory/methods 
package. The handbook of science and technology studies, 3, 113-137. 
Clarke, A. E. & Friese, C. (2007). Grounded Theorizing Using Situational Analysis, in 
The Sage Handbook of Grounded Theory, eds Bryant A., Charmaz, K. 
Clarke, A. E. (2007). Grounded theory: Critiques, debates, and situational 
analysis. The SAGE handbook of social science methodology, 423-442. 
Clarke, A. E. (2007). Social worlds. The Blackwell encyclopedia of sociology. 
Clarke, A. E. 2005. Situational Analysis. Grounded Theory After the Postmodern Turn. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Clarke, R. V. (1983). Situational crime prevention: Its theoretical basis and practical 
scope. Crime and justice, 4, 225-256. 
Clarke, R. V. G. (Ed.). (1997). Situational crime prevention (pp. 225-256). Monsey, NY: 
Criminal Justice Press. 
Clarke, R. V., & Newman, G. R. (2005). Modifying Criminogenic Products-What Role 
for Government?. Crime prevention studies, 18, 7. 
CNN (2016), Developer of anonymous Tor software dodges FBI, leaves US, CNN 
News, Retrieved from: https://money.cnn.com/2016/05/17/technology/tor-
developer-fbi/index.html 
Cohen, L. E., & Felson, M. (1979). Social change and crime rate trends: A routine 
activity approach. American sociological review, 588-608.  
 318 
Cohen-Almagor, R. (2013). Internet history. In Moral, Ethical, and Social Dilemmas in 
the Age of Technology: Theories and Practice (pp. 19-39). IGI Global. 
Cohn, E. G., Farrington, D. P., a Wright, R., & Wright, R. A. (1998). Evaluating 
criminology and criminal justice (No. 51). Greenwood Publishing Group. 
Coleman, G., (2004). The political agnosticism of free and open source software and 
the inadvertent politics of contrast. Anthropological Quarterly, 77(3), pp.507-519. 
Coleman, E. G., & Golub, A. (2008). Hacker practice: Moral genres and the cultural 
articulation of liberalism. Anthropological Theory, 8(3), 255-277. 
Coleman, G. (2009). Code is speech: Legal tinkering, expertise, and protest among 
free and open source software developers. Cultural Anthropology, 24(3), 420-454. 
Coleman, G. (2010). The hacker conference: A ritual condensation and celebration of 
a lifeworld. Anthropological Quarterly, 47-72. 
Coleman, G. (2011). Hacker politics and publics. Public Culture, 23(3 (65)), 511-516. 
Coleman, E. G. (2012). Coding freedom: The ethics and aesthetics of hacking. 
Princeton University Press. 
Coleman, G. (2013). Anonymous in context: The politics and power behind the mask. 
CIGI Series on Internet Governance 
Coleman, G. (2014). Hacker, hoaxer, whistleblower, spy: The many faces of 
Anonymous. Verso books.  
Coleman, E. Gabriella. 2013. Coding freedom: the ethics and aesthetics of hacking. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Coleman, G. (2017). From Internet farming to weapons of the geek. Current 
Anthropology, 58(S15), S91-S102. 
Crawford, A. (2006). Networked governance and the post-regulatory state? Steering, 
rowing and anchoring the provision of policing and security. Theoretical 
criminology, 10(4), 449-479. 
Curran, J. (2012). Rethinking internet history: James Curran. In Misunderstanding the 
internet (pp. 40-71). Routledge. 
Custers, B., van der Hof, S., & Schermer, B. (2014). Privacy expectations of social 
media users: The role of informed consent in privacy policies. Policy & Internet, 6(3), 
268-295. 
Danet, B. (1996). Text as mask: Gender and identity on the Internet. 
 319 
Danezis, G., & Gürses, S. (2010). A critical review of 10 years of privacy 
technology. Proceedings of surveillance cultures: a global surveillance society, 1-16. 
Darier, M. D. M. E. (1998). Virtual control and disciplining on the Internet: Electronic 
governmentality in the new wired world. The Information Society, 14(2), 107-116. 
Décary-Hétu, D., & Giommoni, L. (2017). Do police crackdowns disrupt drug 
cryptomarkets? A longitudinal analysis of the effects of Operation Onymous. Crime, 
Law and Social Change, 67(1), 55-75. 
Deegan, M. J. (2013). Jane Addams, the Hull-House school of sociology, and social 
justice, 1892 to 1935. Humanity & Society, 37(3), 248-258. 
Deibert, R. J. (2008). The geopolitics of internet control: Censorship, sovereignty, and 
cyberspace. In Routledge handbook of Internet politics (pp. 339-352). Routledge. 
Demant, J., Munksgaard, R., Décary-Hétu, D., & Aldridge, J. (2018). Going local on a 
global platform: A critical analysis of the transformative potential of cryptomarkets 
for organized illicit drug crime. International Criminal Justice Review, 28(3), 255-274. 
Demont-Heinrich, C. (2002). Central points of control and surveillance on a 
“decentralized” Net: Internet service providers, and privacy and freedom of speech 
online. info, 4(4), 32-42. 
Dencik, L., & Cable, J. (2017). The advent of surveillance realism: Public opinion and 
activist responses to the Snowden leaks. International Journal of Communication, 11, 
763-781. 
DeNardis, L. (2007). A history of internet security. In The history of information 
security (pp. 681-704). Elsevier Science BV. 
DeNardis, L. (2009). Protocol politics, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
DeNardis, L. (2014). The global war for internet governance. Yale University Press. 
Dennis, A., & Martin, P. J. (2005). Symbolic interactionism and the concept of 
power. The British journal of sociology, 56(2), 191-213. 
De Paoli, S. (2018). The engineer–criminologist and “the novelty of cybercrime”: a 
situated genealogical study of timesharing systems. Internet Histories, 2(1-2), 20-37. 
DeVault, M. L. (1990). Talking and listening from women's standpoint: Feminist 
strategies for interviewing and analysis. Social problems, 37(1), 96-116. 
Dingledine, R., Mathewson, N., & Syverson, P. (2004). Tor: The second-generation 
onion router. 
 320 
Dingledine, R., & Mathewson, N. (2006). Anonymity Loves Company: Usability and 
the Network Effect. In WEIS. 
van Dijck, J., Nieborg, D., & Poell, T. (2019). Reframing platform power. Internet 
Policy Review, 8(2). 
Doctorow, C. (2015), What happened when we got subpoenaed over our Tor exit 
node, BoingBoing, Retreived from: https://boingboing.net/2015/08/04/what-
happened-when-the-fbi-sub.html 
Dodge, A., Spencer, D., Ricciardelli, R., & Ballucci, D. (2019). “This isn’t your father’s 
police force”: Digital evidence in sexual assault investigations. Australian & New 
Zealand Journal of Criminology, 0004865819851544. 
Dremliuga, R. (2014). Subculture of hackers in Russia. Asian Social Science, 10(18), 
158. 
Dubrofsky, R. E., & Magnet, S. A. (Eds.). (2015). Feminist surveillance studies. Duke 
University Press. 
Eckert, S. (2018). Fighting for recognition: Online abuse of women bloggers in 
Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. New Media & 
Society, 20(4), 1282-1302. 
Economic and Social Research Council (2019), Our Core Principles, ESRC, Retrieved 
from: https://esrc.ukri.org/funding/guidance-for-applicants/research-ethics/our-
core-principles/ 
Edman, M., & Yener, B. (2009). On anonymity in an electronic society: A survey of 
anonymous communication systems. ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), 42(1), 5. 
Edwards, P. (1996) The Closed World: Completers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold 
War America. Cambridge, Mass. 
Elliott, M. S., & Scacchi, W. (2005). Free software development: Cooperation and 
conflict in a virtual organizational culture. In Free/open source software 
development (pp. 152-173). Igi Globa 
Ericson, R. V., & Haggerty, K. D. (Eds.). (2006). The new politics of surveillance and 
visibility. University of Toronto Press. 
Escobar, A., Hess, D., Licha, I., Sibley, W., Strathern, M., & Sutz, J. (1994). Welcome to 
Cyberia: Notes on the Anthropology of Cyberculture [and comments and reply]. 
Current anthropology, 35(3), 211-231. 
Eubanks, V. (2018). Automating inequality: How high-tech tools profile, police, and 
punish the poor. St. Martin's Press. 
 321 
Fairclough, N. (1992). Discourse and social change (Vol. 10). Cambridge: Polity press. 
Farrington, D. P., & Tarling, R. (Eds.). (1985). Prediction in criminology. SUNY Press. 
Feeley, M. M., & Simon, J. (1992). The new penology: Notes on the emerging 
strategy of corrections and its implications. Criminology, 30(4), 449-474. 
Ferguson, A. G. (2016). Policing predictive policing. Wash. UL Rev., 94, 1109. 
Ferguson, A. G. (2019). The rise of big data policing: Surveillance, race, and the future 
of law enforcement. NYU Press. 
Fifield, D., Lee, L. N., Egelman, S., & Wagner, D. (2015). Tor’s Usability for Censorship 
Circumvention. InWorkshop on Hot Topics in Privacy Enhancing Technologies. 
Fine, G. A. (1993). The sad demise, mysterious disappearance, and glorious triumph 
of symbolic interactionism. Annual review of sociology, 19(1), 61-87. 
Finn, R. L. (2011). Surveillant staring: Race and the everyday surveillance of South 
Asian women after 9/11. Surveillance & Society, 8(4), 413-426. 
Flammia, M. (1993). The challenge of getting technical experts to talk: Why 
interviewing skills are crucial to the technical communication curriculum. IEEE 
transactions on professional communication, 36(3), 124-129. 
Fonhof, A. M., van der Bruggen, M., & Takes, F. W. (2018, December). Characterizing 
key players in child exploitation networks on the dark net. In International 
Conference on Complex Networks and their Applications (pp. 412-423). Springer, 
Cham. 
Foucault, M. (1991). The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality. University of 
Chicago Press. 
Foucault, M. (2007). Security, territory, population: lectures at the Collège de France, 
1977-78. Springer. 
Foucault, M., (2008). The birth of biopolitics: lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-
1979. Springer. 
Foucault, M., (2010). The government of self and others: Lectures at the Collège de 
France 1982–1983. Springer. 
Foucault, M. (2012). Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison. Vintage. 
Friedman, B. (Ed.). (1997). Human values and the design of computer technology (No. 
72). Cambridge University Press. 
 322 
Furnell, S. M. (2001). The problem of categorising cybercrime and cybercriminals. 
In 2nd Australian information warfare and security conference (Vol. 2001). 
Gandy, O. H. (2007). Data mining and surveillance in the post 9/11 environment. The 
surveillance studies reader, 147-157. 
Gane, N. (2012). The governmentalities of neoliberalism: panopticism, post-
panopticism and beyond. The Sociological Review, 60(4), 611-634. 
Gane, N. (2014). The emergence of neoliberalism: Thinking through and beyond 
Michel Foucault’s lectures on biopolitics. Theory, Culture & Society, 31(4), 3-27. 
Garland, D. (1997). Governmentality'and the problem of crime: Foucault, 
criminology, sociology. Theoretical criminology, 1(2), 173-214. 
Garland, D. (2001). The culture of control: Crime and social order in contemporary 
society. University of Chicago Press. 
Garland, D. (2012). Punishment and modern society: A study in social theory. 
University of Chicago Press. 
Garrow, D. J. (2015). Liberty and sexuality: The right to privacy and the making of Roe 
v. Wade. Open Road Media. 
Garsten, C., & Nyqvist, A. (2013). Organisational anthropology: Doing ethnography in 
and among complex organisations. Pluto Press. 
Geertz, C. (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures : Selected Essays. New York :Basic 
Books 
Geertz, C. (2008). Thick description: Toward an interpretive theory of culture. In The 
cultural geography reader (pp. 41-51). Routledge. 
Gehl, R. W. (2016). Power/freedom on the dark web: A digital ethnography of the 
Dark Web Social Network. New Media & Society, 18(7), 1219-1235. 
Gehl, R. W. (2018a). Weaving the Dark Web: Legitimacy on Freenet, Tor, and I2P. MIT 
Press. 
Gehl, R. W. (2018b). Archives for the Dark Web: A Field Guide for Study. In Research 
Methods for the Digital Humanities (pp. 31-51). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. 
Gehl, R., & McKelvey, F. (2019). Bugging out: darknets as parasites of large-scale 
media objects. Media, Culture & Society, 41(2), 219-235. 
Gibson, W., (1984), Neuromancer, Ace 
Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and self-identity. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 323 
Gilbert, M., & Dasgupta, N. (2017). Silicon to syringe: Cryptomarkets and disruptive 
innovation in opioid supply chains. International Journal of Drug Policy, 46, 160-167. 
Gillespie, T. (2010). The politics of ‘platforms’. New media & society, 12(3), 347-364. 
Gillespie, T. (2018). Platforms are not intermediaries. Georgetown Law Technology 
Review, 2(2). 
Gillespie, T., & Seaver, N. (2016). Critical algorithm studies: A reading list. Social 
Media Collective. 
Goedhart, N. S., Broerse, J. E., Kattouw, R., & Dedding, C. (2019). ‘Just having a 
computer doesn’t make sense’: The digital divide from the perspective of mothers 
with a low socio-economic position. New Media & Society, 21(11–12), 2347–2365.  
Goffman, E. (1961), Asylums. NY: Anchor 
Goffman, E. (1963), Behaviour in public places. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall 
Goffman, E. (1967), Interactional rituals. NY: Anchor 
Goffman, E. (1974), Frame analysis, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 
Goffman, E. (1978). The presentation of self in everyday life (p. 56). London: 
Harmondsworth. 
Goffman, E. (1983). The interaction order. American Sociological Review 48(1), 5-13 
Goffman, E. (1986). Stigma: Notes on the management of spoiled identity. Simon and 
Schuster. 
Goldschlag, D. M., Reed, M. G., & Syverson, P. F. (1996, May). Hiding routing 
information. In International workshop on information hiding (pp. 137-150). Springer, 
Berlin, Heidelberg. 
Goodnight, G. Thomas, and Sandy Green. (2010), Rhetoric, risk, and markets: The 
dot-com bubble. Quarterly Journal of Speech 96(2), 115-140. 
Grabosky, P. (1998). Crime in cyberspace. Combating transnational crime: Concepts, 
activities and responses, 195-208. 
Grabosky, P. N. (2001). Virtual criminality: Old wine in new bottles?. Social & Legal 
Studies, 10(2), 243-249. 
Graham, S., & Thrift, N. (2007). Out of order: Understanding repair and 
maintenance. Theory, Culture & Society, 24(3), 1-25. 
 324 
Graham, S., & Wood, D. (2003). Digitizing surveillance: categorization, space, 
inequality. Critical social policy, 23(2), 227-248. 
Greenwald, G. (2014). No place to hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the US 
surveillance state. Macmillan. 
Guardian (2013), NSA Files – Tor: ‘the king of high-security, low latency anonymity’, 
The Guardian, Retreived from: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/tor-high-secure-
internet-anonymity 
Guardian, (2018), The Cambridge Analytica Files , The Guardian, 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/series/cambridge-analytica-files 
Guardian (2019), The Guardian SecureDrop, The Guardian, Retrieved from: 
https://www.theguardian.com/securedrop 
Gueddana, W., & Ayadi, N. Y. (2015). D4:'An exploratory Platform in the Making': 
Requirements for creating a partially automated analytical tool. Network, 23, 02. 
Gürses, S., Kundnani, A., & Van Hoboken, J. (2016). Crypto and empire: the 
contradictions of counter-surveillance advocacy. Media, Culture & Society, 38(4), 
576-590. 
Guest, G., Bunce, A., & Johnson, L. (2006). How many interviews are enough? An 
experiment with data saturation and variability. Field methods, 18(1), 59-82. 
Guttentag, D. (2015). Airbnb: disruptive innovation and the rise of an informal 
tourism accommodation sector. Current issues in Tourism, 18(12), 1192-1 
Hacking, I. (2004). Between Michel Foucault and Erving Goffman: between discourse 
in the abstract and face-to-face interaction. Economy and society, 33(3), 277-302. 
Hadjistavropoulos, T., & Smythe, W. E. (2001). Elements of risk in qualitative 
research. Ethics & Behavior, 11(2), 163-174. 
Hall, S. (1986). Variants of liberalism. Politics and ideology, 34-69. 
Hall, S., Critcher, C., Jefferson, T., Clarke, J., & Roberts, B. (2013). Policing the crisis: 
Mugging, the state and law and order. Macmillan International Higher Education. 
Hand, M. and Sandywell, B. 2002, E-topia as Cosmopolis or Citadel On the 
Democratizing and De-democratizing Logics of the Internet, or, Toward a Critique of 
the New Technological Fetishism, Theory, Culture & Society, Vol. 19(1–2): 197–225 
[0263-2764(200204)19:1–2;197–225;023254] 
 325 
Haraway, Donna (1991) ‘A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist- 
feminism in the Late Twentieth Century’, pp. 149–181 in Simians, Cyborgs and 
Women: The Reinvention of Nature. New York: Routledge. 
Haraway, D. J. (1997). Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium.FemaleMan Meets 
OncoMouse: Feminism and technoscience. New York: Routledge. 
Harré, R. (2002). Material objects in social worlds. Theory, Culture & Society, 19(5-6), 
23-33. 
Harvey, D. (2007). A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford University Press, USA. 
Haynor, A. L. (1989). Micro-macro integration in sociology: Whither progress?. 
In Sociological Forum (Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 447-453). Springer Netherlands. 
Hayward, K. (2007). Situational crime prevention and its discontents: rational choice 
theory versus the ‘culture of now’. Social Policy & Administration, 41(3), 232-250. 
Hayward KJ (2012) Five spaces of cultural criminology. British Journal of Criminology 
52(3): 441‐462. 
Haywood, D. (2012). The Ethic of the Code: An Ethnography of a “Humanitarian 
Hacking” Community. Journal of Peer Production, 3, 1-10. 
Healy, K. (2015). The performativity of networks. European Journal of 
Sociology/Archives Européennes de Sociologie, 56(2), 175-205. 
Heisenberg, D. (2005). Negotiating privacy: The European Union, the United States, 
and personal data protection (pp. 51-73). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Hillyard, P. (2004). Beyond criminology: Taking harm seriously. London: Pluto Press; 
Black Point, NS: Fernwood Pub.. 
Hinduja, S. (2012). The Heterogeneous Engineering of Music Piracy: Applying Actor‐
Network Theory to Internet‐Based Wrongdoing. Policy & Internet, 4(3-4), 229-248. 
Hine, C. (2008). Virtual ethnography: Modes, varieties, affordances. The SAGE 
handbook of online research methods, 257-270. 
Hine, C. (2015). Ethnography for the internet: Embedded, embodied and everyday. 
Bloomsbury Publishing. 
Hintz, A., & Milan, S. (2017). Through a Glass, Darkly: Everyday Acts of 
Authoritarianism in the Liberal West. 
Hoar, P., & Hope, W. (2002). The internet, the public sphere and the ‘digital divide’in 
New Zealand. Journal of International Communication, 8(2), 64-88. 
 326 
Hoepman, J. H., & Jacobs, B. (2008). Increased security through open source. arXiv 
preprint arXiv:0801.3924. 
Holstein, J. A., & Gubrium, J. F. (1995). The active interview (Vol. 37). Sage. 
Holt, T. J., & Bossler, A. M. (2008). Examining the applicability of lifestyle-routine 
activities theory for cybercrime victimization. Deviant Behavior, 30(1), 1-25. 
Holt, T. J., & Bossler, A. M. (2014). An assessment of the current state of cybercrime 
scholarship. Deviant Behavior, 35(1), 20-40. 
Holt, T. J., Burruss, G. W., & Bossler, A. (2015). Policing cybercrime and cyberterror. 
Criminal Justice and Criminology Faculty Publications, Paper 70 
Holt, T. J., Freilich, J. D., & Chermak, S. M. (2017). Exploring the subculture of 
ideologically motivated cyber-attackers. Journal of contemporary criminal 
justice, 33(3), 212-233. 
Holt, T. J., Brewer, R., & Goldsmith, A. (2019). Digital drift and the “sense of 
injustice”: Counter-productive policing of youth cybercrime. Deviant Behavior, 40(9), 
1144-1156. 
Honeywell, L, (2016), No more rock stars: how to stop abuse in tech communities, 
Leigh Honeywell’s Blog, Retrieved from: https://hypatia.ca/2016/06/21/no-more-
rock-stars/ 
Howard, P. N., & Parks, M. R. (2012). Social media and political change: Capacity, 
constraint, and consequence. Journal of Communication, 62(2), 359-362 
Hughes, E. (1993). A cypherpunk’s manifesto. Retrieved from: http://www.activism. 
net/cypherpunk/manifesto.html. 
Hutchings, A., & Hayes, H. (2009). Routine activity theory and phishing victimisation: 
Who gets caught in the ‘Net’?. Current Issues in Criminal Justice, 20(3), 433-452. 
Hutchings, A., & Chua, Y. T. (2016). Gendering cybercrime. In Cybercrime through an 
interdisciplinary lens (pp. 181-202). Routledge. 
Hutchings, A., & Clayton, R. (2016). Exploring the provision of online booter 
services. Deviant Behavior, 37(10), 1163-1178. 
Introna, L. D. (1997). On cyberspace and being: identity, self, and 
hyperreality. Philosophy in the Contemporary World, 4(1/2), 16-25. 
Isaak, J., & Hanna, M. J. (2018). User Data Privacy: Facebook, Cambridge Analytica, 
and Privacy Protection. Computer, 51(8), 56-59. 
 327 
Jardine, E. (2015). The Dark Web dilemma: Tor, anonymity and online 
policing. Global Commission on Internet Governance Paper Series, (21). 
Jardine, E. (2018). Tor, what is it good for? Political repression and the use of online 
anonymity-granting technologies. New media & society, 20(2), 435-452. 
Jesiek, B. (2003). Democratizing software: Open source, the hacker ethic, and 
beyond. First Monday, 8(10). 
Jewkes, Y. (2008). The role of the Internet in the twenty-first-century prison: insecure 
technologies in secure spaces. In Technologies of InSecurity (pp. 185-202). 
Routledge-Cavendish. 
Jewkes, Y., & Yar, M. (2012). Policing cybercrime: emerging trends and future 
challenges. In Handbook of policing (pp. 608-634). Willan. 
Joerges, B. (1999). Do politics have artefacts?. Social studies of science, 29(3), 411-
431. 
Jones, S. (2017). Disrupting the narrative: immersive journalism in virtual 
reality. Journal of Media Practice, 18(2-3), 171-185. 
Jordan, T., & Taylor, P. (1998). A sociology of hackers. The Sociological Review, 46(4), 
757-780. 
Just, N., & Latzer, M. (2017). Governance by algorithms: reality construction by 
algorithmic selection on the Internet. Media, Culture & Society, 39(2), 238-258. 
Kahler, M. (Ed.). (2011). Networked politics: agency, power, and governance. Cornell 
University Press. 
Kamphausen, G., & Werse, B. (2019). Digital figurations in the online trade of illicit 
drugs: a qualitative content analysis of darknet forums. International Journal of Drug 
Policy. 
Kehl, D., Wilson, A., & Bankston, K. (2015). Doomed to repeat history? Lessons from 
the Crypto Wars of the 1990s. Open Technology Institute Policy Paper, June. 
Kelty, C. M. (2008). Two bits: The cultural significance of free software. Duke 
University Press.  
Kim, S. (2011). The diffusion of the Internet: Trend and causes. Social Science 
Research, 40(2), 602-613. 
Kim, Y. (2011). The pilot study in qualitative inquiry: Identifying issues and learning 
lessons for culturally competent research. Qualitative Social Work, 10(2), 190-206. 
 328 
Kohl, U. (2013). Google: the rise and rise of online intermediaries in the governance 
of the Internet and beyond (Part 2). International Journal of Law and Information 
Technology, 21(2), 187-234. 
Kozinets, R. V. (2010). Netnography: Doing ethnographic research online. Sage 
publications. 
Kvale, S. (1996). InterViews: an introduction to qualitive research interviewing. Sage. 
Kvale, S., & Brinkmann, S. (2009). Interviews: Learning the craft of qualitative 
research interviewing. Sage. 
Ladegaard, I. (2017). We know where you are, what you are doing and we will catch 
you: Testing deterrence theory in digital drug markets. The British Journal of 
Criminology, 58(2), 414-433. 
Ladegaard, I. (2019). “I pray that we will find a way to carry on this dream”: How a 
law enforcement crackdown united an online community. Critical sociology, 45(4-5), 
631-646. 
Laidlaw, E.B. (2012). The responsibilities of free speech regulators: an analysis of the 
Internet Watch Foundation. International Journal of Law and Information 
Technology, 20(4), 312-345. 
Lanchester, J. (2019), Document number nine, London Review of Books, Retrieved 
from: https://www.lrb.co.uk/v41/n19/john-lanchester/document-number-nine 
Laterza, V. (2018). Cambridge Analytica, independent research and the national 
interest. Anthropology Today, 34(3), 1-2. 
Latour, B. (1987). Science in action: How to follow scientists and engineers through 
society. Harvard university press. 
Latour, B. (2005). Reassembling the social: An introduction to actor-network-theory. 
Oxford university press. 
Latour, B. (2007) ‘Turning around politics: a note on Gerard de Vries’ paper’, Social 
Studies of Science, 37 (5): 811–20. 
Laudel, G., & Gläser, J. (2007). Interviewing scientists. Science, Technology & 
Innovation Studies, 3(2). 
Law, J., & Singleton, V. (2000). Performing technology's stories: On social 
constructivism, performance, and performativity. Technology and Culture, 41(4), 
765-775. 
Law, J., & Singleton, V. (2005). Object lessons. Organization, 12(3), 331-355. 
 329 
Law, J. (2009). Actor network theory and material semiotics. Social theory, 141. 
Lave, J (1991). Situating learning in communities of practice. Perspectives on socially 
shared cognition, 2, 63-82. 
Lazarus, S. (2019). Just married: the synergy between feminist criminology and the 
Tripartite Cybercrime Framework. International Social Science Journal. 
Lee, M. (2014), Fact-checking Pando’s smears against Tor, Micah Lee’s Blog, 
Retreived from: https://micahflee.com/2014/12/fact-checking-pandos-smears-
against-tor/ 
Leiner, B. M., Cerf, V. G., Clark, D. D., Kahn, R. E., Kleinrock, L., Lynch, D. C., ... & 
Wolff, S. (2009). A brief history of the Internet. ACM SIGCOMM Computer 
Communication Review, 39(5), 22-31. 
Levine, Y. (2014), Almost Everyone Involved in Developing Tor was (or is) Funded by 
the US Government, Pando, https://pando.com/2014/07/16/tor-spooks/ 
Lemke, T. (2015). Foucault, governmentality, and critique. Routledge. 
Levi, M., & Leighton Williams, M. (2013). Multi-agency partnerships in cybercrime 
reduction: Mapping the UK information assurance network cooperation 
space. Information Management & Computer Security, 21(5), 420-443. 
Leizerov, S. (2000). Privacy advocacy groups versus Intel: A case study of how social 
movements are tactically using the Internet to fight corporations. Social science 
computer review, 18(4), 461-483. 
Lemke, T. (2001) 'The birth of bio-politics': Michel Foucault's lecture at the Collège 
de France on neo-liberal governmentality, Economy and Society, 30:2, 190-207, 
Lessig, L. (1999a). Code is law. The Industry Standard, 18. 
Lessig, L. (1999b). Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace. New York: Basic Books 
Leukfeldt, E. R., & Yar, M. (2016). Applying routine activity theory to cybercrime: A 
theoretical and empirical analysis. Deviant Behavior, 37(3), 263-280. 
Levina, M., & Hasinoff, A. A. (2017). The Silicon Valley ethos: Tech Industry products, 
discourses, and practices. Television & New Media, 18(6), 489-495. 
Levy, S. (1984). Hackers: Heroes of the computer revolution (Vol. 14). Garden City, 
NY: Anchor Press/Doubleday. 
Levy, S. (1996). Crypto rebels. High noon on the electronic frontier, 185-205. 
Lewis, S.J., (2017), Queer Privacy, https://leanpub.com/queerprivacy 
 330 
Lewis, R., Rowe, M., & Wiper, C. (2016). Online abuse of feminists as an emerging 
form of violence against women and girls. British journal of criminology, 57(6), 1462-
1481. 
Liang, F., Das, V., Kostyuk, N., & Hussain, M. M. (2018). Constructing a Data‐Driven 
Society: China's Social Credit System as a State Surveillance Infrastructure. Policy & 
Internet, 10(4), 415-453. 
Licoppe, C. (2010). The ‘performative turn’in science and technology studies: 
Towards a linguistic anthropology of ‘technology in action’. Journal of Cultural 
Economy, 3(2), 181-188. 
Lippert, R., & Stenson, K. (2010). Advancing governmentality studies: Lessons from 
social constructionism. Theoretical criminology, 14(4), 473-494. 
Lischka, J. A. (2015). Surveillance discourse in UK broadcasting since the Snowden 
revelations. Digital Citizenship and Surveillance Society Media Stream.(Discussion 
paper). http://www. dcssproject. net/files/2015/12/DCSS_Broadcasting-report. pdf. 
Littig, B. (2009). Interviewing the elite—Interviewing experts: Is there a difference?. 
In Interviewing experts (pp. 98-113). Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
Licoppe, C. (2010). The 'performative turn' in Science and Technology Studies, 
Journal of Cultural Economy, 3:2, 181-188, DOI: 10.1080/17530350.2010.494122 
Liebling, A. (2015). Appreciative inquiry, generative theory, and the ‘failed state 
prison’. Qualitative Research in Criminology. Advances in Criminological Theory. New 
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 251-269. 
Ljungberg, J. (2000). Open source movements as a model for organising. European 
Journal of Information Systems, 9(4), 208-216. 
Loader, I. (2005). Fall of the ‘platonic guardians’ liberalism, criminology and political 
responses to crime in England and Wales. British Journal of Criminology, 46(4), 561-
586. 
Loll, A. (2016), Power, secrecy and cypherpunks: how Jacob Appelbaum ripped Tor 
apart, The Guardian, Retrieved from: 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/11/jacob-appelbaum-tor-
project-sexual-assault-allegations 
Lorenzo-Dus, N., & Di Cristofaro, M. (2018). ‘I know this whole market is based on 
the trust you put in me and I don’t take that lightly’: Trust, community and discourse 
in crypto-drug markets. Discourse & Communication, 12(6), 608-626. 
Luckman, S. (1999). (En) gendering the digital body: Feminism and the 
Internet. Hecate, 25(2), 36. 
 331 
Luppicini, R. (2014). Illuminating the Dark Side of the Internet with Actor-Network 
Theory: An Integrative Review of Current Cybercrime Research. Global Media 
Journal: Canadian Edition, 7(1).  
Lusthaus, J. (2013). How organised is organised cybercrime?. Global Crime, 14(1), 52-
60. 
Lyon, D., & Zureik, E. (1996). Surveillance, privacy, and the new 
technology. Computers, surveillance, and privacy, 1-18. 
Lyon, D. (2002). Surveillance Studies: Understanding visibility, mobility and the 
phenetic fix. Surveillance & Society, 1(1), 1-7. 
Lyon, D. (2007). Surveillance, security and social sorting: emerging research 
priorities. International criminal justice review, 17(3), 161-170. 
Lyon, D. (2007). Surveillance studies: An overview. Polity. 
Lyon, D. (2014). Surveillance, Snowden, and big data: Capacities, consequences, 
critique. Big Data & Society, 1(2), 2053951714541861. 
Lyon, D. (2015). Surveillance after Snowden. John Wiley & Sons. 
Lyon, D. (2017). Digital citizenship and surveillance| surveillance culture: 
Engagement, exposure, and ethics in digital modernity. International Journal of 
Communication, 11, 19. 
Mackenzie, A. (2005). The performativity of code: software and cultures of 
circulation. Theory, Culture & Society, 22(1), 71-92. 
MacKenzie, D. (2006). Is economics performative? Option theory and the 
construction of derivatives markets. Journal of the history of economic 
thought, 28(1), 29-55. 
Maddox, A., Barratt, M. J., Allen, M., & Lenton, S. (2016). Constructive activism in the 
dark web: cryptomarkets and illicit drugs in the digital ‘demimonde’. Information, 
Communication & Society, 19(1), 111-126. 
Mair, G. (2013). Technology and the future of community penalties. In Community 
Penalties (pp. 182-196). Willan. 
Marcum, C. D., Higgins, G. E., Ricketts, M. L., & Wolfe, S. E. (2014). Hacking in high 
school: Cybercrime perpetration by juveniles. Deviant Behavior, 35(7), 581-591. 
Maréchal, N. (2015). Ranking digital rights: Human rights, the Internet and the fifth 
estate. International Journal of Communication, 9(10), 3440-3449. 
 332 
Marechal (2018). PhD Thesis: Use Signal, Use Tor? The Political Economy of Digital 
Rights Technology 
Matthews, F. H. 1977: Quest for an American Sociology: Robert E. Park and the 
Chicago School. London: McGill Queen's University Press 
Marwick, A. (2017). Silicon Valley and the social media industry. Sage Handbook of 
Social Media. London: Sage. 
McCoy, D. et al. (2008), Shining light in dark places: understanding the Tor network” 
In International Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (pp 63-
67). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg 
McDonald, H, (2016), Boston College ordered by US court to hand over IRA tapes, 
The Guardian, Retreived from:  https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2016/apr/25/boston-college-ordered-by-us-court-to-hand-over-ira-tapes 
McGuire, M. R. (2016). Cybercrime 4.0: now what is to be done?. In What is to Be 
Done About Crime and Punishment? (pp. 251-279). Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
McIlwain, C. (2019). Black Software: The Internet and Racial Justice, from the AfroNet 
to Black Lives Matter. Oxford University Press, USA. 
McLaughlin, P. (2016). Crypto Wars 2.0: Why Listening to Apple on Encryption Will 
Make America More Secure. Temp. Int'l & Comp. LJ, 30, 353. 
Melvin, A. O., & Ayotunde, T. (2011). Spirituality in cybercrime (Yahoo Yahoo) 
activities among youths in South West Nigeria. In Youth culture and net culture: 
Online social practices (pp. 357-380). IGI Global. 
Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self, and society: From the standpoint of a social 
behaviorist (Works of George Herbert Mead, Vol. 1). University of Chicago Press 
Mead, G. H. (1964) “The Objective Reality of Perspectives,” in A.J. Reck (ed), Selected 
Writings of George Herbert Mead (Chicago: University of Chicago Press): 306–19.  
Milan, S. (2013). Social movements and their technologies: Wiring social change. 
Springer. 
Milan, S. (2016). Stealing the Fire. Communication for Development from the 
Margins of Cyberspace. Voice & Matter. Communication, Development and the 
Cultural Return, edited by Thomas Tufte and Oscar Hemer, NORDICOM, 59-70. 
Milan, S., & Van Der Velden, L. (2016). The alternative epistemologies of data 
activism. Digital Culture & Society, 2(2), 57-74. 
Milan, S., & ten Oever, N. (2017). Coding and encoding rights in internet 
infrastructure. Internet Policy Review, 6(1). 
 333 
Milivojevic, S. (2019a). ‘Stealing the fire’, 2.0 style? Technology, the pursuit of 
mobility, social memory and de-securitization of migration. Theoretical 
Criminology, 23(2), 211-227. 
Milivojevic, S. (2019b). Border Policing and Security Technologies: Mobility and 
Proliferation of Borders in the Western Balkans. Routledge. 
Minárik, T., & Osula, A. M. (2016). Tor does not stink: Use and abuse of the Tor 
anonymity network from the perspective of law. Computer Law & Security 
Review, 32(1), 111-127. 
Mohanty, C. T. (2013). Transnational feminist crossings: On neoliberalism and radical 
critique. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 38(4), 967-991. 
Mol, A. (2010). Actor-network theory: Sensitive terms and enduring tensions. Kölner 
Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie. Sonderheft, 50, 253-269. 
Monsees, L. (2019). Crypto-Politics: Encryption and Democratic Practices in the 
Digital Era. Routledge. 
Moore, D., & Rid, T. (2016). Cryptopolitik and the Darknet. Survival, 58(1), 7-38 
Moore, M. (2016). Tech giants and civic power. Centre for the Study of Media, 
Communication and Power.” King's College London. 
Moore, M., & Tambini, D. (Eds.). (2018). Digital dominance: the power of Google, 
Amazon, Facebook, and Apple. Oxford University Press. 
Monteiro, E., & Hanseth, O. (1996). Social shaping of information infrastructure: on 
being specific about the technology. In Information technology and changes in 
organizational work (pp. 325-343). Springer, Boston, MA. 
Mueller, R. S. (2019). Report on the investigation into Russian interference in the 
2016 presidential election. US Dept. of Justice. Washington, DC. 
Munksgaard, R., & Demant, J. (2016). Mixing politics and crime–The prevalence and 
decline of political discourse on the cryptomarket. International Journal of Drug 
Policy, 35, 77-83. 
Murdoch, SJ & Danezis, G. (2005). Low-cost traffic analysis of Tor. In 2005 IEEE 
Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P05) (pp. 183-195). IEEE 
Murdoch, J. (1998). The spaces of actor-network theory. Geoforum, 29(4), 357-374. 
Murdoch, S. J., & Kadianakis, G. (2012). Pluggable transports roadmap. The Tor 
Project, Tech. Rep, 03-003. 
 334 
Murphy, E., & Dingwall, R. (2001). The ethics of ethnography. Handbook of 
ethnography, 339-351. 
Musiani, F. (2013). Network architecture as internet governance. Internet Policy 
Review. 
Musiani, F. (2010). Privacy as invisibility: pervasive surveillance and the privatization 
of peer-to-peer systems. TripleC, 9(2), 126-140. 
Musiani, F. (2012). Caring about the plumbing: On the importance of architectures in 
social studies of (peer-to-peer) technology. Journal of peer production, 1(online), 8-p. 
Musiani, F. (2015). Practice, plurality, performativity, and plumbing: Internet 
governance research meets science and technology studies. Science, Technology, & 
Human Values, 40(2), 272-286. 
Musiani, F., Cogburn, D. L., DeNardis, L., & Levinson, N. S. (Eds.). (2016). The turn to 
infrastructure in Internet governance. Springer. 
Myers, D. (1987). “Anonymity is part of the magic”: Individual manipulation of 
computer-mediated communication contexts. Qualitative Sociology, 10(3), 251-266. 
Nafus, D. (2012). ‘Patches don’t have gender’: What is not open in open source 
software. New Media & Society, 14(4), 669-683. 
Nakamoto, S. (2008). Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system. 
Nakamura, L. (2013). Cybertypes: Race, ethnicity, and identity on the Internet. 
Routledge. 
Nakamura, L., & Lovink, G. (2005). Talking race and cyberspace: An interview with 
Lisa Nakamura. Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies, 26(1), 60-65. 
Nellis, M., Beyens, K., & Kaminski, D. (Eds.). (2013). Electronically monitored 
punishment: International and critical perspectives. Routledge. 
Nissenbaum, H. (1998). Protecting privacy in an information age: The problem of 
privacy in public. Law and philosophy, 17(5), 559-596. 
Nissenbaum, H. (2004). Hackers and the contested ontology of cyberspace. New 
media & society, 6(2), 195-217. 
Nissenbaum, H. (2009). Privacy in context: Technology, policy, and the integrity of 
social life. Stanford University Press. 
Nissenbaum, H. (2011). A contextual approach to privacy online. Daedalus, 140(4), 
32-48. 
 335 
Noble, S. U. (2018). Algorithms of oppression: How search engines reinforce racism. 
NYU Press. 
Nye, J. S. (2004). Soft power. In Power in the global information age (pp. 76-88). 
Routledge. 
O'Neil, C. (2016). Weapons of math destruction: How big data increases inequality 
and threatens democracy. Broadway Books. 
Orlikowski, W. J. (2005). Material works: Exploring the situated entanglement of 
technological performativity and human agency. Scandinavian Journal of Information 
Systems, 17(1), 6. 
Pastrana, S., Hutchings, A., Caines, A., & Buttery, P. (2018, September). 
Characterizing eve: Analysing cybercrime actors in a large underground forum. 
In International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses (pp. 
207-227). Springer, Cham. 
Pfitzmann, A., & Hansen, M. (2005). Anonymity, unlinkability, unobservability, 
pseudonymity, and identity management-a consolidated proposal for terminology. 
Pickard, V. (2007) Neoliberal visions and revisions in global communications policy 
from NWICO to WSIS, Journal of Communication Inquiry, 31(2), 118-139 
Pinch, T. (2010). The invisible technologies of Goffman's sociology from the merry-
go-round to the internet. Technology and culture, 51(2), 409-424. 
Pink, S. (2016). Digital ethnography. Innovative methods in media and 
communication research, 161-165. 
Plummer, K. (2000). A world in the making: Symbolic interactionism in the twentieth 
century. A Companion to Social Theory. 2nd ed,  Blackwell 193-222. 
Pothineni, D., Mishra, P., Rasheed, A., & Sundararajan, D. (2014, April). Incentive 
design to mould online behavior: a game mechanics perspective. In Proceedings of 
the First International Workshop on Gamification for Information Retrieval (pp. 27-
32). ACM. 
Pollock, N., & Williams, R. (2008). Software and organisations: The biography of the 
enterprise-wide system or how SAP conquered the world. Routledge. 
Pollock, N., & Williams, R. (2010). E-infrastructures: How do we know and 
understand them? Strategic ethnography and the biography of artefacts. Computer 
Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW), 19(6), 521-556. 
Postill, J. (2014). Freedom technologists and the new protest movements: A theory 
of protest formulas. Convergence, 20(4), 402-418. 
 336 
Powell, A. (2012). Democratizing production through open source knowledge: from 
open software to open hardware. Media, Culture & Society, 34(6), 691-708. 
Raab, C. D. (1997). Privacy, democracy, information. The Governance of Cyberspace, 
London: Routledge, 155-74. 
Raab, C. D., Jones, R., & Székely, I. (2015). Surveillance and resilience in theory and 
practice. Media and Communication, 3(2). 
Rapp, L., Button, D. M., Fleury-Steiner, B., & Fleury-Steiner, R. (2010). The internet as 
a tool for black feminist activism: Lessons from an online antirape protest. Feminist 
Criminology, 5(3), 244-262. 
Rawlinson, K. (2015), Banning Tor unwise and infeasible, MPs told, BBC News, 
Retrieved from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-31816410 
The Register, (2017), Tor loses a node in Russia after activist's arrest in Moscow, 
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/04/13/tor_loses_a_node_in_russia_after_activi
sts_arrest_in_moscow/ 
Reiman, J., & Leighton, P. (2015). Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Prison, The 
(Subscription): Ideology, Class, and Criminal Justice. Routledge. 
Reyns, B. W. (2010). A situational crime prevention approach to cyberstalking 
victimization: Preventive tactics for Internet users and online place managers. Crime 
Prevention and Community Safety, 12(2), 99-118. 
Rider, K. (2018) The privacy paradox: how market privacy facilitates government 
surveillance, Information, Communication & Society, 21(10), 1369-1385. 
Ritchie, J., Lewis, J., Nicholls, C. M., & Ormston, R. (Eds.). (2013). Qualitative research 
practice: A guide for social science students and researchers. sage. 
Ritzer, G. (2015). Prosumer capitalism. The Sociological Quarterly, 56(3), 413-445. 
Ritzer, G., Dean, P., & Jurgenson, N. (2012). The coming of age of the 
prosumer. American behavioral scientist, 56(4), 379-398. 
Ritzer, G., & Jurgenson, N. (2010). Production, consumption, prosumption: The 
nature of capitalism in the age of the digital ‘prosumer’. Journal of consumer 
culture, 10(1), 13-36. 
Rivest, R. L. (1998). The case against regulating encryption technology. Scientific 
American, 279(4), 116-117. 
Rock, P. (Ed.). (1994). History of criminology. Aldershot: Dartmouth. 
 337 
Rogaway, P. (2015). The Moral Character of Cryptographic Work. IACR Cryptology 
ePrint Archive, 2015, 1162. 
Saco, D. (1999). Colonizing Cyberspace:‘National Security’and the Internet. Cultures 
of insecurity: States, communities, and the production of danger, 14, 261. 
Salter, M. (2018). From geek masculinity to Gamergate: the technological rationality 
of online abuse. Crime, Media, Culture, 14(2), 247-264. 
Sampson, H. (2004). Navigating the waves: the usefulness of a pilot in qualitative 
research. Qualitative research, 4(3), 383-402. 
Saunders, K. W. (1991). Privacy and Social Contract: A Defense of Judicial Activism in 
Privacy Cases. Ariz. L. Rev., 33, 811. 
Schafer, B. (2016). Surveillance for the masses: the political and legal landscape of 
the UK Investigatory Powers Bill. Datenschutz und Datensicherheit-DuD, 40(9), 592-
597. 
Schlossman, D. (2017). Actors and Activists: Performance, Politics, and Exchange 
Among Social Worlds. Routledge. 
Schneier, B. (2014). Metadata= surveillance. IEEE Security & Privacy, 12(2), 84-84. 
Schuilenburg, M. (2017). The securitization of society: crime, risk, and social 
order (Vol. 12). NYU Press. 
Schulze, M. (2017). Clipper meets Apple vs. FBI: a comparison of the cryptography 
discourses from 1993 and 2016. Media and Communication, 5(1), 54-62. 
Scordato, M., & Monopoli, P. A. (2002). Free Speech Rationales After September 
11th: The First Amendment in Post-World Trade Center America. Stan. L. & Pol'y 
Rev., 13, 185. 
Scott, M. (1994), Trouble and Her Friends, Tor 
Sherman, L. W. (2009). Evidence and liberty: The promise of experimental 
criminology. Criminology & Criminal Justice, 9(1), 5-28. 
Shibutani, T. (1955) “Reference Groups as Perspectives,” American Journal of 
Sociology 60: 562–9. 
Skibell, R. (2002). The myth of the computer hacker. Information, Communication & 
Society, 5(3), 336-356. 
Smith, M., Szongott, C., Henne, B., & Von Voigt, G. (2012). Big data privacy issues in 
public social media. In 2012 6th IEEE International Conference on Digital Ecosystems 
and Technologies (DEST) (pp. 1-6). IEEE. 
 338 
Smythe, William, and Maureen Murray. 2000. Owning the story: Ethical 
considerations in narrative research. Ethics and Behaviour 10 (4): 311–36.  
Snader, R. & Borisov, N. (2008). A tune-up for Tor: improving security and 
performance in the Tor network. In NDSS (8): 127 
Söderberg, J. (2015). Hacking capitalism: The free and open source software 
movement. Routledge. 
Solove, D. (2008). Understanding privacy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Solove, D. J. (2011). Nothing to hide: The false tradeoff between privacy and security. 
Yale University Press. 
Sparks, R. (2002). Out of the Digger' The Warrior's Honour and the Guilty 
Observer. Ethnography, 3(4), 556-581. 
Stallman, R. (2002). Free software, free society: Selected essays of Richard M. 
Stallman. Lulu. com. 
Star, S. L. (1988). The structure of ill-structured solutions: Boundary objects and 
heterogeneous distributed problem solving. In Readings in distributed artificial 
intelligence, ed. M. Huhns and L. Gasser. Menlo Park, CA: Kaufman. 
Star, S.L. and Griesemer, J.R., 1989. “Institutional ecology, ‘translations’ and 
boundary objects: amateurs and professionals in Berkely’s Museum of Vertebrate 
Zoology, 1907-39”, Social Studies of Science, 19 (3): 387-420 
Star, S. L. (1990). Power, technology and the phenomenology of conventions: on 
being allergic to onions. The Sociological Review, 38(1_suppl), 26-56. 
Star, S. L., & Ruhleder, K. (1996). Steps toward an ecology of infrastructure: Design 
and access for large information spaces. Information systems research, 7(1), 111-
134. 
Star, S. L. (1999). The ethnography of infrastructure. American behavioral 
scientist, 43(3), 377-391. 
Star, S. L., & Strauss, A. (1999). Layers of silence, arenas of voice: The ecology of 
visible and invisible work. Computer supported cooperative work (CSCW), 8(1-2), 9-
30. 
Star, S. L., Bowker, G. C., & Neumann, L. J. (1998). Transparency at different level of 
scale: convergence between information artefacts and social worlds. Library and 
Information Science, Urbana-Champaign. 
Star, S.L. (2010). This is not a boundary object: Reflections on the origin of a 
concept. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 35(5), 601-617. 
 339 
Steijn, W. M., & Vedder, A. (2015). Privacy under construction: A developmental 
perspective on privacy perception. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 40(4), 615-
637. 
Steinmetz, K. F. (2016). Hacked: A radical approach to hacker culture and crime. NYU 
Press. 
Stenson, K. (2005). Sovereignty, biopolitics and the local government of crime in 
Britain. Theoretical criminology, 9(3), 265-287. 
Sterling, B. (2002). The Hacker Crackdown, IndyPublish.com 
Stratton, G., Powell, A., & Cameron, R. (2017). Crime and justice in digital society: 
towards a ‘Digital Criminology’?. International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social 
Democracy, 6(2), 17-33. 
Strauss, A (1978) “A Social World Perspective,” in Norman Denzin (ed.), Studies in 
Symbolic Interaction 1: 119–128, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press 
Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1994). Grounded theory methodology. Handbook of 
qualitative research, 17, 273-85. 
Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. M. (1997). Grounded theory in practice. Sage. 
Surette R (2015) Performance, crime and justice. Current Issues in Criminal Justice 
27(2): 195‐216. 
Suzor, N., Dragiewicz, M., Harris, B., Gillett, R., Burgess, J., & Van Geelen, T. (2019). 
Human Rights by Design: The Responsibilities of Social Media Platforms to Address 
Gender‐Based Violence Online. Policy & Internet, 11(1), 84-103. 
Swire, P., & Ahmad, K. (2012). Encryption and Globalization. Columbia Science and 
Technology Law Review, 23. 
Syverson, P. (2009, April). Why I’m not an entropist. In International Workshop on 
Security Protocols (pp. 213-230). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
Taylor, P. (2012). Hackers: Crime and the digital sublime. Routledge. 
Taylor, I., Walton, P., & Young, J. (2013). The new criminology: For a social theory of 
deviance. Routledge. 
Techdirt (2017), Here's What Happened When The Dutch Secret Service Tried To 




Teicher, M. (2015). Interviewing Subject Matter Experts. International Cost 
Estimating and Analysis Association (ICEAA). 
Tepper, M. (2013). Usenet communities and the cultural politics of information. 
In Internet culture (pp. 39-54). Routledge. 
Tesar, M. (2015). Ethics and truth in archival research. History of Education, 44(1), 
101-114. 
Thomas, G., & Wyatt, S. (1999). Shaping cyberspace—Interpreting and transforming 
the Internet. Research Policy, 28(7), 681-698. 
Thomson, D., Bzdel, L., Golden-Biddle, K., Reay, T., & Estabrooks, C. A. (2005, 
January). Central questions of anonymization: A case study of secondary use of 
qualitative data. In Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: Qualitative Social 
Research (Vol. 6, No. 1). 
Thomson, T. (2016), Rosewater, Orbit 
Tomczak, P. (2016). The penal voluntary sector. Routledge. 
Tor Project (2019), History, https://www.torproject.org/about/history/ accessed 
06/11/2019 
Trottier, D., & Fuchs, C. (Eds.). (2014). Social media, politics and the state: Protests, 
revolutions, riots, crime and policing in the age of Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. 
Routledge. 
Turner, T. C., Smith, M. A., Fisher, D., & Welser, H. T. (2005). Picturing Usenet: 
Mapping computer-mediated collective action. Journal of Computer-Mediated 
Communication, 10(4), JCMC1048. 
University of Edinburgh (2019), Research Ethics and Integrity, 
https://www.ed.ac.uk/arts-humanities-soc-sci/research-ke/support-for-staff/res-
ethics-policies/ethics 
Unruh, D. R. (1980). The nature of social worlds. Pacific Sociological Review, 23(3), 
271-296. 
Van Teijlingen, E., & Hundley, V. (2002). The importance of pilot studies. Nursing 
Standard (through 2013), 16(40), 33. 
Van der Wagen, W., & Pieters, W. (2015). From cybercrime to cyborg crime: Botnets 
as hybrid criminal actor-networks. British journal of criminology, 55(3), 578-595. 
Vedder, A. (2011). Privacy 3.0. In Innovating Government (pp. 17-28). TMC Asser 
Press. 
 341 
Venturini, T. (2010). Diving in magma: how to explore controversies with actor-
network theory. Public understanding of science, 19(3), 258-273. 
Vincent, J., & Haddon, L. (Eds.). (2017). Smartphone cultures. Routledge. 
Viseu, A., Clement, A., & Aspinall, J. (2004). Situating privacy online: Complex 
perceptions and everyday practices. Information, Communication & Society, 7(1), 92-
114. 
Vold, G. B. (1951). Criminology at the Crossroads. The Journal of Criminal Law, 
Criminology, and Police Science, 42(2), 155-162. 
Von Bernstorff, J. (2003). Democratic global Internet regulation? Governance 
networks, international law and the shadow of hegemony. European Law Journal, 
9(4), 511-526. 
Wacquant, L. (2009). Punishing the poor: The neoliberal government of social 
insecurity. duke university Press. 
Wacquant, L. (2012). Three steps to a historical anthropology of actually existing 
neoliberalism. Social anthropology, 20(1), 66-79. 
Wachter-Boettcher, S. (2017). Technically wrong: sexist apps, biased algorithms, and 
other threats of toxic tech. WW Norton & Company. 
Wagner, B. (2013). Governing Internet Expression: How public and private regulation 
shape expression governance. Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 10(4), 
389-403. 
Wall, D. S. (1998). Catching cybercriminals: policing the Internet. International 
Review of Law, Computers & Technology, 12(2), 201-218. 
Wall, D. (1999). Cybercrimes: New wine, no bottles?. In Invisible crimes (pp. 105-
139). Palgrave Macmillan, London 
Wall, D. (2007). Cybercrime: The transformation of crime in the information age (Vol. 
4). Polity. 
Wall, D. S. (2012). The devil drives a Lada: The social construction of hackers as 
cybercriminals. In Constructing Crime (pp. 4-18). Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
Wall, D. S., & Williams, M. L. (2013). Policing cybercrime: networked and social media 
technologies and the challenges for policing. 
Walton, P., & Young, J. (Eds.). (1998). The new criminology revisited. London: 
Macmillan. 
 342 
Watson, K. D. (2012). The Tor network: a global inquiry into the legal status of 
anonymity networks. Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev., 11, 715. 
Weeks, J. (1982, October). Foucault for historians. In History Workshop (pp. 106-
119). Editorial Collective, History Workshop, Ruskin College. 
Weis, A. H. (2010). Commercialization of the Internet. Internet Research, 20(4), 420-
435. 
Weisburd, D. (1997). Reorienting crime prevention research and policy: From the 
causes of criminality to the context of crime. US Department of Justice, Office of 
Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice. 
Weimann, G. (2016). Going dark: Terrorism on the dark web. Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, 39(3), 195-206. 
Whittle, A., & Spicer, A. (2008). Is actor network theory critique?. Organization 
studies, 29(4), 611-629. 
Wilding, F., & Cyberfeminist International. (1998). Where is feminism in 
cyberfeminism?, n.paradoxa. Vol 2. 
Wiles, Rose, Graham Crow, Sue Heath, and Vikki Charles. 2008. The management of 
confidentiality and anonymity in social research. International Journal of Social 
Research Methodology 11 (5): 417–28. 
Williams, J. W., & Lippert, R. (2006). Governing on the margins: Exploring the 
contributions of governmentality studies to critical criminology in Canada. Canadian 
journal of criminology and criminal justice, 48(5), 703-720. 
Williams, M. L. (2015). Guardians upon high: an application of routine activities 
theory to online identity theft in Europe at the country and individual level. British 
Journal of Criminology, 56(1), 21-48. 
Williams, R., Stewart, J., & Slack, R. (2005). Social learning in technological 
innovation: Experimenting with information and communication technologies. 
Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Williams, S. (2015). Digital defense: Black feminists resist violence with hashtag 
activism. Feminist Media Studies, 15(2), 341-344. 
Williams, S. J. (1986). Appraising Goffman. British Journal of Sociology, 348-369. 
Williams, B. A., Brooks, C. F., & Shmargad, Y. (2018). How algorithms discriminate 
based on data they lack: Challenges, solutions, and policy implications. Journal of 
Information Policy, 8, 78-115. 
 343 
Winner, L. (1999). Do artefacts have politics? The Social Shaping of Technology. DA 
MacKenzie and J. Wajcman, eds. 
Winter, P., & Lindskog, S. (2012). How china is blocking tor. arXiv preprint 
arXiv:1204.0447. 
Wood, D. M., & Wright, S. (2015). Before and after Snowden. Surveillance & 
Society, 13(2), 132-138. 
Wright, D., & Raab, C. (2014). Privacy principles, risks and harms. International 
Review of Law, Computers & Technology, 28(3), 277-298. 
Yar, M. (2012). Virtual utopias and dystopias: The cultural imaginary of the 
Internet. Utopia: Social Theory and the Future, 179-95. 
Yar, M. (2014). The cultural imaginary of the Internet: virtual utopias and dystopias. 
Springer. 
Yar, M. (2005). The Novelty of ‘Cybercrime’ An Assessment in Light of Routine 
Activity Theory. European Journal of Criminology, 2(4), 407-427. 
Yar, M. (2017). Toward a cultural criminology of the Internet. In Technocrime and 
criminological theory (pp. 132-148). Routledge. 
Yar, M., & Steinmetz, K. F. (2019). Cybercrime and society. SAGE Publications Limited. 
Yip, M., Webber, C., & Shadbolt, N. (2013). Trust among cybercriminals? Carding 
forums, uncertainty and implications for policing. Policing and Society, 23(4), 516-
539. 
Youmans, W. L., & York, J. C. (2012). Social media and the activist toolkit: User 
agreements, corporate interests, and the information infrastructure of modern social 
movements. Journal of Communication, 62(2), 315-329. 
Young, J. (1988). Radical criminology in Britain: The emergence of a competing 
paradigm. Brit. J. Criminology, 28, 159. 
Young, J. (2009). Moral Panic, Its Origins in Resistance, Ressentiment and the 
Translation of Fantasy into Reality. British Journal of Criminology, 49(1), 4-16. 
Young, J. (2011). Moral panics and the transgressive other. Crime, media, 
culture, 7(3), 245-258. 
Zwitter, A. (2014). Big data ethics. Big Data & Society, 1(2), 2053951714559253. 
Zuboff, S. (2019). The age of surveillance capitalism: The fight for a human future at 
the new frontier of power, Public Affairs. 
 344 
Zuboff, S. (2015). Big other: surveillance capitalism and the prospects of an 
information civilization. Journal of Information Technology, 30(1), 75-89. 





list of participants 
Core Tor developers: 
• Participant A – Interview carried out in-person. 
• Participant B – Interview carried out over online voice call 
• Participant C – Interview carried out over Signal voice call. 
• Participant D - Interview carried out in-person. 
• Participant E – Interview carried out over email.  
• Participant F – Interview carried out over Skype call.  
• Participant G – Interview carried out in-person 
• Participant H – Interview carried out in-person 
• Participant I – Interview carried out over Skype call 
Other core contributors to the Tor Project: 
• Participant J – Interview carried out over Skype call 
• Participant K –Interview carried out over Skype video chat. 
• Participant L - Interview carried out over Skype video chat.  
Academics and Open Source contributors: 
• Participant M – an academic conducting research on Tor. Interview carried 
out over Skype call. 
• Participant N - an Open Source contributor to Tor and a relay operator. 
Interview carried out over Skype call. 
Relay operators: 
• Participant O – Interview carried out over encrypted XMPP chat. 
• Participant P – Interview carried out over Skype text chat. 
 346 
• Participant Q – Interview carried out over Skype call. 
• Participant R – Interview carried out over Skype video chat. 
• Participant S – Interview carried out via email. 
• Participant T – Interview carried out via email.  
• Participant U – also a sysadmin at an Internet Service Provider. Interview 
carried out in-person. 
• Participant V – Interview carried out in-person. 
• Participant W – Interview carried out in-person. 
Hidden Service developers: 
• Participant X – Interview carried out over Skype video chat. 
• Participant Y – Interview carried out over Skype video chat. 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 as a 
crim
in
al 
te
ch
n
o
lo
gy
Im
age
 in
h
ib
its 
co
o
p
e
ratio
n
 w
ith
 
o
th
er te
ch
 gro
u
p
s
Stro
n
gly articu
late
 
valu
es an
d
 
d
e
sired
 u
sers
B
rin
g u
sers in
to
 
d
e
sign
 w
o
rk
A
sse
rt To
r as 
h
avin
g le
gitim
ate
 
claim
 to
 re
p
re
sen
t 
its u
sers
Flatten
s o
n
lin
e
 p
o
w
e
r fo
r its 
u
se
rs b
u
t re
lie
s o
n
 
in
frastru
ctu
re w
h
ich
 sits 
ato
p
 th
e In
tern
et
1
. W
h
a
t a
re th
e so
cia
l w
o
rld
s o
f To
r?
2
. H
o
w
 d
o
 th
ey sh
a
p
e th
e tech
?
3
. H
id
d
en
 w
o
rk?
4
. N
a
vig
a
tin
g
 crim
e a
n
d
 h
a
rm
Lo
w
 laten
cy
N
o
 vettin
g o
f 
o
p
s
N
o
 
cen
tralise
d
 
co
n
tro
l o
f 
n
etw
o
rk
N
o
 co
n
te
n
t 
ce
n
so
rsh
ip
a
p
p
e
n
d
ix
 f: re
se
a
rch
 q
u
e
stio
n
s m
a
p
 - crim
e
 
